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Abstract of Thesis
Russians overwhelmingly see themselves as part of Europe, yet appreciate their Asian
connection; there is a continuation of the 'Great Debate' between Westernizers and
Slavophiles. Decades of official acrimony towards the EC were followed by acceptance
of West European integration, if it did not involve Russia's isolation. After a period of
rapprochement with Europe, a feeling of betrayal has recently grown in Russia.
Nevertheless, the trend is for ever closer links with the West.
From the EU's perspective, Member States' conflicting views on the New Europe
hinder a united approach to solutions. The EU has gained a very strong position with the
collapse of the CMEA. The EU-Russia Partnership Agreement shows that vested
interests of EU producers often prevail, yet useful structures for political dialogue were
nonetheless created, and the prospect of a common free trade area is momentous. The
need for a new security structure is unlikely to be satisfied by NATO's Partnership for
Peace, but the EU has failed to lead European calls for a WEU or CSCE-based security
framework.
The inheritance of the command economy has damaged foreign trade and investment
conditions. Despite the transformation of the economy, much needs to be done to
improve investment conditions for foreigners as well as for potential exporters - fiscal,
export and property legislation must become workable, and the need to make a profit
must be respected. Nonetheless, foreign investment projects are growing fast. The
energy and aeronautics industries are used as case studies of the new possibilities for
foreign investors and Russian exporters.
Having long been aimed at restricting Russian economic growth, statecraft has become
an instrument of growth. The EU's assistance is particularly beneficial as it is non-
reimbursable and aims at long-term change through training, yet TACIS could be
improved by better management, smaller projects and lower wages. Overall, Western
investment in Russian stability should increase.
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- International Financial Organization
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- Institute of World Economy and International Affairs
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- Institute of International Economic and Political Research
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- International Monetary Fund
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Introduction
Structure of the Thesis, and Significance of the Topic
Perhaps the best way to appreciate the importance of the transformation in
relations between the USSR/Russia and the European Community/Union is to tiy
to remember what the reaction would have been a decade ago to many of the
achievements now realized. How would well-informed specialists have reacted to
suggestions of a Partnership Agreement with Moscow; of a preferential trade
regime for some Russian exports; of large-scale fmancing of projects for the
enhancement of Russian technology; or the prospect of a common free-trade
area? The velocity of change has been simply breathtaking. There is a great need
for studies such as this to attempt to stay abreast of developments, whilst
retaining some degree of historical perspective - not only to expand academic
research in this field, but also to better equip the West European policy-makers
who now have a chance to contribute to the success of true democratic reform in
Russia.
Condensed into one sentence, the hypothesis defended by this thesis is that
the rapprochement which has occured between Russia and the EU - most
especially during 1989 to 1992, although in many aspects still continuing at the
end of 1994 and beyond - represents a greater degree of closeness and
cooperation than has ever been achieved between Russians and West Europeans,
and that a return to Cold War levels of isolationism and antagonism is virtually
impossible. Clearly this has not been a smooth and monodirectional process;
there are many forces both in Russia and in the EU which have opposed such a
sblizhenie, and there have been many periods when these forces have been
relatively stronger. In attempting to defend my position, I have tried nonetheless
not to discard events and tendencies which have gone against the gradual
14
integration of Russia into European commercial and political developments. In
the words of Hugh Miall, 'elements of a new order in Europe are visible, but not
yet established, and elements of the old order are still in evidence. It is therefore
unlikely that any single paradigm will be wholly satisfactoiy in a transitional
period."
It should also be mentioned at this stage that this thesis focuses primarily
upon the period ending in 1994, although some gathering of additional material
and re-writing continued until May 1996. The 'Postscriptum' is added to test the
hypothesis suggested from the perspective available at the end of 1994, with the
benefit of hindsight.
In order to understand the momentum for closer relations between Russia and the
EU, it is essential to consider the debates among Russians on their role in Europe;
such is the objective of the first chapter. This chapter seeks to demonstrate the
following: (i) that the fact that the very optimistic period of strengthening
relations between Russia and the EC/EU from 1986 to 1992 was followed by the
disillusionment and relative discord of 1993-94 is not indicative of a definite and
perpetual move away from Western Europe, but rather yet another cycle in the
ongoing debate between Westernizers and Slavophiles; (ii) that despite this aspect
of continuity, reforms within Russia and the increase in access to people,
information and commodities from the EU have made a return to censorship and
protectionism extremely unrealistic; (iii) that the Russian government has viewed
relations with the EU at least as much as an opportunity to gain influence in a still
developing European structure, as a threat of being isolated from the rest of
Europe, this time with the CMEA countries on the opposite side; (iv) that
Moscow's worries about security in Europe do not reduce the importance of
relations with the EU, as the latter can assist in solving non-military aspects of
security, and in creating a new role for the CSCE or an entirely new European
security structure; and, in summary, that (v) what is most likely to prevail in
1 Hugh Miall, Shaping the New Europe, RHA, London, 1993, p. 19.
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Russian policy towards the EU is a gradual but nevertheless increasing political
and economic cooperation, rather than a definitive move away from the EU
through the curtailing of trade, cultural and social ties.
The shift in Moscow's policies to the West in general is compared with the
past record of Russian attitudes to Europe, concentrating on the post-1917 period.
The elements of continuity are compared to the elements of change in Russian
relations with Western Europe, to help predict how the relationship is likely to
develop in the future. The focus then moves to the metamorphosis of Soviet
policies towards the Community, and the reasons behind the relatively recent
willingness to cooperate. The benefits which Moscow expects from cooperation
with Brussels are detailed, both in terms of support for trade, and regarding the
use of the European Communities as a way into the institutional framework of
Western Europe. The degree to which Russian society has been Europeanized is
addressed, as well as difficulties that would be involved in any attempt to curtail
the availibilty of European goods, of European business partners, and even of an
increasingly European approach to politics. Finally, this section examines the
Russian perspective on the possible options for a new security structure for
Europe, and the resulting concerns and fears in Moscow which Western countries
cannot ignore if they want relations with the EU and other multilateral
organizations to become closer, rather than give way to ever greater mutual
suspicion.
This chapter should be a useful addition to the scarce literature on the
background to Russia's contemporary policies towards Western Europe, whether
in terms of politics, economics or security; in particular, it fills a lacuna
concerning Russian expectations with regard to the economic benefits of reaching
higher levels of interaction with the EU.
The factors driving the West European impetus for closer relations with Russia
are elaborated upon in the second chapter. This chapter suggests that: (i) the
consolidation and homogenization of EC policy towards the USSR, despite set-
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backs and conflicting approaches amongst member states, together with the
increasingly acknowledged need for the USSR to increase trade with the EC,
meant that Brussels could largely dictate the terms upon which the two sides
could agree to cooperate; (ii) although the ECIEU moved rapidly to approve the
Trade and Cooperation Agreement, and included significant political aspects in
the Partnership Agreement, the level of protectionism against Russian goods
which was retained was unreasonably high, and bound to cause resentment in
Russia; (iii) the prospect of establishing a free trade area between Russia and the
EU - a possible consideration from 1998, according to the Partnership
Agreement - is unfortunately veiy unlikely, as there are no reasons to believe
that the EU member states are inclined to move sharply away from the
protectionist attitudes which they have clearly shown thus far; (iv) the possibility
for the EU to play an active and positive role in the development of a new
security structure in Europe is unprecedented, on one hand because it can become
involved directly in the increasingly important non-military aspects of security in
Europe which affect Russia, and on the other hand by putting its political weight
behind either increasing the role of the OSCE, or developing a new structure
which could coordinate the peace-keeping and peace-enforcing activities of both
Russia and EU states' armies, which is essential if Russia's feeling of frustration
and isolation is to be reduced.
The influence of the varying and sometimes contradictory approaches of
the Twelve to the ECIEU's Ospolitik are considered, as are the effects of
internal conflicts on overall EU policy towards Russia. This section further
contemplates the reasons for the antagonism often evident when the West
Europeans' relative inclination to cooperate has clashed with American policies
towards Moscow. Also noted are Moscow's gradually more frequent and
insistent requests to establish official relations with the EC, and Brussels' never
hostile but always finn insistence that such an agreement would never accord the
CMEA too much political influence, nor afford the USSR entirely free access to
EC markets. Not only does this section go into detail of the December 1989 EC-
lntroducfioo	 17
USSR Trade and Cooperation Agreement, but it is also one of veiy few detailed
academic analyses of the negotiations for, and end result of, the June 1994 EU-
Russia Partnership and Cooperation Agreement. The implications of existing
security arrangements are explored, as are possible EU approaches to filling the
current vacuum and facing the challenges of the next century, especially the
possibility of closer cooperation with the OSCE.
The long term prospects of an Agreement can only be promising if that accord
secures significant mutual benefits. In order to ascertain the prospects for greater
economic interdependence to develop between Russia and the EU, the third
chapter examines the extent of economic reforms, and their affect on trade with
Western Europe as well as Western investment in Russia. This chapter intends to
demonstrate that: (i) the USSR has always been disproportionately dependent
upon trade with the EC, and that this dependence has increased even more since
the dissolution of the USSR; (ii) pushed by the inability of the old Soviet
economic system to keep up with the West's standards, Gorbachev de-
monopolized foreign trade, made dealing with hard currency legal, started making
the ruble more convertible, and initiated the privatization process, all of which
were sine qua nons for large-scale non-state trading with the EC; (iii) although
not improving the predictability of trading with Russia, E1'tsin did achieve
remarkable successes in the privatization of state enterprises, the full internal
convertibility of the ruble, the possibility to repatriate profits, and the
disappearance of a shortage economy; (iv) while the remaining disincentives to
EU traders and investors are great - especially the political, legislative and fiscal
complexity and changeability - trade with the EU has nevertheless gone from
strength to strength, as have Western investments into Russia, and these are
certain to expand exponentially if the above-mentioned risks are adequately
reduced.
Starting with a brief section on the main aspects of a command economy
which continues to affect Russian economic development to this day, the chapter
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moves on to Gorbachev's economic perestroika, and finally concentrates on
restructuring under El'tsin. The main subdivisions of these reforms -
privatization; macrostabilization and price liberalization; and ruble convertibility
- are all explored in terms of their affect on commercial dealings with the EU,
and this is followed by a section on foreign trade policy, as well as foreign
investment conditions. Clearly, the subjects discussed in this section are much
too broad, not to mention volatile, to be covered in any great depth in the context
of this topic, but they nevertheless form an essential part of this thesis.
Linked to this chapter are the two Appendices on the energy and
aeronautics industries. Both of these promising spheres of Russia's economy are
first examined in terms of their importance to Russia's foreign trade so far, and
the prospects for that significance to increase. The potential benefits of greater
cooperation with Western partners is then assessed, followed by some examples
of foreign entrepreneurs who have already managed to become involved in these
sectors, through joint production and/or trade. Documentation of the precedents
set by these pioneers of commercial cooperation with the new Russia is crucial, to
facilitate emulation by other entrepreneurs, whilst allowing them to avoid the
pitfalls. The importance of the EU's own involvement in these industries, mostly
through TACIS, is also discussed. These Appendices are based largely on
primary sources, from entrepreneurs with first-hand experience of the intricacies
involved in doing business with Russia.
The threat to the democratic reforms in the Former Soviet Union which is
constituted by popular anger at material hardship and economic uncertainty is
well recognized, as is the potential for Western assistance to reduce this threat,
albeit in a limited manner. Chapter Four seeks to show that: (i) the aid being
offered to Russia is a total reversal on previous Western policy towards Russia,
and one of the rare tangible signs of the readiness of the EU and elsewhere to pay
a price for more stability and prosperity in Russia; (ii) the assistance offered to
Russia has been substantial, but often benefiting the Western providers at least as
19
much as the receivers, and not infrequently overpriced and inefficient; (iii) it is
likely that the opportunity to appease public opinion through large-scale non-
profit-orientated aid has now disappeared, as the level of cynicism and
discontentment with reform and its Western supporters is now too high; (iv)
despite its failings, EU and other assistance has had many positive effects, not
only in terms of material support for new enterprise, but also in terms of setting
good examples and offering the possibility to many of the most influential
entrepreneurs to learn first-hand from Western businesses.
The vely fact that such aid has been politically expedient in Western
Europe demonstrates an acute change in the approach to statecraft, although this
section also considers the continuing debate between those who see aid as a
necessary tool for reform, and those who think it should be a reward for effective
restructuring. The evolving influence of the EU's statecraft towards Russia is
what this section concentrates on, especially the use of food grants, credits, and
technical assistance. The complicated and world-leading contribution of the EU's
technical assistance to the CIS (TACIS) is explored here in more depth than any
other available academic work, as the author considers its role to be potentially
vital, if its effect can be maximized. It is stressed that the type of assistance
offered by TACIS cannot be expanded to yield its full results in the short term, as
the knock-on effect of those trained by the EU will take time to be felt. The
mechanisms for coordination of Western assistance are discussed, as is the
increasing degree of joint action between the EU, the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development, and the World Bank Group. Finally, this thesis
also examines the possibility and desirability of an expansion of EU assistance to
Russia.
20
Methodolgy and Sources
As mentioned at the beginning of this introduction, this thesis supports one
overall direction, namely that Russia and Western Europe are, gradually and not
without important set-backs, becoming more integrated with time. In terms of
traditional international relations theory, this integrationalist position is situated
neither at the cynical extreme of Realist thought, nor at the opposing utopian pole
of orthodox Functionalist thinkers.
The schools of Realism (followed by neo-Realism, and sometimes called
the Strategist school), and Functionalism (followed by neo-Functionalism and
then post neo-FunctionaJism, and closely related to institutionalism) were
developed from an analysis of international relations based largely on the work of
Martin Wight. Wight based his theories concerning the dynamics of international
relations on the debate between three groups of thinkers: the Machiavellians, the
Grotians and the Kantians, which were sometimes referred to as respectively the
Realists, the Rationalists and the Revolutionists. Crudely, Wight saw them thus:
the Machiavellians were 'the blood and iron and immorality men', the Grotians
'law and order and keep your word men', and the Kantians 'subversion, liberation
and missionary men'. 2 Hedley Bull stated that Wight had overemphasized the
importance of the debate between the three traditions, believing that much of
what has happened in history cannot be covered by any of the three schools of
thought, and that Wight's strong assumption that there has to be a pattern in the
development of thought on international relations was not always substantiated.3
Yet Wight himself had written that these three traditions were merely paradigms,
to which no actual thinker did more than approximate, adding that 'in all political
and historical studies the purpose of building pigeon-holes is to reassure oneself
that the raw material does not fit into them'.4
2 Hedley Bull, 'Martin Wight and the Theory of International Relations' in International Theory -
the Three Traditions, eds Gabrielle Wight and Brian Porter, London, 1991, p. xi.
n,id., p. xviii.
Martin Wight, 'Conclusion - the Balance of the Three Traditions' in International Theory - the
Three Traditions, eds Gabrielle Wight and Brian Porter, London, 1991, p. 259.
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In the more contemporary argument between Realists and Functionalists,
the former tend to believe that the increase of state power, which occurs in a
relatively 'anarchical environment' with no effective authority existing to limit
this power, 'will always be the immediate aim of nations'. Die-hard Realists
believe that states do not trust each other, and that they will be more interested in
relative than absolute gains, thus hampering collective action. According to this
view, 'states will only establish an alliance under the circumstances of an acute
external threat or other powerful external pressures'. They stress the inevitability
of discord among nations, and the temporaly nature of alliances.5
Functionalists, on the other hand, typically see intrinsic value in
cooperation, believing that it is vital in an increasingly interdependent world.
One veiy important principle within Functionalism is the 'spill-over' concept.
This can be divided into 'functional spill-over' and 'political spill-over'. The
former reflects the belief that as one sector of a state's economy is integrated with
others, pressures mount for sectors related to the integrated one to also become
integrated, and so on. As more sectors are integrated, there is also overall
pressure for the dissolution of tariffs, for convertible or even common currencies,
and therefore for compatible monetary policies. Political spill-over relates to the
expected increase in pressure for integration as various sectors of society become
accustomed to interacting, and to dealing with the multinational centre, in both
cases coming to realize the benefits of the multinational approach.6
Thus it is clear that the position taken in this thesis is much more akin to
Functionalism than to Realism. However, the above descriptions of these schools
of thought are merely charicatures, descriptions of two extreme positions.
Exploring the extent to which Functionalist or Realist theories apply to all the
real-life policies and actions which are described in this thesis, and indeed
suggesting how these schools of international relations theory should themselves
be changing in view of the restructuring of the role of multinational organizations
Peter van Ham, The EC, Eastern Europe and European Unity, London, 1993, p. 6.
6 Stephen George, Politics and Policy in the European Community, Oxford, 1988 (reprint), pp. 21
23.
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in Europe, would be of great interest, but is beyond the scope of this already
wide-ranging thesis. The terms Funtionalist and Realist will only be used in one
context in this thesis, in order to simplify the explanation of the approach to
statecraft (in Chapter Four) towards Russia by certain policy-makers, to
differentiate between the varying expectations from assistance.
An inevitable problem with a thesis so broad in scope is limiting the areas which
are covered, even though they could justifiably be included. For Chapter One,
spending more time scouring various Russian sources for the changing
impressions of Russia's role in Europe was an unaffordable luxury, as was the
tempting prospect of designing and carrying out a small poll of Russian opinion
on the matter. The second chapter could unfortunately only give a glimpse of the
direction in which the EU could encourage the development of a new security
structure, with the military aspects of security being granted only very superficial
consideration. Chapter Three, on Russian economic reform and its implications
for relations with the EU, could never hope to be anything more than a
background chapter, the topics therein warranting at least a dozen doctorates by
themselves. In the final chapter, the Bretton Woods institutions could regrettably
only be discussed with regard to how the aims of their assistance compared with
those of the EU, even though detailed analysis of their projects would also have
been relevant. Other areas in which Brussels is not directly involved, notably
investment guarantee funds and Russian foreign debt relief, would all have been
closely related to the subject matter. In all these areas, detailed and up-to-date
studies would be very useful, and would complement this thesis well.
Of the sources used in the first chapter, two authors have been of particular
influence. Peter van Ham's The EC, Eastern Europe and European Unity was a
particularly reliable source of information, but most of all this first section has
much in cotmnon with the work of Neil Malcolm. Malcolm's 1989 Soviet Policy
Perspectives on Western Europe was an important source in the early stages of
research, and the draft chapter 'New Thinking and the Politics of Soviet European
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Policy', discussed at the RIIA in July 1991, was also of much influence. Perhaps
not surprisingly, considering this common background, many of the same
conclusions were reached in this thesis and in Russia and Europe - an End to
Confrontation? My indebtedness to Neil Malcolm is gratefully acknowledged,
although I would like to indicate that many common findings - in particular
seeing the recent debate on Russia's role in Europe as a continuation of the 'Great
Debate', and the belief that the Eurasians' less positive attitude towards the West
did not mean an end to Europeanization - were reached independently, before
Russia and Europe was released.
For the chapter on Brussels' attitude towards Russia, it must be admitted
that van Ham's The EC, Eastern Europe and European Uniy8 was again a most
useful source of reference. Perdita Fraser's work was also particularly useful, for
both the second and fourth chapters, providing an insightful perspective on some
of the Community's attitudes towards Moscow. 9 For Chapter Three, Leonard
Geron's Soviet Foreign Economic Policy Under Perestroika 1° was the most
comprehensive yet concise source on Gorbachev's economic reforms, whilst Alan
Smith's Russia and the World Economy - Problems of Integration' 1 was a
particularly useful tool for the analysis of Russia's own efforts to improve
investment and export conditions. In the final chapter, Peter van Ham yet again
deserves mention as an influential informant for the section on statecraft, this time
with his Western Doctrines on East-West Trade;'2 most of all, the passage on
statecraft benefited from Philip Hanson's Western Economic Statecrafi in East-
West Relations.'3
Neil Malcolm (ed.), Russia and Europe - an End to Confrontation?, London, 1994(i); also of
influence was Neil Malcolm, 'The New Russian Foreign Policy', The World Today, Februaiy 1994(ü), pp.
28-32.
8 PetervanHani, 1993, op. cit
Perdita Fraser, The Post-Soviet States and the European Community, London, 1992; and 'Russia,
the CIS and the European Community: Building a Relationship' in Russia and Europe - an End to
Confrontation?, ed. Neil Malcolm, London, pp. 199-223.
10 Leonard Geron, Soviet Foreign Economic Policy under Perestroika, London, 1990.
11 Alan Smith, Russia and the World Economy - Problems ofIntegration, London, 1993.
12 Peter van Ham, Western Doctrines on East-West Trade, London, 1992.
13 Philip Hanson, Western Economic Statecraft in East- West Relations, London, 1988.
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For the most interesting and innovative parts of this work, however, well-
established academic sources have been scarce. Apart from certain ECIEU
documents which have comprehensively and directly covered some of the issues
tackled herein (such as the Partnership Agreement, or TACIS Action
Programmes), the data have mainly come in small fragments, from very varied
sources. Some journals have provided penetrating and relevent articles; from the
Russian side, MEMO (Mirovaia ekonomika i mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia) and
Mezhdunarodnaia zhizn' (and its English translation, International Affairs) were
the most dependable, whilst the NATO Review, Soviet Studies/Europe-Asia
Studies and International Affairs (London) were among the most useful Western
journals. Many topics and events in the thesis were too recent to have been
included in the academic journals, yet were approached in bulletins or reports, the
RFE/RL Research Reports providing insightful articles, whilst the very broad
scope of Business Eastern Europe was of unparalleled assistance for the update
of the section on foreign trade and investment. Many other facts were only to be
found in newspapers, with The Guardian and The Financial Times being most
reliable in London, and Kommersant ' Nezavisimaia gazeta and The Moscow
Times being the preferred titles from Moscow. Occasional use has also been
made of news releases from news agency wires, for which the author is indebted
to journalist friends in Moscow.
As concerns primary sources, most of the documents used here were
accessed from one of four information centres. Many European Community
documents were obtained from the European Communities Delegation in
Moscow, and others were accessible at the London School of Economics'
European Documentation Centre. Many documents from the IMF, IBRD and
EBRD, as well as EC/EU materials, were available at the Department of Trade
and Industiy's World Aid Section. The author also benefited from access to
presentations and meetings with Russian politicians both at the School of
Slavomc and East European Studies (S SEES), and the Royal Institute of
International Affairs (R11A). Also very informative were the Chatham House
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discussion groups for the various chapters in Neil Malcolm's Russia and Europe,
which the author had the opportunity to attend. Much useful information was
also acquired through participation in conferences on legal cooperation between
the EC and the USSR, on foreign investment in Russian oil and gas, as well as in
the aeronautics industiy. Work carried out by the author on TACIS project
analysis and design, under the guidance of John Pilgnm of Pilgrim Associates,
offered a different and incisive perspective on the workings of EU assistance.
The vast majority of written material used for this thesis was gathered in
the period up to December 1994, after which the author was working in the Urals.
Although this has meant that the re-writing and updating of the thesis could not
include as many new published materials as could perhaps have been the case, the
author's position as Regional Representative for the Flemings Urals Regional
Venture Fund, established by the EBRD, has afforded a unique opportunity to
benefit from the perspective of very many enterprise managers and public
administrators in the Sverdlovsk, Penn and Cheliabinsk oblast 's.
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Chapter 1: The Russian Vision of Europe
1.1 Introduction
This chapter begins by examining the dynamics of relations between Russia and
Western Europe, especially since the Second World War. After looking at the
histoiy of ups and downs in relations between the USSR/Russia and the West, the
author questions whether the very rapid improvement and fruitfulness of relations
between Moscow and Brussels at the turn of the 1980s, and the subsequent
cooling of that interaction, are unique. Russian views on and relations with the
European Community under Gorbachev, the first Soviet leader to allow an official
relationship to develop, are then explored in more detail. How the Soviets
approach to the EU changed, and most importantly why it altered, is what must
primarily be determined. Similarly under Gorbachev's successor, the ebbs and
flows of both academic opinions and official policy on relations with the West,
together with underlying motives, are closely examined.
The focus of the following section is Moscow's reaction to European
integration throughout the second half of this century, underlining the dramatic
improvement which has occured in the last decade. Section 1.4 further examines
what has qualitatively and probably irreversibly changed in relations with
Western Europe, in a context not only of foreign policy, but also everyday
attitudes and freedoms. Quieter and often disregarded forces supporting refonns
are examined. Section 1.5 briefly depicts the distinct relations which Moscow
has with Bonn, and how they have affected Russia's readiness to continue striving
for close relations with the EC/EU.
Finally, the changing security situation from Moscow's viewpoint is
explored. The evolving nature of security concerns is addressed, as is the
importance of the reduced perceived military threat to Russia, most of all because
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of improved relations with the USA, which are therefore also summarized. The
need Moscow sees for a new security structure in Europe, and the options
available for such an organization, then follow. The author concludes the chapter
with the main findings from every section, and an overall judgement on whether
or not relations between Russia and the EU can expect to remain relatively close,
or whether they are destined to be re-frozen in the mould of the Cold War.
1.2 Russia's Role in Europe - the Endless Cycles of the Great Debate
The ambivalence of Russia's attitude towards Europe is as old as Russia itself. It
can be argued that the debate started in the mid-fifteenth century, when
Metropolitan Isidore returned from the Ferrara-Florentine Council of 1439, with
news that he and all but one of the other Orthodox patriarchs had signed a
declaration of unity. Isidore ended up fleeing from a Muscovy which largely
retorted that it would rather be ruled by the Turks than by the Roman Pope.' The
Grand Duke of Muscovy arrested Isidore in 1441, thus emancipating the Russian
Metropolitan from Constantinople. Yet when Constantinople fell to the Turks in
1453, there were some who expressed regret, believing that as part of
Christendom, Muscovy should have defended Christendom as a whole, whilst the
official church-state stance was that the Russian Church was now the only true,
unadulterated and living faith. The Polish-Lithuanian invasion of the early
seventeenth century also created a modest group of pre-Westernizers; a minority
of Russians, rather than criticize the invaders' non-Orthodox nature, lauded their
economic and political organization. It was this minority which attempted to
make Wiadyslaw of Poland tsar of all Russians.2
This duality became much more significant with Peter the Great's attempts
to Westernize everything from Russia's fashion to its armed forces, but it was
1 Nicolas Zernov, Eastern Christendom: a Study of the Origin and Development of the Eastern
Orthodox Church, London, 1961, pp. 126-29.
2 Iver B. Neumann, Russia and the Idea of Europe, London, 1996, pp. 5-10.
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only in the nineteenth century that it was to be clearly and academically
deliberated. This so-called 'Great Debate' between the 'Slavophiles' and the
'Westernizers' started in earnest in 1836 with Peir Chaadaev's 'First Letter', and
attracted most attention during the following three decades. On the one hand
there were the Westernizers, who wanted to see a much greater presence of
European influences in Russia, whether it be European art, fashion, philosophy or
industry, and on the other hand the Slavophiles, who detested Western
materialism and traditionally saw the value of Russia in the Russian Orthodox
Church, the 'Russian soul' and its special links with 'Mother Russia', as well as
in the role of the mir (council of elders) and the obshchina (commune). This
dichotomy, and the resulting conflicts, remain to this day.
It has been suggested that the adoption of Marxism as the governing
ideology in Russia should have given the Westernizers the decisive upper hand.3
Theoretical Marxism, seeking to really transfer power to the people, and aiming
to eventually eradicate the need for government, was certainly more democratic
than tsarist Russia. Even Lenin's long-term revolutionary plans were originally
Western-orientated. Karen Dawisha wrote that Russia was seen by Lenin as 'an
important home-base, safe-haven, hide out, and arms cache all rolled into one for
the European revolution'.4 Maksim Gorkii went so far as to write in 1918 that
'the Smolny government treats the Russian worker like brushwood - it kindles
the brushwood in order to see: will a European revolution be ignited by the
Russian bonfire?' 5 Yet even in terms of relations with the Western powers, Lenin
remained fairly conciliatory; the need for a peredyshka (breathing space) was a
common post-revolutionary theme. Vladimir ll'ich aimed not only at increased
foreign trade, but also at encouraging Western business concessions in Russia, as
extra insurance against war. 6 With the advent of the New Economic Policy, links
Karen Dawisha, 'Soviet Ideology and Western Europe' in Soviet Strategy Toward Western
Europe, eds E. Moreton and G. Segal, London, 1984, p. 21.
Ibid., p. 22.
Maksim Gorkii, 'Untimely Thoughts', (from Novaia zhizn', 5 Janualy [18 January OSI 1918)
New York, 1968.
6 Margot Light, The Soviet Theory ofInternational Relations, Brighton, 1988, pp. 26-29.
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with the West became particularly important, economic interdependence having
again (at least temporarily) been accepted. As long as Lenin was in power, the
Kremlin kept one eye to the West, whether for trade revenues, or in the hope of
exporting the revolution.
With Stalin's accession to power came a return to the old autocratic ways
of the tsars, which had been made easier by Lenin's own lack of respect for
democracy, such as the dissolution of the first Constituent Assembly, and the
harsh repression of opposition. The new 'tsar', who came to be famed for his
paranoia and persecution complex, saw only enmity in the West. He was
extremely un-European - he extolled the exclusive virtues of Russia, he
denigrated the consumerism and corruption not only of the European bourgeoisie,
but also of its proletariat, and pursued the ideology of 'socialism in one country'.
There are innumerable accounts of how damaging Stalin's intolerance towards
Western ways was for Russia's industrial, cultural and intellectual life. Under
Stalin, in the words of the Soviet historian Konstantin F. Shteppa, there developed
'a new Slavophilism negating Western influence, extolling Cheniyshevskii, Lenin
and Stalin at the expense of Marx himself. In his article 'On the article of Engels
'The External Policy of Russian Tsarism'" (1949), Stalin even criticizes Engels
for condemning Russian foreign policy under the tsar! 7
 Marxism was retained in
name, but in essence Stalin's policies steadily distanced themselves from Marx's
ideas. Although Stalin still echoed the term 'Peaceful Coexistence' first used by
Lenin, and continued to maintain workable relationships with some 'imperialist'
powers, his approach was much more cynical. The level of the Soviet dictator's
anti-Westernism was shown by his readiness to side with the Nazi dictator against
the major part of Western Europe. After unsuccessful attempts to cooperate with
Britain and France in face of the Nazi threat, Stalin settled for the Soviet-Nazi
pact - hardly appropriate for 'peaceful coexistence'. Although acknowledging
some dependence upon foreign trade, Stalin closed down all Russian subsidiaries
of Western firms. Under Stalin, cohabitation with the capitalists was presented
Karen Dawisha, op. cit., pp. 14-15.
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more aggressively, more as a result of Western weakness and fear of the USSR.8
Only in the last years of Stalin's power was there a slight increase in emphasis on
cooperation rather than mere coexistence, starting a trend of better relations with
the West, which Khrushchev was to continue.
It would clearly be an exaggeration to call this shift a return to
Westernism, however - a sizeable amount of Bolshevik hostility towards the
whole of the Western world, including Europe, still remained. Nevertheless,
Western Europe came to be seen in a relatively more favourable light. Stalin's
extreme anti-Westernism was being replaced by a more flexible approach. The
increased risk of war, and most of all the devastating effect on the Russian
economy of having curtailed trade and technological interaction with the West to
next to nothing, swung the Kremlin back into a more moderate position. What
changed with Khrushchev was that the references to Peaceful Coexistence
became increasingly frequent, and stark. According to Margot Light, Peaceful
Coexistence 'was no longer a tactic or even a strategy, but had become, with
proletarian internationalism, the principle on which Soviet foreign policy was
based'. Khrushchev also specified that Peaceful Coexistence was more than the
absence of war - it was the renunciation of war as a method of settling
international disputes. 9 Brezhnev's bid for power was even more closely
associated with détente, and he only achieved a strong majority in the Politburo
and Central Committee after convincing Party ideologues that more openness to
the West would not damage socialism domestically.'° Although using the term
Peaceful Coexistence less often, he achieved more concrete results than
Khrushchev in his first decade in power. The proof that the cycle had continued
towards increasingly pro-Western policies came with the signing of the SALT
agreement in 1972, and the Helsinki Final Act in 1975; there was also an
unprecedented readiness for cooperation in research and ecology with Western
8 Margot Light, op. cit., pp. 37-3 9.
9 Margot Light, op. cit., pp. 45-50.
10 Peter Shearman, 'Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917-1991' in Russian Foreign Policy Since 1990, ed.
Peter Shearman, Boulder, 1995(i), P. 17.
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countries during the early 1970s. 11 This relative détente was fragile, however -
its economic rewards had been veiy limited; it had not prevented the hostile 'twin
track' approach of NATO to 1NF negotiations (whereby the Atlantic Alliance
started preparations for the deployment of cruise and Pershing 2 missiles in
Europe, which could be stopped only by the removal of Soviet SS-20 missiles
aimed at Western Europe), nor the reluctance of the US Senate to ratify SALT II;
and the Helsinki Final Act had encouraged a troublesome increase in dissident
activity in Eastern Europe. It has also been argued that a greater emphasis on the
ideological struggle with the capitalist world had emerged in reaction to the
growth of the convergence theory in the West.'2 Economically, by the late 1970s
the West had much less credit to offer the Eastern Bloc in the aftennath of the
OPEC crises, and the high level of indebtedness of some of the CMEA states. 13 It
is important to stress that this period of détente did not result in any significant
access to Western goods, a much freer flow of information or new possibilities of
entrepreneurship for the population as a whole. There was no reason, other than
political, for popular opposition to a new Cold War.
Thus the Kremlin allowed itself, once more, to paint the Western powers'
actions in as dark a hue as possible, and became more willing to risk a re-freezing
of relations with the West.'4 This break-down in détente was an important factor
in Moscow's decision to intervene in Afghanistan, triggering a period of even
greater hostility with the West. As we shall examine later, both the Soviet Union
and many West European countries managed to continue forging some links
despite the renewed political hostilities between the superpowers in the early
1980s, but nevertheless, the undercurrent of East-West relations in the late 1970s
was flowing back towards the isolationism and antagonism of the Slavophiles.
11 Hemy Kissinger, 'Kissinger on Détente' in Major Problems in American Foreign Policy, ed.
Thomas G. Patterson, Lexington, Massachusetts, 1989, p. 632.
12 Margot Light, op. cit., p. 61.
13 Marie Lavigne, Economie internationale des pays socialistes, Paris, 1985, p. 52.
14 Peter J. S. Duncan, 'Soviet Policy Towards the Main West European Powers' in Gorbachev
and Europe, eds V. Harle and J. livonen, London, 1990, p.88.
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Already by the end of Brezhnev's leadership, though, there were signs of a
new shift westwards, as Andropov's influence in the Politburo increased. Yet
again, the isolationist and relatively anti-Western outlook of the previous years,
and the negative effect on the economy and on the likeliness of armed conflict
with the West, resulted in a return to more cooperative dealings with Western
Europe and its Atlantic partners. The new positive overtures towards the West
included the March 1982 moratorium on the deployment of SS-20s, and the 'no-
first-use' policy on nuclear weapons later announced by Brezhnev. In December
1982, Andropov offered a reduction in the number of Europe-orientated SS-20s
equal to any quantitative decrease in British and French missiles, if deployment of
cruise and Pershing missiles was cancelled (this initiative was rejected by the
Western powers).
In other words, by the time Gorbachev came to power, there were already
a few precedents of a more cooperative approach, of a less antagonistic
perspective. However, the new General Secretary was to ensure that this pro-
Western wave became much more all-embracing, and better publicized.
Gorbachev was to put himself firmly in the Westernizers' camp by talking about
'We Europeans'.' 5 Soon after Mikhail Sergeevich came to power, the Soviets
went back to START and 1NF negotiations. In August 1985 Gorbachev declared
a moratorium on nuclear testing, which lasted seventeen months; it was not
copied by Washington, but it did win Gorbachev much public support in the
West. In April 1986, Gorbachev again showed his awareness of West European
fears of Soviet conventional superiority, as he brought forward proposals for the
reduction of conventional forces from the Atlantic to the Urals.' 6 On the nuclear
front, Moscow conceded to 'asymmetrical reductions', and the historic
elimination of all land-based nuclear missiles with a range of 500-5,000 km.
followed by the agreement to include shorter range missiles. The demilitarization
of Europe continued further in December 1988, when Gorbachev announced a
15 Ole Waever, 'Three Competing Europes: German, French, Russian', International Affairs,
London, no. 3, 1990, p. 482.
16 Peter J. S. Duncan, op. cit., pp. 8 9-94.
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500,000 troop reduction in Eastern Europe.' 7 By the summer of 1990, the USSR
had agreed with eveiy East European countly (except with Poland, where there
had been disagreements about the necessary time-span) on a timetable for the
complete withdrawal of Soviet troops from what used to be its satellite states.
From late 1986, Moscow also changed its approach to the UN, putting much more
emphasis on the conflict resolution aspects, rather than defensively using this
body for collective security only; in other words, the UN was now seen as an
instrument of conflict resolution, not just a mechanism to avoid intervention.'8
This was most clearly shown in the USSR's support of UN intervention in the
Gulf War, and subsequent blue-helmet interventions, notably in the former
Yugoslavia and Somalia.
Gorbachev's foreign policy was also shown to be uniquely 'westernized'
through his endeavour to find solutions to non-military global problems.
Admittedly, already in 1976 Brezhnev had talked about global problems at the
Twenty-Fifth Party Congress, but no breakthroughs followed. Gorbachev
declared at the Moscow Peace Forum in 1987 that
Our world is united not only by the internationalization of
economic life and by powerful information and communications
media, but also in facing the common danger of nuclear death,
ecological catastrophe and global explosion of the contradictions
between its poor and wealthy regions.'9
This statement was backed by a readiness on the part of the Soviets to develop
nuclear safety together with Western experts, as well as enthusiastic participation
in conferences and debates on other ecological issues. According to Shenfield,
Soviet 'globalistics' started spreading in the early 1970s, but were to be
legitimized only in the early 1980s. Global problems have had a variety of
definitions, from being exclusively those problems which constitute a clear threat
17 Neil Malcolm, Soviet Policy Perspectives on Western Europe, London, 1989, p. 2.
18 Robert Boardinan, Post-Socialist World Orders - Russia, China and the UN System, New
York, 1994, pp. 89-94.
19 Stephen Shenfield, The Nuclear Predicament: Explorations in Soviet Ideology, RIJA, London,
1987, p. 60; taken from Moscow News, no. 8, 1987, p. 3 of the supplement.
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to human survival, to covering almost any problem which might benefit from an
international attempt at alleviation. Gorbachev's delinition of global problems, as
presented in a speech in Prague in April 1987, was rather broad, including AIDS,
terrorism, crime, drug addiction, underdevelopment, pollution and the threat of
war.20 The new priority accorded to these areas of concern has affected
Moscow's approach to security, as discussed later in this chapter and in Chapter
Two. This new 'global' approach to foreign policy was symbolic of the greater
importance attached to the effect of policies on the world at large; Eduard
Shevardnadze (then Soviet Foreign Minister) openly stressed the need 'to
correlate public opinion (in the West) with the foreign policy actions planned (by
the USSR)'.2 ' Clearly, this swing towards the Westernizers' pole of foreign
policy went much further than during any other period of Soviet government, and
had irreversible implications.
The change both in the perception of Western Europe and of its relation to
Russia, and in the approach to information and censorship, became irrefutable.
There was a gradual but overwhelming tendency in Soviet specialist writing, from
1985 until the beginning of the 1990s, to emphasize the high levels of cooperation
and understanding between the peoples of both sides of Europe. One
commentator stressed Europe's common cultural heritage, and realization of the
horrors of war, from the raids of Attila's Huns to the devastation of the Second
World War. 22 The historians lu. Borko and B. Orlov pointed out that from the
end of the seventeenth century, Russia started actively participating in many
aspects of European life. Both these historians agreed that after decades of self-
isolation, the Soviet Union was left with catching-up to do, both materially and
morally. In their opinion, isolation during the Renaissance and Reformation
periods may have been at the root of the violence and intolerance of Soviet mass
20 Stephen Shenfleld, op. cit., p. 63.
21 Gerhard Wettig, Changes in Soviet Policy Towards the West, London, 1991, p. 16.
22 A. Grigoiyants, 'Europe - Our Common Home', International Affairs, Moscow, no. 4, 1986,
p. 81.
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culture in the 1980s. 23 It was regularly stated that the Soviets share with Western
Europe a particular attachment to détente, due to their similar geographical
situation and experience of war.
At least until the end of the 1980s, opinions on foreign policy included in
academic journals such as MEMO and New Times could be expected to have
support in at least part of the Central Committee, or else high up in MID.
Although strongly pro-Western and anti-isolationist articles did not necessarily
reflect the view of the relevant decision-makers, they did show the dichotomy
which was by then present within the various foreign policy-determining organs
of Soviet government. Writing for the sake of truth and academic debate did not
start until the turn of the 1980s, at least in such established journals; until then,
the views therein were bound to be shared by some influential cadres. A more
diverse array of opinions was being printed in the second half of the 1980s, often
offering contradictory opinions and suggestions, because this reflected the clash
of opinions which reigned in foreign policy-determing bodies. The mere fact that
conflicting information could be published reflected Gorbachev's readiness to
widen the debate on foreign policy. This put the Foreign Ministiy in a relatively
strong position, where it could use its greater knowledge and expertise. At the
same time, the Central Committee's International Department became less
influential. 24 This change in itself made Soviet foreign policy decision-making
more similar to the equivalent process in Western Europe, and more influenced
by Westernizing tendencies. It would be wrong to say that unanimity had always
reigned in the higher echelons of Soviet power in the past; struggles had often
taken place. As Peter Shearman explains,
Leadership in the USSR was personalized, and in order to build
authority and power individuals needed to formulate programs
23 lu. Borko and B. Orlov (dialogue), 'Chto nam stoit obshcheevropeiskii dom postroit', ivIEMO,
no. 1, 1990, pp. 50-5 1.
24 Neil Malcolm, 'Russian Foreign Policy Decision-Making' in Russian Foreign Policy Since
1990, ed. Peter Sliearman, Boulder, 1995, p. 25.
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identified with themselves that would appeal to a winning coalition
in the Politburo and Central Committee of the CPSU.25
The difference now was that the debate, in fact the lobbying process itself; was
made more open to the public. This was to be even more the case in the 1990s.
Turning back to the intellectuals in the last years of the Soviet era, the
predominating opinion was that the artificial barriers between East and West
served no useful purpose, and that it was time to stop seeing Europe as divided
between socialism and capitalism. According to Orlov, the Soviets had not
reached socialism or even come close to its high levels of morality and humanism,
whilst the West had gone past capitalism, its working class no longer being
exploited, its democracy no longer serving only the middle classes, and it having
now developed an 'embryonic' level of social justice. 26 Also reducing the divide
between the two sides of Europe was a willingness by the Soviet Union to
acknowledge its diminished international political status. This new-found
modesty was prompted by the belief that to appear threatening was simply no
longer affordable, not only because of the amount of resources having to be
poured into the military sector, but also because of the lost trading opportunities.
The head of IMEMO's (the Institute of the World Economy and International
Relations) West European Department wrote that Moscow hoped to fulfill its new
primary aim in foreign policy, which was to integrate itself more tightly into the
international community, by going through the 'European window'. This could
only be possible if Europe did not feel threatened by the Soviet Union.27
Such concern to reduce West European apprehension about the Soviet
Union was clearly echoed by Gorbachev's government, and represented a vital
development in Soviet European policy; previously, argued Adam Ulam and
Hamies Adomeit, even when Moscow was trying to achieve friendlier terms with
the West Europeans, there was still a tendency to resort to threats regarding the
25 Peter Shearman, 1995(i), op. cit., p. 17.
26 lu. Borko and B. Orlov, op. cit., p. 56.
27 Vladimir Georgievich Baranovskii, 'Evropa: forniirovanie novoi mezhdunarodno-politicheskoi
sistemy', MEMO, no. 9, 1990, p. 9.
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consequences of non-cooperation.28 The Kremlin under Gorbachev instead
swallowed its pride and sought a smooth, friendly relationship with Europe.
An important aspect of this new perception of the relationship with
Western Europe was the much-talked-about 'Common European Home'. This
concept was veiy nebulous, however, and understood in various ways by various
people at different times. This is a predictable problem, partly because, as Orlov
and Borko point out, the notion of 'home' has different meanings to different
nationalities, be it a tent, a mud hut, an old wooden cottage or a gigantic concrete
apartment bloc. This may help to explain why attempts to find all-embracing
definitions became rather vague, for example: 'Home is a place where you are
understood, and you understand others, where residents show an interest in each
other, and where an atmosphere of accord and spirituality surrounds them';29 or
Deputy Foreign Minister Vladimir Petrovskii declaring that the establishment of a
Common European Home would support Kantian principles of international
relations, 'discarding stereotypes of disunity as it shapes a new system of human
relations on the principles of non-violence, solidarity and cooperation'.3°
Although the concept of the Common Home was included in the majority of
articles on relations with Europe in the late 1980s, there were few attempts made
to clarify what institutions and/or measures the Soviets would have liked to see
holding this home together.
It is not without reason that the concept of a 'Common European Home'
came to be heard less and less; although it was initially a major component in
Gorbachev's new approach to Western Europe, the subjectivity of the term, and
the discord over what the new home should or could look like, eroded the support
for this slogan for a new Europe. Alex Pravda has suggested that the need for
constant shifts in the Common Home ideal stemmed from the fact that the
Common European Home was conceived as some sort of scaffolding, bridging the
28 See for example Adam Ulam, 'Europe in Soviet Eyes', Problems of Communism, May-June
1983, P. 29.
29 lu. Borko and B. Orlov, op. cit., p. 49.
30 Neil Malcolm, 1994(i), op. cit., p. 160; taken from International Affairs, Moscow, March
1991.
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Western and Eastern blocs; with the collapse of the WTO, it was simply left
hanging. 3 ' By 1990 Russians seldom talked of Europe as a 'home', largely
because no two architects had the same pians, but perhaps also because the hope
of transcontinental domestic bliss had faded.
After five years in office, Gorbachev was far from his early days of
unchallenged leadership and traditional respect for the General Secretaiy - his
opponents were numerous, and vehement. Starting in earnest in 1989, as it
became clear that Moscow was to lose control of Eastern Europe as a result of
New Political Thinking, Gorbachev's opposition went from strength to strength.
By the sununer of 1991, the Chairman of the KGB was implying that Gorbachev
was helping Western intelligence services in their plans 'for the pacification, and
even occupation, of the Soviet Union under the pretext of establishing
international control over its nuclear potential'. 32 Soon afterwards, a group
including a deputy defence minister and the Deputy Interior Minister publicly
questioned how it happened 'that we put in power those who do not love this
countly, who enslave themselves to foreign patrons and seek advice and blessing
across the seas?' 33 After a period where the Foreign Ministzy's vision of foreign
policy went relatively unchallenged, in 1990-9 1 the KGB and the armed forces
were pushing for alternative approaches to relations with the West.34
Yet despite this harsh high-level criticism, which pushed Mikhail
Sergeevich to take certain conciliatory actions and appear somewhat less modest
and desperate in his appeals to the Western community, the basic direction of his
foreign policy remained unchanged. Gorbachev still hoped to be included in, and
supported by, the G7; he also met the then President of the European
Commission, Jacques Delors, in the sunimer of 1991, and showed a continued
desire to have closer links with the EC. No serious alternative to total
31 Alex Pravda, 'Soviet Foreign Policy Priorities Under Gorbachev: Europe and Beyond',
unpublished draft paper, presented to the RHA, May 1991.
32 The Guardian, 24 June 1991.
33 The Guardian, 24 July 1991; the deputy ministers involved were General Valentin Varennikov
and General Boris Gromov - their appeal was published in Sovetskaia Rossiia.
34 Neil Malcolm, 1995, op. cit., p. 25.
The Ruithn Vision of Europe	 39
cooperation and interdependence with the West had been put forward by
Gorbachev's entourage or the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs as long as they
were in power.
The transformation of Russia's perception and approach to Western
Europe under Gorbachev should be seen as more than just another high in a
constant cycle of relatively pro- and anti-Western policies; the level of
cooperation with Western countries and inter-governmental organizations was
truly unprecedented, and the openness to Western information and commodities
made a return to previous levels of isolation and censorship extremely unlikely.
With the failure of the conservative putsch in August 1991, El'tsin's rise to
power and the dissolution of the USSR, the tide of Westernism reached its highest
mark. As great as Gorbachev's need had been to reappoint a large proportion of
senior government and party cadres, and to seek the support of the inteffigentsia
and the media, if he was to succeed in his revolutionary endeavours, the necessity
for E1'tsin to do this was yet greater, if he was to succeed in the dismemberment
of the Union and the dismantling of the Communist Party. The support of the
West was seen as equally essential, not only to ensure that Russia would be in a
'no-threat' situation during those times of instability and weakness, but also in the
hope that the more radical economic reforms planned could be made to succeed.
In the early days of the new Russian government El'tsin fully supported his
Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, for example when the latter stated at a foreign
policy conference in February 1992 that 'the main guideline is to achieve inherent
compatibility with the world economy, in particular by joining the IMF and other
institutions at an early date', adding that Russia intended to continue along the
road 'leading from a cautious partnership to friendly and eventually allied
relations with the civilized world, including NATO, the UN, and other
structures'. 35 In fact, for the first time, the Foreign Ministiy became the only
body left to determine Russia's foreign policy, apart from the President's own
Andrei Kozyrev, speech at the Conference on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy at the Foreign
Ministry of the Russian Federation (26-27 February 1992), International Affairs, Moscow, April-May
1992, pp. 86-90.
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apparatus. The KGB was being reformed, a separate Minister of Defence was
only found (in Pave! Grachev) in May 1992, and the International Department
had disappeared with the rest of the CPSU.36
Both the President's and MID's positions were, in fact, arguably overly
pro-Western. Not because they ceased to be guided by Russia's national
interests, as has sometimes been suggested. Moscow has never ignored Russia's
self-interest - it had simply very dearly valued a high level of trust and
cooperation with the West. Once this trust and cooperation was seen to have
delivered only limited financial and security rewards, and once it became less
vital as the President's position became consolidated in domestic political terms,
the value of unconditional support to the West was reconsidered. The definition
of national interests at that stage was changed back to a position that was more
reminicent of pre-perestroika times, but by no means as strongly isolationist and
antagonistic. The problem was that the Russian leadership had joined most of
Russian society in overestimating what the West would do to help.
It was, clearly, unrealistic of Russia to expect aid on the scale of the
Marshall Plan (as explained further in Chapter Four), or to suddenly see all trade
barriers with the European Community disappear; however, it should not be seen
as unreasonable. Russia's expectations must be seen in context. After the
dissolution of the Communist Party's monopoly over politics, the freeing of
information and communications, the collapse of the WTO and Comecon,
widespread statements on new peace and cooperation, there was little reason to
disbelieve that anything was possible. In the West also, many had heightened
hopes for the future of cooperation with Russia. We have already noted
Mitterrand's plan for a Confederation of Europe; on the economic side, even
Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), said at the Lisbon Conference (May 23-24, 1992) that the international
community will have to find over $3Obn per year to save the reforms in the
36 Neil Malcolm, 1995, op. cit., p. 33.
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FSU. 37 In other words, Russia was not alone in overestimating what the West
was ready to do to build a new Europe with Moscow's full participation. Russia
was fully entitled to high hopes.
The reaction to the realization that both financial assistance and support in
the international forums would be much less than originally hoped was, of course,
very negative. Andrei Kozyrev declared himself
worried by how quickly a 'school of thought' has sprung up in the
West which maintains that it is better to have dealings with a
weakened Russia, left alone with its troubles. How Russia and its
problems can be isolated is not explained. However, this 'selling
short' of a power which is historically destined to be great is not
only unrealistic but dangerous [...]38
Already by the February 1992 conference, therefore, there were clear signs
of strong pressure to make policies towards the West less 'artificial' and
'idealistic'. For example Vladimir Lukin, the Chairman of the Russian Supreme
Soviet's Committee on International Affairs, stressed that although there was
some important common ground with Europe, Russia should approach it
realistically 'because it has interests of its own and is a scene of great changes.
Entering the scene there are new powerful forces of a traditional nature that have
both serious reasons to help us and very serious reasons not to strengthen us'.39
What was to become 'New Realism', as it has been called by Neil Malcolm, had
roots dating to Soviet days; the historian Mikhail Aleksandrov wrote in early
1991, for instance, that the concept of New Political Thinking was just as
nebulous and idealistic as that of proletarian internationalism, adding that 'it is
known, from the experience of history, that attempts to implement any ideology
on a global scale have always ended in failure'. 4° Even Andrei Kozyrev had
37 The Guardian, 25 May 1992.
38 Andrei Kozyrev, 'The New Russia and the Atlantic Alliance', NATO Review, February 1993,
p.4.
3 Vladimir Lukin, 'A Transfonned Russia in a New World', at the Conference on Foreign Policy
and Diplomacy (see note 35), op. cit., p. 93.
40 Mikhail Aleksanchov, 'Mit' i real'nosti "bol'shoi" ideologii', Literaturnaia Rossiia, no. 1, 4
January 1991, p. 5.
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denounced the 'utopianism' of Shevardnadze's foreign policy in 1991,' and in
February 1992 complained that the New Political Thinking reaction to the Cold
War 'gave way to another extreme that made us see all countries through rose-
coloured spectacles... '•42 Opposition to the pro-Western stance was building up
in numbers partly because forces opposed to the splitting-up of the USSR had
begun to regroup, through the new Russian Ministiy of Defence and the new
Russian successor to the KGB, the FSK (Federal Counter-espionnage Service),
and on a broader scale through the Russian Communist Party and the Liberal
Democratic Party.
By late 1992, overwhelming pressure had built up against the policy of
total reliance on the West and international organizations, for reasons examined
further on in this chapter. The result was that the massive swing to pro-Western
policies by the USSR and then Russia, having lasted barely more than half a
decade, was already reversing into a gradually more independent and antagonistic
phase.
The battle between Westernizers and Slavophiles acquired not only 'new' names,
but new positions; the prevailing debates came to be between schools known as
'Atlanticist' (or Euro-Atlanticist43) and 'Eurasianist' (or neo-Eurasianist44). As
with the 'New Realist' or other movements, however, any attempts to clearly
define the period of prevalence of Atlanticism or Eurasianism is somewhat
artificial. Already in early 1991, a senior advisor to El'tsin noted the
predominance of two main tendencies 'in the mentality of the peoples and
authorities of Russia' - European and Asian. 45 Another contributor to early neo-
Eurasianism stated that a greater orientation towards Asia would be natural, and
41 Neil Malcolm, 1994(i), op. cit., p. 164.
42 Andrei Kozyrev, speech at the Conference on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (see note 35), op.
cit., p. 85.
43 A term suggested by Mohiaddin Mesbahi, in 'Russian Foreign Policy and Security in Central
Asia and the Caucasus', CentralAsian Survey, vol. 12, no. 2, 1993, p. 182.
44 Ibid.
' Galina Starovoitova, 'Poimet li Rossiiu Evropa?', Demokraticheskaia Rossiia, no. 6, 26 April
1991, p. 10.
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indeed that the process had already started, as shown by the negotiations already
then under way towards the establishment of a Black Sea Council, and by closer
contacts with China, Korea and Japan.46 Nonetheless, the 1990-91 period was
still dominated by the remnants of New Political Thinking and the consequent
New Realism, and it is only in 1992 that Eurasianism started to be of real impact.
The changeability of the supporters of these various schools of thought is
likewise too often overlooked. Pleasingly tangible names of prevailing ideologies
suggest that they have their devoted followers who are sworn enemies to the
challenging movements, but in fact experts and politicians have been regularly
transferring allegiances. Sergei Stankevich, Russian State Counsellor on Political
Affairs, is an example of someone who was extremely pro-Western in the late
1980s, but who had become a leading light of the Eurasianists by 1992. Perhaps
the best example is the Foreign Minister himself, who has at various times been
labelled as both 'New Realist' 47 and 'Atlanticist',48 and has since 1993 shown
clear signs of certain 'Eurasianist' tendencies. It is helpful to remind ourselves of
the fluidity of the situation, and that these name-tags are only approximate
indications of main tendencies in attitudes to foreign policy.
The term 'Atlanticism' was in many ways a continuation of the New
Political Thinking, synthesized with New Realism. It is, of course, not to be
confused with the Atlanticism discussed previously by Soviet scholars, which
referred to the tendency for close links to be maintained between North America
and Europe. Russian Atlanticists tended to view the Western powers not as
adversaries, but potential partners in a new world order. 49 Part of that new world
order was often perceived by them as including a Westernization of the Asian
parts of the FSU, through the influence of 'an enlightened Russian big brother'.5°
46 VlaLlimir Ivarntskii, 'S Evropoi iii s Aziei?', Dialog, no. 10, July 1991, p. 80.
''' Neil Malcolm, 1994(i), Op. cit., p. 161.
48 Alexander Rahr, '"Atlanticists" versus "Eurasians" in Russian Foreign Policy', RFELRL
Research Report, vol. 1, no. 22, 29 May 1992, P. 19.
Ibid., p. 18.
50 Mohiaddin Mesbalü, op. cit., p. 183, quoting Evgenii Gusarov's article in Rossiiskaia Gazeta,
5 March 1992.
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Nonetheless, it was European Russia which was the main concern, as it not only
housed the majority of the population, but also of infrastructure, factories and so
on. In other words, it was European Russia that had the greatest chance of
making reforms work in the shortest possible time. 5 ' The success of economic
reforms was the key to the Atlanticists' reasoning - foreign policy was seen as
subordinate to this goal. This school also called for a rejection of imperialism,
and a renunciation of any ideological basis to external affairs.52
Eurasianism was not a new concept. It first emerged under that name in
the aftermath of the First World War and of the Russian revolutions, supported by
scholars such as Trubetskoi53
 and Savitskii. The Eurasian movement at the
beginning of the century was much more anti-European than its contemporary
namesake (in its mainstream form), and was also vehemently opposed to Western
colonialism. The original Eurasianists explicitly stated that they were the
followers of the Slavophiles and panSlavs.M
The main core of neo-Eurasianists in the early 1990s was more moderate
and open-minded to Western influence than were traditional Slavophiles. Many
Eurasianists wanted to maintain good relations with the West, mostly for
technology and know-how.55 They generally acknowledged the decreased role of
the military in establishing the international power hierarchy, and the increased
significance of the economic sphere. 56 This at least was the line of the more
influential Eurasianists - Stankevich, Ruslan Khasbulatov, Aleksandr Rutskoi,
former Secretary of the Security Council Iurii Skokov, and increasingly, Kozyrev.
This is admittedly a broad definition of Eurasianism, but it does still have at core
a desire to increase Russia's independence from the West, seeking to compensate
by increasing influence and interaction with neighbours to the East and South.
51 Andrei Zagorskii, 'Russia and Europe', Intern ational Affairs, Moscow, January 1993, p. 50.
52 Alexander Ralir, 1992, op. cit., p. 18.
53 Sergei Stankevich, 'A Transformed Russia in a New World', at the Conference on Foreign
Policy and Diplomacy (see note 35), op. cit., p. 99.
Mark Bassin, 'Russia Between Europe and Asia: the Ideological Construction of Geographical
Space', Slavic Review, vol. 50, no. 1, 1991, pp. 13-14.
Alexander Rahr, 1992, op. cit., p. 20.
56 Mohiaddin Mesbahi, op. cit, p. 187.
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Yet even this relatively moderate core of Eurasianism clashed in many
ways with previous Russian policy. The increasing coverage of their standpoint,
and most importantly the prominent positions held by the above-mentioned
politicians, clearly reflected a shift not only in academic debate, but in the
position of the most crucial foreign policy decision-making bodies. Very slowly,
the tide was retreating from the Westernizers' shore.
One of the earlier objectives of this group was to encourage closer
relations with the non-European republics of the FSU, whilst criticizing the
inordinate amount of attention and resources given to relations not only with the
USA and Western Europe, but even with Ukraine. 57
 As El'tsin's original attempt
to create a Slavic Union (with Ukraine, Belarus', even Poland and Bulgaria)
failed, it became easier to steer policy in this direction. The next main
Eurasianist target was policy towards the West. Although friendly relations were
still sought, the common stance was that there was too much emphasis on the
need to conform to Western expectations. By relying totally on Western ways
and norms, Russia would suffer greatly from her lower level of economic
development; Stankevich warned that 'for quite a few years to come, we will have
to settle for the role of junior partner'. In any case, he stressed that Russia has
been geopolitically distanced from Europe by the establishment of new
independent states between Russia and Europe, which created a need for the
'redistribution of our resources, potentialities, ties and interests in favour of Asia
and the Eastern sector'.58 Like the Eurasianists of old, the contemporary
movement started emphasizing a particular Eurasian characteristic of Russia; both
Stankevich and Vladimir Lukin stress the historic mixture of Orthodoxy and Islam
and the 'traditional Turkic-Slavic unity'. 59 This inextricable Asian side of Russia,
and the close relations it has held with many Asian powers, are behind the calls
for the Russian government not to align itself fully with the West, in opposition to
5 Alexander Rahr, 1992, op. cit., p. 20.
58 Sergei Stankevich, at the Conference on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (see note 35), op. cit.,
pp. 100-01.
5 Vladimir Luldn, at the Conference on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (see note 35), op. cit, p.
92.
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Islam. There were fears that Russian pressure to enforce Western standards of
human rights and liberal democracy, and talk of a 'Northern' militaiy alliance
between Russia and NATO, could alienate the Muslim world and China, and
perhaps precipitate a North-South conflict, which would be much more damaging
to Russia than to the West.6° Eurasianists saw Russia's role as that of a bridge
between Western and Eastern civilizations, 6 ' a unique player in global relations
as it can claim to be a part of each.
Eurasianists claimed to support reform, but with a much greater degree of
central control. In any case, they saw foreign policy not as an extension of
domestic policy, 'but as an equally important pole of an interdependent
dynamic'.62 The intrinsic role of foreign policy was greater than that perceived
by the Atlanticists. There was a renewed desire to show Russia's power and
maximize her influence; in the words of Evgenii Primakov, then head of Russia's
Foreign Intelligence Service, relations with China, India, Japan and the Third
World are as important as those with the West,
because Russia cannot be great, it cannot play the positive role it is
destined to in the absence of such wide geopolitical scope. In
promoting relations with all other countries, we must remember
that histoiy never nullifies geopolitical values.63
In simplified fonn, this is a struggle between those who still thought in
terms of Moscow's strategic interests being served by geopolitical strength, and
those who saw the health of the Russian economy, and a long-term elevation in
material standards, as worthy of sacrifices in geopolitical control.M
On the opposite side of the political spectrum from the Atlanticists were
chauvinist-populists under many banners - the 'Red-Brown' alliance, 'National
Patriots', and more recently 'Liberal Democrats'. The relative position of these
60 Alexander R.ahr, 1992, op. Cit., p. 19.
61 Andrei Zagorskii, op. cit., p. 48.
62 Mohiaddin Mesbabi, op. cit., p. 186.
63 Evgenii Primakov (Foreign Minister, at the time of printing), 'A Transformed Russia in a New
World', at the Conference on Foreign Policy and Diplomacy (see note 35), op. cit., p. 96.
64 Neil Malcolm, 1994(ü), op. cit., p. 31.
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two poles is closer to the original Great Debate. Like last centuly's Slavophiles,
these groups 'reject the increased use of markets, the spread of private property,
the opening up of the economy to foreign investment and the export of Russian
mineral wealth'. 65
 The selling of Russian raw materials to foreigners is a
particularly emotional issue, with articles seeking to increase resentment by
blaming the ecological destruction in Russia on foreign demand for natural
resources, or being particularly outraged at the exporting of Russian black earth
(the violation of Mother Russia not stated, but implied). 66
 These are relatively
moderate examples, compared to some of the xenophobic and anti-semitic
statements published in the extreme-right newspaper Den and a whole myriad of
lesser newspapers and leaflets being energetically distributed by supporters of
neo-fascist policies. Although the activists, and even strong supporters of the
more strongly anti-Western doctrines, seem to represent only a minority of the
population, 67
 the frustration caused by the present poverty and chaos (and other
factors, examined further on in this chapter) are widespread, and with it the
inclination to seek easy solutions and gratification. This was shown clearly in the
December 1993 elections, when Vladimir Zhirinovskii obtained a significant
proportion of votes (23% of votes on the party list, assuring his Liberal
Democrats a significant role in the State Duma). These elections also underlined
the extent to which El'tsin must now take account of public discontent, if he is to
minimize this protest vote in his own Presidential elections.
This, again, was a first. Public discontent with the political situation,
including the foreign policy of the existing government, could now result in the
government having to change its policies, if not be replaced altogether. The
65 Pekka Sutela, Economic Thought and Economic Reform in the Soviet Union, Cambridge, 1991,
p. 155.
Mikhail Lemeshev, 'Spasaetsia li zapad razrusheniem Rossu', Moskva, February 1993, pp.
119-20.
67 According to a poll conducted by the All-Russia Centre for Public Opinion and Market
Research (YrsIOM), only 5.7% of those questioned fully trusted Zhirinovskii, whilst 50.2% did not
trust him at all; this compared to 16.7% who fully trusted E1'tsin (Iavlinskii topping the poll with
18.3%), whilst 23.1% had no trust at all in the President (that figure being 12.5% for Iavlinskii) - in
Moscow News, no. 7, 18-24 Februaiy 1994, p. 3.
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coming to power of the Liberal Democrats would be particularly disastrous to
relations with the EU and the West in general. In 1993, the Liberal Democrats of
Russia were blaming the opening of borders and the squandering of resources for
the poor material standard of living of many Russians, and called for a cessation
of all 'solliciting' of credits from the West. 68 The Communists were not
exhibiting this sort of xenophobia in their pre-election campaign, but it
nevertheless seemed clear that the CPRF's call for the establishment of a foreign
policy which would 'respond to Russia's national interests and guarantee its
safety'69
 was intended to be interpreted in a manner very much less pro-Western
than that of El'tsin's team and Foreign Ministry.
Thus the balance of official policy shifted slightly towards the neo-
Slavophiles, with El'tsin's government putting more effort into relations with
Asian countries (with the exception of Japan, as the Kurile Islands will remain a
problem under Eurasian-influenced policies), and tightening up the CIS. It is no
coincidence that 1993 saw the re-inclusion of Azerbaidjan, and even enough
pressure to make Georgia join the Commonwealth. The enlargement and greater
integration of the CIS became a more important objective, and Russian control of
its periphery a stated goal (see 'The Security Dimension of the New Europe',
below). Russia's insistence on the right to intervene in neighbouring states with
peace-making missions is just one example of Moscow's new forcefulness in
foreign policy; other clear signs included the anti-interventionist stance on the
Bosnian war, the pressure to ease sanctions against Iraq, and intervention in
diplomatic conflicts in the Middle East and North Korea. This by no means
equated to a total shift to anti-Western policies by El'tsin's government; closer
cooperation with the West was still a clear aim, including joining GATT,
developing closer relations with the EU, and even becoming part of a 'G8'. Most
of the shifts of foreign policy were towards the 'Near Abroad', and seemed to
68 vladimir Zhirinovskii, Programma Liberal 'no-Demokraticheskoi partii Rossi I, Ustav LDPR,
pamphlet, Moscow, 1993, pp. 1-2.
69 Pravda Rossii, no. 6, 9 December 1993, from the CPRF's 'call to the electorate'; also echoed in
electoral publicity supporting a CPRF candidate for the State Duina.
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have reluctant agreement from Western governments. This was possible, despite
the overwhelming opposition to pro-Western policies in the State Duma, due to
the relative independence of MID, and most of all because the President and his
team have ultimate control in any case. On the other hand, the momentum
increased towards greater isolation and antagonism, supported by domestic fear
and strain. Even by early 1996, this tendency had not been reversed, although
neither had it greatly increased in strength.
1.3 Overall Shift Westwards
Having examined the cyclical nature of Russian foreign policy thinking, and the
shift away from an unambiguously pro-European approach since 1992, it might
be reasonable to expect the pendulum to move back all the way to the level of
anti-Europeanism of Brezhnev, or even Stalin. Yet this thesis argues that this will
not be the case. Both Russia and the rest of the world have changed enormously
since the days of the old Communists, and there is much to suggest that the
parameters of the Great Debate have shifted Westwards.
The very fact that for almost a decade Russians have now been able to
contemplate being a part of Europe is very important. The feeling of
'Europeanness' is compounded by an exponential increase in contact with the
West since 1985; for a majority of people, this includes articles in Russian
newspapers and journals, Western music, Western consumer goods available in
kiosks and shops, and perhaps most of all, Western programmes on Russian
television (including BBC news); for a large and powerful minority, there are also
personal contacts with Westerners in Russia, and foreign travel. One of the great
achievements of Communism, the high level of education of the Russian people,
has made it much less likely that most Russians could be duped into not arguing
inteffigently and forcefully for the continuation and development of desires and
dreams they have now experienced. The precedent of glasnost' 's freedom of
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expression is also a vital factor here. There is more to communications than
television (including foreign satellite television) and newspapers, of course: the
immense number of telephones, faxes, networked personal computers with
printers all make it virtually impossible to prevent contacts with Europe, and the
distribution of knowledge thus acquired. Wide-ranging and well-publicized
debate on all issues, including foreign policy, can no longer be halted.
The diffusion on a global scale of this communications revolution has led
to new heights of economic interdependence amongst nations. Russia's
dependence is all the greater for the loss of control over Eastern Europe, and
largely over the FSU states as well. Attempts at self-reliance would mean not
only greater material hardship and public discontent, but also a free-fall into even
lower levels of relative technological development. The domestic effect of
economic reforms is also easy to underestimate. Despite the many setbacks to the
reform programmes, an independent business sector has developed, consisting of
both new entrepreneurs and managers of state enterprises which have now been
privatized. Regardless of their backgrounds or politics, most of these
businessmen have a vested interest in maintaining a free and strong economy,
with the foreign trade that that entails. This private sector is constantly
expanding, and many experts argue that privatization has long reached the point
of no return7° (see Chapter Three).
Neil Malcolm has pointed out that the very style of political debate has
taken on a more Western flavour. Already we often take for granted the massive
change in the ideological basis of foreign policy (even if it was often no more
than a front) brought about by Gorbachev and Shevardnadze, by abandoning the
need to couch ideas in Marxist-Leninist ideology. Gone also is the nineteenth-
century black-and-white battle of two extremes; instead, the most influential
supporters of both tendencies are now rather centrist, agreeing on many issues.
An unprecedented degree of mutual influence and compromise has also had to
70 For example Richard Layard (economic advisor to the Russian government), 'Can Russia
Make It?', lecture given at the London School of Economics and Political Science, University of
London, 8 Februaiy 1994.
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develop between various organs of the legislative and executive authorities.
Perhaps the best indication of this is the 'Russian Federation Foreign Policy
Concept', adopted in the spring of 1993; this was a clear attempt to minimize the
differences between the Foreign Ministry, the Ministiy of Defence, the military
and Parliament. Increasingly, Russian foreign policy was becoming a
'compromise between pragmatically conceived longer-term interests and the
shorter-term interests of influential groups', 71
 in other words, much more similar
to what Western democracies are used to. As has been noted by Westernizers in
the past, the very passion with which Russia either attempted to imitate Europe,
or to reject and slander it, was a sign of its non-Europeanness; the recent tendency
to concentrate less on theories and more on real problems and interests indicates
that Russian statesmen may have become more comparable with the statesmen of
the West,72 for better or for worse.
The source of the most visible and audible objections to the Westernist
tendencies of Gorbachev and El'tsin should be looked at more closely. The vast
majority comprises pensioners and other low-income groups who have little to
offer to a market economy and do not have the support of a well-founded social
security service. Although the pensioners are powerfully represented in elections,
turning out at polling stations in much greater numbers than Russian youth, their
influence stops there. The only strongly anti-reformist sector of the population
which has tangible power is the military. The possibility of a military take-over is
something which El'tsin must be concerned about, and which explains best of all
his readiness to shift away from the Westernist pole of foreign policy. Yet the
likelihood of such a turn of events is very small, unless the President attempts to
maintain power against both the results of Presidential elections and the desire of
the military leaders.
Much of the support for reforms, or at least the opposition to a return to
isolationism and centralism, is largely silent yet strong. This includes the many
71 NeilMalcolni, 1994(ü), op. cit., p.31.
72 Neil Malcohn, 1994(i), op. cit., p. 174.
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young people, especially in large cities, who have found work (normally
involving trading, sometimes services, legal or illegal) which is well remunerated.
The author's experience suggests that few of these people vote. However, if the
possibility to trade freely or choose one's place of work became restricted, they
would have the example of August 1991 to follow, and force the authorities
through mass protests to again abandon attempts to turn back the clock. The
effect of this precedent is rarely emphasized, yet its importance is enormous. It
has largely contributed to a reversal in the mentality of young people from
thinking that the authorities could never lose power, to the present position where
most young people in populated centres do not think the prevailing authorities can
regain control to the same extent as previously. More importantly, there is a
widespread belief that they have a right to the relative freedom enjoyed at the
moment. The freedom of choice of commodities, the lack of queues, the
predictability of supply, the growing respect for consumers, the aesthetically
pleasing goods and retail outlets - all these would suddenly stop being taken for
granted.
This time, however, such protestors would not only be armed with bits of
wood and metal. The employers of the young people described above comprise a
slightly different class. Commonly also young, many of these 'New Russians'
started trading early, often finding ways to export raw materials as well. Others
merely exploited the real entrepreneurs through protection rackets. The majority
of new bars and cafés, shops and restaurants, even small investment companies,
are run by this type of 'biznessmen'. Many of these nouveaux riches have
developed very close relations, at a price, with whichever politicians or
bureaucrats whose approval they need for doing business, and whichever
government those chinovniki work under, their help can be counted upon. 73 The
world they deal in is ruthless, and the norm is for every such entrepreneur to be
3 The author has, for example, seen well-placed politicians in the Urals being heartily supported
by New Russian entrepreneurs. The politicians later lobby for them, and even supply Regional Budget
funding for their businesses.
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protected by many heavily armed guards. On a national scale, this represents a
whole army which would be ready to defend their right to make money.
Yet another powerful group which would on the whole not want to risk
losing their present economic freedom is that of the large enterprise directors.
Contrarily to most of the people described above, these men tend to be middle-
aged, were already successful under the Soviet system, and are also very well
connected. Although most of these were CPSU members in the past, in order to
climb to such senior positions, they would now be loathe to give up the financial
rewards, and the opportunity to use these rewards freely, which they have gained
in the last decade. Even if a Communist leadership were to come to power, this
group would largely push for free trade with the Western world to continue, and
the lobbying power of the large industrial directors is difficult to overestimate.
For all of these reasons, the author believes that the entire debate for or
against closer relations with the EU in particular, and the West in general, has
moved closer to the Westernizers' side. The context is not as it ever was before.
Near total isolation from Western culture, commodities, technology, business
practice and market opportunities, which existed before, is now truly improbable
- even if a new Russian leadership pushes the present 'Slavophile' wave still
further.
1.4 Moscow's Perspective on West European Integration
This section looks specifically at Soviet and Russian responses to integration in
the Western part of the European continent, and in particular to the process of
extending and deepening the integration of the European Community. The
unofficial and almost entirely antagonistic relationship between the USSR and the
EC before 1985 makes the high degree of interaction and moves towards closer
political and economic relations in the early 1990s all the more remarkable.
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Although it was only with Gorbachev that a truly positive relationship with
the EC could be established, the previous degrees of harshness of Soviet criticism
of the Community, and the reasons for it, have varied. There is a clear, though
inconsistent, degree of correlation between the cycles of pro- and anti-Western
feeling described in the first part of this chapter, and the variations in the
Kremlin's open-mindedness regarding the Community.
In the decade that followed the signing of the first Community treaties in
1951 (the establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community with the
Treaty of Paris), Moscow's reaction echoed Lenin's response to the proposition
of a United States of Europe in 1917, which he described as 'either impossible or
reactionary', and certain to collapse. The run-up to the signing of the Rome
Treaty showed that Khrushchev's particular emphasis on Peaceful Coexistence
with the West did not imply a great increase in tolerance towards occidental
institution-building. When concrete plans for the EEC and Euratom were
published in 1956, there followed a strong attack by the Kremlin, which instead
advocated an atomic energy organization controlled by the United Nation's
Economic Commission for Europe (UN ECE). 74 Just before the Rome meeting in
1957, the Six received notes from the Soviets warning against signing the Treaty,
stating that it would be a threat to world peace and stability, and proposing
instead an all-European economic cooperation organization under the auspices of
the UN ECE. Moscow warned of both American imperialist monopolies and
German revanchist forces. The fact that all EEC members were also part of
NATO, thus making it in Soviet eyes an aggressive anti-Communist sub-group
which complicated future European security, was pointed out by USSR
spokesmen.75 Moscow's onslaught on the EC continued after the signing of the
Treaty of Rome with IMEMO's seventeen theses 'On the 'Common Market" and
Euratom'. These theses most notably described the EEC as a redivision of the
' Christopher A. P. Binns, 'The Development of the Soviet Policy Response to the EEC', Co..
existence, vol. 14, no. 2, 1977, p. 244, from 'Zaiavlenie sovetskogo pravitel'stva ob
obshcheevropeiskom sotrudnichestve v oblasti mirnogo ispol'zovaniia atomnoi energü', Pravda, 14 July
1956, p. 3.
Petervan Ham, 1993, op. cit., p. 59.
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world in the joint struggle amongst state-monopolies for new markets, as well as
representing a concerted effort to reduce socialist influence, which was trying to
compensate for the 'deteriorating' conditions of imperialism; the Community was
seen as a tool of neo-colonialism.76
 Furthermore, the EEC was seen as an
American-sponsored project designed to weaken the position of socialism on the
continent, with the EC as an extension of NATO, and as a vehicle to allow
German rearmament. The facts that Euratom was to be financed mostly by the
USA, and that the enriched uranium necessaiy for nuclear generators would also
be provided by Washington, fuelled Moscow's fear that the EC would simply be
an American tool.77
The serious proposals for a European Defence Community (EDC) in the
early 1950s had not been forgotten by Moscow. Strongly supported by the
Americans (especially because of the Korean War, starting in 1950, which
seemed to confirm the inherent expansionism of Communism), and including the
re-establishment of German armed forces, these plans were to haunt Soviet
politicians and specialists long after the project was dropped in 1954. Although
many Western writers dismissed this as paranoia, the fact remained that proposals
for the resuscitation of an EDC continued to be heard, especially in West
Germany, which wanted an EDC linked with NATO. As unlikely as it may now
seem, even the British government was pushing for agreements on military
integration of the EEC in the early 1970s.78 Thus it is not unreasonable to
suggest that Khrushchev may truly have seen the establishment of the EEC as a
threat to security and stability in Europe.
Nevertheless, there seemed to be a lull in Soviet aggressiveness towards
the Community in 1958 and up to early 1959, as the American recession and
76 Christopher A. P. Binns, 'From U.S.E. to E.E.C.: the Soviet Analysis of European Integration
under Capitalism', Soviet Studies, vol. 30, no. 2, 1978, pp. 245-47.
77 Peter van Ham, 1993, op. cit., p. 59.
78 Christopher A. P. Binns, 1977, op. cit., p. 257; taken from V. Levin, Kommunist
vooruzhonnykh sil, 5 March 1973, pp. 81-85, and G. Kolosov and S. Madzoevsky, 'The Plans for
Militaiy Integration of Western Europe: the British Variant', International Affairs, Moscow, September
1973, pp. 52-58.
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British antagonism to the EEC contrasted with Soviet sputniks successfully
orbiting, and with Soviet growth rates also rocketing. There was a confident
feeling that Moscow could simply wait for the Community to collapse. At a 1959
IMEMO Conference on the Common Market, not only were the main points of
the Seventeen Theses repeated, but it was also stated that the EEC was not a
reality in the historic sense, and that it should not to be taken seriously.79
This confidence in the swift demise of the EEC was to be short-lived; from
1960, the Community appeared to be going from strength to strength, a trend
which Moscow sought to challenge. There were many applications for EEC
membership, including that of Great Britain, which further increased the
likelihood that the EEC-EFTA rift could be bridged. The earliest phase of EEC
integration had been fulfilled one year ahead of schedule (1 January 1962).80
This period also saw dissent amongst West European Communists, as the Italian
Communist Party began to admit that the EEC had played a vital role in Italy's
'economic miracle'. Adding insult to injury, the Italian CGIL delegation opposed
the USSR's stance at the World Federation of Trade Unions' executive meeting in
Budapest in May 1962, disagreeing that the EEC should be attacked, or that it
could not benefit workers' living standards. 8 ' The Italian trade unionists' reaction
was symptomatic of the feeling in the whole of Western Europe. In the words of
David Forte: 'it is difficult to describe the wave of confidence felt in most
Western capitals about the progress of integration during the latter half of 1962.
The Russians were also aware of it and the full significance of the trend it
forbode.' 82 These factors were most likely responsible for the propaganda
offensive against the EEC which occurred around this time. The Soviets
encouraged the World Federation of Trade Unions to promote labour unrest in
Western Europe, although to little avail.
' David F. P. Forte, 'The Response of Soviet Foreign Policy to the Common Market, 1957-63',
Soviet Studies, vol. 19, no. 3, 1968, P. 375.
80 Peter van Ham, 1993, op. cit., p. 63.
81 Christopher A. P. Binns, 1977, op. cit., p. 246-48.
82 David F. P. Forte, op. cit., p. 379.
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Moscow nonetheless continued to resist West European integration any
way it could. At the International Conference on Contemporaiy Capitalism in
August 1962, the USSR Academy of Sciences presented a new set of thirty-two
theses on imperialist integration, arguing that the original Soviet analysis of the
EEC's weakness and inevitable demise still applied. The thirty-two theses
received two full pages of publicity in Pravda, far more than the 1957 theses, and
this was only one of many articles published at this time on the subject.83
Paradoxically, Western optimism about the EEC provoked a positive response as
well as all the dogmatic criticisms; most interestingly, one relatively
accommodating article towards the EEC was signed by Khrushchev. This piece
spoke out against the inevitable collapse of the EEC due to imperialist
contradiction, yet accepted that great benefits were being derived from the
Community by its members; it acknowledged the 'objective tendency' towards
the internationalization of production in the capitalist world, and accordingly
perceived a need for greater socialist integration. Khrushchev apparently saw the
desirability of cooperation not only amongst socialist nations, but also the
possibility of closer economic cooperation both between individual states of
different social systems, and between their economic unions. In a speech to the
Central Committee in November, he argued that central planning in the CMEA
should be able to outdo what the market was achieving in the EEC.M
Thus already another cycle began to emerge which also influenced the
Kremlin's attitude towards the Community. Not only were the overall cycles of
Westernizer/Slavophile tendency pertinent, for example Khrushchev's generally
more concilliatory stance towards Europes both East and West, allowing East
European countries to conclude long-term trade agreements with the EEC;85 there
were also the ups and downs of Brussels' influence which often corresponded to
changes in the tone of official Soviet statements on the Community. Major
Christopher A. P. Binns, 1977, op. cit., pp. 248-49.
84 Ibid., p. 250, and David F. P. Forte, op. cit., pp. 381-3 82; both referring to N. S. Khrushchev's
article in Kom,nunist, no. 12, 1962.
85 PetervanHam, 1993, op. cit., p. 61.
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increases in the perceived power of the EEC could be met by either particularly
harsh attacks (for example, just before the Rome Treaty), or by extraordinarily
benevolent statements (after the inclusion of Britain and Denmark, and during the
preparations for the CSCE), or sometimes both, as in 1962. What is common is
the noteworthiness of the response, always denoting an increase in the intensity of
the discourse on the Common Market, and often a change in direction.
Conversely, when Brussels' influence as seen from Moscow declines, so does the
emphasis of government commentary, and there can even be a return to the
previous stance. A case in point is that six months after Khrushchev's article in
Kommunist, as the process of integration in the West had again faltered, there was
a clear return to anti-European dogma, and new life given to the infallibility of
imperialist contradiction. 86 We shall see that this tendency to react to shifts in
EEC clout, though by no means absolute, continues to play a part to the present
day.
In the first decade after Khrushchev was overthrown, despite lesser
emphasis on the doctrine of Peaceful Coexistence, there were many occasions
when relations between Moscow and Brussels seemed to be improving. There
was a further blow to the conspiracy theory that the Community was merely a
tool to attack the socialist world87 when specialists from IMEMO stated in 1965
that
the process of 'integration' (in Western Europe) [...] is an attempt
by the financial oligarchy to find a 'constructive answer' to the
objective needs of contemporary productive forces, which have
long ago grown beyond the possibilities of private property
satisfying the needs of production, and call out for the essential
shift to a higher system - socialism.88
86 David F. P. Forte, op. cit., p. 383.
7 Vladimir Baranovskii, 'The EC Seen from Moscow' in Russia and Europe - an End to
Confrontation?, ed. Neil Malcolm, London, 1994, p. 62.
88 'Mezhdunarodnye otnosheniia posle vtoroi mirovoi voiny', IMEMO, Moscow, vol. 3, 1965, p.
27.
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Although this article still alludes to the constant and conscious attacks on
socialism by Western Europe, it nonetheless portrays the Community as a higher
level of social and economic development.
The late 1960s and early 1970s again saw a strengthening of the
Community's international role, and again provoked a reaction from the Soviet
leadership. Many favourable statements emerged about the EC's role as an
instrument to defend West European interests against the USA; Moscow became
more optimistic about the future of the EC in world politics. In particular, the
European Political Cooperation (EPC) procedure, set up at President Pompidou's
suggestion at The Hague summit in 1969, was seen by many in Moscow as a
positive sign that the EC was acquiring more independence from the USA,89
contrarily to the early 1960s when any political integration was predominantly
perceived as being inherently anti-Soviet, and limiting Moscow's ability to play
off West European states against each other. 9° It was on this wave of relative
optimism that Brezhnev (in 1972) talked of the desirability of building 'business-
like relations' between the CMEA and the EC.9' Official relations between the
CMEA and the EC experienced a thaw at this time; after having ignored the
Commission and instead addressed the Presidency of the EC Council for a long
time, in September 1974 the CMEA Secretary Fadeev accepted the EC's offer to
negotiate by inviting the Commission's President François Xavier Ortoli to
Moscow. Brussels wanted instead to start negotiations at a lower level (not being
eager to encourage a consolidation of Comecon). Thus in early 1975 Directors of
the Departments of External Relations of both the Commission and the CMEA
Secretariat met; in this event, however, the high level of the EC delegates was not
matched by the standing of the CMEA representatives. Despite the lack of
success at the first meeting, the EC invited a CMEA delegation to Brussels to try
again, especially keen to achieve agreements on transport, statistics, economic
89 Hannes Adomeit, 'Soviet Policy Perspectives of Western European Integration: Ideological
Distortion or Realistic Assessment?', Millennium, vol. 8, no. 1, 1979, pp. 10-13.
9° View expressed by Vladimir Baranovskii, at a study group at the RIIA, London, June 1991.
91 Vladimir Baranovskii, 1994, op. cit., p. 63.
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forecasting, technical standards and environment - but the CMIEA failed to
respond to this invitation. 92 The ease with which these negotiations collapsed
reflected the return of aggressive superpower politics in the mid-1970s.
Even before the onset of Cold War II, a main bone of contention had
limited the impact of more pro-European tendencies - the possibility of Britain
joining the Community. This was partly because such a move would really
transform the EEC into a force to be contended with, as it was widely expected
that the other Eftans would soon follow suit, thus no longer leaving Western
Europe almost equally divided into two. At least as important was the fear that
Washington would start having more influence on the EEC through London.93
Moscow's vigorous campaign to persuade the Community not to admit Britain
was to be in vain, but with typical pragmatism, and aided by what still remained
of détente, the inevitable was accepted without preventing the above-mentioned
attempts at a CMEA-EEC agreement.
With the re-freezing of East-West relations, however, the Community
tended to be either ignored or insulted. The sharp deterioration in the EC's
economic situation, especially the OPEC crisis and recession, were used by
Moscow as proof of the Community's failure. Later on, in the early 1980s, the
Kremlin was worried by what it saw as the American counter-offensive to reassert
its dominance in Western Europe.94
Yet it was also during the early 1980s that the economic arguments for
integration started to become particularly powerful. Regional economic
integration, such as that of the EC, came to be seen as an intermediate phase on
the way to further internationalization, the next step perhaps being on an Atlantic
scale. It was generally regarded as positive, except by a minority of scholars
including Anatolii Shapiro 95
 and G. Sorokin, 96 who argued that the capitalist and
92 Peter van Ham, 1993, op. cit., p. 129.
9 mid., pp. 68-69.
94 Hannes Adomeit, 1979, op. Cit., p. 21.
95 Anatolil Shapiro, 'Bshche raz k voprosu o teorii vsemirnogo khoziaistva', MEMO, no. 3, 1985,
pp. 91-102.
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socialist world-systems were still economically 'incompatible and antagonistic',
and that it was therefore desirable to be as independent from capitalist economies
as possible. Other economists, such as Iii. Shishkov 97 and E. Pletntev,98 took the
middle ground, writing for example that, although there was increasing
interdependence between the economies of the two systems, they were clearly
distinct, and that the all-world economy 'is not a real organic economy but a
sterilized theoretical abstract', with objective limits to interdependence which are
dangerous to cross (perhaps meaning Polish debt). 99 Yet a growing body of
specialists, many also from IMEMO, saw the world economy as an integral unit.
The philosopher Fedor Burlatskii was one of the earlier proponents of this view,
writing in 1982 (in an article purportedly on China) that any contemporary
economy cannot develop adequately without close economic ties with other
countries, and participation in the international economic division of labour; he
also suggested that the economy should be set up in such a way as to be corrected
by economic, and not administrative measures.'°° This helped clear the way for
economists such as M. Bunkina and N. Petrov, who later criticized the concept of
two distinct socialist and capitalist economies, as taught to foreign policy and
foreign trade officials. They argued that the stage for the class struggle was now
the global economy; adding that the only way to achieve global peaceful
coexistence was to have international economic cooperation.'°' Such specialists
therefore joined the Europeanist ranks in warning against isolation from the
thriving West European market.
96 G. Sorokin, 'Problemy teorii vseinirnogo khoziaistva', Voprosy ekonomiki, no. 5, 1983, pp.
127-37.
9 lu. Shishkov, 'K voprosu o edinstve sovremennogo vsemirnogo khoziaistva', MEMO, no. 8,
1984, pp. 72-83.
98 E. Pletnev, 'Za politiko-ekonomicbeskii podkhod k kategorii vsemirnogo khoziaistva', MEMO,
no. 7, 1985, pp. 106-13.
Stephen Shenfleld, op. cit., p. 66.
100 Fedor Burlatskii, 'Mezhdutsarstvie, ili khronika vremen Den Syaoprna', Novyi Mir, no. 4,
1982, p. 224.
101 M. Bunkina and N. Petrov, 'Vsemirnoe khoziaistvo - ekonomicheskii fundament mirnogo
sosushchestvovaniia', MEMO, no. 9, 1986, pp. 56-57.
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Gorbachev truly revolutionized the Soviet approach to the EC. Although
the Community had been acknowledged de facto by the Soviet government in
1962 through Khrushchev's article, and then in the 1970s when there were
negotiations on trade agreements, it had never been treated as a potential ally.
The overwhelming Westernist current of the late 1980s, however, allowed the
above pro-integration economic theories to influence foreign policy, and
Gorbachev soon went far beyond treating Europe as a simple American
'marionette'. In other words, Moscow's reaction to this particular period of
strengthening of intergration in the EC was veiy positive and cooperative; it was
at least as remarkable and progressive as the signing of the 'Single European Act'
(1985).
In the same year Gorbachev went to the Council of Europe with his
visionary 'Common European Home'. With the strong emergence of New
Political Thinking, academics made much use of their new-found freedom,
usually in support of pro-European policies. The interest was all the greater as
the prospect of a truly single market (in 1992) neared. Yurii Borko described
West European integration as a mass phenomenon, supported not only by
bourgeois circles, but also by working class organizations and by the 'democratic'
inteffigentsia.'°2 In a new set of theses on the European Community in 1988,
IMEMO described West European integration as a progressive tendency towards
the strengthening of communications between states, and stressed its capacity to
exert a positive influence on relations between all the states of Europe, reducing
military tension and paving the way for mutually beneficial cooperation
agreements. 103
 The following year another important publication by Vladimir
Baranovskii's West European Department of IMEMO also put forward a very
positive view of the EC integration process, suggesting that it would allow Europe
to compete on better terms with the USA and Japan, permitting the Community to
achieve an increase of between 4.5-7.0% of its GDP by abolishing internal trade
102 Iurii Borko, '0 nekotorykh aspektakh izucheniia protsessov zapadnoevropeiskoi integratsii',
MEMO, no. 2, 1988, P. 37.
103 IMEMO, 'Evropeiskoe soobshchestvo segodnia', MEMO, no. 12, 1988, pp. 5-18.
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tariffs and rationalizing the division of labour, a reduction in inflation by 4.5-
6.0%, and an increase in the number of jobs by 1.5-5.0 million as a result of the
single market. These 'Three Theses' also acknowledged some of the negative
sides of West European integration. These paled, however, in comparison with
the expected advantages of the Single Market. Despite the lesser flexibility if
ever funding for the USSR could not be obtained through the individual EC
countries, there was still likely to be more credit available once it was centralized,
as the EC economy would in any case be stronger, and not least because the
Community's increasingly common foreign policy, with its emphasis on pan-
European issues, would look more kindly upon Soviet requests. Although
exporters of manufactured goods would find it more difficult, exporters of raw
materials would see an increase in demand, due to the increased rate of economic
growth in the West. The USSR had acquired a strong new partner in foreign
affairs, according to IMEMO. Not only that, but the integrated Western Europe
could be seen as all the more ready to then be joined to the Eastern part of the
Common European Home.'°4
By the end of the 1980s the CMEA was crumbling, and the European
Community was important both as cause and effect. For as long as the
Community has existed, it has had an effect on Comecon. We have already noted
that Khrushchev called for greater integration of the Eastern Bloc to compete with
Western Europe. As the number of trade agreements between East European
countries and the EC multiplied in the l960s, there was a strong incentive for
Moscow to keep a tighter hold of the CMEA states' foreign economic ties. It has
been argued that the main reason for both the revival of the CMEA in the mid-
1950s, and its further integration at the end of the l960s, was not a desperate
need to compete with the EEC, but rather a reaction to insubordination by
Moscow's East European partners.'° 5
 This was definitely a major factor, but it
must be recognized that this East European tendency to seek agreements with
104 IMEMO (West European Department), 'Posledstviia formirovaniia edinogo rynka
Evropeiskogo Soobshchestva', MEMO, no. 4, 1989, pp. 38-44.
105 Christopher A. P. Binns, 1977, op. cit., pp. 240-60.
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Brussels was a result of the Community's success and economic strength; in other
words, Moscow's concerns about the Community's economic and political
successes, and the worries about disobedience by its allies, were to a large degree
two sides of the same coin. All the same issues re-emerged in the mid- to late
1980s. There was another attempt to breathe new life into Comecon, partly to
keep up with the prestige and power of the Community, and partly to prevent
members from abandoning this alliance. A rejuvenated CMEA was often seen as
the foundations for the Eastern section of the new European structure. As late as
December 1989, Gorbachev suggested that the first step towards a European
economic area should be a mechanism of consultation between the EC, the EFTA
and the CMEA.'°6
By this time, however, counting on a strong Comecon was clearly against
all odds. Although the EC went from strength to strength whilst the Eastern Bloc
collapsed, it is remarkable that Soviet policy did not become defensive and
antagonistic overall; this time the result of greater EC integration, in terms of
Eastern Bloc cohesiveness, was to be the opposite of that in the 1950s and 1960s.
By the sunmier of 1988 the CMEA had signed a Joint Declaration with the EC,
and the USSR was soon to follow with a Trade and Cooperation Agreement in
December 1989 (see Chapter Two). Despite the incalculable loss of the East
European buffer zone, New Political Thinking still prevailed.
There was, of course, an increase in conservative opposition to the
passivity of Soviet policy towards Eastern Europe, as there was towards the
acceptance of the establishment of the Single Market. Nonetheless, Gorbachev's
government seemed to have come to the conclusion that ttying to create a fuss
over the Single Market would destroy much that had been achieved in improving
the Soviet Union's image in Europe, and would have been unlikely to have
achieved much in any case. The chances of rapid positive results of the
Kremlin's European policy had to be over-emphasized and the risks played down
in order to keep domestic criticism to a minimum, and to show enthusiasm to the
106 Gerhard Wettig, 1991, op. cit., p. 96.
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West. In 1990, the head of IMEMO's West European Department pointed out
that the imminent Single Market, the EC's increasing involvement in foreign
policy and the relative decline of the international importance of NATO all made
closer relations with the Community extremely desirable. Baranovskii added that
'there is more than enough basis to assume that the EC will increasingly become
the heart, the nucleus of the regional (all-European) international system'.107
This optimism about Europe was still reflected in government policy also, as
shown by the Delors-Gorbachev meeting in the summer of 1991, and the
negotiations for a more binding agreement between the EC and Russia.
The status quo was changed unrecognizably by the collapse of the USSR
and the emergence of the new Russian government as its successor; but despite
the growing tendency for New Realism in foreign policy, the approach to the
Community was left much the same. This is one of many indications that the
'New Realism' of this period was centrist in many aspects, and not as anti-
Western as foreign policy was to become in 1994, nor as defensive and/or
distrustful as hard-line Realism as generally understood in Western international
relations theoiy. During his visit to the European Parliament in April 1991,
El'tsin had declared his intention to 'repair a historical injustice' and to 'return to
the European Home'. Although the intensity with which El'tsin has pursued the
European goal has varied, the basic direction has not.
Attitudes remained positive about the Community even as it was about to
become still more integrated through the fulfillment of the Maastricht Treaty. An
article in International Affairs of March 1993 gave a vely flattering perspective of
the evolution of the EC up to Maastricht, and was positive about the changes
expected once that Treaty was enacted, stating that the increased powers of the
Parliament and greater number of issues decided through qualified majority
voting represented 'a shift towards intensifying the supranational character of the
European Communities'.'° 8
 Although noting the risk of greater isolation of
107 Vladimir Georgievich Baranovskii, 1990, op. cit., p. 13.
108 Valeril Gorskii and Elena Chebotareva, 'Maastricht and Russia', International Affairs,
Moscow, March 1993, pp. 46-51.
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Russia, they emphasize the stabilizing effect of the Union not only on West
European economies, but consequently on intra-regional trade, as well as the
likely increase in major pan-European projects in the field of energy, transport,
communications and human resources development, 'which are of great interest
to Russj'O9 The established Westernizer Andrei Zagorskii continued
supporting greater efforts to establish closer economic and political ties with the
Community, pointing out in the summer of 1993 that the EC is not only an
economic alliance, but the beginning of a West European political union, which
will soon include more neutral countries as well, adding that 'the degree of
Russia's future involvement in European affairs will greatly depend on how
relations between her and the EC will develop'." 0 This kind of pro-European
feeling was still expressed by the Foreign Minister as late as October 1993, when
he stated that 'Russia's choice is an all-European choice in favour of freedom,
private ownership and the rule of law'.' 11 It should be pointed out that despite
being much less unambiguously pro-integration with the EC than 'New Thinkers',
Russian New Realists have tended to recognize that EC integration is inevitable,
and that there is still much benefit to Russia to be gained from closer political and
economic relations with the Twelve (in this, New Realism differed from hardline
Realism as commonly perceived in the West, which would minimize dependence
on multinational organizations such as the EC). What had changed, as shall be
examined further on, was the level of hope and trust in Western Europe's
capacity, and even willingness, to help.
Throughout the post-Soviet period, domestic criticisms of Moscow's pro-
Western policies were greater than ever, following the shift to Eurasianism and
even nationalist-populism. The general shift away from the Russia-Western
world honeymoon was reflected also in attitudes towards the EC. Amongst an
increasing number of public figures, there has been ever-louder evidence of what
Baranovskii has called 'residual superpower complex'; they could not resign
109 Ibid.
110 Moskovskie novosti, no. 24, 13 June 1993.
111 Andrei Kozyrev's speech at the R11A, October 1993.
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themselves to Russia having to accept the role of mere regional power, on a par
with that of the EC, nor to attempts to limit its geostrategic power in order to
appease Western fears. The complaints examined above concerning the betrayal
of Russia's security interests, cheaply selling off Russia's natural wealth, and
granting the West control over Russia's affairs, have all been directed against
Europe. It is noticeable, however, that these attacks are almost invariably either
based on petty issues (such as the complaints about selling black earth, mentioned
earlier), or are very general and superficial. The attacks on the Community, and
Russia's attempts to form a closer relationship with it, have normally been
delivered by people with no real knowledge of Western Europe. There are two
main areas of serious complaint which are exceptions - the dangers of Russian
isolation, and the prolongation of EC trade restrictions on Russian exports; both
are detailed below.
The modern-day Slavophiles naturally abhor the idea of designing any
aspect of the new Russia according to EC blueprints; Russia should count on its
strong moral character and rich history, rather than follow plans which would
make of her a second-class nation and a colonial supplier of raw materials." 2
 Yet
it is not only the anti-Western camp which has warned against reliance upon the
Community's example as the best road to growth. One commentator, having
analysed the problems of Maastricht and found them minimal, nonetheless
discarded the idea of closely comparing the CIS to the EC, as the levels of
economic development are so different; 'here there is no market, the level of
technology is low and political culture is lacking'."3
On the whole, however, there has been much positive analysis of the
Community as a framework which could be useful to Russia. Valerii Gorskii and
Elena Chebotareva, for example, wrote that although the EC is obviously very
different from the CIS, the positive as well as the negative experiences of the EC
should be borrowed by Russia and her partners, not only for their own use, but
112 As an examp1e, see Mikh2il Lemeshev, op. cit, pp. 119-20.
113 Dmitrii Pogorzhelskii, New Times, no. 52, 1991, p. 30.
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also to assist relations with the Community. l14
 Elena Volkova wrote that
Russia's European policy is also of importance in resolving domestic problems,
as an analysis of the situation in Europe could help clarify and correct some of the
Russian Federation's contemporazy problems, or at least provide suggestions as to
how to solve them. She refers in particular to the question of sovereignty, not
only that of Russia over the other republics, but within Russia itself."5
Baranovskii confirms that in the first two months after the 1991 coup there was
much debate about the nature of the political union which should succeed the
USSR, and that the EC was a major influence in this debate - 'the EC model
now represented a kind of maximalist strategy for preserving the union'. In
particular, the concept of 'variable geometry' was interesting in the post-coup
period. Baranovskii added that the EC structure should be copied on a pan-
European scale in many spheres, to reduce the threat of violence in the same way
as it had been reduced in Western Europe." 6
 This idea of spreading the formula
of the Community, whilst implying that the EC itself need not expand, is shared
by Karaganov" 7
 and other top-level specialists. These calls to use EC experience
as a way out of domestic political problems in Russia remained academic,
however, and were not explicitly used by the Russian government.
For all the positive comments about West European integration, calls to
quickly become sufficiently compatible with the EC and to aspire to full
membership have been very rare. It has been suggested that Russia bring its
export standards up to those of the EC, 118 or even that the new legal system
should be comparable with those of the Community," 9 but only in the interest of
114 Valerii Gorskii and Elena Chebotareva, op. cii, p. 52.
115 Elena Volkova, 'Vneshnaia politika Rossü: evropeiskü kontekst', MEMO, no. 9, 1992(ü), p.
20.
116 VIajimjrBaranovskji, 1994, op. cit., p. 75.
117 Sergei A. Karaganov, 'Towards a New Security System in Europe' in Gorbachev and Europe,
eds V. I1arle and I. livonen, London, 1990, p. 44.
118 IMEMO, 1989, op. cii, p. 42— one of very many examples.
119 An overall theme at the 'Europe-USSR: Law and Cooperation' International Forum, 21-24
October 1991; but see for example A. I. Dolgova's paper 'Market Relations and Criminality:
Criminological Problems, Problems of the Transition Period'.
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greater and closer cooperation, not the actual merging of Russia and the
Community. It was clearer than ever, under El'tsin, that the rapprochement with
the Community could only go so far. Russia's Ambassador to the EC, Ivan
Silaev, admitted in August 1992 that Russia was not aiming at full membership of
the EC, saying that 'our economy is completely incompatible with what you have
in the European Community'.'2°
Accepting the inevitability of remaining outside the Commuity did not
mean that Moscow was not going to push for close cooperation, however. From
the beginning of the negotiations on the new 'Partnership' agreement, which was
to replace the Cooperation and Trade Agreement with the USSR, it was clear that
Russia was aiming at a much more far-reaching agreement than the Commission
was at first able to grant. As the EC has tended to be in the driving seat during
these negotiations, most of the details are dealt with in the next chapter. It is
worth emphasizing at this stage, though, that Russia was particularly looking for a
guarantee of the 'four freedoms' of goods, services, capital and persons.' 2' Some
of the more pressing problems caused by this were in the services industry,
especially over transportation and commercial satellite launches. 122 On specific
restrictions, the Russian Deputy Prime Minister Aleksandr Shokhin listed several
goods on which agreement had still evaded the negotiators in the fourth round of
negotiations (in May 1993): steel, aluminium, coal, uranium, textiles and space
technology.' 23 Russia was requesting tariff concessions on all of these exports.'24
Shokhin also expressed dissatisfaction at the proposed treatment of Russian
companies in the EC, although it was unclear why the Russian delegation was
unhappy with the official position of the EC, which called for EC companies
operating in Russia to have the choice between MFN treatment or that of national
120 The Guardian, 19 August 1992.
121 Europe,4 June 1993.
122 Kommersant", 1 June 1993.
123 Kommersant", 29 May 1993.
124 Europe, 4 June 1993.
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companies, and Russian companies in the EC to benefit from national trealment
in the countly of establishment.'25
The significance of this Russian drive to be accepted as a partner of the EC
is critical. There are few clearer indicators of the degree of pro-integrationalism
within the Kremlin at the begininning of the 1990s than the requests, at the risk of
embarassing refusals, to allow Russia free movement of people, money and
commodities within the EC. This clearly shows Russia's desire to be seen as a
fully-fledged member of the European continent. Although the drive for this
acceptance was to be weakened, and official statements to become much more
independent and defensive, the basic desire to become as compatible as possible
with Western Europe is still clearly present in early 1996.
Back in 1993, however, the frustration of fruitless negotiations, helped no
doubt by the general pressure to seem less dependent on Western Europe, resulted
in veiy angiy comments by the Russian authorities. The Minister of Foreign
Economic Ties, Sergei Glazev, stated that the EC's discriminatory measures
against Russian trade should be seen as a trade war unless they were soon
rectified. Glazev tried to argue that in foreign trade, disappointingly, Russia was
now more free-market than EC countries, as there were no longer any export
subsidies, and import tariffs were very low, as were the numbers of quotas.
Russia was nonetheless to take a further measure to avoid this trade war - a
declaration was soon to be delivered by El'tsin on Russia's desire to become a
full member of GATT. l26 As examined in Chapter Two, this would be a
tremendous boost to the chances of achieving a free trade agreement between
Russia and the European Union.
It is noteworthy that even on this most contentious issue of trade
restrictions, the more pro-reform organs were willing to see Brussels' point of
view. In a very conciliatory article, Kommersant" tried to explain the EC's
reluctance to open up its markets to Russia using a table exposing the following
125 Europe, 1 April 1993.
126 Kommersant", 27 and 29 May 1993.
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points: the EC's 1992 trade deficit of $90bn 127 with the rest of the world;
France's expected zero growth and Germany's slight decline, whilst the USA
expected to see a rise of 3.3% and Japan of 0.8%, and so on. 128
 Another
commentator lamented the obstinacy with which Russia was refusing to reach
agreement without achieving all its economic aims, thus risking the loss of very
important advances in political relations with Europe - 'Is it then worth delaying
the establishment of the basis for political interaction because of the unsettled
trade relations? Clearly, no'.129
The economic aspect of the negotiations was particularly difficult to
separate from the political ones, because what was in effect being called for by
the Russian government was the establishment of a new European Economic
Area, which would extend to the Pacific. This was not an old-fashioned attempt
to create a new system in order to weaken or even replace the Community; the
fact that Moscow needed Brussels to agree to the plan meant that the European
Union would remain the core of the new European economic arrangement. The
call for a pan-European free-trade area to start being established before the end of
the century was the most important part of the new agreement being negotiated; it
was the solution to Moscow's greatest worry about the new Europe - that it not
be isolated from it.
Ever since there was a likelihood of Moscow losing its East European
allies, the threat of standing alone against the rest of Europe has loomed large in
Soviet and Russian writing. Many writers believed that the strengthening of the
EC would go against the unity (tselostnost') of Europe.' 3° The possibility of a
Europe 'from Brest to Brest' was warned of by Borko and Orlov in 1990, and
concern was expressed about the balance of power in Europe.' 3' This latter point
had by then lost most of its validity, however, as the balance of power had
127 Throughout this thesis, a $ sign refers to US dollars, unless otherwise indicated.
128 Kommersant", 29 May 1993.
129 Andrei Zagorskii, Moskovskie novosti, no. 24, 13 June 1993.
130 Gerhard Wettig, 1991, op. cit., p. 95.
131 lu. Borko and B. Orlov, op. cit., p. 54.
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already been destroyed, and it is this dissolution of the previous balance of power
which had permitted the resiructuring of European institutions and alliances. In
fearing isolation of the then Soviet Union, however, Borko and Orlov were in
good company. Baranovskii noted the danger of a new 'fault line' of Europe
appearing at the Western border of the USSR. 132 Karaganov's wording of this
concern was that
there is the most undesirable possibility that 1992 will cement the
economic and even the spiritual base of the military divide in
Europe. [...] this could happen by default if the process is not
balanced by correctives, not only in niilitaiy, political, cultural and
humanitarian fields but also in the economic field.133
Volkova also expressed concern at the new polarity of Europe, between a wealthy
Western part and an Eastern 'grey zone',' 34
 whilst Gorskii and Chebotareva noted
that with an ever increasing part of Europe submitting itself to EC rules and
regulations, Russia may well lose much of its trade.'35
Contrarily to the many blatantly xenophobic attacks by extreme
nationalists on the rapprochement between Eastern Europe and the EC, however,
all the specialists quoted above have balanced the threat of isolation with the
opportunity for unparalleled cooperation with Western Europe. Paradoxically,
West European integration threatens to isolate Russia, but at the same time it
provides new hope for Russian input and interaction in Europe which had hitherto
been unthinkable. Still in 1993, many Europeanists saw deeper integration in the
European Union as a step towards greater integration on the continent as a whole.
The opinion that the consequent strengthening of the EU's economy may lead to
more trans-European investment has already been noted. Often repeated is the
positive effect of the stability of the Community on the rest of Europe (despite its
failure to prevent the Yugoslav crisis), and this would only be enhanced by
132 Vladimir Baranovskii, 1990, op. cit., p. 10.
133 Sergei Karaganov, op. cit., p. 46.
134 Elena Volkova, 1992(U), op. cit., p. 23.
135 Valerli Gorskii and Elena Chebotareva, op. cit., p. 51.
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further integration. Baranovskii strongly emphasizes the advantage of the EU
becoming a strong power in every sense - 'a more powerful EC could minimize
uneasiness in respect of the size and potential capabilities of Russia and reduce
the likelihood of it being excluded from European affairs'. 136 The need to make
every effort to improve relations with Western Europe (and even tiying to
encourage a cooperative approach towards the EU with FSU states' 37), and to
implement EU standards which would facilitate freer trade, are all recommended
by this group.
Although Russian politicians and diplomats have been on the whole much
less enthusiastic than the above academics, especially from 1993 onwards,
nevertheless the main direction of Russia-EC policy remained similar. It can be
argued that there was little choice. It seems clear that the Maastricht Treaty will
be, at least mostly, realized, and that the Visegrad Group will be able to join the
Union. Russian complaints would not halt the process. In economic terms also,
it would have been foolish for Russia to miss the opportunity for increased trade
and investment that would follow a closer Partnership Agreement. Thus, despite
the overall decrease in warmth of relations with the West, and strong pressure to
once again look the part of a superpower, Russia remained on good working
terms with Brussels, and might even enter a European Economic Area before the
end of the century, should reformers win the day. Although Russia's more
irksome behaviour in the last few years, whether on the international stage or in
the Caucasus, has shown a lesser degree of readiness to act exactly as the West
would like, Moscow has nevertheless wanted to build on existing successes
towards closer ties with Western Europe. At the CSCE Snmit in 1994, El'tsin
attacked those in the West who were giving up on the Russian democratic
process, and were ready to exclude Russia altogether from European integration.
In the spring of 1995, the suspension of the ratification of the Partnership
Agreement, and of the approval procedure for Russia's membership of the
136 Vladiiui.r Baranovskii, 1994, op. cit., p. 76.
137 Elena Volkova, 1992(ü), op. cit., p. 23.
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Council of Europe, caused very strong protest from the Russian government.'38
Moscow has by no means given up on the possibility of becoming a more integral
part of Europe.
1.5 Germany's Special Position
Germany has played a particularly important role as an advocate of greater
integration of Russia into Europe, and in turn Moscow has tried particulaiy hard
to keep relations with Bonn as positive as possible. Germany's approach to the
integration of Russia into European structures is explored in the next chapter,
whilst this section concentrates on Moscow's reactions.
The first real positive change in the Kremlin's attitude to West Germany,
and to the possibility of German reunification, came with Gorbachev's response
to proposals by the German President, Richard von Weizsäcker, during his
meeting with Gorbachev in July 1987. 'What happens in a hundred years' time',
said Gorbachev, talking about the possibility of reunification, 'history will
decide'. Almost imperceptibly, a massive shift had occurred. This was no longer
the theory of the 'diverging paths' of the two German states; it opened up the
possibility of preparing for eventual reunification. 139 The improvement in
relations was confirmed by the Soviet-German Joint Declaration which was
signed in July 1989, committing both parties to the 'precedence of international
law in domestic and international politics'. This did not mean, however, that the
idea of unification was not still met with hostility; in Paris in July 1989,
Gorbachev repeated that such hopes were unrealistic, whilst in a speech to the
Supreme Soviet in November Shevardnadze said that security and peace in
Europe rested on the existence of two Germanys. Yet in both these speeches,
138 Heinz Timmermann, 'RuI3Iand und Deutschland: Ihre Beziehungen als integraler Bestandteil
gesamteuropaischer Kooperation', Berichte des Bundesinstituts für ostwissenschafihiche und
intern ationale Studien, no. 39, 1995, pp. 15 and 22.
139 Fred Oldenburg, 'The Settlement with Germany' in Russia and Europe - an End to
Confrontation?,ed. Neil Malcolm, London, 1994, pp. 102-03.
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another way forward was suggested; Gorbachev stated that a solution to the
German problem could be found in a new pan-European framework, whilst his
Foreign Minister declared more specifically that Moscow could agree to changes
in the historical status quo if they were reached in a CSCE framework.'4°
Proposals not including a European structure, however, such as Chancellor
Kohl's 'Ten Points' plan, put forward on 28 November 1989, met with a veiy
negative response in Moscow.'4' In other words, Moscow wanted not only
general goodwill from the West in exchange for not forbidding German
reunification, but also wanted, in particular, to obtain a key place in a new
European structure. Avoiding isolation was the main priority.
When Shevardnadze conceded in May 1990 that intra-German and
European integrations did not have to coincide, this was conditional upon dual
membership, which was described as a neat way to begin cooperation, and
eventually the merger, of both organizations; there was also an insistence upon
the four powers maintaining their responsibilities in Germany until agreement
could be reached upon a new security structure.' 42 It is important to note that the
EC was not seen as an adequate security partner for the USSR because it did not
cover the whole of Western Europe. What Moscow wanted was a structure
which covered the whole continent, and wherein it would hold sway.
Such was the momentum towards reunification, however, that the Soviets
feared being presented with a fait accompli which disregarded the agreements
already reached at the Ottawa Two-plus-Four meeting in February 1990,
especially as the West German constitution could be seen to sanction the
assimilation of Eastern Germany. Moscow's criticism could only be constructive,
in order to avoid the risk of being totally disregarded. In the end, Soviet officials
cleverly made a virtue of necessity by starting to claim that a united Germany was
a pre-condition for the establishment of a Common European Home.
Shevardnadze said in June 1990 that the unification of Germany had formed 'a
140 Gerhard Wettig, 1991, op. cit., pp. 154-56.
141 mid., p. 157.
142 Thid., p. 163.
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load-bearing structure of the Common European House', and Gorbachev stated in
Bonn in November that 'Our concord and cooperation make up parts of the load-
sharing structures of the 'Common European House'.' 43 In the end, however,
Moscow was not able to secure any commitment to the building of a strong pan-
European structure around this pillar; isolation remained a danger. All Gorbachev
managed to salvage from negotiations on reunification was a reduction of German
troops by over 4O%, an exclusion of nuclear weapons and foreign troops from the
Eastern Lander, finality of German borders, and inaccessibility of nuclear
warhead delivery systems to German troops.
For many of the more conservative elements, the loss of East Germany was
the cracking point, whereafter they ceased to accept reforms. With the rise in
Eurasianism that followed in the 1990s, distrust of Germany's future role spread
to a wider base. Even the liberal Baranovskii asked whether the new disbalance
in Europe, with Germany as a superpower, could not in itself be a source of threat
to stability in Europe.' 44 The one supranational European organization which
was growing in strength, the EU, was also a disappointment to Russian hopes of
German containment. Faina Novak wrote that Germany dominates the EC to
such an extent that the 'destiny and pace of further integration largely depend on
its positions'; she adds that Germany seems to be finding the structure of the
Twelve increasingly confining, and is pushing for expansion eastwards.' 45 The
unspoken aversion to Germany regaining control over its former hinterland of
Eastern Europe, through the EU, was shared by Aleksandr Bykov. He warned
against granting too much influence to Germany, and said that Russia needs to
establish links with all main powers, so as not to restrict its options and thus
become vulnerable.146
143 S. Smol'nikov, 'Novaia logika evropeiskogo razvitiia', MEMO, no. 6, 1990, p. 28; and Soviet
News, 4 July 1990 and 14 November 1990.
144 Vladimir Georgievich Baranovskii, 'Neobkhodiinost' novykh podkhodov' (a roundtable of
specialists from IMEMO and IMEPI, on new security arrangements in Europe), MEMO, no. 8, 1992, p.
9'7.
145 Faina Novak, 'Russia and Germany', Intern ationa! Affairs, Moscow, no. 12, 1992, p. 112.
146 Alexander Bykov, 'Russia and Germany', International Affairs, Moscow, no. 12, 1992, pp.
116-18.
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At the same time, however, there were signs of a potential re-emergence of
the close 'special relationship' between Russia and Germany. Not all
commentators are negative about Germany's power; Andrei Zagorskii, for
example, deplored the two simplistic notions of Europe now prevailing in Russian
society, one of them being an exaggeration of the role of the new Germany.'47
Boris Shmelev stressed the potential for close cooperation between Russia and
Germany, singling out the Kaliningrad region as ideal for the establishment of a
joint Special Economic Zone. 148 In early 1993, it was reported that 'top foreign
policy advisers' to El'tsin expressed anger at Russia being sidelined in
international affairs, and stated that 'only Germany still has Russia's confidence'
and could allow Russia to stand up to the USA.'49 In a June 1993 poll conducted
by the All-Russian Centre for Public Opinion, only 4% of Russian policy-makers
and experts named the USA as Russia's number one friend, whilst 22% chose
Germany. 150
The overall trend amongst foreign policy decision-makers, however, has been
to remain somewhat closer to Germany than to other Western powers, but in a
multilateral framework. Statements suggesting an exclusive association with
Germany should be seen in the light of Russia's frustration with the international
community, and as an eventual hedge if Germany does break away from the EU,
but not a serious intention in the short- or medium-term. As Shmelev pointed out,
'it is already clear, in developing cooperation with Germany, that Russia
must take into account the interests of other countries and heed their well-founded
or groundless fears and anxieties'.' 5 ' Nevertheless, Germany is in a special
categoiy, and has so far been criticized much less than all the other Western
powers for its policies towards the East.'52
147 Andrei Zagorskii, op. cit., p. 45.
148 Boris Shinelev, 'Russia and Germany', International Affairs, Moscow, no. 12, 1992(ü), p.
120.
149 The Daily Telegraph, 3 February 1993, and The International Herald Tribune, 3 Februaiy
1993.
150 Moscow News, no. 2, 17 January 1994.
151 Boris Shntelev, 1992(ü), op. cit., p. 111.
152 Heinz Timmermann, op. cit., p. 29.
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1.6 The Security Dimension of the New Europe - As Seen From Russia
Although much can be achieved from closer relations between Russia and the
European Union, the issue of collective security is largely beyond the EU's
competence. However, security is an important issue regarding rapprochement
between Russia and the EU, mainly because this process would not have been
possible without the reduction in importance of militaiy might, at least between
Russia and Western Europe. As we shall see, another important factor is that the
definition of security itself has changed in the last 10-15 years, and the EU could
become a vital partner in tackling non-military aspects of security. This section
also argues that the development of possible alternative security structures has
allowed Russia to consider new approaches to a security equilibrium in Europe.
The very meaning of security has changed in the last decade, in Russia just
as in the West. In tandem with the globalist trend described in the first section of
this chapter, there has been a new emphasis on the ecological threat to European
security, especially the danger of nuclear accidents. 153 Also underlined has been
the menace of mass migration, and the need for a joint solution. The potential for
mass migration westwards is of course linked with economic cooperation.
Economic relations have become explicitly recognized as an important
component of the necessary European security edifice. The greater strategic
importance of economics, as the role of military power in determining
international relations decreases, is now widely acknowledged. With the
diametrically opposite directions taken by the economies of Europes East and
West, Iurii Gusarov has warned of the danger of the iron curtain being replaced
by the 'poverty border', lM which would damage yet further any chances of
153 See for example Boris Shmelev in 'Neobkhodimost' novykh podkhodov' (a round table of
specialists from IMEMO and TMEPI, on new security arrangements in Europe), MEMO, no. 8, 1992(i),
p. 96.
154 Juru Aleksandrovich Gusarov, 'Problemy evropeiskoi bezopasnosti v sozdaniia novogo
mirnogo poriadka' MEMO, no. 8, 1992, p. 108.
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establishing an effective joint security system. Baranovskii also shared the same
concern, seeing the growing polarization of European economies as one of the
main threats to European security' 55
 These areas of 'soft defence', concerning
economic and ecological threats to peace, are clearly ones which can be assuaged
by improved cooperation between the EU and Russia, as seen in the previous
section. The more traditional security problems still remain to be solved,
however.
The non-military aspects of security were most heavily emphasized around
1989-90, when the prospect of interstate war in Europe seemed particularly
unlikely. This new approach to security was made possible most of all because of
the improvement in relations between the USSR and its most feared potential
enemy, the USA.
The early days of perestroika saw a phenomenon that now seems rather
odd - Soviet international affairs specialists were warming to Europe, but still
being hostile and competitive vis-à-vis the United States. This was a period when
Aleksandr Iakovlev, for example, made his anti-Americanism very clear. Gemikh
Trofimenko, formerly a leading analyst at the Institute of USA and Canada, said
that when Gorbachev came to power in 1985, he shared Andropov's view that the
USA should be kept out of Europe.' 56 At that time, A. Grigoiyants published an
article which was in essence an attack on imperialists and a call on Western
Europe to avoid becoming dependent upon the USA, and instead to build a
stronger Europe.' 57
 Soviet Europeaiiists often stressed that if the relationship
with Western Europe could be sufficiently developed, the partnership could
survive an eventual deterioration of relations between Moscow and Washington.
It took a relatively short time, though, for Gorbachev to establish the
predominant principles of his foreign policy - encouragement of détente and
friendlier relationships with every country, but most of all with the USA. Europe,
155 Vladimir Georgievich Baranovskii, 1992, op. cit., p. 97.
156 Hannes Adomeit, 'The Atlantic Alliance in Soviet and Russian Perspectives' in Russia and
Europe - an End to Confrontation?,ed. Neil Malcolm, London, 1994, p. 38.
157 A. Grigozyants, op. cit., p. 87.
The Russian Vision of Europe	 80
as a security entity, did not prove itself to be sufficiently important to dislodge the
United States as Moscow's main concern. This meant that overtly anti-American
visions of Europe soon lost their media space, and by 1988 there had been a
complete shift in the emphasis in most specialist writing, where the USA was now
welcomed to take part in the formation of a 'new Europe'. Nikolai Portugalov,
not normally the most liberal of writers, stated in the summer of 1988 that
driving a wedge between the USA and Europe is an absolutely
unrealistic task and one which we cannot put to ourselves. As I see
it, without the USA, which will have its own 'penthouse' in the
common European home, security in either Europe or in other
areas is simply impossible.158
This view was supported by Gorbachev himself; when he said in his speech to the
Council of Europe in July 1989 that
[...] the USSR and the USA are a natural part of the European
international political structure. And their participation in its
evolution is not only justified but also historically conditioned.
Any other approach is unjustifiable.'59
Such an attitude was deemed necessaiy partly because too great a reduction of the
US forces in Europe would have made many West European states nervous and
veiy waiy of the USSR,' 6° and also because of what Karaganov calls the 'calming
European influence on US foreign and military policies'.'6' In other words, the
relationship with the USA had improved to the point where Moscow actively
wanted to be joined by Washington in a new European structure, not least to
avoid the creation of an exclusive West European 'Club'.
In terms of military structures in Europe, Russia has had two clear main
goals: to avoid NATO coming up to the borders of the FSU in Europe, and to
attempt to transfer some real decision-making power from NATO to other bodies
158 Moscow News, no. 25, 1988, p. 6.
159 Valery Giscard d'Estaing, 'The Two Europes, East and West', International Affairs, London,
RIIA, no. 4, 1989, pp. 653-58.
160 See also Elena Volkova, 1992, op. cit., p. 26.
161 Sergei Karaganov, op. cit., p. 49.
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in which Moscow holds sway, especially the CSCEIOSCE. Without such
possibilities, Russia's perspective on relations with the EU would have been
much more negative.
Whilst actual or associated membership of NATO became discredited as
an option for Russia, there was increasing emphasis on the prospects for closer
cooperation between NATO and the former Eastern Bloc, as separate entities.
Hopes of such interaction being possible were raised by the creation of the North
Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC) in November 1991, establishing a forum
for discussion and assistance between NATO, the then Visegrad Three, Bulgaria,
Romania, the Baltic states and the CIS. 162 Suggestions that NATO should use its
resources to set up information centres in Eastern Europe, to provide help in the
case of catastrophes, large scale migration, conversion, as well as in upholding
the commitments to the Helsinki Final Act, were all discussed at the December
1991 meeting of foreign ministers of NATO and the ex-WTO. There was also the
prospect of having permanent Russian representatives in NATO economic,
political, and even certain military committees, as well as regular meetings of the
defence ministers of all the NACC states, and yearly meetings of their foreign
ministers.' 63 It seemed, at that stage, that the idea of a Common Home from
Vancouver to Vladivostok might become workable after all.
Cooperation between NATO and Russia has already seen concrete results.
Russian senior officers started studying problems of military development in the
NATO military academies in Rome and Oberammergau (Germany) with
representatives of other countries in Europe, enabling them to acquire detailed
knowledge of NATO military doctrine and practice, and similar courses were
planned from Moscow's side, to be attended by members of all fifty-two CSCE
162 Fraser Cameron (Foreign Policy Advisor to the EC), 'The Future Relationship and Division of
Responsibilities Between the EC and the CSCE' in Redefining the CSCE - Challenges and
Opportunities in the New Europe, ed. I. M. Cuthbertson, Helsinki, 1992, p. 104.
163 B. M Khalosha, in 'Neobkhodimost' novykh podkhodov' (a round table of specialists from
IMEMO and IMEPI, on new security arrangements in Europe), MEMO, no. 8, 1992, p. 100; and Elena
Volkova, 1992, op. cit., p. 25.
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states. 1TM In the spring of 1994, the navies of Russia, the US and other NATO
countries held joint exercises off the coast of Norway.'65
In fact, however, NACC turned out to be insufficient, largely because it
was not offering membership, protection nor even a strategy to tackle violent
conflicts in the former Eastern Bloc. The Atlantic union's next attempt at a
rapprochement with the FSU, whilst simultaneously paving the way for East
European membership of NATO, was the Partnership for Peace (P4P - see
Chapter Two for more details). Russia's reaction to P4P has been veiy
inconsistent. Despite initial objections to any implication of future membership
of NATO for East European states, Moscow later acquiesced, on the condition
that future membership for the Visegrad Group and others be left as a
hypothetical possibility. In early March 1994, a NATO diplomatic mission in
Moscow was assured by Vitalii Churkin that the decision had been taken at the
highest level that Russia wanted to join 4I66 It soon became clear, though, that
this agreement was seen as a way of preventing NATO expansion 'from the
inside', rather than a real desire to strengthen this alliance; hence the refusal to
join in on two main Partnership for Peace programmes in December 1994 (see
Chapter Two).'67
Whether or not El'tsin's government ever expected this proposal to be
accepted is a debatable question, but in any case it was refused by Washington.
With Russia's growing antagonism towards NATO, this was predictable. From
late 1993 the message came increasingly bluntly from Moscow that it would not
accept NATO expansion into ex-WTO states; Kozyrev had said as early as
Februaiy that 'East Central Europe has never ceased to be an area of interest for
Russia'. 168
 It is commonly thought that El'tsin's statement in Warsaw on the
acceptability of Poland joining NATO was simply a drunken blunder; it was
164 Andrei Kozyrev, 1993, op. cit., p. 3.
165 The Guardian, 18 March 1994.
166 The Guardian, 3 March 1994.
167 The Guardian, 7 March 1994.
168 Suzanne Crow, 'Russia Asserts its Strategic Agenda', RFE'RL Research Report, vol. 2. no.
50, 1993, pp. 5-6.
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certainly quickly denied. The other main bone of contention between Russia and
NATO had been the latter's behaviour in the Bosnian war. With Russian
misgivings about sanctions against Serbia and UN no-fly zones having already
grown throughout 1993, the NATO threats of bombing the Serbs around Sarajevo
created an uproar in Moscow. Russian politicians of every persuasion were
united in opposition to NATO bombings. Although Russian diplomatic
intervention prevented NATO attacks around the Bosnian capital, the first
bombing of Gorazde, despite its very restricted scale, triggered bitter criticism
from El'tsin for not having been approved by Moscow; as a result he was said to
be 'in no hurry' to join p4p169 (it seemed clear by then that Russia would not be
allowed special status).
Just as in the case of American policy on international security, NATO's
attitude has exasperated Moscow because of its lack of cooperation with the rest
of the world community, and the UN in particular. In the case of Bosnia, the
harshness of Russian opposition to the proposed bombing of Sarajevo was due to
the fact that it was based on a NATO resolution, not one of the UN; the Russian
Foreign Ministry accused NATO of trying to usurp the authority of the United
Nations.' 7° When NATO fighters shot down two Serb aircraft which violated the
no-fly zone and bombed a Muslim ammunition plant, Russia supported the action,
as it was in response to a clear violation of a UN Security Council resolution.171
The case of Gorazde was different for two reasons: it was not unambiguously
sanctioned by the UN mandate, as shown by efforts to justify the bombing as
'protection of UN personnel'; more importantly, the lack of consultation with
Moscow caused an angry reaction. This is another reason why the Russian
reaction to the prospect of NATO being the basis for the new European security
system has become generally negative. In its criticism of NATO's action, it is
arguable that Moscow was not simply being anti-Western, but rather pushing for
a transfer of power to organizations in which it has a say.
169 The Guardian, 12 and 13 April 1994.
170 The Guardian, 11 February 1994.
171 The Guardian, 1 March 1994.
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NATO has avoided any real shift of power from itself to the CSCE; the
theoretical possibility of CSCE calling on NATO forces will be at NATO's
discretion as much as in the case of the UN. The support that there had been in
Russia for NACC tended to be for its role as a linking mechanism of the three
main elements in the CSCE process: the North Atlantic Alliance, the European
Union, and the ex-WTO. The way NATO has proceeded, however, has been
entirely different. It seems clear now that any expansion of NATO will be on
Washington's terms, and the resulting alliance will remain under American
control. This is supported by the reaction of the American Ambassador to
NATO, who said, when rejecting Russia's call for a special role in P4P, that 'we
wanted to make veiy clear that NATO takes its own decisions'.172
The fact that Russia finally accepted to join the Partnership for Peace in
early summer of 1994 shows that El'tsin's government has retained a large degree
of Westernism, despite the strong pressures from the supporters of more
Eurasianist tendencies. The desire to avoid isolation from Western security
structures affecting Europe was greater than the need to placate the neo-
Slavophiles. What it does not prove, however, is that NATO has become an
adequate foundation for an effective European security structure. Moscow's
decision to join P4P does not mean that the objections listed above have been
dropped; it is more likely to be an attempt to reduce the influence of P4P from
inside, rather than from Russia's traditional position as an outsider.
Moscow's continued opposition to full NATO membership for the East
European states brings a new perspective to the question of Russia's attitude
towards EU membership for those countries. Despite what some experts have
proposed,' 73 however, opposition to EU membership is by no means inevitable
simply because NATO membership has been countered. This is in part because
membership of the EU, especially as long as common defence policy remains
likely to be optional, is much less sensitive than membership of an American-led
172 The Guardian, 7 March 1994.
173 See for example Suzanne Crow, op. cit., p. 2.
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military alliance. Equally, the Russian reaction is going to depend upon the
extent to which an expanded EU is going to appear as pan-European, rather than
remaining a Western phenomenon. If a free trade area with the FSU is
strengthened at the same time as non-military membership is granted to East
European states, the progression may well be welcomed by all concerned,
especially if the EU plays a part in encouraging a pan-European approach to 'soft
defence' issues (for example through the CSCE, see below). The fact that not
once, at least up to the end of 1994, 174 has the President or the Russian
government directly opposed itself to the inclusion of the Visegrad countries into
the EU is extremely telling of Moscow's desire to maintain good relations with
the European Union.
The lack of an adequate Western response to any Russian proposals for a truly
joint security structure in Europe was one of the factors which prompted Moscow
into again concentrating primarily on the FSU. Russia had never fully abandoned
its military influence in most of the FSU republics, and by late 1992 that
involvement in the 'Near Abroad' was again on the increase. In the words of
Suzanne Crow, 'Russia's liberals underestimated the appeal within Russia's top
political echelon posed by Russian nationalism';' 75 there was a very important
section of policy-makers who still had to be convinced that maintaining a
conciliatory position towards the West was worthwhile. Amongst many,
especially in the military sector, the feeling of persecution and of a need for
buffer states was still present. This feeling was all the stronger for the impression
given occasionally by Western powers that Russia would have to remain
militarily alienated. The impression that Moscow is disenchanted with the West's
condescending approach to international relations was confirmed by Karl-Heinz
Hombies, a senior advisor to Chancellor Kohl, who reported after meeting with
senior advisors to El'tsin that 'I was told repeatedly [...] if the West wants to form
174 Even by the spring of 1996, the author had not encountered any such opposition being put
forward as official Russian policy; this is supported by Heinz Timmermann, op. cit, p. 12.
175 Suzanne Crow, op. cit., p. 7.
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a common security policy with Russia it must involve Moscow more closely'.176
El'tsin has expressed similar frustration about relations with the EU itsell his
press spokesman Viacheslav Kostikov stating during the Presidential visit to
Brussels in December 1993 that
Russia considers itself to be a great power and the successor to the
Soviet Union and all its might. Everybody clearly understands that
Russia cannot and does not want to wait in the entrance of the hail
of the 'European House' and to ask permission to enter.
To cater for this, in March 1993, El'tsin appealed to CIS leaders to improve
the Commonwealth's viability as a peacekeeping organization;' 78
 and a similar
call was made thirteen months later by Defence Minister Grachev.' 79 In an
address to the United Nations in September 1993, Kozyrev claimed that no other
group of nations 'can replace our peacekeeping efforts' along the borders of the
FSU. 18°
 By the end of 1993, there were Russian peacekeepers in Tajikistan
(5,400), Moldova (1,500), Abkhazia (950), and South Ossetia (600). The Foreign
Minister pointed to the successful record of Russian peacekeeping, stating that
there had been no hostilities in the Dniestr region or in South Ossetia for over a
year.' 8 ' The spring of 1994 also saw signs of Russia tiying to delay the
withdrawal of troops from Estonia and Latvia until after the agreed August
deadline, and disagreements over the control of the Crimea and of the Black Sea
fleet continued to threaten peace between Russia and Ukraine. Russia's new
Military Doctrine, approved by the Security Council and by the President in
November 1993, legitimized Moscow's new determination to keep troops in the
176 The Daily Telegraph, 3 Februaiy 1993.
177 Suzanne Crow, op. cit., p. 2; from ITAR-TASS, 8 December 1993.
178 Suzanne Crow, op. cit., p. 4.
179 The Guardian, 19 April 1994.
180 International Herald Tribune, 30 September 1993; the same argument was defended at
KoZYrev'$ speech to the Royal Institute of International Affairs, 27 October 1993.
181 Andrei Kozyrev, 'Russia's Peacekeeping: There are no Easy Solutions', New Times, no. 4,
1994, pp. 16-17.
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'Near Abroad', as well as its resolve in preventing any militaiy build-up on its
borders.'82
The change in Moscow's attitude to its neighbouring states is an important
one; the CIS is now going to have to be considered a regional security
organization within the broader European security framework. Although it has
attracted much attention in the Western press, however, Russia's recent quasi-
imperialist policies do not denote a total shift away from the West. Most of the
new Russian influence in the FSU has been achieved not by outright force, but by
'geopolitical manoeuvring',' 83 exploiting the economic or defence weakness of its
neighbours to be welcomed back. In all cases apart from Moldova, Russian
peacekeeping troops were invited by the host countly. The most blatant
exception to the relatively controlled and responsible Russian attempts to regain
influence occured within the Federation itself The military intervention in the
Chechnian Autonomous Republic, which started in December 1994, is the low
point reached, at least so far, in Russia's disregard for European Union opinion.
It was caused largely by domestic pressure to stop the secessionist drive in
Chechnia, not least in fear of it spreading to other areas. On the other hand, it
was permitted to happen because of the level of disillusionment and
dissatisfaction with the West's attempts to integrate Russia, and to help its reform
process. As noted above, however, the negative EU reaction was far from
ignored. The Western reaction to Chechnia will be examined in the next chapter.
In order to deal with the new security situation in the FSU and the rest of Europe,
and to maximize its own role at the same time, Moscow had suggested adapting
some of the UN's approaches to peacekeeping. One of the propositions has been
for a greater role to be played by regional organizations, which could lighten the
UN's burden by accepting responsibility for peacekeeping operations in their
area, under UN auspices; predictably, the CIS was used as an example. Kozyrev
182 'The Militaiy Doctrine of the Russian Federation', Jane 's Intelligence Review - Special
Report, no. 1, January 1994, pp. 7-8.
183 Siiznne Crow, op. cit., p. 1.
The Ruithn VWoa& of Europe	 88
further reiterated suggestions that the UN should link peacekeeping operations
with the protection of human rights, especially those of ethnic minorities;' 84
 this
proposal is likely to be linked to the desire to protect Russians in other republics,
or even to use them as an excuse for intervention. The experience in Checbnia
has ensured that the human rights aspect of influence of the UN, or any other
international organization tiying to deal within Russia, not be taken seriously for
a long time to come.
Even before the Chechnian war, hopes of UN assistance were minimal.
Russia had to push hard to increase the number of observers the UN was willing
to send to Abkhazia from 8-12 to 80, and only 20 had arrived by the time the
cease-fire was disrupted two months after the request.' 85 If observers were hard
to acquire, Russia was likely to have to look elsewhere for financial and other
support for full-scale peacekeeping. In any case, the UN's stature has been badly
damaged by its performance in Bosnia, both in the eyes of Russia and of the rest
of Europe.
The Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) has been,
overall, the institution which has had by far the most Russian support as the basis
for a new security structure for Europe. Partly because the Helsinki process was
largely a Soviet initiative, but mostly because it is the only alternative (for Russia)
to NATO and American dominance of European security, Moscow's desire to
increase the CSCE's influence has been a recurring theme ever since the 1975
Helsinki Conference. Some Western specialists have even suggested that part of
the reasoning for the drive for a 'Common European Home' was to rejuvenate the
'flagging' CSCE. l86
 At the time of German reunification, there were clear links
between Russian approval and suggestions of a greater role being assigned to the
CSCE. The optimism about the CSCE at the end of the 1980s is only slightly
184 Ibid., p. 18.
185 Ibid.
186 Alex Pravda, op. cit., p. 5.
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overemphasized by Borko and Orlov's statement: 'the 'Yalta" Europe has
outhved its useful life. The "Helsinki" Europe is now being born'.187
There was indeed some basis for optimism, as many of the early Soviet
requests for the strengthening of the CSCE were approved and put into practice.
At the November 1990 CSCE summit in Paris, Shevardnadze's plan for a conflict
prevention centre was agreed upon, as well as a CSCE Council of Ministers for
Foreign Affairs.' 88 Moscow had also strongly supported the opening of the
CSCE Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODifiR) in Warsaw,
and the establishment of the post of High Commissioner on National
Minorities.' 89
 These institutions have already shown themselves to be beneficial,
especially the annual summit of CSCE Foreign Ministers; but the lack of further
progress has been disappointing to Moscow. All the excitement and publicity
surrounding the 1990 Paris summit of the CSCE have led to relatively little.
Mitterrand' s vague notion of a Confederation of Europe, first based on the EC but
then progressing to the Helsinki process as its basis, was never to be attempted,
despite Shevardnadze's support.' 9° The CSCE, although having become an
institution rather than a process, was still a paper tiger.
The CSCE's failings, and the lack of Western support for it, were widely
acknowledged. Iurii Gusarov is one of those who recognized that many in the
West do not think that the CSCE is ready for essential functions of European
security. He saw a need to make the CSCE's decisions legally binding, but
believed that 'so far Europe has not yet reached that level of unity, which is
essential for the realization of the pan-European project'. 19' Vladimir
Baranovskii bemoaned the fact that the CSCE still works on virtually intact
national sovereignty, often paralyzed by the principle of consensus, and that
187 '..."ialtinskaia" Evropa ischerpala sebia. Rzhdaetsia Evropa "khel'sinkskaia", In. Borko
and B. Orlov, op. cit., p,. 57.
188 Anatolii Lukianov, speech at the RIIA, June 1991.
189 Konrad J. Huber, 'The CSCE and Ethnic Conflict in the East', RF&RL Research Report, vol.
2, no. 31, 30 July 1993.
190 Eduard Shevardnadze, 'From Blocs to Building Blocs', Vestnik, April 1990, pp. 53-56.
191 IuriiGusarov,op.cit.,p. 113.
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CSCE decisions are still not compulsory, Helsinki not having the mechanisms to
translate its decisions into action.'92
Despite the CSCE's failings and the lack of enthusiasm from the West,
Russian suggestions and enthusiasm for the Helsinki process remained.
Baranovskii went on to suggest that if the right of veto was changed, and if
violation of CSCE decisions resulted in heavy sanctions and potentiaflly even in
military intervention, then the CSCE could play its proper role in Europe.
Gusarov, whose support for the CSCE derived partly from the fact that it is not
controlled by any bloc, and grants some influence to neutral and non-aligned
states, saw a clear need for a CSCE-based mutual sharing of defence, rather than
the 'essential defence' of every individual countiy.193
To make the prospect of a strong CSCE more feasible, there have been
various suggestions of partnership. Volkova wrote that the economic support of
the EC, together with tactical support from NATO, would give the Helsinki
process a new impulse, and allow the resolution of many questions to be put into
action. As an example, she proposed that the CSCE's Centre for the Prevention
of Conflicts, if joined with the appropriate NATO institutions, could create a
much more active and efficient instrument to monitor and resolve conflicts.
NATO and the CSCE should also cooperate, in her opinion, to establish a system
to control the sales of arms, assist in the execution of military conversion
projects, and improve on the actual methods of disarmament verification.'94
Many became hopeful of the CSCE gaining true executive power after the
December 1991 Rome Suniniit of NATO, when the North Atlantic alliance
assured the CSCE of all the means necessary to fulfill the Helsinki Final Act and
the Paris Charter, and declared that NATO was not an alternative to the CSCE
process, but rather complemented it. 195 Although next to nothing has been
192 Vladimir Baranovskii, 1992, op. cit., pp. 98-99; virtually all of the members of this round
table agreed on the desirability of strengthening the CSCE's role, and the need to abolish the rule of
conSensuS.
193 Iurii Gusarov, op. cit., p. 113.
194 Elena Volkova, 1992, op. cit., p. 28.
195 B. M Khalosha, op. cit., p. 100.
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written in Russian specialist journals about the potential role of the EU in a
CSCE-based security system, Boris Shmelev has suggested that there should be
permanently active sections within the CSCE which could carly out rapid and
independent observance of violations of human rights, minority rights, and
determine sanctions, which should be enforced by the EU. 1 Shmelev failed to
give any details as to how the EU could impose these sanctions on the non-EU
members of the CS CE, but it shows that the EU is seen as the main economic
dynamo, and perhaps also trade policeman, of an eventual CSCE-led security
structure.
The concept of the CSCE enabling the rest of Europe and North America
to influence the resolution of the deadly conflicts in the FSU could be difficult to
realize for reasons other than the obvious lack of experience, infrastructure and
commitment. Yet to be tackled is also Russia's unwillingness to subordinate any
of its policies concerning the 'Near Abroad'. Whenever the possibility of UN or
CSCE involvement in the FSU has been officially discussed, only potential
observers have been welcome, not troops.' 97 Kozyrev, whilst appreciating the
quiet support emanating from the West for Russian involvement in settling FSU
conflicts, has nonetheless emphasized 'that it's a matter of support and not of
attempts to instruct and control, laying the burden of fulfilling this task on Russia
alone'.' 98 However, although their presence could only have minimal impact,
OSCE observers were eventually allowed into Chechnia during the conflict, and a
representational office set up.
In the first years of post-Soviet Russian statehood, despite the shift to more
Eurasianist policies, Kozyrev continued to show support for the CSCE. In late
1993, he talked of the need for a clear-cut 'vertical line of responsibility' for
maintaining peace, from the UN and the CSCE down to NATO, NACC, the WEU
and CIS; he also suggested the establishment of a permanent body for political
196 Boris Shnielev, 1992(i), op. cit., p. 97.
197 See for example Alexander Alexeev (Deputy Chief of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
European Security and Cooperation Department), 'Security from the Atlantic to the Urals and Beyond',
Intern ational Affairs, Moscow, Februaiy 1993, p. 55.
198 Andrei Kozyrev, 1994, op. cit., p. 18.
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consultation, a Council or Committee of Permanent Representatives, as part of the
CSCE structure. 199
 In February of that year, the Foreign Minister approached
'the question of sharing (j)eacekeeping) burdens with our Western partners by
way of CSCE mechanisms', and proposed that
in the near future, the CSCE will have to transform itself from a
forwn for political dialogue into an organization guaranteeing
security, stability and the development of cooperation in the
European space. [...] Implementation of the principles and planned
programmes of the CSCE is perhaps the most important area of
cooperation between the new Russia and the states united in the
Atlantic Alliance.200
Even the 1993 Russian Military Doctrine, despite its emphasis on Russia's right
to secure its interests in the FSU, declared that the deployment of foreign troops
into states adjacent to Russia would be considered a military threat 'unless this is
done to restore or maintain peace, in accordance with the decision of the UN
Security Council or a regional agency of collective security, by agreement with
the Russian Federation.'20' In other words, there was provision for the possibility
of foreign troops joining a UN or CSCE peacekeeping effort in the FSU.
The increased suspicion and antagonism which had developed by the end of
1994 prevented the CSCE Summit in Budapest achieving anything of substance;
its change of name to the OSCE was unfortunately not a reflection of a change in
structure or influence. The fact that most of the CSCE Summit in December 1994
was taken up by arguments over the role of NATO in Europe, and the possibility
of expansion, shows that the hope for the OSCE is much less than the fear of the
Atlantic Alliance.
This could simply mean that a new structure altogether will have to evolve, or
at the very least a new approach. Such a new overture came just before the last
CSCE Summit, when the then Foreign Minister gave a speech to the Western
European Union (WEU) parliamentary assembly in which he called for close
199 Andrei Kozyrev, speech at the RITA, 27 October 1993.
200 Andrej Kozyrev, 1993, op. cit., p. 6.
201 'The Militaiy Doctrine of the Russian Federation', Jane's Intelligence Review, op. cit, p. 7.
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security cooperation between the WEU and Russia. He proposed the
establishment of a Russia-WEU consultative council, offered to make Russian
sateffite inteffigence available to the WEU, to arrange joint naval operations,
cooperate in defence production, and for Russia to participate in a European-wide
sateffite surveillance system.202 It was clear, however, that this was more an
attempt to weaken NATO's position than a real desire to develop mutual military
dependence between the EU and Russia. However, this sort of cooperation could
pave the way for meaningful interdependence, once the pendulum of relations
with Western Europe has swung back towards greater trust and optimism.
What is clear is that, even in the recent times of relative distrust and antagonism,
Russia wants to remain close to Europe and avoid isolation. The need for a new
security structure is still being sought by Moscow. An essential aspect of this
new structure, from the Russian perspective, is that it must include Russia not as a
follower, but as one of the leaders. This is the principal reason why a NATO-
based approach to European security cannot be the full solution; an alternative to
NATO must be found to guarantee safety in Europe, lest Russia be again
alienated and made fearful of the West. The United Nations's fatally indecisive
performance in the Bosnian war, and the overwhelming demand for its
peacekeeping resources in the rest of the world, make it unlikely to be able to
provide a sufficiently reliable superstructure for European safety. Whether the
necessaly structure should be built on the foundations of the OSCE, as an
appendage to the WEU, or from scratch, will depend on the reaction to new
suggestions from the Western powers, but not least also on timing, and the
domestic political situation in Russia, which largely determines the flow of
official pro- or anti-We stemism.
Although this section may seem to have moved away from the EU
somewhat, it was necessary to show what security avenues appeared to be open to
Moscow as it sought closer relations with Western Europe overall. At the time of
202 The Guardian, 2 December 1994.
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the negotiations over the Cooperation and later the Partnership Agreements with
the ECIEU, the expectation of much closer security relations with Western
Europe played an essential role in Moscow allowing itself to move closer to
Brussels.
1.7 Conclusions
To understand the vast changes in the Russian attitude towards Western Europe,
there are many factors which must be kept in mind. One strong influence is the
underlying current of feeling towards the West, which swings at inconsistent
intervals and to vaiying degrees, between the extremes of Slavophilism and
Westernism. Overall, Moscow's reaction to the EU has reflected that towards the
West as a whole, with occasional exceptions caused by Russian attempts to
underplay the United States' importance, or to weaken the link between
Washington and the West European capitals.
Thus the cyclical history of relations with Western Europe shows that
expectations of ever-improving relations were never realistic. Too many factors
would push back against Westernism, once its influence had started again to
predominate. This pressure came from within the Soviet or Russian government,
when either the conservatives and/or the military felt they were losing too much
influence. This loss of influence could be seen to happen within the
governmental structure domestically, through increased Western influences within
the Motherland, or as a perceived geostrategic loss abroad.
In the case of the most recent wave of Westernism, like anywhere else in
the world, there is an element of 'the grass is always greener on the other side'
factor - the natural tendency to be unhappy with an existing situation, and
wanting to try the opposite approach. Just as countless Western governments
have lost power due to popular frustration with a situation which was not
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necessarily the government's fault, El'tsin's ratings have been paying the price of
tiying to reverse seventy years of 'Communism'.
More specifically, this rapid drift back away from a strongly pro-Western
policy happened in part because many of the niilitaiy and conservatives in Russia
never stopped believing that the West was a threat, militarily and/or
economically. Any signal which could conceivably be used to support this
perceived threat was a potent weapon against the reformers.
There were two other main reasons for the premature return to widespread
suspicion towards Western Europe. The first was unrealistically high
expectations. After the mid-1980s, having been unreasonably negative for so
long about European integration, its goals, successes and implications for the
Soviet Union, Moscow went to the other extreme, being overly optimistic about
the prospects of aid, joint security, and special trade privileges.
The other main reason for the growth in anti-We sternism has been the lack
of provision for Russia's need of self-respect. Even at the times of greatest
acquiescence in the wishes of the West, Moscow still insisted upon being treated
as an equal in economic alliances, and as a leader in defence groupings. An
overall impression has grown among Russian commentators that the Western
powers have little intention of taking notice of the wishes of a weakened Russia;
it has even been suggested that maintaining Russian frailty is intentional.
Thus partly as a result of unrealistic expectations, partly because of the
West's failure to procure adequate levels of aid and support, and partly because
of the failure to find a face-saving role for Russia in international politics, a veiy
strong sense of disillusionment with the West and its promises has emerged.
Even many of the more liberal politicians and specialists became more willing to
support policies which could be seen as antagonistic to the West. Sergei
Karaganov, by early 1994, began to support a more assertive foreign policy,
'because the country is facing a grave psychological crisis. [...] if we are to be a
democratic country, then we cannot pursue a policy which would substantially
depart from public sentiments.' He opposed himself to full membership of
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NATO for East Europeans, arguing that this would still further increase the
feeling of isolation in Russia, calling it the 'Weimar syndrome'. 203
 It is this
disillusionment which is largely responsible for the redefining of Russia's
relations with the West. It is important to re-emphasize that the recent adjustment
of Russia's foreign policy represents a new perspective on what constitutes
Russia's national interests, not a sudden return to self-interest after a period of
surrender. The benefits of closely cooperating with the West in foreign relations
and in the pace of Russian reforms were no longer seen to be sufficiently
important to justify providing the conservatives with political ammunition. Both
Gorbachev and El'tsin needed the West's support to achieve the stability that
would enable the former to abolish the monopoly of the Communist Party, and
the latter to dissolve the Soviet Union, and also to attract active assistance to
propel reforms to success. The return to a more aggressive and nationalistic
approach to international relations should be seen more as a result of the failure
of Western support towards Russia's reforms, than as a reason for this failure.
Despite the severe disappointment on the part of both the Russian populace and
their government, and despite the shrinking away from close interaction and
interdependence with the EU and the West in general in the last few years, Russia
has nevertheless stayed closer to Western Europe than it ever was before
Gorbachev.
It has become apparent that not only the parameters within which the Great
Debate is argued, but also the manner in which it is undertaken, have become
more Western in character. The veiy fact that an antagonistic Parliament is a real
problem, or that most people are more concerned with maximizing their income
than with political ideals, indicate a more Western-like approach of society. The
successful protection of reformist ways by the masses in August 1991 (regardless
of the possibility of premeditation by El'tsin or others; the point is that people
took to the streets, and believe they won) is another greatly democratizing factor
203 Moscow News, no. 7, 18-24 Februaiy 1994.
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- there is an unprecedented feeling of empowerment amongst a veiy significant
proportion of Russians.
The material improvement achieved by a veiy powerful minority is an
important factor which is likely to prevent a return to strongly isolationist or
command-economy policies. No less important is the freedom of choice, the
predictability of availability, and the sense of equality with the West that many
Russians can now feel as Russian cities have become more colourful and
consumer-orientated. The freedom to travel, to work officially or unofficially, to
say and read what one likes, and benefit from global communications - all of
these would be fought for, if a new leadership attempted to revert to old ways.
This, and the economic reasons discussed in chapter three, explain why -
despite the shift back to a more Slavophile-oriented approach to foreign policy
since 1992 - relations with the EU have on the whole maintained their positive
momentum. The desire on Moscow's part to avoid isolation from Europe, both in
economic and security terms, remains strong. Russia has kept pushing for the
signing of the Partnership Agreement, and later of the interim Trade agreement
that would allow the former to be implemented. Although Russia's overall
behaviour in international affairs, and the intervention in Chechnia, show that
closer relations with Brussels is not the Kremlin's number one priority, the EU
(and especially Germany within it) has been relatively unscathed by Russian anti-
Westemism.
Relations could be improved further if a way forward towards a pan-
European security structure could be agreed upon. It is clear that from Russia's
point of view, such a structure would have to include it as a main partner, not as a
second class member as in NACC. The OSCE could be the foundation for such a
structure, but its failure to achieve much so far, or to be sufficiently respected by
Moscow, could mean that a new body is needed. In any case, the domestic
political situation in Russia will have to stabilize before this question is
effectively approached.
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In short, though the degree of Russian frustration and disappointment with
the EU is high, the present movement away from the previously veiy close
relations is only temporary. The habit created amongst ordinary Russians for a
more Western style of life, the need for economic interaction with the EU, and
the fear of political isolation mean that a return to previous enmity is not a
realistic option. The degree of success of future relations between Moscow and
Brussels depends upon the EU taking full consideration of the perceived abuse of
Russia's trust, self-respect and patience.
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Chapter 2: European Union Views on the New Europe and
Policy Towards Russia
2.1 Introduction
This chapter will examine the various currents influencing the European
Community's/European Union's approach to the Soviet Union and then Russia,
from the inception of the Communities. To start with, the relative positions, and
the relative weight, of the main EU member states are examined, as far as this is
possible with the very limited data available. Despite the antagonism and discord
sometimes present within the EC/EU, the Communities' stance vis-à-vis the
USSR/Russia is thereafter considered a single predominant position in this
chapter. The history of relations between the two sides is covered, to give an idea
of the extent to which the whole approach to dialogue and cooperation has
altered, and what had to change in order for the two sides to increase cooperation.
The progress of Brussels' relations with Moscow is charted, from the old-
style, confrontational East-West political climate, through Gorbachev's New
Political Thinking and El'tsin's new Russia, to the present-day uncertainties of
how to bridge the chasm left by the collapse of the CMEA, and the already
disappointed hopes of EU solidarity and support for the Russian people. The
degree to which the EC was willing to compromise, and to innovate, is of
particular interest. The protectionist element to the policies of the Member States
is explored, together with the consequences of EC/EU restrictions on imports into
its markets.
The negotiations over the Trade and the Partnership Agreements are
covered in detail, especially concerning trade restrictions, the prospect of a joint
free trade area, and the conditionality clause, which were the most contentious
aspects of these Agreements. The resulting Agreements, and the implications of
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what is decreed within them, are detailed both in order to assess the likely impact,
and to determine those areas of cooperation which must still be tackled.
The question of what new security structure can replace the void left by
the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact and the re-shaping of NATO is vital to the
topic of relations between Russia and the EU. This is in part because until
Moscow feels that there is an effective security framework in Europe which will
ensure that Russia is not threatened, it cannot wholeheartedly join in a partnership
with the EU, nor entirely trust the latter's member states. The security issue is
also important as the EU has an important, and normally undervalued, role to play
- both as an active player in 'soft defence' issues, and as a political player of
enormous influence over the actions of European multinational security
organizations, namely the WEU and the OSCE. The failings of the existing
security situation in Europe, the possible solutions and the pros and cons for the
EU's relations with Russia are all addressed in the last part of this chapter,
concluding that much is still left to be done if relations between the opposite sides
of Europe are to be helped rather than hindered.
2.2 Different Approaches to a United Europe
The fact that Western Europe ever managed to unite into the supranational
structure which is the European Union is astonishing, for many reasons. In part,
it is remarkable that this was able to happen despite the veiy heterogenous
approaches and perspectives of any number of issues, not least relations with
Russia, as we shall see below. It is also surprising because Western Europe and
its allies have always been aware of the antagonism prevalant in Moscow, until
recently, towards the idea of an exclusive integration of Western Europe. Even
before the end of the Second World War, European proposals for federal
organization of the continent after the war were opposed by President Roosevelt,
who was determined that
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the basis of postwar policy must rest on a firm agreement with the
Soviet Union. It was already clear that the government of the
Soviet Union would look with deep suspicion on any European
union, whether of a general or particular kind.'
Yet in the years following the defeat of the Nazis, prevention of future war was
the first priority, and almost anything was possible. The Marshall Plan, which in
the end became directly linked with the creation of not only the EC, but also the
OECD, WEU and other multinational organizations, was available to the USSR
as well as to Western Europe, but for various reasons Moscow refused to join
(see Chapter Four). One of the reasons was that in negotiations with Britain and
France, Moscow was only willing to support the shopping-list approach, whereby
each country would unilaterally deliver a list of the areas most needing aid, rather
than a coordinated set of demands; this showed the determination of the Soviets
to avoid any measures which would encourage integration in Europe, which
would reduce the chances of weaker individual countries being influenced by
Communism. Stalin had already distanced West European governments at the
Moscow Conference of the Allied Council of Foreign Ministers of the Big Four
(May-April 1947), and encouraged them to group against him, by demanding
$lObn in reparations as well as control over the Ruhr valley and centralization of
the German state. 2
 From then on, Europe was doomed to be split, at least for the
remainder of the century.
Before going on to examine the development of the policies adopted by the EU as
a whole towards Moscow, the author will very briefly summarize the main trends
determining the Osipolitik of the EU's most important constituent states, in order
to show that 'the EU' is in fact merely a consensus of sometimes very discordant
voices. The main purpose of this section, however, is to try to establish what
position the individual coutries support in the debate on relations with Russia,
1 Max Belofl, The United States and the Unity of Europe, London, 1963, PP. 3-4; cited in Peter
van Ham, 1993, op. cit., p. 18.
2 Peter van Ham, 1993, op. cit., pp. 21-22.
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and the influence enjoyed by major member states in pushing through their
vision. Thus we can hope to grasp EU policy towards Moscow more fully, by
better understanding the driving forces behind certain directions of that policy.
As explained in the last chapter, Germany's relations with Russia are of
particular importance, and in the same way the German position within the EU on
policy towards Russia always holds particular sway. Germany's policy towards
Moscow has swung from one extreme to the other since the Community's early
days. The same year that the Treaty of Rome was signed, Bonn started enforcing
the Hallstein doctrine, which aimed to weaken the international status of the
GDR, and discourage other countries from recognizing it. Chancellor Konrad
Adenauer combined this with a Westpolitik, which sought to tightly interconnect
Germany with the EC and the Atlantic Alliance, not least to reassure other
Western countries concerning the direction of German policies. Although some
claim that the erection of the Berlin Wall in 1961 triggered off the realization in
West Germany that a solution to the German problem could only be found
through conciliation, 3 there was no clear warming of Bonn's policies until the
Grand Coalition Government took up office in Bonn in 1966, followed by the
election victory of the SPD's Willy Brandt in 1969. That was the year that Bonn
signed the Basic Treaty and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, followed in
1970 by the Renunciation of Force Treaty between the FRG and the USSR.5
Importantly, Bonn's policies towards Moscow, with the primary aim of
German reunification, remained firmly couched in a multilateral framework, very
often leaving the EC to attempt forging new links with Eastern Europe.
Nonetheless, Germany's approach had an individual slant. The new Ospolitik
brought with it a new way of defining the nation-state and its importance, as
shown by the popular slogan 'we should not change borders, but what borders
mean'. It has been argued that such a decrease in the importance of borders was
Renata Fritsch-Boumazel, L 'Union Soviétique et lesAllemagnes, Paris, 1979, p. 254.
4 Peter van Ham, 1993, op. cit., p. 66.
5 Angela Stent, From Embargo to Ostpolitik, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 154-64; also Peter van Ham,
1993, op. cit., p. 105.
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sought by the Federal Republic not only to increase links with Eastern Germany,
but also to re-establish a new version of Mitteleuropa, where Germany could
enjoy special relations with Central and East European states, as has historically
been the case.6 In fact, although special conditions applied for relations between
the two Germanies, Bonn's use of the EC to reach its foreign policy goals meant
that the relations with all other states had to become increasingly well-defined
and compatible with those of other EC states, rather than nebulous and less
relevant. The apprehension among other EC states about Germany's power and
influence has also worked against the possible development of a Mitteleuropa.
Bonn's desire to reunite Europe, initially as a way of achieving German
reunification, has been clear ever since Brandt's Oslpolitilc Even though the
slant towards cooperation and integration is more typical of the SPD (Social
Democratic Party), the West German government was supporting ideas of a
common Europe even after the SPD had lost power, and yet before Gorbachev
had proven his willingness to compromise fully with the FRG. Thus, for
example, Foreign Minister Genscher talked of a 'European Identity', saying that
the USSR 'according to its history and the cultural contribution of its peoples', is
a full member of this wider Europe, and that this is why West Germany favoured
overcoming the division of Europe. The German Federal President added in 1987
that 'Politically, Europe is divided, but it is undivided and indivisible in spirit'.7
This was a very general principle, however, and suspicion of the USSR's motives
when talking of the 'Common European Home' remained strong until
reunification was allowed to take place. Then still Defence Minister, WOrner
warned in November 1987 that there was a correlation between the 'huge military
weight of the superpower USSR' and its intention of 'clear political dominance in
peace', and terms such as 'common security' or 'Common European Home' were
6 Ole Waever, op. cit., pp. 477-93.
7 Carl-Christoph Schweitzer, 'The Federal Republic of Germany in the 1980s' in The Changing
Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat, ed. Carl-Christoph Schweitzer, London, 1990, P. 250.
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merely aimed at disguising this looming dominance. 8 This position, however,
was fairly average for the EC.
After Moscow finally agreed to German reunification, despite the fact that
it had already achieved it's main aim, Bonn responded with a great deal of
support for the USSR, and later Russia. Chancellor Kohl pushed energetically for
Russia to be admitted in the G7, allowing the political G8 to be established. Most
importantly with regards to this chapter, Germany was also the strongest
proponent of compromise and speedy signing of the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement; as described below, Germany was even pushing hard for precisely
defined parameters which would determine whether or not a free trade area
between Russia and the EU could be established after l998. Germany had also
managed to obtain greater trade concessions for Russia within the Agreement.
This approach is typical of Bonn's constant efforts to show a Western willingness
to compromise, and to treat Russia as similarly to the Central European countries
as possible;'° this is the position not only of the CDU, but was confirmed as the
position of the opposition SPD in 1995 as well."
As can be seen from this strong (although by no means unconditional)
German support for Russia within the EU, Bonn clearly also sees itself having a
'special relationship' with Moscow, this exact term being used by the German
Ambassador to Moscow in an article in Moscow News in December 1993. One
of many examples of this was when E1'tsin spoke first with Kohl, to confer on
NATO's ultimatum on Sarajevo, before speaking with Clinton. 12 The greater
degree of closeness, especially on the issue of bow to integrate Europes East and
West, is of course not surprising. Russia and Germany are, after all, the two large
powers with most to gain or to lose over how Eastern Europe is dealt with in this
period of transformation. This 'special relationship', however, has not been
8 Ibid.,p.255.
9 Heinz Tinunermann, op. cit., p. 28.
10 Jbid.,p.12.
11 The Guardian, 17 November 1995.
12 Peter Shearman, 'Russian Policy Toward Western Europe: the German Axis' in Russian Foreign
Policy Since 1990, ed. Peter Shearman, Boulder, 1995(ü), pp. 98-99.
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enough for Germany to support the conversion of the CSCE into a body with real
decision-making powers over security in Europe; Bonn balked at this, just as did
the majority of EU member states, although the German Ambassador to Hungary
did say at the October 1994 Budapest Conference that 'we can build up the CSCE
on condition that no member state gain a special status or particular right in any
part of the CSCE zone'. 13 Neither has it been sufficient for Germany to denounce
plans of eventual integration of the Visegrad states into NATO. However, whilst
Germany is principally supportive of the expansion eastwards of NATO, it is also
pushing for the concept of 'cooperation and integration' with regard to the whole
of Europe, including Russia; in this case, this would mean including Central
Europe into NATO, but also introducing Russia into a looser European security
organization'4 (or presumably strengthening the role of the OSCE, although not to
the extent requested by Russia in late 1994). Bonn's support of Russia obviously
has its limits; in January 1995, for example, the German Parliament passed an all-
Party resolution stating that whilst Germany would remain a 'partner and friend'
of Russia, it maintained trust in its democratic process, as would the EU and
NATO, but if Russia was to continue forceful interventions in the ex-USSR,
relations between Germany and Russia would deteriorate.'5
Economically, Germany will remain at the forefront of West European
states in trade with Russia. One estimate values German assistance to the
USSR/Russia at $SObn;'6 the flow of assistance has considerably lessened since
1993, and it will remain at a more modest level now that the repatriation of
Russian troops from Germany has been completed, and that the macroeconomic
implications of reunification are politically sensitive. Politically, however,
Germany will have to tread veiy carefully, not least because of Moscow's record
for forming liaisons with Germany rather than the rest of Europe (such as the
Rapallo Treaty of 1922, and the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact of 1939), echoes of
13 Michael Mihalka, 'Restructuring European Security', Transition, OMRI, 30 June 1995, p. 6.
14 Heinz Timmermann, op. cit. p. 14.
15 Ibici.,p. 14.
16 Peter Shearman, 1995(h), op. cit., p. 97.
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which have been heard recently in Russia, as noted in the first chapter. Yet it is
not just EU concerns over the development of any exclusively close relations
between Russia and Germany which will restrain the latter's policies. Bonn
would in any case be veiy unlikely to forego what many consider the securement
of its new buffer zone, as many consider the inclusion of the Visegrad countries
into the EU, 17 even if this meant a new coldness coming over the Bonn-Moscow
axis. Germany clearly no longer wants to be the Eastern frontier of Western
Europe.
To understand France's attitude towards the EU's Ostpolitik, it is helpful
to understand the complete transformation through which France's attitude
towards the unity of the EC itself has gone. Under the leadership of General de
Gaulle almost since the establishment of the European Communities, Paris
jealously guarded full sovereignty of nation-states within the Community, under
the slogan 'Europe des patries'; this was also the policy which prevented the
creation of the European Defence Community, and which took French troops
away from NATO control during peacetime. The volte-face occurred in the early
1980's, when French politicians started ttying to make the EC as state-like as
possible, both with a defence capacity and a cultural 'mission'; in the words of
Ole Waever, 'France had become too small, and its mission had to be taken over
by "Europe".' 8 Waever argues that this Europe could only include Western
Europe, as only Western Europe could have the necessary cohesion. Another
suggested reason why France has been inclined to support the exclusion of
Eastern Europe from the EC was the desire to avoid the increase in German
power and influence expected if the Community continued to grow eastwards,19
and arguably also to avoid the reduction in relative influence which would result
from the greater number of seats in the Council and Parliament, if expansion
occured. This coldness clearly extended to the USSR, even after Gorbachev had
17 Kirill Sergeevich Viatkin, 'Rossiia i Germanlia: potentsial sotrudnichestva', MEMO, no. 4,
1994 p. 106.
Ole Waever, op. cit., pp. 477-93.
19 PetervanHain, 1993, op. cit., p. 107.
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been in power for some time. Pierre Hassner believes that under the term
'Common European Home' used by Gorbachev, the Quai d'Orsay saw the old
Russian aims of denuclearizmg Germany and weakening European links with the
USA. France feared that by jumping head-first into Gorbachev's conception of
Europe, the French perspective of how the EC should be developing - in
particular the development of a European defence capability and re-enforcement
of German ties with its Western European partners - could be put at risk.20
That is not to say that France has not attempted to build structures which
would draw Russians nearer to their Western neighbours. The European Bank of
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) is arguably an example of the French
'missionary' approach to Europe. Contrarily to the British Prime Minister John
Major, for example, who used the inauguration of the European Bank to try to
sell London to the business world, both President Mitterrand and former
President of the EBRD Jacques Attali had a visionary approach to the bank,
arguing it will be the 'first institution of the new world order with both a
"political and economic mandate".21 The goals of the EBRD, as explained in
Chapter Four, are much more humble than those of 'European Home builders',
but at least they were being executed eighteen months after their conception in
Paris. Paris also clearly came to put more trust in Gorbachev and his New
Political Thinking, with Mitterrand for example saying that he approved of
Gorbachev 'a hundred times' for his initiatives, especially on disarmament.22
Another French overture was President Mitterrand's vision of a 'European
confederation', discussed in the first chapter. Although this has been seen by
some as a breakthrough in the design of a new Europe, others believe it is simply
another mechanism to avoid the need to include East European states in the
Community. It does seem clear that France's priorities are increased integration
20 Pierre Hassner, 'Perception of the Soviet Threat in the 1950s and the 1980s: the Case of France'
in The Changing Western Analysis of the Soviet Threat, ed. Carl-Christoph Schweitzer, London, 1990(ü),
p. 183.
21 The Guardian, 16 April 1991.
22 Pierre Hassner, 1990(ü), op. cit., p. 183.
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of the EU, preferably with a degree of niilitary capacity,23
 and the resulting
containment of German power.
Another element of French policy within the EU is its opposition to
reduction of aid granted to many of its former colonies, and when it appears that
assistance to France's partners in Africa is reduced as a result of the relatively
high levels of aid being aimed at the FSU, France is likely to argue against any
such reduction in EU leverage in LDCs. Paris also often shows a strong
Mediterranean streak in its attitude to the EU's Russian policy; as mentioned
below, France is not above trying to protect its agricultural and other products
from Russian imports, and has been opposed to widening the scope of the
European Investment Bank's activities to the USSRJRussia. Another example of
France using the EU to protect its own market share is Paris' strong opposition to
the freeing of quantitative restrictions on the importation of Russian enriched
uranium into the Union.24 Nonetheless, the Elysee Palace's tradition for high
diplomacy, and the desire for France to achieve a historic mission through the
EU, mean that French policies will continue to seek a strong European Union role
in the restructuring of the former Soviet Bloc. This does not mean, of course, that
the role of the EU as seen by Paris will be mirrored in other European capitals;
the opposite was true as France started its presidency of the EU at the same time
as the war began in Chechnia. Paris' reaction was soon much harsher than that of
London or Bonn, pushing harder for official EU responses, and calling for
sanctions.25 Inevitably, Russia will remain on a very different level from core EU
countries in the new Europe as viewed by Paris.
The other major EU power, Great Britain, has been no exception to the
general rule of varying approaches to the Kremlin. Britain has often tried to
resuscitate its traditional leading role in international diplomacy through its
Ostpolitik, and very often to the despair of other West European countries; for
23 Dominique David, Conflits, puissances et strategies en Europe - le dégel d'un continent,
Brussels, 1992, p. 12.
24 Peter Shearman, 1995(li), op. cit., p. 104.
25 The Guardian, 11 Januaiy 1995.
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example during Prime Minister Harold MacMillan's quest for a compromise over
Berlin in 1959-62, or Wilson's declaration that London was ready to recognize
the Oder-Neisse line in 1964.26 In the run-up to Britain's accession to EC
membership, on the other hand, British policy made vely sure it did not strongly
displease any of its future partners, especially Germany, whose support was
essential if Britain was to be accepted into the Community. Once a member of
the EC, however, London could again allow its strong Atlanticism to prevail. In
1981-82, Margaret Thatcher showed far less determination than France and
Germany to defeat American sanctions on exports to the USSR. London's
primary concern was still to avoid financing the incompetence of the Soviet
system, and thus at an EPC meeting of the Twelve foreign ministers in 1988 she
joined Portugal in favouring a much more passive EC policy towards the East
than was proposed by Germany and France. 27 At about the same time, the
Foreign Minister Sir Geoffrey Howe urged 'a better European defence effort,
galvanized perhaps through the WEU' •28
The British Government's stance altered markedly from 1989. This was in
part due to a greater confidence that the Russian reforms were not merely
artificial or transitory, but also clearly due to the fact that keeping the EC open to
Eastern Europe had been identified as a subtle yet effective mechanism with
which to slow down the process of integration amongst the Twelve; 29 this
reasoning is also likely to have encouraged British support for accession of the
EFTA states. John Major carried on the pro-Eastern Europe stance with regard
not only to the EC, but also using his chainnanship of the G7 during the August
1991 coup aftermath to initiate a strengthened Western aid package to the
USSR.3° Just before taking up his presidency of the European Council, John
26 Peter van Ham, 1993, op. cit, p. 107.
27 Time, 14 November 1988.
28 Julian Bullard, 'Perceptions of the Soviet Threat: Britain in the 1980s' in The Changing Western
Analysis of the Soviet Threat, ed. Carl-Christoph Schweitzer, London, 1990, p. 147; Sii Geoffrey said this
in Brussels in March 1987.
29 Anna Michaiski and Helen Wallace, The European Community: the Challenge of Enlargement,
RIIA2
 London, second edition, 1992, p. 11.
iO The Guardian, 30 August 1991.
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Major affirmed that 'the borders of Europe do not stop in the centre of our
continent. We must not replace the iron curtain that has been torn down with a
new regulatory net'. 31
 Helen Wallace and Anna Michalski note that '[...] some
voices can be heard, especially from London, suggesting that the next group of
candidates - two or three or four - could be accommodated within the existing
structures and then take part in the next IGC (Inter-Governmental Conference)',32
which will be in 1995-96. This shows either great optimism, or, more likely,
great determination to avoid fulfilling the goals of Maastricht.
Italy's role, although less important than that of Europe's three largest
countries, has nonetheless been one of continued support and involvement in
Russia. The vanguard role that Italy's national gas company played in breaking
down an unofficial boycott of Russian hydrocarbons in 1960 (see Chapter Three),
and Fiat's massive deal to establish the Lada car plant at Togliattigrad, were
merely the two largest projects in a general Italian policy of encouragement of
trade with Russia which has continued into the 1990s. It is therefore not
surprising that it was an Italian industrialist, Carlo de Benedetti, who first
presented a serious proposal for a 'Marshall Plan' for Eastern Europe, in the
spring of 1988 (see Chapter Four). In 1992, according to MEMO, Italy was
second only to Germany in trade with Russia, and also second in volumes of
inter-governmental credits being offered. Although Italy was at first opposed to
granting significant fmancial aid to the USSR and Eastern Europe by the G7, she
had changed her mind by the time of the Houston G7 summit, the reversal in
policy having occurred due to apprehension about the extra influence Germany
would gain if its assistance to Eastern Europe was not channeled through the G7
and the EC. Rome requested that the G7's assistance be granted according to the
principles established by the EC at the Dublin Summit in June 1990. Thus Italy
showed herself in favour of a consolidation of the EC as the best way of helping
the USSR without damaging relations within Western Europe.33
31 The Guardian, 29 April 1992.
32 Anna Michalski and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 14.
33 Nadezbda Aibatova, 'Rosslia i Italiia: neispol'zovannyi potentsial', MEMO, no. 5, 1993, p. 65.
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The Southern members of the EU are also worth mentioning in the context
of relations with the former Soviet Bloc, as they have a strong tendency to oppose
moves which would increase the accessibility of the EU market to East European
goods, which are often in competition with South European production,
especially in agricultural products and textiles. Together with France, they have
also tended to oppose granting Russia access to European Investment Bank (Effi)
credits. M Paradoxically, however, it appears that public opinion in Greece,
Portugal and Spain is the most pro-Russian of the EU. In a poll conducted by
Eurobarometer in the autumn of 1992, Europeans were asked which country they
thought should be part of the EU by the year 2000. On the prospect of Russian
membership the average answers for the Union as a whole, after being weighted,
were 39% for and 43% against. All three Southern members averaged 48% for
Russia's inclusion, however, and Spain only had 27% voting against, 35 suggesting
that opposition from the Southern capitals to freeing trade with Russia may not be
as inevitable as is sometimes suggested.
2.3 Agreement and Disagreement Between Brussels and Moscow, Before
Gorbachev
Out of the often contradictoiy tendencies of the member countries, the European
Community per se managed to put forward a mostly consistent, and eventually
successful, policy for the establishment of diplomatic relations and closer
economic cooperation between the USSR and the EC. Despite the extremely
hostile attitude of the Soviet Union towards the Community in the 1950s and
1960s, as we saw in Chapter One, Brussels regularly reminded the Kremlin that it
was willing to be cooperative. One example occurred in 1963, when an EC aide-
3 Perdita Fraser, 1994, op. cit., p. 210.
Eurobarometer, no. 38, December 1992, p. A46; samples were taken between 21 September and
15 October 1992, using 1000 people, representative of the population as a whole, from each member
state (with the exception of 300 additional for Northern Ireland, only 500 for Luxembourg, and an
additional 1000 for East Germany).
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mémoire was sent to the USSR expressing hope that relations could be
normalized, 36
 accompanied in the same year by the so-called 'dolce vita
concessions' on imports of goods including vodka, caviar and crab-meat.
It is doubtful that these advances played any great role in the relatively
lenient position of Moscow vis-à-vis its East European allies, but in any case in
the late 1950s and 1960s certain CMEA countries defied the unwritten Soviet law
forbidding Eastern Bloc countries from having any dealings with the EC, when
they asked for 'alleviation of some problems of agiicultural trade' 37. The
resulting agreements were extremely limited, however. Another EC initiative was
taken when in 1972 the heads of state and government of the Community
expressed their willingness to establish trade relations with Eastern Europe as a
result of improved East-West relations. This was followed in 1974 with an EC
offer to establish bilateral agreements with every Central and East European
country, in view of the introduction of a Common Commercial Policy (CCP).38
Brussels was to find it difficult to enforce a common commercial stance with
respect to the Soviet Bloc. The Council of Ministers had decided in late 1969 to
unify trade policy vis-à-vis Eastern Europe, theoretically disallowing bilateral
trade agreements from remaining in force beyond 1974. In fact, however, not
only did many bilateral trade agreements continue to operate beyond 1974, but
the very importance of trade agreements was reduced in favour of accords which
could be initiated and controlled by national governments. The usual formula
was to sign economic cooperation agreements, which dealt with credit agreements
and political support for joint ventures rather than 'trade' itself thus escaping
Brussels' control. Even when these agreements did have a trade element,
36 'EC-USSR Relations', Commission of the European Communities' Background Report, 5 April
1990.
John Pinder, 'The EC and Eastern Europe Under Goibachev: How Normal Could Relations
Become?' in The Economies of Eastern Europe Under Gorbachev's Influence. NA TO Colloquium,
March 1988, Brussels, 1988, p. 266.
3 'EC-USSR Relations', Commission of the European Communities' Background Report, 5 April
1990.
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however, there was little the EC could do to prevent this practice, as there was no
consensus on this issue.39
On the question of credit to the CMEA states in particular, there had been
an attempt by the EEC to coordinate policy as early as 1962, when the Council
ruled that any credits over a term longer than five years (thus exceeding the limit
established by the Berne Union of Credit Insurers in 1934) would have to be
approved by Brussels. This too was often being ignored, however, as member
states wanted to compete with non-EEC soft loans being offered to the East. All
the major EEC players had their credit support agencies actively supporting their
own businesses, with only the FRG very reluctant to see larger flows of credit
going Eastwards, lest the GDR benefit from it. An important precedent in the
battle between Brussels and the national capitals on control of trade and credits to
the East was France's successful defence in 1966 of credits as a part of national
foreign policy, and therefore not under the jurisdiction of the EEC. From the end
of the 1960s the Community tried to put the European Investment Bank in charge
of member states' export credits, but the high demand for new Western
technology in Eastern Europe, the general atmosphere of détente, the specially
low interest rates for credit to the East (2-7%, whilst domestic borrowers could be
charged as much as 14%), and the flood of oil crisis petrodollars coming through
commercial banks meant that the flow of credits to Eastern Europe was much too
large and diverse to be managed by a new institution which had limited support.4°
Not until the 1975 Helsinki Conference did the EC states begin to coordinate their
credit policies more effectively, helped later by the 1976 'OECD consensus',
strengthened in 1978, which imposed guidelines on government-backed credits
stretching over two years. 4' Thus the EC failed to increase the pressure upon
CMEA states to recognize it and sign trade agreements through a coordinated
credit policy. By the end of the 1970s, however, the damaging competition in
Western credit terms to the East was minimized by the G24. The EC could
3 PetervanHam, 1993, op. cit., pp. 89-91.
40 Ibid., pp. 80-85.
41 Marie Lavigne, op. cit., pp. 209-12.
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finally be perceived as having a more unified trade policy towards the USSR,
although there was much progress yet to achieve.
The CCP towards the Soviet Bloc was part of the run-up to the Conference
on Security and Cooperation in Europe. From the onset, the CSCE negotiations
were attractive for the EC as a test of the European Political Cooperation (EPC)
machinery.42 In preparation for the CSCE, a 'Groupe ad hoc CSCE' was formed,
in early 1971, to prepare a common stance on economic issues, and a similar
'Sous-Comité CSCE' was established within EPC, although in the latter there was
no Commission representative, as political involvement was still considered
forbidden for the EC. In the end, there were many issues in the 'Second Basket'
(on cooperation in economics, science, technology and the environment) which
were settled purely between the EC and the USSR, largely because the USA was
far from cooperative in East-West trade. Although it covered general concepts
rather than concrete measures, the final resolution for the Second Basket was
almost entirely based on a draft drawn by the Commission. So successful were
the EC states at achieving a unified stance that the EC, rather than NATO as had
been expected, took the lead in coordinating the groundwork for the CSCE.
Determined to see a successful outcome to the Helsinki Conference, Moscow did
not object to the Italian Prime Minister Aldo Moro signing the Treaty on behalf of
the EC as well as his countiy. Very regular meetings of the Working Group of
CSCE experts of the EC members helped the EC to retain a common stance in the
CSCE Follow-up Meetings in Belgrade (1977-78) and Madrid (1980-83). By the
Madrid meetings, the Eastern Bloc countries no longer raised objections to
delegates speaking on behalf of the EC. 43
 Thus de facto recognition of the EC as
an international actor was achieved through the CSCE process starting in the mid-
1970s, although it was to be officially denied for another decade.
42 Fraser Cameron (Foreign Policy Advisor to the EC), 'The Future Relationship and Division of
Responsibilities Between the EC and the CSCE' in Redefining the CSCE - Challenges and
Opportunities in the New Europe, ed. I. M. Cuthbertson, Helsinki, 1992, pp. 95-96.
'13 PetervanHain,1993,op.cit.,pp. 111-13.
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Another sign of thawing relations between the CMEA and EC came in
1976, with a Soviet proposal (through the CMEA Executive Council) for an
agreement to be concluded between the EC and the CMEA, and between their
respective member countries. This agreement was to be almost totally 'bloc-to-
bloc', and would have severely limited the possibility for bilateral contacts, as
they would have had to be approved by a special body - the 'EEC-COMECON
Joint Committee'. This was seen as an attempt to appease Moscow's East
European allies, whilst not risking a surrender of influence in individual countries
to the EEC; in fact, this agreement would have strengthened the CMEA, thus
benefiting the USSR.' The CMEA proposal also called for the elimination of
quantitative restrictions in agriculture and trade, inter alia implying the
abandonment of the Common Agricultural Policy, but the EC's objections were
of a more basic nature. Brussels considered any increase in the USSR's control
over its East European allies, through the CMEA, as wholly undesirable.
Furthermore, it could argue that the international legal status of the EC and the
CMEA were incompatible; whilst the Treaty of Rome gave the EEC both treaty-
making power and diplomatic status in international relations, the CMEA Charter
only mentions its intergovernmental character, and was considered by the
European Parliament to be 'only empowered to issue recommendations and these
only assume legal force when adopted by other countries', and having 'no legal
powers whatsoever to impose the implementation of such an agreement on its
members'.45 The Commission had its own reasons for rebuffing the draft
agreement, as it implied a reduction in its influence and a shift back towards
empowerment of the Council of Ministers and the individual EC states. As a
result, no trade issues were accepted in these negotiations with Comecon, and
deliberations on statistics, standards and the environment were not backed by
sufficient political will from the EC's side to be successful. Talks were
abandoned with the advent of the Afghan crisis.46
44 'The European Community and Eastern Europe', lecture given by Sir Leslie Fielding; op. cit.
'15 Peter van Ham, 1993, op. cit., pp. 129, 52 and 135.
46 John Pinder, The European Community and Eastern Europe, New York, 1991, p. 13.
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Meanwhile, despite disagreements and set-backs, homogeneity of the EC's
domestic and foreign trade policies was gradually increasing. For example, the
forthcoming transfer of the Twelve's fisheries' policy to EC control forced the
first meeting for negotiations between a Soviet Minister (of Fisheries) and the
Commission in February 1976. Moscow had to either negotiate fishing quotas, or
leave EC waters; there was no chance of weakening EC solidarity by ignoring
Brussels this time. The Soviet Minister of Fisheries did state, however, that his
mandate was to reach agreements with the EC's member states, and not with the
Community itself; the Soviet delegation also kept requesting that there be special
EC-CMEA negotiations. In the end, the talks failed to reach agreement, and
Soviet ships had to leave EC waters. 47 The fact nevertheless remains that the
EC's strong commercial policy had forced the USSR to the negotiating table.
Despite the failure to reach agreement in this instance, Brussels was beginning to
realise that it had the upper hand, as EC-USSR trade relations had become much
more important to Moscow than they were to the Community (for figures, see
Chapter Three). The few attempts by Moscow to reach an EC-CMEA agreement,
in the late 1970s and early 1980s, had little new to offer; the EC could afford to
wait for its own terms to be met.
2.4 The EC's Relations with the USSR under Gorbachev
With Gorbachev in charge in the Kremlin, a new initiative to establish ties with
the EC was put forward in May 1985 by V. Sytchov, the new Secretary General
of the CMEA. This proposal was devoid of many of the obstacles previously
retained by Comecon and, most importantly, allowed some state trade relations
between the EC and individual CMEA states. The extent to which this was
guaranteed, however, was ambiguous, and the draft agreement was still basically
47 Peter Marsh, 'The Development of Relations Between the EEC and the CMEA' in The EEC
and Eastern Europe, eds Avi Shlann and G. N. Yannopoulos, Cambridge, 1978, p. 61; and Peter van
Ham, op. cit., p. 132.
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an inter-bloc one, and thus unacceptable to Brussels. The real breakthrough came
in September of that year, when Sytchov declared that an EC-CMEA agreement
could be secured 'within the respective fields of competence' of the two
organizations, thus clearing the way for an arrangement where Comecon was not
an equal 48 The combined pressure of Eastern Europe's attraction to the EC, and
of Moscow's need for improved trade relations in order to acquire technology,
created a very fertile environment for agreement.
Negotiations began in Februaiy 1986 between the CMEA and the EC, and
after the sticking point of West Berlin's status was resolved largely in Brussels'
favour, the Joint Declaration was signed on 25 June 1988. The Declaration did
not cover trade relations; it merely established official relations between the EC
and Comecon, and provided for cooperation between them on matters of mutual
interest, as well as for future agreement on the nature of such cooperation.49
 It
was most of all a token gesture, not least because the CMEA had by this stage
lost most of its influence. Nonetheless, it was a very clear sign of the
revolutionary transformation taking place in Eastern Europe, moving away from
Soviet imperialism, and reflecting a strong West European Community together
with the crystallization of EC foreign policy. Negotiations began with all the
individual European CMEA states towards Trade and Cooperation Agreements
withtheEC.
Without the political limitations of previous Soviet regimes, it did not take
long at all for Gorbachev's government to show the strong economic interest it
had in becoming closer to the EC. The first Soviet Ambassador to the
Communities, having presented his credentials in March 1989, started
negotiations in June with the Commission. It only took three rounds of
negotiations before the Trade and Cooperation Agreement between the EC and
the USSR was signed in Brussels on 18 December 1989. This agreement was
very similar to those signed with Hungary and Poland, except that in the USSR's
48 PetervanHam, 1993, op. cit., pp. 141-43.
'	 John Pinder, 1991, op. cit., p. 25.
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case Euratom also joined the agreement, due to mutual interest in nuclear
research and safety. The agreement was a ten-year one, whereby the EC
abolished Quantitative Restrictions (QRs) on Soviet imports, subject to
exceptions for sensitive products (including steel, textiles and agricultural
products), and the USSR granted non-discriminatoiy treatment for Community
exports as regards QRs, licensing and the allocation of currency. The quotas
specific to state-trading countries were to be curtailed, gradually, and abandoned
totally by 1995. For all goods not exempted, the principle of Most Favoured
Nation (MFN) applied. The agreement also promised to facilitate the operations
of Community businessmen in the Soviet Union. Furthermore, economic
cooperation was promised in a wide range of areas: environment, energy,
transport, science and technology, financial services, and others. 5° A joint
committee, meeting annually, was also established to oversee the agreement and
act as a forum to increase dialogue and cooperation between the EC and the
USSR.51
The signing of this agreement had significant diplomatic and political
importance, but regarding concrete terms of trade improvements or cooperation
objectives, its achievements were modest. The document did not provide for any
financial commitment on the part of the EC, even in the areas of cooperation. On
the trade issues, in practice the EC was already according MFN status to Russian
goods not covered by the ECSC, CAP or Multi-Fibre Arrangement. As explained
in Chapter Four, hydrocarbons were not affected by EC trade restrictions, and
raw materials were subject only to low or non-existent tariffs, and few quotas.52
Most importantly, the EC retained safeguards against imports which, according to
GATT rules, 'cause or threaten serious injury' to domestic producers. 53 It has
been argued that this type of safeguard clause in agreements can be even more
'EC-USSR Relations', Commission of the European Communities' Background Report, 5 April
1990.
51 Perdita Fraser, 1994, Op. cit., p. 200.52 Peter van Ham, 1993, op. cit., p. 86.
John Pinder, 1991, op. cit., pp. 25-28.
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restrictive than normal anti-dumping, which could also still be enacted.M The
reason for this is that rather than having to prove that the price of imports from
the USSR is lower than an appropriate equivalent, with the safeguard clause the
EC producers simply had to show that these imports were 'damaging'. In the
case of state trading countries such as the USSR, inflicting anti-dumping duties
had already been made relatively easy, as any underpricing was judged in relation
to prices from a 'free market' equivalent. To cite one example, in September
1993 Russia was subjected to a temporaly anti-dumping duty of 12OECU per
tonne on its exports to the EU of isobutanol; the 'analogous' country chosen to
determine the 'fair' price was the USA, as Brazil (chosen by the complainant) and
Poland (by then no longer considered state-trading, and suggested by Russia)
were not deemed acceptable by the Commission as they were monopolies which
enjoyed some tariff protection. 55 Thus in this and many other cases, the dumping
margin (the difference between the suggested import price and the imposed
minimum, once anti-dumping duty is added 56 ) was much greater than it should
have been, considering the lower labour costs in Russia. Yet the 'safeguard
clause' makes protectionism easier still in the Trade and Cooperation Agreement,
as it can provide safeguards against almost any increase in imports from Central
and Eastern Europe which could be considered as harmful to EC producers.
The number of goods subjected to anti-dumping is small. Between 1985
and 1989, for example, the USSR had anti-dumping procedures initiated against it
over exports to the EC only in the following instances: for deep freezers (in
1985), ferro-silicon (1986), urea and polyester fibre (1987) and calcium metal
54 1. M. C. Rob and Helen Wallace, 'New Patterns of Partnership', in The Community and the
Emerging European Democracies, a Joint Policy Report of six national EC foreign policy research
institutes, June 199!, p. 60.
55 Official Journal of the European Communities, no. L 246, 2 October 1993, 'Commission
Regulation (EEC) no. 2720/93 of 28 September 1993, imposing a provisional anti-dumping duty on
imports of isobutanol originating in the Russian Federation'. Isobutanol is a neutral liquid, mainly used
as a solvent in paint and laquer industry; also used as a plasticizer and as a raw material for the
production of acrylates.
56 Brian Hindley, 'Exports from Eastern and Central Europe and Contingent Protection' in Trade,
Payments andAdjustments in Central and Eastern Europe, eds John Flemining and J. M. C. Rob, RJIA
and the EBRD, London, 1992, p. 146.
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(1988). 57
 During the 1992-93 period, the only new anti-dumping duties imposed
upon Russia were regarding potassium chloride, isobutanol and low carbon ferro-
chrome. 58
 This does not mean, however, that anti-dumping laws have not done
much damage to Soviet and Russian exports; the knowledge that threatened EC
producers can initiate anti-dumping procedures leads to massive voluntary
restriction of exports. The number of goods affected by quantitative restrictions
is much larger. In 1992, a total of 1,058 QRs were still being imposed on Russia
on a transitional basis, although less than 10% of these were enforced by more
than two member states. Therefore, these QRs often did not prevent imports from
reaching their desired destination, merely forcing them to be imported first into
another member state; they do represent an administrative and logistical bather,
however. 59
 It was wholly unclear how many of these QRs were to be abolished
by 1995, as specified in the agreement, and how many would be retained on
account of their 'sensitive' classification.
2.5 The Evolution of a New Partnership Agreement
The above shortcomings, and the fact that Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary
were already in negotiations for Europe Agreements to replace their Trade
Agreements, meant that Brussels quickly came to accept that the Trade and
Cooperation Agreement with the USSR was also insufficient. The EC was
sensitive to Russia's dissatisfaction, and ready to accomodate Moscow through a
new form of agreement. Within the West European side, it was the French and
German governments which first put forward initiatives to start negotiations for a
new agreement, proposing both wide-ranging cooperation measures and gradual
Susan Nello, The New Europe: Changing Economic Relations between East And West, London,
l99l, p. 52.
Regulation (EEC) no. 1031/92, and in Official Journal of the European Communities, no. L
246, 2 October 1993, 'Commission Regulation (EEC) no. 2720/93, and 'Council Regulation (EEC) no.
27 17/93, respectively.
5 Perdita Fraser, 1994, op. cit., p. 206.
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liberalization of trade, which would lead to the eventual establishment of a joint
free trade area. They had suggested using Article 238 of the EEC Treaty as the
basis for the new agreement; the Commission was reticent, as this Article refers
to the conclusion of Association Agreements. 6° Nevertheless, in December 1990
the European Council agreed that the Community should go beyond its Trade and
Cooperation Agreement to a more comprehensive and important agreement to
develop EC-Soviet relations (without mentioning Article 238 or Association
Agreements), and should meanwhile offer the USSR substantial food aid and
technical assistance. 61 The year that followed, however, was to prove as
revolutionary as 1917, and not conducive to the formulation of a new framework
for relations between Europe's two greatest powers. By the end of 1991 the
USSR no longer existed, thus making a new agreement much more imperative.
For the purpose of this thesis, only Russia's post-Soviet relationship with
Brussels is examined, but it is worth noting that despite the official statement that
'the Community has no intention of making distinction between "European" and
"Asian" republics', 62 in practice the Western republics are being considered much
more seriously as a potential part of an extended European structure than the
Central Asian states (the Baltics are in a different category altogether, having
either already secured, or been promised association agreements).
At this stage it should be emphasized that at no stage has full Russian
membership of the EC/EU been a realistic possibility. Russia's case is arguably
the most important one for the EU to solve, as well as the most complex and
unpredictable; but Russia remaining a distinct political entity from the EU is one
of the few predictions which can be made with certainty in this field.
Nevertheless, it is useful not to rely upon an instinctive feeling that Russia could
not be an integral part of the EU, and to tty to define clearly why this is not a
60 IbicL,p.200.
61 John Pinder, 1991, op. cit., p. 34.
62 'EC Relations vith and Assistance to the CIS', EC Commission background bnef Brussels, 14
April 1992.
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possibility, at least in the short- or medium-term. Precisely drawn parameters
may become useful one day when sovereign parts of Russia come knocking on
Brussels' door.
In theory, an application for EC membership by Russia would have to be
taken seriously. The European Council in Maastricht in December 1991
confirmed that 'The Treaty on European Union, which the Heads of State and
Government have now agreed, provides that any European State whose system of
government is founded on the principle of democracy may apply to become a
member of the Union'. Although neither the Maastricht Treaty, nor the Treaty of
Rome, define the term 'European State',63 the Council of Europe's Parliamentary
Assembly has set a precedent by stating that membership to it 'is in principle
open only to states whose national territory lies wholly or partly in Europe, and
whose culture is closely linked with the European culture', and declaring that
countries whose legislative assemblies enjoy special guest status with the Council
of Europe's Parliamentary Assembly, including Russia, are considered
European.M
Even if it was clear that Russia could be accepted as part of Europe, and
that being a full member of the EC was a Russian objective (which, as seen in
Chapter One, it is not), the hurdles are insurmountable. If Russia were to join,
the area of the EC would be quadrupled, and the population increased by 50%.
Also prohibitive would be the expected reaction of the USA and Japan.65
Economic and security reasons for this incompatibility are elaborated upon in
more detail below, but the main fact is that new members are required to accept
the acquis communautaire, that is, all the principles and rules which have been
adopted so far. This is all the more diffIcult as the post-Maastricht Europe is a
Union, moving towards economic and monetary union, a single currency, and the
63 Graham J. L. Avery, 'Europe and the Challenge of Enlargement', report from the EC
Commission to the European Council, EC Doc., Lisbon, 24 June 1992, BibIlo post-Maastricht. no. 7,
1992.
64 Council ofEurope ParliamentaryAssembly Documents - Working Papers, 1994 Session (First
Part), 24-28 January 1994 - these were draft reconunendations to the Council of Europe's Council of
Ministers, later approved.
65 Perdita Fraser, 1994, op. cit., p. 220.
European UJo. Views os the New Krope d Po&y Towsrdz RussIa
	 123
introduction of a CFSP; these all dissolve any chance of full membership for
Moscow. The administrative implications of such a Union being expanded to
include Russia are detailed below.
Only rather recently has the definition of 'association agreements' become
more precise and, in the case of 'Europe agreements', clearly exclusive of Russia.
For some time in 1992 there was talk of extending an association agreement to
Russia, or a hybrid version of it. Alter all, association agreements have in the
past had varying forms. In 1957, France, followed later by Italy and Belgium,
demanded special treatment for their former colonies, which led in the end to the
Convention of Yaoundé, and the use of association agreements. 66 Turkey, which
has a more tenuous geographical and cultural justification for European status
than Russia, and which has had a worse record of treatment of minorities in
recent years, has held an association agreement with the EC since 1963.
Although the agreement intended to 'create a customs union between the
Community and the associated country and to enable the latter to adjust its
economy and so to prepare itself for the assumption of duties consequent upon
accession',67 Turkey's example shows that, despite being provided for in the
association agreement, membership is by no means assured.
On the other hand, the pressure which has been applied upon the EC by
Turkey to be allowed to graduate from associate to full membership has taught
Brussels a lesson; association agreements have since only been granted to
countries which are considered very likely to meet EC standards in the
foreseeable future. The expectations and fears of other countries which have
achieved associate status provide yet more reasons not to grant Russia associate
status; East Europeans would be likely to complain that their membership is
either being delayed, or diluted, by Brussels concentrating instead on Russian
association membership.
66 Stephen George, op. cit., p. 26.
67 Petervan Ham, 1993, op. cit., p. 195.
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Some of the main areas in which East Europeans must improve in order to
gain closer association with the EC include: reduction of their budget deficit;
development of an efficient dual banking system; development of more
sophisticated fiscal systems; development of social policies to replace the
abandoned state-provision of many services and goods, and means of financing
them. 68 In all these areas, Russia is a long way behind the Visegrad Four, and the
necessary solutions are vastly more complex and time-consuming due to that
countiy's size and longer history of 'Communism'.
Even in the case of the East Europeans, with their relatively simple
problems, many officials in the Community question whether the resolve to
acquire the acquis will not fade, as the social impact of the monetary reforms
becomes politically difficult, and as they realize how much of their new found
independence they would have to relinquish as part of a single domestic market
and foreign policy. 69 The parliamentary elections in Poland in 1993 substantiated
this concern. Whatever reservations of this nature are held by East Europeans
can be expected to be felt much more strongly by Russians, considering the fresh
memory of Moscow's role as superpower, and its continuing position as major
regional power.
Another crucial difficulty in the case of the Visegrad Four, which would
become a virtual impossibility in the case of Russia, is the degree of reform that
will be needed to incorporate them into the EU's governing mechanisms. Even
for the inclusion of the EFTA countries, although the Commission has often
optimistically assumed that the EU structure need not be altered, many of the
member states have expressed doubt. One well-publicized example of this was
during the run-up to the special EC summit of October 1993, when semi-official
proposals by France and Germany were disclosed, including the following
suggestions: firstly, a voting system in the Council of Ministers which requires
68 Heinz Kramer and Fridemann Muller, 'The Economic Requirements for Successful
Association' in The Community and the Emerging European Democracies, a Joint Policy Report of six
national EC foreign policy research institutes, June 1991, pp. 34-36.
69 Anna Michaiski and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 62.
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both a majority of member states and a majority of the overall EC population (this
would strengthen Germany's position); and secondly, having a European
Commission with a maximum of ten Commissioners, to be selected by the
Commission President from nominees put forward by the member states, and
approved both by the Parliament and the Council of Ministers. 70 The existing
voting system in the Council of Ministers is one where consensus is needed on
questions which come under headings considered sensitive, whilst others, such as
health and safety, the environment and completion of the single market, go
through a process of weighted qualified majority voting (QMV), where twenty-
three out of seventy-six votes are needed to block a proposal. Even the extension
of this system so that it could cope with a new Union of sixteen, ensuring that
around 30% of weighted votes were needed to defeat less sensitive directives,
proved to be a major problem.7'
Already, with only Twelve members, the Commission is under-resourced
and over-worked. Any increase in the number of member states will require both
a rationalization, and greater subsidiarity, and yet still necessitate a substantial
increase in the size of the Commission, the Council and Parliament. These
changes will prove difficult enough, if the wrangles over changes in QMV are
anything to judge by, and yet structural changes will also have to be agreed upon
for the EU to stretch into Eastern Europe. Changes are virtually certain to mean
that not every country will be assured a Commissioner, and that Presidency of the
Council will also cease to be a right of every member, alternating every six
months as it does at present. A very recent proposal for restructuring the EU, put
forward by a German think-tank, and co-drafted by Chancellor Kohl's personal
foreign policy adviser Joachim Bitterlich, suggested that the President of the
Council should be elected by the Parliament. This would reflect the increased
role of the European Parliament, which according to this blueprint would be equal
in power to the Council, creating a two-chamber decision-making process, with
70 The Financial Times, 29 September 1993.
71 The Guardian, 16 March 1994 and 24 March 1994.
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the Council acting as a Senate. 72 Also requiring major alterations, if the Visegrad
Four were to join the EU (to say nothing about FSU states joining), are the CAP
and the Budget; the CAP most radically, because agriculture is such a large part
of the East European economies, and is relatively backward. Even for the
association stage, with increased access to East European agricultural products
into the EU, the CAP is proving inadequate. Another hurdle is how to solve the
EU's political unaccountability; even if the present rate of 'degressive
proportionality' is maintained, with the Eftans and Visegrad Four included in the
EU, the number of MIEPs would go up to 767, whilst even the new Parliament
building in Brussels could only house 750 MEPs. It is interesting to note
hypothetically that even at only one MEP per million voters (in these three
states), the addition of Belarus', Ukraine and Russia to the EU Parliament would
bring the number of MEPs to 977.
Thus, despite the fact that countries such as Greece, Portugal and Spain are
precedents of members admitted largely for political and stability reasons, and
that their adaptation period to the acquis communautaire was permitted to be
gradual and to some extent individualized, Russia's case is too extreme to be
seriously considered. The same is also true for the other CIS republics, as
confirmed by the then EC Commissioner for external affairs, Hans van den
Broek, who declared in early January 1993 that the line on EC membership must
be drawn at those who are being tied now to the EC with association
agreements.74
 Even the Parliament, which has consistently taken a more pro-
Russian stance than the Council, stated in 1993 that 'it is possible that [...]
partnership (with FSU states) could eventually pave the way for an association or
something even stronger, although to look ahead in that direction at present would
be to engage in political fiction'. 75
 Mostly, however, EU officials have tried to
72 The Guardian, 21 June 1994.
Anna Michaiski and Helen Wallace, op. cit, p. 19.
74 The Times, 29 January 1993.
5 EP DocumentA3-0201/93, p. 23.
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avoid drawing a clear line between future members and 'no bopers', wanting to
avoid a new separation of Europe and a generation of resentment in the CIS.
Since January 1992, however, it is the Russian Federation which has been
knocking, and has been kept waiting in the doorway. For the reasons mentioned
above, it soon became clear that the agreement with Russia could not be a full
association agreement; and furthermore, whatever agreement was going to be
reached with the CIS states was not going to include the intention of full
membership in the future. The process of defining this new type of agreement,
more than Trade and Cooperation but less than Association, was a slow and
arduous one, but is worth analysing as a mechanism to indicate in which spheres
Brussels and Moscow easily agree to cooperate, those in which they easily agree
not to interact, and those in which the terms of partnership are contentious. To
simplify the task of studying the evolution of the Trade and Partnership
Agreement, I will first tackle its political aspects, followed by those involving
EU-Russian trade, despite the fact that they are, of course, inextricably linked.
The new agreement as a whole has largely been a political exercise. The
EU's low level of reliance on types of trade that can be improved by the
agreement has already been noted, as has Brussels' desire not to give the
impression of favouritism towards East European countries, with whom
association agreements had already been signed. The new accord was, to a large
extent, intended to soften the blow of the impossibility of EU membership, to
avoid any adverse effect on the Russian domestic political scene. The political
parts of the proposed accord were the most important, at least as far as the EU
was concerned. From the outset, one of the main goals was to increase the
foreign policy dialogue between the two sides. 76
 Commission recommendations
for these negotiations (with all FSU states), dated July 1992, also suggested that
they include provisions for financial assistance, cooperation and aid, and that
special attention be paid to support for regional cooperation among the FSU
76 InteMew ith Michael Emerson, op. cit.
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states.77 Contrarily to the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the new agreement
had been intended to officially commit the EC to material assistance to Russia; it
was not only to provide for multi-annual funding for TACIS, but also for possible
provision of exceptional balance of payments support, complementary to IMF
programmes.
On the question of improving intra-CIS cooperation, the Connnission
suggested to the Council that the EC be ready to use its good offices to help the
CIS states reach agreement on trade, payments and regional economic
cooperation; Brussels had already managed to do this successfully in the context
of ensuring collaboration between TACIS Coordination Units. All the areas of
cooperation provided for in the last agreement were to be included in the new
one. Jacques Delors was particularly eager to develop the cultural aspect of the
accord,78 whilst the Head of the EC Delegation in Moscow also pointed out,
during the early stages of negotiations, that EC-Russia cooperation in such sectors
as transport, education and science, was a specific objective. 79 Environmental
issues were also to figure in the EC proposals, but on this issue the Parliament
judged that the suggested measures (by early 1993, at least) were insufficient.80
Preliminary consultation with Russia must have started in early 1992, as
the first Commission recommendations to the Council on the contents of the new
agreements were issued in April. 8 ' The accord to be signed was officially defined
as a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, and the Commission was instructed
to open negotiations for the completion of such agreements with Russia and the
other newly independent states by a Council Decision in October 1992. 82 Round
after round of negotiation failed to reach a mutually acceptable compromise,
however, despite the fact that the Commission's negotiating mandate was
extended in the spring of 1993 (see below).
7'1 Bulletin of the European Communities-Commission, no. 7/8, 1992.
78 Press Conference given by Jacques Delors in Moscow, 30 May 1992.
79 Interview with Michael Emerson, op. cit.
80 Bulletin of the European Communities-Commission, ECSC-EEC-EAEC, no. 3, 1993.
81 'Relations avec les Pays d'Europe Centrale Ct Orientale Ct les Etats Independents', EC
Commission document, for the G7 Meeting, Munich, 1992.
82 Bulletin of the European Communities-Commission, ECSC-EEC-EAEC, no. 10, 1992.
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Disagreements over terms of trade proved to be the more stubborn
stumbling blocks, suggesting that the trade aspects of the agreement were both
important and as yet insufficient for the Russian side. By the fourth round of
negotiations in May-June 1993, however, it became clear that there had been
many political hurdles as well. EC officials claimed that talks had stalled largely
because of Russian objections to EC demands for guarantees on human rights,
rejecting the 'suspensive clause' according to which the EC could suspend
implementation of the agreement should there be severe human rights breaches.83
Some of the other bones of contention were exposed by Russia's chief negotiator,
Deputy Premier Aleksandr Shokhin, on his return from talks with the EC
Commission's Vice-Chainnan for Foreign Trade, Sir Leon Brittan. He stated that
Russia could at last expect a lowering of EC demands in the following spheres:
the movement to free price structuring in Russia; the need to develop economic
relations with other newly independent states; and the restrictions on Russian
workers in the EC.M The first two of these points should be considered political,
as they are more an attempt to influence the political situation in the CIS than to
affect trade with the EC.
This period of late May and early June 1993 saw an intensification in
negotiations, first between Shokhin and an EC delegation including Poul
Rasmussen, Head of the Danish government and then President of the Council of
Ministers, and later between Prime Minister Chernomyrdin and Sir Leon
Brittan.85
 This produced some results, as by the end of June Russia's
Ambassador to the EC, Ivan Silaev, said that accord had been reached upon the
political chapters of the Partnership Agreement, concerning 'coordination of
actions on key problems of international life'; only the commercial and economic
parts remained problematic.86 One of the major political breakthroughs of this
negotiating period was the elevation of Russia to the same formal level of
83 International Herald Tribune, 5 June 1993.
84 Kommersant", 1 June 1993.
Maiakradio,7 June 1993.
86 StPetersburg Press, no. 7, 22-28 June 1993
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political relations with the EC as enjoyed by the USA and Canada, involving
twice-yearly summits between Brussels and Moscow; this had supposedly been
proposed by Prime Minister Major. 87 Nonetheless, and despite a further
commitment from the Copenhagen Council to intensify the negotiation process,
disagreements on trade had still prevented the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement from being sealed at the Brussels Summit in December 1993.
It is veiy significant that the EC attempted to use any progress achieved in
negotiations to boost President El'tsin's image, and conversely to underplay the
significance of the continued inability to reach consensus. In other words,
Brussels was much more interested in maintaining good relations with Russia,
and not weakening the positions of the pro-reformers, than with speeding up or
optimizing the conclusion of the Partnership Agreement. Even when the Minister
for Foreign Economic Relations, Sergei Glazev, declared that the EC's continued
trade discrimination was tantamount to a trade war, and that Russia was ready to
reciprocate, 88
 Brussels merely calmly replied that in part Russia's economy had
to be out of transition to be treated as other free-market economies, and partly
that even free-market economies are subject to specific quotas (see below).
Brussels also failed to react to El'tsin's snub of the invitation to Copenhagen just
before the Council, to at least sign a declaration of intent on the agreement. On
the other hand, the EU publicized the first sunimit between EC Commission
President Jacques Delors, the Belgian Council President, and President E1'tsin.89
Brussels avoided criticizing El'tsin on the undemocratic measures he bad
advocated during the run-up to the December 1993 elections, and again invited
him to a pre-Council meeting to sign a declaration of intent on the Partnership
Agreement, this time conveniently just before the Russian elections. 90 Brussels
has played a balancing game of hying to have some influence on El'tsin through
the new agreement, yet also using it to grant influence to El'tsin vis-à-vis his
87 The Moscow Times, 22 June 1993, and The Guardian, 23 June 1993.
88 Kommersant' 27 May 1993.
89 The Financial Times, 10 November 1993.
° The Guardian, 12 November 1993.
European Union View, on the New Europe and Policy Towardi kneala 	 131
domestic opponents. The positive relations established with E1'tsin's government
were seen as too important, and too fragile, to put at risk over details of the
Partnership Agreement.
I shall now turn to the trade and commercial aspects of the evolving agreement.
The above description of the Trade and Cooperation Agreement showed that
many avenues were left open to block imports from the ex-USSR: specific
restrictions until 1995; the safeguard clause; and a continued disregard for prices
set in the CIS, as they were still considered state-trading, therefore requiring
minimum prices to be set with reference to production costs in free-market states.
There was pressure from many sources in the EU to reduce the protectionism
towards Russia, largely because all other efforts of assistance could be of only
limited value without the possibility of translating new knowledge or technology
into export earnings. The European Parliament defended this position, just before
yet another round of negotiations between the Commission and the Kremlin in
late May 1993, adopting a statement calling for wider access to exports from the
FSU. 9' The Parliament's Resolution particularly mentioned controls over
textiles, coal and steel and nuclear products, and asked the Commission to cariy
out studies on the effect of liberalizing trade with Russia in these goods. 92 It has
been suggested that the Community has little to fear in opening its own market
even in some of the so-called sensitive sectors, where Russia has a potential
comparative advantage, as the present economic chaos in Russia means that large-
scale increases in exports are unlikely to be common.93
Trade relations between the two sides had already received a notable boost
at the end of 1992 when the EC decided to extend the General System of Tariff
Preferences (GSP) to Russia and the other CIS states. 9" The GSP scheme
91 Bulletin of the European Communities-Commission, ECSC-EEC-EAEC, no. 5, 1993.
92 El' Doc. A3-0073/93, Motion for a Resolution, passed by the Committee for External Economic
Relations, 24 Februaiy 1993.
Perdita Fraser, 1994, op. cit., p. 220.
9' 'Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities in Moscow - Press Release', 25
March 1993.
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developed from the second United Nations Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD) in 1968; it is normally directed at less developed
countries. This provided ammunition for groups who would lose out from GSP
being applied to Russia to tiy to reverse her inclusion, but the European
Parliament rejected this proposal. 95 The current EU scheme allows duty-free
access for all industrial products apart from a defined list of sensitive goods, and
preferential entry to a limited range of (mainly processed) agricultural products.
This is as opposed to the usual Most Favoured Nation (MFN - a misnomer,
therefore, as GSP is preferable) tariff for most industrialized goods, of around 5-
7%. Under GSP, for each sensitive industrial product, each beneficiary country
not subject to a fixed duty-free amount (FDFA) is granted an individual tariff
ceiling. After a FDFA is reached, full duty is automatically reinstated, whilst for
tariff ceilings, full duty will only be reimposed if a member state succeeds in
showing damage to its industry, the duty then being reimposed for the whole of
the EU. In certain circumstances preferences are reduced or excluded for certain
countries; for Russia, this is only the case for urea. Products which are
considered non-sensitive may be included on the sensitive list if a member state
can show that the GSP for that product is damaging to its producers. A separate
regulation applies for textiles - the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA). For
agriculture, only a few products are included in the GSP, for reduced rates of
duty. There are separate rulings on some iron and steel products, under the
ECSC, but they do not benefit the CIS. The GSP was to apply to Russia from 1
January 1993, but in practice enactment was delayed, as the Russian government
had to satisfy the EC that it had a trustworthy system of certification of origin.
Finally, in late May 1993, the Ministiy of Foreign Economic Ties and its
plenipotentiary offices could issue 'certificate of origin type A' documents, which
would be satisfactory proof to obtain exemption from EC tariffs. The process
involves obtaining the form, producing a copy in English or French, obtaining an
9 Europe, 21 Januaiy 1993.
96 Generalised System of Preferences - A Brief Summary of the European Community's Scheme
for 1993, London, Department of Trade and Industiy, 1993.
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'expert' certificate of origin from the regional chamber of commerce and industry
(minimum cost of this was Rb30,000, or $30, in May 1993), as well as paying
Rb8,000 per certificate to the Ministry of Foreign Economic Ties. 97 It should be
stressed that only a minority of Russian exporters had to face this bureaucratic
procedure to be exempted from duty, however, as there are relatively few
industrial goods which are exported to the EU from Russia, once textiles, coal
and steel are excluded. Even in the case of Central and East European countries'
exports, it has been estimated that the combined impact of non-eligible goods and
strict rules of origin reduces GSP benefits to one-third of industrial and
manufactured exports; 98 in Russia's case, an even lower percentage of exports are
likely to be favoured by GSP. In other words, the Partnership and Cooperation
Agreement still had much to achieve if it was to significantly help Russian
exporters.
On specific restrictions, Aleksandr Shokhin listed several goods on which
agreement had still evaded the negotiators in the fourth round, namely steel,
aluminium, coal, uranium, textiles and space technology. 99 On all of these
exports, Russia was requesting tariff concessions. 100 The Russian Deputy Prime
Minister also expressed dissatisfaction at the proposed treatment of Russian
companies in the EC, although it was unclear why the Russian delegation was
unhappy with the official position of the Community, which called for EC
companies operating in Russia to have the choice between MFN treatment or that
of national companies, and Russian companies in the EC to benefit from the
treatment accorded to national companies in the country of establishment.101
From the beginning, Russia has been the side pushing for a more far-
reaching agreement, in particular looking for a guarantee of the 'four freedoms'
9 Kommersant", 25 May 1993.
98 P. Aghion; R. Burgess; J.-P. Fitoussi and P. A. Messerlin, 'Towards the Establishment of a
Continental European Customs Union' in Trade, Payments andAdjusiments, eds J. Flemzning and J. M.
C. Rollo, RIIA, London, 1992, p. 170.
99 Kommersant" 29 May 1993.
100 Europe, 4 June 1993.
101 Europe, 1 April 1993.
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of goods, services, capital and persons.'°2 Germany in particular pushed for
definite promises of Russian participation in a common free trade area, subject to
certain conditions, whilst others would have preferred to avoid making
committing references to the four freedoms.'° 3 Promising a free trade agreement
was expected to create particular difficulties in the services industry, especially
over transportation and commercial satellite launches.104
In the end, such was the desire to accomodate Russia, and so determined
was Germany in particular to do this, that the very nature of the agreement was
altered to encompass a capacity to switch to a truly free market between Russia
and the EU; the Commission's negotiating mandate was extended by the EC
General Council of foreign ministers in April l993.'° It was also this Council
which established that the condition to the enforcement of this free trade
arrangement was Russia's ability to comply with GATT obligations. 106
 The use
of GATT as a benchmark is a natural gesture; already, the EC's anti-dumping
rules had been based largely on Article VI of the GATT (as well as the 1979
Anti-Dumping Code).'°l Moscow's involvement with GATT was by no means
new. The USSR first officially applied in August 1986 to acquire observer status
to GATT, but this was refused; however, after securing the support of President
Bush in Malta in December 1989, and then of the European Council in
Strasbourg in the same month, the Soviet Union was finally admitted with
observer status on 16 May 1990. 108 Brussels' insistence on compatibility with
GATT before proceeding with the free trade status has greatly intensified the
efforts towards gaining full GAIT membership. On 6 June 1993, El'tsin stressed
Russia's wish to become full a member of GAIT, and hoped that the issue could
102 Europe, 4 June 1993.
103 Perdita Fraser, 1994, op. cit., pp. 208-09.
104 Kommersant'ç 1 June 1993.
105 Europe, 5 April 1993.
106 Bulletin of the European Communities-Commission, no. 4, 1993.
101 European Economy, no. 52, 1993, p. 196.
108 Leonard Geron, op. cit., p. 56.
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be examined at GATT's meeting ten days later.' 09
 By the end of 1994, though,
full GAIT membership still eluded Moscow.
Although stating that full GAIT membership was desirable, the Russian
negotiators were not going to allow it to be a sine qua non of a free trade accord.
This stance could be justified by the fact that Brussels' 'evolutionary clause' was
not insistent on membership of GATT itself, but on the ability to meet GATT
obligations. 11° Deciding when to judge if these obligations could be met became
an important impasse. At first the EC wanted to leave the question open-ended,
and later showed willingness to review Russia's status after six years, while
Moscow wanted this to occur after two years. At the November 1993 EU-Russia
sununit, Delors announced that 1998 was being offered as the earliest date when
a common free trade zone could be created.' 1 ' The EU came to this first summit
with another gesture of good will - it altered the Commission's mandate to
allow for slightly better access for Russian steel and aluminium. More
importantly, it changed Russia's status from 'state trader' to 'economy in
transition', the main advantage of this being that now the Commission would
have to prove 'substantial damage' to EU producers if anti-dumping measures are
to be taken; furthermore, the use of 'safeguard clauses' became justified only if
the EU could show that Russian goods were both underpriced and that there had
been a significant surge in imports." 2 This was an important concession indeed,
which addressed the heart of the problem preventing agreement.
Yet despite these measures, and having secured the right of foreign
creditors to seize Russian property abroad in the case of non-repayment, by the
December 1993 Council El'tsin could still only sign an intention of agreement.
Many areas of trade had not yet been resolved to each side's satisfaction. Sir
Leon Brittan had suggested that trade in these difficult areas be dealt with in
separate accords, or in a 'revision clause', in order to conclude the main
109 Kommersant", 27 May 1993.
110 International Herald Tribune, 5 June 1993.
111 The Financial Times, 10 Novemebr 1993.
112 The Financial Times, 10 November 1993.
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Agreement, but the Russian side rejected this, apart from the special case of
'nuclear cycle' goods." 3
 Nonetheless, there was reason to be optimistic; after
the November swnnlit, Alexandr Shokhin declared that no important hurdles
remained. Finally, the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement was signed at the
Corfu Summit in late June 1994, the latest delay having been blamed in part on
continuing problems with the treatment of EU banks in Russia, 114
 although
reports from early spring suggested that agreement had already been reached, and
that signature simply awaited a suitably grand occasion. It is also likely that
Moscow may have wanted to wait for agreement to be reached on the Partnership
for Peace with NATO before signing the Partnership Agreement, trying to make
the latter dependent upon the former. Whatever the case may be, Russia now
joins Ukraine in having provisional Partnership status with the European Union.
This status was provisional, however, pending ratification by the parliaments of
Russia and the EU member states; this ratification had not occured by the end of
1994, and was going to be delayed further by the war in Chechnia.
The Partnership Agreement was concluded for an initial period of ten
years, after which it would be renewable. In the mean time, the Agreement is to
be renewed automatically yearly, unless written denunciation of the Agreement is
presented by one party (either the EU or Russia) to the other. Importantly, the
Agreement includes a clause covering human rights which allows it to be
suspended, even unilaterally, in an emergency.' 15 The Agreement does not,
however, prevent a party from taking any measures which it considers necessary
for the protection of its essential security interests, whether in relation to sensitive
information, fissionable materials, production of or trade in war materials, or in
the event of serious internal disturbances or international tension. Neither does
the Agreement prevent a party from taking measures which it considers necessary
ll3 Moskovskiye novosti, no. 24, 13 June 1993, and Europe, 4 June 1993.
114 The Guardian, 15 June 1994.
115 Proposal for a Council and Commission Decision on the conclusion of the Agreement on
Partnership and Cooperation between the European Communities and their Member States on the one
part, and Russia on the other part, Brussels, Comnussion of the European Communities, COM(94) 257
final, 15 June 1994, pp. la and 2.
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in line with generally accepted international obligations and commitments in the
conirol of dual-use industrial goods and technology." 6 There were therefore no
benefits to be expected from the Western side in terms of limiting Russia's anus
sales, nor from the Russian side relating to post-CoCom technology trade
restrictions.
In common with the Trade and Cooperation Agreement, the Partnership
Agreement established a Cooperation Council to monitor the implementation of
the Agreement. This Council is to meet once a year at ministerial level, and when
circumstances require. The Council consists of members of the European
Council, the European Commission, and members of the Government of the
Russian Federation; the office of President of the Council is held alternately by a
representative of the EU and by a member of the Russian Government. The
Cooperation Council is assisted in the performance of its duties by a Cooperation
Committee composed of representatives of the same three authorities represented
in the Cooperation Council, normally at senior civil servant level; the Committee
is to be presided over alternately by a representative of the EU and of the Russian
Government. The Committee's main role is to ensure continuity between
meetings of the Cooperation Council. New to this Agreement is the
establishment of the Parlianientaiy Cooperation Committee, consisting of
members of the European Parliament and of the Federal Assembly of the Russian
Federation. The Parliamentary Cooperation Committee, which was to establish
its own rules of procedure, does not have a clearly defined role; all that is
specified is that it can request information regarding the implementation of the
Agreement from the Cooperation Council, and that it can make recommendations
to this Council."7
One of the most important elements enshrined by the Partnership
Agreement is that of political dialogue, especially the meetings which shall take
place 'in principle' twice a year between the Presidents of the European Council,
116 Ibid., Article 99, pp. 56-57.
117 Ibid., Articles 90-97, pp. 53-54.
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the European Commission, and of the Russian Federation. The Agreement also
pledges to set up procedures and mechanisms for biannual meetings at senior
official level between the European Union Troika and Russian officials, as well
as the dialogue through the Council and Committees described above.'18
The Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, as its title suggests, also
stresses that cooperation between the parties will be increased in many areas.
The cultural aspect of interaction which had been stressed by Delors was covered
by an Article which promised cooperation particularly in exchanges of
information in the field of conservation of heritage, and between institutions of
culture. As expected, education and science are also included. In education,
cooperation is aimed not only at higher education, but also civil servants,
journalists, interpreters, adult training, and others. In science and technology,
collaboration is specified in the exchange of infonnation, training activities and
mobility programmes for scientists and technicians, as well as R&D activities. A
particularly detailed section covered cooperation on environment and human
health, calling especially for disaster planning, an exchange of information and
experts, bringing laws to Community standards, cooperation through the
European Environment Agency, development of strategies with regard to global
issues and achieving sustainable development, and environmental impact studies.
There are numerous other areas in which both sides commit themselves to
cooperation."9
Technical assistance, as a means of achieving the cooperation mentioned
in the Agreement, is only pledged in a few instances. In the field of social
cooperation, it is stated that cooperation shall include technical assistance (TA) to
118 thid., Articles 6-9, p. 6.
119 Thid., Articles 56-85, pp. 34-5 1; the other fields are: industrial restructuring and interaction;
investment promotion and protection; standards of conformity assessment and consumer protection;
mining and raw materials; agriculture and the agro-industrial sector, energy; the nuclear sector, civil
space research and commercial application; construction; transport; postal services and
telecommunications; financial services; regional development; health and safety of workers, optimization
of the labour market, and social protection; tourism; small and medium enterprises (SMEs);
communication, informatics and information infrastructure; customs systems (cooperation in this sphere
was also covered in a detail protocol); statistical cooperation; economic policy; and the prevention of
ifiegal activities including illegal emigration, traffic of narcotics, and corruption.
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optimize labour markets, plan and manage restructuring programmes, and
promotion of self-employment and entrepreneurship; TA was also to be provided
to develop social assistance institutions. In the promotion of SMEs, there was
particular mention of access to and operation of the Business Cooperation
Network, and of Euro-Info-Correspondence Centres, which are part of TACIS.
The regulation of capital movements and payments in Russia was to be aided with
TA to exchange information, establish links between competent authorities on
both sides, and develop appropriate regulations in Russia. Finally, in the
prevention of illegal activities, TA was to include the drafting of national
legislation, the creation of information centres, the training of personnel, and the
development of joint strategies.' 2° This is the closest the Agreement comes to
including precise provisions for aid and financial assistance. No specific
monetary amounts or period of duration are mentioned in relation to TACIS, or to
financial assistance, contrarily to what had been speculated upon during the time
of negotiations. Financial assistance is mentioned solely in the form of grants for
TA, which are still to be covered by the TACIS framework.'2 ' The only other
benefit stipulated is in a joint declaration exempting financial loans and credits
granted for assistance purposes from MFN conditions.'22
In terms of reducing EU protectionism towards Russia, the Agreement's
achievements are limited. There is recognition that Russia is no longer a state
trading country but an 'economy in transition', with the implications discussed
above. Thus, imports may still be restricted, although normally after
consultations through the Cooperation Committee, in cases where a product is
being imported in such increased quantities as to cause substantial harm to
domestic producers.' 23
 Although quantitative restrictions on the whole were
abandoned, the Agreement still does not cover nuclear products, coal and steels,
and textiles. Concerning nuclear products, both sides agreed to 'take all
120 ibid., Articles 74, 76, 83 and 84, pp. 44, 45, 49 and 50 respectively.
121 ibid., Articles 86-88, p. 52.
122 Ibid., 'Joint declaration in relation to article 10', p. 83.
123 Ibid., Articles 13-17, pp. 8-9.
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necessary steps' to arrive at an arrangement by 1 January 1997. For issues
concerning trade in coal and steel, a joint Contact Group was to be established. 124
Despite Russian requests during preparations for the Agreement, no special
conditions were granted for trade in aluminium, uranium or space technology,
leaving these still open to anti-dumping measures. In Russia's case, QRs could
also be applied to EU imports when needed to protect sectors 'undergoing
restructuring', 'newly emerging', or 'facing serious difficulties', until such a time
as Russia becomes a member of GATT. 125
Concerning conditions for Russian workers in the EU, workers 'legally
employed' in a member state were promised access to the applicable pensions in
respect of old age, death or industrial accident, 'with the exception of special
non-contributory benefits'.' 26
 The Agreement did not, however, stipulate any
measures to facilitate the employment of Russians in the EU. With regards to the
establishment of companies from one party on the territory of the other, both
sides agreed to grant treatment no less favourable than that offered to domestic
companies. In the EU's case, exceptions to this were in fishing, real estate
purchase, audiovisual service, telecommunications, agriculture, and news agency
services. In Russia's case, this article did not apply to air and maritime transport,
and there were also exceptions in banking and insurance services.' 27 The
situation concerning banks, which caused so much delay to the Agreement, is
particularly convoluted. In relation to Russian subsidiaries of EU banks, Russia
reserved the right to continue to apply the ceiling to the overall share of foreign
capital in the Russian banking system which was in operation on the date of the
Agreement, and to retain the higher minimum capital requirement in force on the
date of the Agreement. For a period of five years, in relation to banks established
after the date of the Agreement, Russia could also restrict the number of Russian
branches, set a minimum level for balances on accounts of 55,000ECU, and
124 Ibid., Article 22, p. 11, and Article 21, p. 10.
125 Ibid., Article 15, p. 8, Annex 2, p. 61, and Annex 9, p. 72.
126 ibid., Article 24, p. 12.
121 jbid., Article 28, p. 14, Annex 3, p. 62, and Annex 4, p. 63.
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prohibit transactions in shares of Russian companies; finally, until 1 January
1996, Russia could also prevent EU banks established after 15 November 1993
from carrying out transactions with Russian residents.'28
Further privileges were accorded to Russia in terms of aid to exporting
industries. In general, such support could be granted to primary products for a
period of three years, or to struggling or emerging industries for a period of five
years.'29
 The Russian authorities were also permitted to continue to apply
restrictions on outwards direct investment by Russians, as well as capital
movements which affect the currency exchange rate.' 30
 Other significant aspects
of the Agreement include the guarantee from both sides that internal restrictions
for goods from the other party will be no greater than for domestic goods, and
both parties grant the right of transit through their territory of goods originating in
or destined for the other party.
Although in terms of trade advantages for Russia the Partnership
Agreement is less pivotal than may have been expected, it nonetheless consitutes
a crucial step forwards in relations between Russia and the European Union,
establishing a workable framework for foreign policy coordination, and opening
the possibility for very close economic interaction in the future. The economic
aspects of the Agreement are certainly not without value, otherwise they would
not have caused such protracted political wrangling; the decreased likelihood of
anti-dumping procedures being applied to Russian exports is of particular
importance. What remains to be seen is to what extent the spirit of the
Agreement will be adhered to, in terms of minimizing barriers to Russian trade
with the EU, and with regards to the establishment of the eventual free trade area.
12$ Ibid., Article 29, p. 15, and Annex 7, pp. 68-69.
129 Ibid., Article 53, p. 31.
130 Ibid., Article 52, pp. 29-30.
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2.6 On the Road to a Pan-European Economic Structure?
Potentially the most important aspect of the Partnership Agreement is that it
clearly establishes the prospect of a future free trade area. It is stated that one of
the objectives of the Agreement is:
to create the necessary conditions for the future establishment of a
free trade area between the Community and Russia covering
substantially all trade in goods between them, as well as conditions
for bringing about freedom of establishment of companies, of
cross-border trade in services and of capital movements.
The parties undertake to develop the relevant Articles, 'as circumstances allow',
with a view of establishing this free trade area. 'The parties shall examine
together in the year 1998 whether circumstances allow the beginning of
negotiations on the establishment of a free trade area'.' 31 Despite the pressure
from Germany, the conditions necessary for Russia's admission were not clarified
in the Agreement; neither were the precise aspects of trade which were to be
further liberalized. The proposed free trade agreement is in fact likely to be a
variation on the present European Economic Area (formerly know as the
European Economic Space, but renamed as there were fears of connotations with
'void' or 'nothingness') between the EU and EFTA, although aiming at a lesser
level of compatibility. There are no references in the Partnership Agreement to
the existing EEA, but it is most likely to be the basis for the eventual EU-Russia
free trade area. The superimposition of a new free trade area on top of the EEA
would represent a tremendous amount of duplication, confusion, and irritation.
Providing that it is accepted by all sides that Russian participation in no way
signifies a first step towards EU membership, the economic aspects of such an
extension of the LEA need not be particularly threatening.
In terms of freedom of goods from Russia, the abolition of duties and
tariffs could be expected, as could a higher degree of compatibility of standards
131 Ibid., Articles 1 and 3, pp. 4-5.
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and definitions of goods. Greatly reduced use on the EU's part of clauses which
allow anti-dumping measures, however, appears unrealistic. In cross-border trade
in services, the restriction to those spheres listed in Annex 5 could reasonably be
expected to be dropped by Russia, as could the interdiction on such services
being paid for in that countiy, as is the case under the Partnership Agreement.
The freeing of capital to a much greater extent than in the Agreement is likely to
be more problematic. As mentioned in Article 52, areas which need much more
liberalization include movements in portfolio investment, commercial credits and
financial loans. Financial services need to develop to a much greater extent in
Russia, as does trust in the Russian authorities, for capital movements to be truly
free. Freedom of persons could be relatively easy to achieve in terms of mutual
abandonment of the need for visas; the precedents set with countries such as
Poland give an indication of the feasibility of this. On the other hand, any hopes
of Russians having the freedom to seek work in the EU would be unrealistic.
This scheme is the clearest sign yet that the EU is willing to be the core of
a pan-European structure of some kind, whilst still insisting that this framework
be organizationally independent of the Union itself. In this, these proposals are in
keeping with many of the traditional plans for a new Europe. Jacques Delors'
vision, at the end of the 1980s, of a Europe of concentric circles, 132 may now be
closer to realization; an inner circle of the most committed EU members, with a
common currency and military capacity; an outer circle of EU members, stalling
on monetaiy union and militaiy union, but in every other way integrated; a circle
of associated members, consisting of East European and Baltic states, as well as
perhaps some EFTA countries who continued to resist the losses of sovereignty
involved in joining the Union; and finally, some or all of the CIS states, included
in a free trade area of abolished tariffs and compatible fiscal and legal systems,
but without tight links in currency or interest rates, nor any view to full Union
membership. Including Russia in a European Economic Area (EEA) moves
somewhat away, though, from Valery Giscard d'Estaing's vision a few years later
132 The Economist, 25 November 1989.
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of a 'European Village', consisting of several European Homes: (i) the Twelve;
(ii) the EFTA countries; (iii) the East European countries of the Warsaw Pact; (iv)
'isolated' countries - Yugoslavia, Albania, Malta; (v) the European part of the
Soviet Union.' 33 The assumption in this perspective was that interdependence
was to be much greater within the Houses than between them, but in fact
cooperation within the FSU, for example, has proven to be very elusive on
account of mistrust, anxiety about continued dependence on Russia, and a need
for Western rather than Soviet technology. Even between East Europeans,
agreements have been aimed more at successful membership application to the
EU than at increasing trade amongst themselves.
The existing concept of an EEA began to be taken more seriously in the
1980s, to allay Eftans' fears of being left in the cold by EC integration, yet not
leaving application for membership as their only option. Whilst the European
Free Trade Agreements in the early 1970s were essentially concerned with the
elimination of customs duties on industrial products, the EEA Agreement
established the 'four freedoms'. The EEA also aims to increase cooperation in
fields relating to economic activity which directly affect the four freedoms - the
so-called 'horizontal' policies, including social policy, consumer protection, the
environment, statistics and company law. Joint action is also expected in areas
outside the four freedoms, in the form of EFTA participation in Community
programmes, projects and actions concerning research and development, the
environment, social policy, information services, education, training and youth,
SMEs, tourism, and other areas.'" The fact that the integration process in the
EEA has allowed many of its members to be accepted for full EU membership
shows a high degree of success in making economies compatible with the EU,
but, on the other hand, also shows that the EEA is not considered an adequate
substitute to the Union. During this process of integration, EFTA countries have
met with numerous and serious problems, which are likely to be even more
133 Valery Giscard d'Estaing, op. cit., p. 656.
134 Background Report - European Economic Area - Background Briefing, EC Commission,
London Information Office, 13 January 1994, p. 2.
European Union Views on the New Eiu'ope and Policy Toward, RussIa 	 145
damaging in Russia's case. In other words, whilst an eventual free trade area
with Russia may be based on the EEA, even attached to it, Russia cannot
realistically be expected to have all the benefits of the countries already in the
EEA today.
Although the Economic Area is supposed to deal purely with economic
aspects of relations between the EFTA and EU states, one of the most basic
hindrances is the artificiality of the distinction between economic and political
integration; the interdependence of these two spheres has meant that it has been
very difficult for all sides to agree on where to draw the line on the integration
process. On one hand, the high level of necessary compatibility of systems and
scale of economic interpenetration has been problematic for some members, yet
on the other hand the lack of a customs union has created friction, undermining
much of what the EEA has to offer. The asymmetiy between EU and EFTA
members proved to be an obstacle to mutual accommodation, with partial
participation of Eftans in the decision-making process, for example, proving to be
frustrating for them, and cumbersome for the EU.' 35 Many specific examples of
these impediments were exposed in 1993, as frustration grew with the inability to
finalize the terms of the EEA. Iceland, for example, remained very reluctant to
join, mainly due to its fishing resources which it does not want to share;
Switzerland, followed by Liechtenstein, could not accept the loss of sovereignty
involved when they continue to be refused an opt-out clause from individual EEA
laws (as opposed to an opt-out for EFTA as a whole, which is catered for). To
enforce EEA laws, a joint panel of five judges from the European Court of Justice
and three from EFTA countries (from a pool of seven, one for each member) was
established. Yet, so far, the Twelve have refused to put this EEA legal body on
equal footing with the European Court of Justice, thus generating more
antagonism.'36
135 J. lvi. C. Rob and Helen Wallace, op. cit., p. 57.
136 The Financial Times, 15 May 1993.
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Despite the setbacks, however, the EEA has managed to greatly further the
cause of wider European integration, and at the same time managed to delay
applications from EFTA states long enough to get the Twelve firmly on the road
to an integrated Union. The EFTA countries, through the EEA, had already
adopted over 60% of the EC's acquis (meaning 60% of the legislation and
commitments to standards relating specifically to the EC) by 1992.' It is now
expected that the EEA will play the same delaying yet integrating role with the
Visegrad Four, to be thought of as a 'comfortable ante-chamber'. It had been
thought that the East Europeans might be introduced to the EEA sooner rather
than later, in part to lower the expectations of the Eftans in the conditions of
acceptance into the EU, especially in the fields of social and environmental
protection, as these could not be met by the Eastern members of the EEA. This
has failed to happen in time to affect the conditions of membership of the EFTA
countries which were to join the EU in 1995, but the same principle may be used
with Russia - in order to delay demands of high levels of integration from East
Europeans, the inability of Russia to join the EEA under those conditions may
provide a welcome excuse for Brussels to slow down the Visegrad Group's drive
for compatibility with the EU.
In any case, the prospect of Russia's inclusion in the EEA is now more
feasible, as long as reforms advance far enough to allow qualification for full
GATT membership. Not only would it be an effective mechanism for further
guidance of Russian economic reforms, but it may also be politically soothing.
The problem is that the EU member states are not ready to pay the price, in terms
of trade competition, needed to grant Russia more than a policy of rejection. The
protectionism which member states have so far imposed on the Commission
seems likely to continue, so that even if a pan-European free trade area is made
accessible to Russia, it is unlikely, at least in the near future, to greatly open up
those areas of trade which have not already been freed. That is not to say that the
symbolism of such a continent-wide free trade area would not be of value, nor
137 Anna Michaiski and Helen Wallace, 1992, op. cit., pp. 57 and 30.
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that limited improvements in the Russian access to the EU markets would not be
better than none at all - any such agreement would be of positive value. It is
likely to take the form, however, of a first step, rather than the full achievement of
free trade throughout Europe from the first day of such an agreement.
2.7 The Security Dimension of the New Europe - As Seen From the
European Union
Arguably the most sensitive aspect of the new relations between Russia and
Western Europe is that of security. As has now been made clear more than once
in this thesis, Russia is not realistically considered as a potential member of the
European Union, and a major reason for this is its geostrategic and military might.
The EU's CFSP will be considered much too closely-knit an alliance to be shared
with Russia, as long as she is both as powerful and as unpredictable as she is
now; only a long period of successful partnership in a less binding association
could reverse this Western perspective. Many structures for a new security
arrangement throughout Europe have been brandished by politicians and
academics, as we shall see below, but none of them foresee the precise future role
of Russia. The prospect of trying to tie the Russian 'bear' to Western Europe,
however loosely, is a fearful one for many. Nevertheless, this question has to be
adressed, for without its solution all other pan-European structure, including any
Agreement between the EU and Russia, will only solve part of the equation, and
will be vulmerable to changes depending on the security situation.
'Whatever else it might turn out to mean, Gorbachev's "Common
European Home" would be a home dominated by the Soviet Union', stated one
commentator in 1990. 138
 At around the same time (3iscard d'Estaing believed
that the USSR could not be included in the political sphere of a new Europe
138 Ian Davidson, 'The Search for a New Order in Europe', International Affairs, London, vol. 66,
no. 2, 1990, p. 282.
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because it would not be ready to give up conducting global diplomacy on other
continents.' 39
 The sheer size of the country has also been intimidating to
European decision-makers; for example, a former vice-president of the
Commission stated that 'Russia is a special case, if only because of its size, which
could threaten the interior equilibrium of the Community. [...] It would be as if
the USA were part of the Community'.'4°
The growing unrest in Russia, caused by the ever-increasing poverty and
inequality, compounded the West's insecurities about attempting a close security
alliance with Moscow. The severe economic slump has created a real possibility
of widespread civil war in a nuclear country, either through spontaneous unrest,
or instigated by a populist regime which may come to power. The success of
Vladimir Zhirinovskii's Liberal Democrats in the December 1993 elections
demonstrated the feasibility of the latter phenomenon. Even before the election,
there were many signs that Russia was shifting back to a policy of optimizing
geostrategic gains, at the expense of relations with Western countries, as shown
in Chapter One. This new self-determination in security policy included a
reversal of the policy of 'no first use' of nuclear weapons, which was supported
first by Brezhnev and later by Gorbachev. The abandonment of the nuclear-free
doctrine of the late 1980s was not entirely surprising or unpredicted. Willem van
Eekelen, General Secretary of the WEU, wrote in 1990 that the Kremlin was
likely to accept that the inherent danger in conventional warfare is that it is
calculable, and that particularly after the disappearance of the buffer zone, this
made a nuclear deterrent very desirable;' 4' Moscow's readiness to resort to first
use of nuclear weapons may be simply an extension of the same argument.
Combined with Moscow's new determination to keep its military sphere of
influence, however, the new doctrine has been wonying for Western analysts.
Russia's ruthless readiness to put down Chechnia's pro-independence
139 Valery Giscard d'Estaing, op. cit, p. 656.
140 Revue du marché unique européen, February 1992, article by Martin Bangemann, former Vice-
President of the Commission.
141 Francois Heisbourg (ed.), The Strategic Implications of Change in the Soviet Union,
HounditUllS, Macmillan, 1990, p. 48.
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government, which erupted at the very end of 1994, has obviously been of even
more concern.
All these developments have undeniably complicated the prospects for the
building of a new security structure in Europe, but they do not change the fact
that Europe is still much safer from superpower conflicts than it was ten years
ago. The following factors have all greatly increased security in Europe: the
elimination of medium-range missiles, including those of shorter-range (500-
1,000 km) and American warheads in Germany, under the 1NF Treaty;
asymmetrical reduction of conventional forces (especially significant, as this
greatly reduces the risk of surprise attacks); the signing of the START I and II
Treaties, to be complemented with unilateral measures; NATO declaring that the
USA and Britain will reduce their tactical nuclear weapons in Europe by 80%. 142
Perhaps most importantly, the withdrawal of Russian troops has been completed
in all the former satellite states of Eastern Europe. Also of significance is that
Russian nuclear missiles are no longer aimed at Western targets. Every one of
these reductions in the threat of Russian aggression make the possibility of joint
security structures more realistic, Moscow's geostrategic position now offering
less threat and leverage.
The road to a pan-European security arrangement was made less
improbable by the declining military role of the United States in Europe. In an
American directive on military planning for 1994-99, Washington stated for the
first time that it was not against the creation of a purely European security
structure. 143
 After the elimination of American land-based nuclear missiles in
Europe, and the decrease in American troops due to financial pressures on
Washington's budget, a new level of self-reliance has become essential for
Europeans. A truly joint security system may seem unrealistic, an unacceptable
encroachment on national governments' sovereignty, but in fact 'most of the
countries of Europe, constrained by history or by their own leader, have long ago
142 Dominique David, op. cit., p. 7, and Peter I. S. Duncan, 1990, op. cit., pp. 88-89.
143 S. Pechurov, 'Razvitie obstanovki v Evrope i Rossii', MEMO, no. 4, 1993, p. 128.
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let their power of defence slip on to others' shoulders'.' 44 Clearly there remain
many problems to be ironed out, for example the unprecedented establishment of
a truly multilateral military command, although it must be remembered that in the
past the main factor preventing such a joint leadership in the Atlantic alliance was
American insistence on keeping control.
Thus the vacuum created in the East by the disappearance of the Soviet
military presence in Eastern Europe, and the virtual collapse of law and order in
much of the FSU, was mirrored in the West, albeit to a far lesser degree, by the
decreasing American military presence in Europe. A new security architecture is
called for to fill these voids. Paradoxically, the greatest threat now is not Russian
power, but Russian weakness. It is the new dissolution of authority in some cx-
Soviet as well as Russian autonomous republics, combined with ethnic rivalries,
which most urgently require a mechanism to minimize loss of life, and prevent
attempts at national expansion such as have been experienced in the Former
Yugoslavia.
The threat of the latest Balkan War being replayed in the FSU on a much
greater scale is a real possibility. Russia's involvement in its so-called 'Near
Abroad', in other words the former Soviet states, can now be taken for granted,
and more recently the bloody intervention in Chechnia has shown the fragility of
peace in some areas of Russia itself Increasing the role of international bodies in
such situations could have saved very many lives. For a long time, the nature of
Russia's intervention was much more careful. Apart from Moldova and
Tadzhikistan, Russia's involvement in armed conflicts in its neighbouring states
had been restrained and covert, until Chechnia. As mentioned in the last chapter,
this was at least in part due to a fear of Western cooperation being sharply
curtailed in retaliation. However, Russia's patience, and subtlety, had run out by
the end of 1994. Still, although its implementation would be much more difficult
now, the theoretical need for a pan-European security structure is as great as ever.
144 'La plupart des pays d'Europe, contraints par l'histoire oü leur propre chef, ont depuis
longtemps fait glisser sur d'autres épaules leur pouvoir de defense' - Dominique David, op. cit., p. 1.
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Before trying to identify the potential role of existing organizations in a
new European security structure, it is essential to first define what we now mean
by 'security', as this has altered in the West just as it has in Russia. In the last
decade, security has become an issue no longer concerned purely with defence
matters, but also needing to deal with a whole array of non-military threats to
Western Europe which have been exacerbated by the instability and poverty in
the former Soviet Bloc. European security now includes not only avoiding
nuclear and chemical proliferation, the protection of minorities from
mistreatment, and so forth, but also minimizing the threat of economic and social
frustration, of violent nationalism, and the problems of military restructuring and
conversion. 145 In particular, the risk of nuclear accidents, of mass migration, and
of water and air pollution are all issues which the builders of a new European
security structure must now take into account.'46
This contemporary concern with non-military aspects of security, or 'soft
defence', vastly increases the potential for EU involvement in the construction of
a European safety framework. Indeed, Brussels is already a major player in many
of these fields, and in many cases this should remain the case, in order to take
advantage of already established infrastructures which could be extended to the
rest of Europe. One such area may well be environmental protection. This is a
field where Brussels has proved to be relatively effective within the Twelve. In
1990, the European Environment Agency was created to assist the Commission's
DG XI (Directorate General for environment, nuclear safety and civil protection)
to formulate and implement environmental policies, supported by an
environmental and observation network extending to all countries of the EU. The
Agency is already open to membership of all European countries, and its
Management Board, comprising representatives of the member states, the
European Parliament and the Commission, could very feasibly be altered to
145 I. M. Cuthbertson (ed), Redefining the CSCE - Challenges and Opportunities in the New
Europe, Helsinki, 1992, p. 103.
146 Peter van Ham, 1993, op. cit., p. 187.
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include, perhaps even be dominated by, the institution (such as the OSCE) which
would head an eventual overall security structure.
One area of environmental protection which is particularly pertinent with
the FSU is that of nuclear safety. The EU has been a leader in providing
specialists to secure workable power stations in the FSU, and to encourage the
closure of unreasonably hazardous ones (see Chapter Four). Another important
contribution of the European Community was its role in the establishment of the
European Energy Charter (see Chapter Three); the potential for increasing and
coordinating efforts to secure nuclear plants in the East has not been fully
exploited, and the European Energy Charter, with continuing support from the
EU, may well be the organization to cany this through.
The threat of massive migration from East to West is also one which the
EU is tackling, albeit vely indirectly so far; it would be unrealistic to expect the
West Europeans to entrust their immigration policies to any other international
body - the shift from national to EU control is proving sufficiently problematic.
Russia, however, could be persuaded to join an EU-designed imniigration policy
if it means greater access to the EU labour market for its citizens. Again, such an
extension of EU policy would require some institutional adjustment, in this case
perhaps adding joint EU-EEA or EU-OSCE sections to all the relevant
Directorates-General in the Commission, or establishing a specially-designed
joint immigration agency, still using much of the equipment, staff and information
developed originally by Brussels. Such a development could be part of the
realization of the eventual free trade agreement.
In the above sectors there is a very strong case for the EU to play a central
role in a new unification of Europes East and West, but in more defence-
orientated matters, the direction now being taken by the EU is unlikely to be
extendable to the FSU. Being part of the European Union not only equates to a
commitment to a common foreign and security policy, but it also increasingly
appears that the Western European Union will provide the EU's armed forces
from 1996, when the Union is expected to alter its own constitution to include
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defence. 147 The Western European Union (WEU) was established in 1955 by the
Six plus Britain, to coordinate the defence policies of its members and to further
cooperation in political, social and legal matters. After the establishment of the
European Community, the WEU gradually became the 'European pillar' of
NATO, remaining veiy much under the latter's control. The 1990s have brought
a change to the WEU's role, however. First of all the Maastricht Treaty granted a
dual role to the WEU, providing for it to be the EU's militaiy arm whilst retaining
its role in NATO.' At the NATO summit in Januaiy 1994 the WEU shifted
further towards being a truly European organization, when it obtained the right to
mount operations without the involvement of the USA, although Washington's
approval would still be needed.'49
 Soldiers from the so-called 'Eurocorps',
originally set up by France and Germany and since joined by Belgian, British,
Dutch and Spanish contingents, have been made available to the WEU. Yet
although the WEU is being moulded with peacekeeping in Eastern Europe in
mind, the inclusion of these former WTO countries in this Union is far from
certain, and that of Russia virtually impossible. The vely close links with both
NATO and the EU mean that unless Russia was a full member of both, full
membership of the WEU would almost certainly also be out of the question. The
position of the Visegrad Four is much more uncertain, although the consensus of
opinion appears to be that full membership of the WEU is highly unlikely before
full membership of the EU, despite the fact that associate membership has been
granted to them. Even membership of the EU would not guarantee full WEU
membership, however, largely because of Western fears of antagonizing Moscow.
Therefore, for military security especially, the EU is only likely to be part of the
pan-European solution, not the continental overlord which it is in economic
terms.
147 Fraser Cameron, op. cit., p. 100; also The Guardian, 8 January 1994.
148 The Moscow Tribune, 9 October 1992.
149 The Guardian, 8 January 1994.
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The European Union will, nevertheless, continue to overshadow the Council of
Europe. The Council of Europe, not to be confused with the EU's Council of
Ministers (often simply called the European Council), developed from the
Congress of Europe, held under the aegis of Churchill in The Hague in May
1948.'° Many of its original goals of economic and political cooperation in
Europe, and of partial sharing of sovereignty, were subsequently fulfilled by the
EC, the Council's earlier attempts to build a framework of integration and
burden-sharing having failed. 151 At the end of the 1980s, the Council of Europe
saw a certain revival, as it played a new role as bridge between Western and
Eastern Europe, and by 1991 it had created 'special guest' status for the countries
of Eastern Europe and the European countries of the FSU.' 52 Overall, the
Council of Europe's main role has been as a keeper of standards of human rights
amongst all nations with a claim to call themselves European. Its main
achievement is the establishment of the European Convention of Human Rights,
which is upheld by the European Court of Human Rights. An important issue in
the last few years has been how to extend the influence of this code of conduct to
European parts of the FSU. In 1993, the Council of Europe's Parliamentary
Assembly called for the establishment of an interim mechanism for the protection
of human rights in states participating in the CSCE, but not yet members of the
Council of Europe, and for Council of Europe member states to provide the
necessary funding (estimated at $30m p.a.).'53 Earlier suggestions included the
possibility for such states to request the opinion of the European Court of Human
Rights, and for them to invite the European Committee for the Prevention of
Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment to visit places of
detention in their countries. Participation in the European Convention of Human
Rights, however, has been judged against, as the countries concerned would not
150 Peter van Ham, 1993, op. cit., p. 26.
151 Anna Wallace and Helen Michaiski, op. cit, p. 4.
'52 Lucio Levi, 'Considerations on the European Community and the New World Order', The
Federalist, vol. 33, no. 1, 1991, p. 13.
153 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe - Recommendation 1219 (1993) - on
establishing a mechanism for the protection of human rights in European states not members of the
Council of Europe.
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be affected by the European Court's ultimate weapon, namely loss of membership
of the Council of Europe.' 54 The Council of Europe has also played a role in
establishing common parameters in many fields which already affect both sides of
Europe. By the autumn of 1993, Russia had adhered to or signed eight of the
Council of Europe's 143 conventions. 155 Most such international standards of
quality, however, are dealt with by the EU as an essential part of controlling the
single market. In the sphere of human rights, especially when dealing with
violations on a large scale, the activities are largely duplicated by the CSCE,
although without the support of the European Court of Human Rights. What role
could be left? There have been suggestions that the Council serve as a 'political
antechamber' to the EC, l56 but this role now seems more likely to go to the
European Economic Area (Mark II). Perhaps the most interesting idea has been
to find ways of associating the framework of the Council of Europe and of its
Assembly with parliamentary debates in the EU which clearly affect the whole of
Europe;' 57 a similar concept, noted by the Commission but not involving the EU,
is for the Council to regularly organize meetings of the heads of European states,
either through a conference of European states meeting at the invitation of the
European Council, or perhaps even in the framework of a confederation based on
the Council of Europe. 158 In fact, however, the Council of Europe is extremely
unlikely to become the basis for a continental security or political structure. In
terms of political and economic integration it is dwarfed by the EU, and in terms
of military potential or acceptability to Russia, it is eclipsed by the CSCE. Not
the least of the Council of Europe's problems are the unclear boundaries of its
mandate. Even the Council of Europe's Parliarnentaiy Assembly has recognized
154 ParliamentayAssembly of the Council ofEurope - Recommendation 1183 (1992).
155 Chart of Signatures and Ratifi cations ofEuropean Treaties, Directorate of Legal Affairs, Treaty
Section, Council of Europe, 5 November 1993 update; the European Conventions concerned are:
Culturaj; Protection of Archaeological Heritage (both original and revised versions); Spectator Violence
at Sports Events and in Particular at Foothall Matches; Protection of the Architectural Heritage of
Europe; Anti-Doping; Protection of Animals During International Transport; additional protocol to the
latter, Information on Foreign Law.
156 Anna Wallace and Helen Michaiski, op. cit., p. 23.
157 Ibid., p. 66.
158 From a report from the EC Comniission to the European Council, Lisbon, 24 June 1992, in
Graham J. L. Avery, op. cit.; EC Doc., 24 June 1992, in Bibilo post-Maastricht, no. 7, 1992.
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this, calling in 1992 for measures to improve the knowledge amongst CSCE
participating states about Council of Europe activities in order to avoid
duplications, waste of resources and possible conflicts. 159
 It is particularly
essential for the Council of Europe and the CSCE to clarify, coordinate, and
possibly even ainalganiate their respective actions and policies on human rights, if
the Council of Europe is to maximize its effectiveness in what is its most
important field.
The organization with the most experience of trying to ensure security in Europe,
and the mentor of the EU's own embryonic defence organization, is the North
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). NATO is of obvious importance to the
future of cooperation between Russia and Western Europe; an overly agressive
policy on the part of the Atlantic Alliance could easily derail the movement
towards closer relations with the EU, whilst a policy of restraint and compromise
could achieve the opposite. The creation of NATO was sparked off by the Soviet
blockade of Berlin in 194849, 160 and until the late 1980s its raison d'être
remained to defend the West from the Soviet threat. With the great reduction in
this menace by the late 1980s, the purpose and even the future of NATO were in
doubt. One of the suggestions, for example by the then US Secretary of State
James Baker in Berlin on 12 December 1989, was to assign new, non-military
tasks to NATO, including the building of new economic and political ties with the
East, promoting respect for human rights, helping to build democratic institutions,
and so forth.' 6 ' This proposal met with much opposition. Ian Davidson, for
example, argued that NATO was neither equipped nor experienced enough to do
this, and should instead simply accept a reduction in its role, as the price for
remaining 'alive and functional' as before, even if this meant weakening the main
American lever in East-West European affairs. Yet despite a lack of experience at
159 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe - Recommendation 1184 (1992) - on the
work of the CSCE on the eve of the Third Summit (Helsinki, 9-11 July 1992).
160 John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: an Interpretive History,
New York, 1978, pp. 190-92.
161 Ian Davidson, op. cit, p. 282.
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a cooperative rather than defensive approach, NATO has been the most active and
effective institution so far in drawing up a new security arrangement. The fact
that NATO no longer has a counterpart in Eastern Europe has not prevented it
from seeking alliances there, and succeeding. This could mean that it is only a
matter of time before NATO (or one of its new creations) takes on a political
aspect, especially if other European institutions fail to do so on a continental
scale. It was noted in the last chapter how even in Russia there has been the odd
suggestion that as only NATO has come up with an adequate security plan, it
would be the only sound basis for a defence system for the whole continent;'62
the establishment of NACC at first seemed to confirm this. The North Atlantic
Cooperation Council brought together all the former members of the WTO and
the signatories of NATO, aiming to enhance military consultation, and to
cooperate in military planning, civilian management of the military, disarmament
and conversion, air traffic control, and civil emergency planning. In 1992, NACC
had also established an Ad Hoc Group on Cooperation in Peacekeeping, which
included representatives from the CSCE and from non-NACC CSCE countries.'63
In fact, though, NACC turned out to be insufficient, largely because it was not
offering membership, protection nor even a strategy to tackle violent conflicts in
the former Eastern Bloc. The Visegrad Four in particular kept pushing hard for
closer association with, and eventual membership of, NATO. We have seen
already, however, that by the end of 1993 Moscow was clearly against the
inclusion of Eastern Europe in NATO. Attempts to appease Moscow with a
separate treaty with NATO were insufficient, and the NATO leaders in the end
backed down from directly offering membership to the East Europeans. The
compromise that was reached in time for the January NATO summit was the
'Partnership for Peace' (PFP, or sometimes referred to as P4P). This
Partnership's official aim is to adapt the military systems of many of the ex-WTO
162 S. Pechurov, op. cit., p. 127.
163 'Statement Issued at the Meeting of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council', at NATO
IleadqualterS, Brussels, 3 December 1993, NA TO Review, December 1993.
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states so that they could eventually join NATO,' 64 which is now officially stated
to be a definite possibility; in the words of President Clinton, PFP 'changes the
entire dialogue so that now the question is no longer whether NATO will take on
new members, but when and how. It leaves the door open'.' 65 No timetable is
provided, though, precisely because of the reluctance to antagonise Moscow more
than is deemed strictly necessary. Each country has been encouraged to go at its
own pace.
Russia's own position vis-à-vis PFP has always been unique, and difficult.
For a country not aiming at NATO membership, PFP offers very little more than
the NACC framework within which it was created. In the event of a threat to
territiorial integrity or political independence, PFP merely promises consultation
from NATO.'66 Membership of PFP provides the opportunity to establish a
liaison office at NATO Headquarters, but the main incentive for joining remains
the provision for gradually making a country's armed forces compatible with
those of NATO, thus facilitating membership. Yet despite the realization that full
NATO membership is not a realistic option for Russia in the short- or medium-
term, Moscow has accepted many compromises to join the NATO Partnership.167
Although the soothing effect on relations with the West will be pleasing to
E1'tsin, as will be the increased cooperation on conversion projects, the main
reason for Russia's participation lies elsewhere. El'tsin's goal is almost certainly
to delay, and perhaps even prevent, NATO expansion into Eastern Europe. In the
words of Alexei Pushkov, PFP 'leaving the issue of admission open until things in
i64 Johnathan Sunley, 'Tasks for NATO II: Improve the Partnership for Peace', World Today, April
1995 p. 70.
15 The Guardian, 13 January 1994.
166 'Partnership for Peace: Framework Document', NATO Review, February 1994, p. 29.
167 Despite this agreement to join the Partnership for Peace in general, signed in the summer of
1994, the issue of NATO expansion remained a serious bone of contention between Russia and the
Atlantic Alliance, and was used as the reason for Foreign Minister Kozyrev not signing two programmes
which came under PFP and formed the core aspects of it; namely, commitment to ambitious programmes
of military cooperation with possible joint peace-keeping operations. These two programmes were finally
signed in late May 1995, when Russia apparently felt more confident about the fact that NATO expansion
would not occur in the near future; from The Guardian, 2 December 1994, 6 December 1994 and 31 May
1995.
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Russia become clearer, best suits both the West's and Russia's interests'.'68
There were clear signs of Russia's anti-expansionist stance during the
negotiations for PFP, when El'tsin's representatives objected strongly both to a
reference to PFP's role in the expansion of NATO, and, of particular interest to
the EU, to the mentioning of the associate status granted by the WEU to East
European and Baltic states. 169 Statements in the press declaring that Moscow no
longer opposed NATO expansion were probably a severe misinterpretation; what
Andrei Kozyrev actually said was that 'We do not preclude the possibility that we
or other countries should join NATO, but there is no haste'. 170 This could just as
easily be taken to mean that East Europeans will only be allowed into NATO
when Russia is offered membership, in other words not for a vely, veiy long time.
It was never probable that a NATO-based structure could be the solution
for a united Europe, considering Russia's apprehensions about American
supremacy. PFP and NACC, being derivatives of NATO, remain to a very large
degree in Washington's control. This was made clear during PFP negotiations in
the spring of 1994, when the American Ambassador to NATO replied to Russian
requests for a different status from that of the East Europeans by saying that 'the
partnership itself is on the basis of equality of opportunity.' He added that
'outside Partnership for Peace we would be pleased to talk to them about how one
could have consultative mechanisms [...]. But we wanted to make very clear that
NATO takes its own decisions'.'71 Thus the author believes that hopes for a true
solution remain outside PFP.
The Americans have also stressed the possibilities outside PFP, the
Secretary of State, Warren Christopher, stating that dialogue on nuclear
disarmament, strategic doctrine and counter-proliferation were potential topics for
what be called 'Sixteen plus One' consultations.' 72 Such consultations, though,
'68 Mexei Pushkov, 'Russia and the West: an Endangered Relationship?', NATO Review, Februaiy
1994 p. 23.
169 The Guardian, 11 June 1994.
170 SWB, SU/2030, 24 June 1994 - taken from World Service, Moscow, in Russian, 22 June 1994,
j The Guardian, 23 June 1994.
171 The Guardian, 7 March 1994.
172 The Guardian, 10 June 1994.
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would not satisfy Moscow's need for a more active role in European security. In
other words, if Russian membership of PFP is to have any significant effect, it is
most likely to be this structure's stagnation, rather than allowing NATO to lead
the direction of Europe's new security arrangement. This will probably only
change when Moscow obtains what it failed to acquire in negotiations over PFP
- a wider organization, of which both the CIS and NATO are constituent parts,
and which is not controlled in Washington. NATO foreign ministers have
themselves in the past declared that Eastern Europe should concentrate on the
CSCE and the EC, 173 and this still appears to be the most sound solution, short of
developing a new structure altogether.
It is the CSCE which Moscow has most often specified as the organization which
should have overarching control over all the security organizations operating in
Europe, including NATO. This was put forward as a pre-condition for Russian
adherence to PFP when Defence Minister Grachev visited the NATO
headquarters in May 1994, and only in the vely last stages of negotiations, after
NATO unambiguously refused any degree of subordination, did the Russians
back down. Nevertheless, Kozyrev concluded a speech on the day he had signed
PFP (in principle) by declaring that the main aim was 'to direct every effort
towards the fonnulation of a single Europe in which the main role, NATO and
Russia were agreed, would go to the CSCE'.'7
The European Union would have much to gain if Washington could agree
with Moscow on a security coordinating and controlling role for the CSCE
throughout Europe. The EU's links with the Helsinki Process already go very
deep, and the European Parliament's readiness to participate has been particularly
noticeable. Not only was Brussels of importance in the original Conference, but
the EU also encouraged the CSCE, starting at the 1984 Venice meeting, to assist
in encouraging economic and environmental cooperation throughout the
173 The Guardian, 16 Februaiy 1991.
174 SWB, SU12030, 24 June 1994 - taken from World Service, Moscow, in Russian, 22 June 1994,
B/7.
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continent. In 1987, the European Parliament passed a motion stating that the
CSCE process was the most appropriate instrument for a European policy of
détente, and it called for an integration of members' security interests into EPC.
It was hoped that this would enable the EC to be on an equal standing with
Washington and Moscow at future CSCE conferences,' 75
 rather than
concentrating purely on economic and human rights aspects of the Helsinki
Process, as EPC had done so far. Although this level of involvement was not
supported by the European Council, the Dublin Summit of June 1990 did
nonetheless reaffirm the important role played by the CSCE in the process of
change in Europe, and it was stated that the EC should continue to play a leading
role in the CSCE.'76 Meanwhile the Parliament continued to be more enthusiastic
about the CSCE, calling (in 1990) on the foreign ministers at the forthcoming
CSCE meeting to promote an initiative for political cooperation with the countries
of the former Eastern Bloc, to be pursued in close cooperation with the
Commission of the EC and the European Parliament.' 77 The MEPs went further
still in 1993, resolving that,
the EC must use its influence in the CSCE in particular to seek a
solution to all the conflicts between and within the countries of the
FSU before they spiral out of control and trigger off crises of
international dimensions posing a threat to world peace and
stability.'78
In particular, it was stated that reform of the political and legal systems in the
FSU could be helped by the Council of Europe and the CSCE (through its Office
of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights), and that the Parliament believed
that the CSCE process must be backed up by arbitration arrangements as a way of
helping to resolve the intractable conflicts bedeviling parts of the FSU.'
175 European Parliament Document, EP DocA 2-26/87, pp. 5-8.
176 Fraser Cameron, op. cit. p. 97; also Background Report - The European Community and the
Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe, in View of the Helsinki Follow-Up Meeting, EC
cnjsion, London Information Office, 26 March 1992.
171 EP Doc. B3-0664/90.
178 EP Doc. A3-0201/93, p. 5.
179 Ibid.
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Although the European Parliament's enthusiasm for an increased role for
the CSCE has only partially been translated into action by the Council and the
Commission, there is nonetheless a solid basis of cooperation already in place
upon which to build the joint structures to deal with pan-European environmental
and emigration problems suggested in the above paragraphs on the EU. The
guidance and support of the EU would be an invaluable asset to the CSCE in its
transition to an eventual leading role in European security, providing that the
CSCE has its own financial backing to avoid depleting Brussels' already stretched
resources. In already combining at least some aspects of political, social,
economical as well as military security, the CSCE has a head start over NATO.180
The EU Council's failure to push for a strong security role for the CSCE
goes against the advice of some West European specialists. One main reason for
this support of the CSCE is that it is not based on the old framework of
conflicting alliances. The fact that the Helsinki Process is not overwhelmingly
dominated by the USA not only makes it more attractive to Russia, but also
provides the potential for Europeans to acquire a greater ability to determine their
own future defence policy. A shift away from the previously high level of
dependence upon American military support in Europe is not a new requirement;
by the mid-1980s, the Western security alliance had come to a severe conflict
over burden-sharing.' 8 ' As the level of military might needed in Western Europe
has declined with the immediacy of the Russian threat, the feasibility of European
states accounting for a greater proportion of this defence capability has increased.
Conversely, the fact that the Americans are an important part of the CSCE is also
a blessing. Although greater self-determination in European security is desirable,
the prospect of being devoid of American military support is too perilous to be
acceptable to most strategists. In part this is because the core of the military
' 80 Chr1es Kegley Jr, 'Does the US Have a Role in the Future European Security System?' in
Redefining the CSCE - Challenges and Opportunities in the New Europe, ed. I. M. Cuthbertson,
Helsinki, 1992, p. 131.
'81 Wjllem F. Van Eekelen (General Secretaiy of the WEU), 'The Future of NATO and Warsaw
Pact Strategy', The Strategic Implications of Change in the Soviet Union, ed. Francois Heisbourg,
Basingstoke, 1990, p. 41.
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threat to Western Europe is nuclear, especially now that Russia's conventional
forces are reduced and are further away; consequently, as the USA provides the
most efficient nuclear deterrent, it still holds a key role. 182
 The CSCE is the only
organization which can count on some degree of American protection, without
being subject to overwhelming American control. Yet it is not simply American
domination that the CSCE could help discourage. One common concern is that if
Russia is included in a European structure, it would then inevitably dominate it,
and that if it is not, Germany would then have an inordinate amount of influence.
A CSCE-based structure could balance out the strength of these three powers.
Another strength of the CSCE process is that, from its very inception, it
has been concerned not merely with international affairs, but also with violence
and attacks on human rights within countries, thus challenging the traditional
taboo on interfering in another country's internal affairs. This strong leaning of
international law towards problems in interstate relations, not those within states,
is a major reason why the crisis in Former Yugoslavia could not be solved sooner.
The Paris Charter of 1990 and the Helsinki Document of 1992 explicitly stated
that human rights are a 'matter of direct and legitimate concern to all participating
states and does not belong exclusively to the internal matters of the state
concerned'.' 83 The CSCE could, if supported adequately by all sides, be in a
good position to develop its experience in encouraging governments to feel
accountable to the international community in their treatment of minorities or of
the opposition, especially if the European Parliament's suggestion of an effective
arbitration system can be realized.
Probably the best reason for concentrating on the CSCE as Europe's overall
defence framework is that it is the one most suitable for translating Russia's
desire for assistance with its defence objectives into international leverage and
interdependence. As mentioned earlier, the high cost of large-scale military
involvement in conflicts in neighbouring states is a great worry to Moscow.
'82 Dominique David, op. cit.
183 Michael Mihailca, op. cit., p. 3.
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Although it is by no means clear what level of Western involvement could be
negotiated in exchange for financial support, Moscow certainly understands that
it will not be without its price. At the very least teams of monitors should be
sent, whose reports will determine whether financial support should continue. In
theoiy, if proposals were carefully designed with adequate consultation, a system
of joint forces, and some level of joint decision-making, might be made to work.
Debates along these lines have already been taking place, Washington for
example coming up with 'Directive 13', which called for external help in the
resolution of conflicts between states of the FSU by the UN, the CSCE or perhaps
even NACC; this directive attracted much criticism from the USA's NATO allies,
however.1M There are, indeed, many potential pitfalls. The experience of the
early stages of the military intervention in Chechnia, however, has shown the
El'tsin administration was then not willing to risk either opposition from anti-
Western forces in Russia, or a further Western outciy based on the reports of an
intergovernmental organization. That lack of support for the OSCE evidently
puts the entire progress of this body on the back burner, at best. Michael Mihalka
may well be right in suggesting, however, that this failure to translate theoretical
support for the OSCE into practical empowerment from the side of the Russian
government is due in large measure to the low level of support which the OSCE
commands amongst West European governments.'85
Even if there came to be a mutual readiness to form a truly supranational
pan-European security structure, some would argue that military alliances
designed to protect its members from each other can be argued to be 'plausible
only if they are not really needed'. A new European security organization might
fail to be more effective than previous attempts at military alliances in the Middle
East or in the Balkans, even if they included the setting up of 'multiple reciprocal
stationing of forces, national or multinational, by European states on each other's
territories in a "reassuring" or preventative function', because if Russia again
184 The Guardian, 19 August 1993.
185 Michael Mihalka, op. cit., p. 8.
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became militaristic, or if Germany distanced itself from the EU and/or became
aggressive towards Russia, reciprocal entanglements probably would not help.'96
Gerhard Wettig stressed that under a system of collective security, 'the
contractual obligations taken are a mere bluff', as governments still have the
freedom to apply them only as long as the benefits outweigh the costs.187
Although these points should be kept in mind, reminding us that there are
never any guarantees on security alliances' endurance, it can also help us to focus
on how to maximize the chance of making an alliance work - making the
benefits outweigh the costs. Thus the more benefits it provides for Russia,
without granting it obvious supremacy in any important sphere, the more
influence the OSCE (or an entirely new organization) could have as an
organization.
Of course the OSCE at present has numerous failings, and is a veiy long
way from being a continental leader or patron. In the words of I. M. Cuthbertson,
'the broad and relatively unstructured mandate of the CSCE process, which gave
it flexibility during the last two decades, is now seen by some as a liability'.'88
Some American diplomats at the Helsinki meeting in July 1992 went further,
saying that 'the CSCE is not an international organization. It is in constant
change'. 189
 The risk of insufficient support being provided by the USA for an
increase in the OSCE's importance at the expense of NATO is a veiy serious one,
but which might be overcome by a desire on Washington's part not to provoke
Moscow by expanding NATO, yet wanting another structure to cover Eastern
Europe. 'Directive 13', despite being arrogant in tone, showed the first (albeit
untypical) signs of Amencan willingness to grant an important security role to the
Helsinki Process.
Despite the OSCE not yet being a vely powerful body, at least it is a long-
established one. The Paris Summit in 1990 made a CSCE organization out of
186 Pierre Hassner, 1990(u), op. cit., p. 468.
187 Gerhard Wettig 'Security in Europe: A Challenging Task', Aussenpolitik, English edition, vol.
43, 1992, nO. i,p.5.
188 I. M. Cuthbertson (ed), op. cit, p. 3.
189 Gerasimos Turukis, 'Evropa v poiskakh novogo ustroistva', MEMO, no. 5, 1993, pp. 91-99.
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what was formerly merely a CSCE process, and at the 1992 Review Conference
in Helsinki, the Belgian government's proposal that the CSCE become a
collective regional security organization under chapter eight of the UN Charter
was approved.' 90 There have been more concrete developments, with the CSCE
Office of Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) opening in
Warsaw, the Conflict Prevention Centre in Vienna (there have been suggestions
to merge these two bodies together), and the CSCE Secretariat in Prague. The
Helsinki Summit also saw the establishment of the post of High Commissioner on
National Minorities.' 9 ' The creation of a stronger Court of Arbitration and
Conciliation is still being discussed. At the CSCE Summit in Budapest in
December 1994, the Conference was officially renamed the Organization for
Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). This change is seen as being
merely cosmetic, as operationally the organization remained the same. This was
also the Summit where Russia failed to persuade its West European partners to
increase the role of the OSCE, as partially explained above. The main objection
that the Western members had was that if the CSCE was to become the
coordinator of all security bodies operating in Europe, Russia would be likely to
obtain a veto over NATO activities in CSCE areas.192
The CSCE was often criticized for having failed to react adequately to the
escalation of war in the former Yugoslavia, but when violence erupted in 1991 it
had no institutional capacity to deal with it; the Conflict Prevention Centre had
only been open a few months, and its brief was to deal with interstate rather than
intrastate conflicts, contrarily to that of the ODIHR.' 93 More importantly, of
course, it suffered from the same lack of political support for intervention as did
NATO and the WEU, a fact deplored by the CSCE Parliamentaiy Assembly in
July 1993. 1
 Nevertheless, the CSCE has sent observer missions to conflict areas
of the Balkans and of the FSU, and has established on-site missions in Estoma,
190 Charles Kegley Jr, op. cit., p. 131, and Fraser Cameron, op. cit., pp. 98-99.
191 Konrad J. Huber, op. cit., p. 12.
192 Michael MihMk2 op. cit., Pp. 4-6.
193 Konrad J. Huber, op.cit., p. 12.
194 Helsinki Declaration of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 9 July 1993, P. 6.
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Abkhazia, Macedonia, Kosovo, Sandzak and Vojvodina (the last three are in the
rump of Former Yugoslavia). All in all, however, it has had to concentrate on
monitoring and prevention of potential conflicts; one particularly successful
instance was the intervention of the High Commissioner on National Minorities in
Estonia, which, combined with pressure from the Council of Europe, helped to
persuade the government to alter the proposed constitution in the interests of the
rights of the Russian minority.'95
Clearly, though, there is much restructuring of the OSCE to be done if it is
to assume a European UN-type role. Many serious suggestions have been put
forward, some of which show the influence of the EU as successful precedent
worth following. The growing importance of the OSCE's Council of Ministers,
and the annual summit of OSCE heads of state are examples of the emerging EU-
type decison-making structure. The OSCE's Parliamentary Assembly has also
requested that the Council of Ministers set up a Council of Permanent
Representatives with headquarters in Vienna, with the task of preparing for
meetings of the Council, implementing and following up the decisions of the
Council,' 96 thus playing the role of both the Commission and COREPER
(Committee of Permanent Representatives) in Brussels. The need to reform
important voting majorities is even more essential in the OSCE than it is in the
EU. Although consensus-minus-one has been accepted in cases of blatant
violations of human rights, there have been wide-spread calls for an acceleration
of the decision-making process; the Parliamentary Assembly singled out the need
to abandon consensus-minus-one, presumably for a system of QMV similar to
that of the EU's Council. The Assembly also invited its Council of Ministers to
consider setting up a CSCE security committee, based on an annual rotation
system between representatives of Member States which would examine all
subjects relating to peacekeeping and peace enforcement;' 97
 this could become
the OSCE's equivalent of the UN's Security Council.
195 Konrad J. Huber, op. cit.
196 Helsinki Declaration of the CSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 9 July 1993, p. 16.
191 Ibid., p. 17.
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For the OSCE to develop a real peacekeeping and peace enforcement
capability, the relationship between it and the bodies providing troops must be
clarified, and the OSCE's position strengthened. The providers of the OSCE's
military resources could be divided into four main groups: the Western European
Union; non-WEU members of NATO (this may include countries such as the UK
and Denmark, who may become excluded from the WEU if their commitment is
insufficient); East European states; and the CIS. The first steps towards such an
arrangement were taken in July 1992, when the CSCE was empowered to call
upon NATO, the WEU and others to help with peacekeeping.' 98 If ever such a
system of coordination and control of peacekeeping and peace enforcement in
Europe was achieved, NATO would inevitably retain a higher status, as an 'elite'
section of the CSCE's forces, with its higher technology used to the assistance of,
but not shared with, the other CSCE groups. The decision-making structure of
each individual military grouping could decide to decline involvement in any
particular conflict. Any proposed peacekeeping or enforcement mission would
need the approval of the CSCE's security committee to take place; disobeying
CSCE rulings could result in sanctions and/or loss of CSCE membership.
The abolition of the need for consensus in the CSCE Council, as suggested
above, would solve the main objection used by the USA to subordination of
NATO to the CSCE, namely that Russia would be given a veto over NATO
activities, as long as the Council could overrule decisions by the security
committee (unlike the UN's Security Council).
At the Helsinki summit in 1992, the German government proposed the
establishment of a permanent and easily accessible CSCE force, the 'Green
Helmets', responsible both for peacekeeping and environmental protection.'99
Eventually, the CSCE could have developed a truly multinational military
command, with a level of integration nearing that which NATO has at present,
although in the meanthne NATO would most likely retain the role of coordinator
198 The Financial Times, 27 November 1993.
199 Fraser Cameron, op. cit., pp. 98-99.
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in any major interventions. There should be clearly defined stages making this
process of integration a gradual one, with eveiy stage being conditional upon
adherence to the principles this whole structure is designed to upkeep.
It must be recognized, however, that the scenario depicted above is veiy
unlikely to be realized. For any real increase in the power of the OSCE to take
place, there is a need for a level of initiative and foresight which is lacking
amongst present politicians in Europe. West European powers, writes Stefano
Silvestri,
while engaged in a 'reformist' process of European integtation,
have a strong 'residual' interest in the maintenance of the present
international system and share with the major powers the distrust
and the fear of 'new' solutions which might endanger their
strength.20°
More recently, we have also seen that Russian support for the OSCE at the
moment is much greater in theory than in practice, at least so far as involvement
within the FSU is involved.
Even before war broke out in Chechnia, despite the many statements about
the desirability of a stronger role for the CSCE, in June 1994 Moscow rejected a
CSCE proposal which would support 'third party' (not CSCE and not UN)
peacekeeping operations, because they would have to be subject to scrutiny by
CSCE monitors. The EU, again showing a very united stance in CSCE
negotiations, complained of the Russians wanting any monitoring to be merely
symbolic. It seems, however, that monetary support for Russian peacekeeping
was not part of these negotiations. There is still an outside chance that if the
price is right, CSCE monitoring might become acceptable.
This does not make for a promising future. It now seems likely that within
a decade the inclusion of Eastern Europe into a NATO-based structure will have
resurrected a Cold War mentality between NATO and non-NATO members, and
that whichever way the East Europeans fall, Europe will again be divided, and
200 Stefäno Silvesiri, 'The New World Order: Too Good to be True?', The International Spectator,
vol. 26, no. 4, October-December 1991, p. 31.
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again more dangerous. The EU should increase its efforts to work on soft
defence issues, in some areas by itself and in others with the OSCE, and to find a
mutually acceptable, veiy possibly OSCE-based solution to the lack of military
cooperation in Europe, and to the threat of a new split. Inevitably, whilst the
Russian government is close enough to the Slavophile pole of foreign policy to
allow full-scale warfare to take place on its territory, whilst allowing only
negligible West European involvement, no real progress can be achieved in the
establishment of a new European security siructure. As soon as the Russian
governmental position changes back to a more conciliatory position, however, all
the above arguments will have to be considered.
2.8 Conclusions
Although the full integration of Russia into the EU is not seriously at issue, nor
will it be in the foreseeable future, the level of cooperation and interdependence
which can be secured between Brussels and Moscow will nonetheless be of
decisive importance in determining Russia's future openness to the West as a
whole. This is in part due to the intrinsic economic and political gains which
could potentially stem from the signing of the Partnership Agreement, and in part
because of the precedent established through accords with the EU, which opens
the way for closer interaction with other European and international
organizations.
Despite the discrepancies in individual EU states' approaches to relations
with Russia, in particular France's fear of decelerating integration, Britain's
determination to do precisely that, and the Mediterranean states' fear of losing out
to Russian import competition, the Partnership Agreement shows that enough
compromise can be reached to encourage closer commercial and diplomatic
exchanges between Moscow and Western Europe within an EU framework. The
signing of the Maasiricht Treaty has also shown the high level of consensus still
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possible in the Union, and makes likely an even greater degree of coordination in
EU foreign policy, as well as a more prominent role for the European Parliament.
The result may eventually be an increased ability to pursue more enthusiastic and
far-sighted policies towards Russia.
The process of rapprochement between the EC and the USSR was strongly
dominated by Soviet initiatives and control by Brussels over what should be
included in agreements between the two sides. This shows both the relative
economic weakness of the USSR/Russia in relation to the EC/EU, and the greatly
increased importance of economic might and competitiveness in contemporary
international relations. However, the lack of a need to initiate or to push for
consensus has also meant that Brussels has offered much less not only than
Russia wanted in their mutual accords, but also less than many specialists saw as
desirable to increase Russian goodwill towards Western Europe. The shift away
from Westernist policies can be attributed in part to the insufficiently generous
terms, especially in trade restrictions, offered by the EU to Russia. Negotiations
over the Partnership Agreement demonstrated that the greatest stumbling blocs
between both sides were over protection of the EU market, most notably in
chemicals, non-ferrous metals, nuclear fuels and satellite launchings. The
Council and Commission would have done well to heed the criticism coming not
only from Moscow, but also from its own Parliament and many specialists,
suggesting that the benefits to bilateral relations of freeing trade in these areas
would far outweigh the damage done within the EU, especially considering
Russia's very limited ability to increase exports during its chaotic transition
period.
The initial signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (and
eventual signing of the Interim Agreement which enacted the commercial clauses
of the Partnership Agreement - see Postscriptum) is nevertheless of great
importance. On the political side, the bi-annual summits put in place by the
Agreement are an important vehicle through which to achieve still closer
interaction and mutual understanding; it is significant that this is the very same
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mechanism which the EU uses for its high-level contacts with the USA. The
establishment of an official framework for technical assistance and for
cooperation in a vast number of cultural and scientific areas is also valuable. On
the commercial side, recognizing Russia as being an 'economy in transition'
rather than a centralized economy, in terms of decreased liability to anti-dumping,
was a very important concession. The prospect of a free trade area extending to
Russia is clearly the most remarkable aspect of the Partnership Agreement; what
remains to be seen is the extent to which Brussels is committed to its realization,
and how many 'special' areas of restricted trade will survive. A detailed study is
needed of the expected levels and benefits of trade and economic interdependence
which would result from Russia's inclusion in a new EEA.
It has been shown that the EU has a vital part to play in pan-European
security, not least because the definition of security itself has changed in the last
decade. Primarily, the EU's direct role should lie in 'soft defence' areas such as
environmental protection, human rights, poverty and migration control. The EU's
experience, staff and infrastructure should be extended to the rest of Europe, very
possibly with the help of the OSCE. As its own WEU is inappropriate for FSU
membership, and as a NATO-based structure is most likely to eventually be
divisive, the EU should also unite in insisting on a greater role for the OSCE, or
alternatively a new security organization, in coordinating and controlling
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, as well as military pacts,
throughout the European continent.
The problems with the establishment are enormous, and have become even
more so after the war in Chechnia and Russia's own lack of support of OSCE
activity in the FSU. Nevertheless, the dire need for a new security structure to be
set up in Europe is obvious, as is the desirability of including Russia in that
structure, lest Europe again be neighboured by an unfriendly superpower. A
better balance between granting Russia a voice in Europe's security organization
which reflects its size and power, yet does not allow it to paralyze the rest of the
continent's ability to act against Moscow's interests if Russia stands alone, is the
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necessary goal. Without a mutually acceptable solution to the security question,
the economic and political agreements between Russia and the EU rest on
unstable ground.
The Effect of Russian Economic Reforms on ForeIgn Trade, and on Prospects of
Closer Russia-EU Economic Relations
Chapter 3: The Effect of Russian Economic Reforms on
Foreign Trade, and on the Prospects of Closer Russia-EU
Economic Relations.
3.1 Introduction
The importance of commercial interaction between the European Union and
Russia is critical; although the political aspects of the relationship are the main
concern of the EU, Russia is largely concerned with the economic sides of this
partnership. As explained in the first chapter, Russia's inability to compete either
commercially or technologically with the West whilst maintaining a centralized
and isolated economy was the major reason for Gorbachev's perestroika. The
main aim of this chapter is to determine what progress has been achieved by
Russia in opening up its economy to trade and investment from the West, and to
examine whether the degree of interdependence between the EU and Russia has
increased.
To do this, the first section of this chapter aims to give an outline of the
factors which will determine in which sectors trade and investment with Western
Europe can be expected to grow, and to what extent. After an assessment of the
significance of foreign trade for Russia, there follows a background section on the
economic problems inherited from the Soviet system. The focus then moves to
Gorbachev's attempts to revolutionize Moscow's approach to foreign trade and
investment, and what was left to El'tsin to tackle in this field. The new Russian
President's successes and failures in areas most relevant to foreign trade and
investment are then examined: macrostabilization; price reforms; privatization;
tax regime; legislative structure and investment protection; and foreign trade per
Se. Russia's ability to attract foreign investment is compared to that of some of
the other states who have reformed Communist economic systems. Finally, the
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main achievements are emphasized, as are the most important failings which must
be tackled if Russia is to become an integral part of the European economy,
without threatening the Western part of the continent. Appendices on the energy
and aeronautics industries are added at the end of the thesis to provide a more
detailed study of the opportunities for Western involvement in two of Russia's
most promising sectors, and to give concrete examples of the areas in which
Russian industiy is most dependent on Western technology and know-how.
3.2 The Former Soviet Economy in Terms of European and World Trade
Soviet trade with the rest of the world, especially with the non-socialist countries,
was traditionally seen as small in relation to the size of its economy.
Unfortunately, Soviet statistics on this cannot be regarded as adequate, as they
compare external valuta rubles to domestic or intra-CMEA prices, whilst the
prices inside and outside the ex-USSR were not comparable, nor were the quality
of the commodities they could purchase. Foreign trade figures in Vneshniaia
torgovila used to be presented in so-called 'foreign-trade' rubles, representing the
prices in foreign currencies actually received or paid by the USSR, converted to
rubles by means of an officially set exchange rate. These prices in valuta rubles
were then converted into domestic rubles using 'differentiated convertibility
coefficients' (DCCs, often known by their Russian acronym - DVKs), of which
there were approximately two thousand,' with ratios to foreign trade rubles of
anything from 0.2 to 10.0.2 Domestic prices of imports therefore joined prices of
locally produced goods in being entirely unreflective of world prices.
1 Franldyn D. Holtzman, 'Moving Toward Ruble Convertibility', Comparative Economic Studies,
vol. 33, no. 3, 1991, p. 37.
2 Vladimir G. Treini, 'Soviet Dependence on Foreign Trade' in External Economic Relations of
CMEA Countries: Their Significance and Impact in a Global Perspective, NATO Colloquium 1983,
Brussels, 1983, pp. 35-52; Alan Smith (1993, op. cit., p. 133) reports that DVKs (which were used
directly by enterprises dealing in foreign trade after 1987, not merely used by the central authorities to
present a ready-converted price for imports or exports, the so-called preisausgleich system, which
continued to operate in parallel to DVKs after 1987) had a ratio of foreign exchange rubles to domestic
rubles of 0.1 to 15.9.
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The discrepancies between domestic and world prices are blatantly
obvious if we look at trade figures for 1991, presented by the relatively reliable
economists of Elt'sin's government. Total exports from the former USSR were
valued at $70.2bn; of which $3 1.8bn went to Western countries, therefore having
comparable quality. 3 If these dollars would have been exchanged for rubles at the
non-cash Moscow International Currency Exchange in mid-January, at the going
rate of Rbl8O to the dollar,4 the value of exports to the West would have been
Rb5,724bn, in other words over three times the total value of ex-USSR GDP (if
the latter is taken to be Rbl,800bn, as given in the ETU report)! This shows how
unrepresentative Soviet prices were, and how the ruble was still overvalued in
1991.
Thus using Soviet figures to establish the importance of foreign trade in
relation to GDP is of extremely limited use. Although an IMF study of Soviet
foreign trade in 1988 concluded the economy was relatively closed, as exports
were only 6.8% of GDP, the two figures being measured up to each other are
probably not comparable. Exports were measured in foreign trade prices, but it
was not specified how GDP was calculated. 5 It is highly unlikely, however, that
it was calculated by using volumes of production of every product group and
multiplying by average world prices, the only method which would have given a
reasonable approximation (although still very inaccurate, due to the important
discrepancies in quality). It is most likely that GDP was converted from an
estimation in rubles, and was consequently very misleading. By 1993, however,
Russian figures were more representative of the value of exports and imports in
relation to domestic production, although still retaining a high degree of
inaccuracy. 6 Rosgoskomstat (the Russian State Committee for Statistics) and the
The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report on the CIS, no. 1, 1992, p. 65.
' Kommersant", no. 3, 13-20 January 1992, p. 6.
IMP, IBED, OECD, EBRD, A Study of the Soviet Economy, Paris, OECD, 1991, vol. 2, p. 68.
6 Even the 1993 Russian figures are vezy tentative, for many reasons. The main factor
contributing to this distortion is that an important degree of foreign trade is not officially recorded, as
importers or exporters manage to either smuggle their goods or bribe customs officials to turn a blind
eye, in order to avoid tariffs and taxes; such underreporting also affects GDP figures, however, and it is
impossible to tell which figure is most underestimated. Converting a ruble figure into hard currency
still represents an important loss of accuracy, both because the ruble was undervalued in 1993, and
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Russian Central Bank's (RCB) figures put Russian merchandise exports (outside
the FSU) at $43.7llbn, and imports at $32.959bn; these represent, respectively,
25.3% and 19.1% of GDP. 7 Such figures suggest a much greater dependence
upon foreign trade than the EU countries.
What does seem clear is that the share of foreign trade with the EU has
increased in importance throughout the early 1990s. The FSU's total exports of
merchandise to the Community amounted to $19.Thn in 1990 (excluding Eastern
Germany), increasing by 9.6% to $21.6bn in 1991 (although this figure included
the Eastern territories), by 1.9% to $22bn in 1992,8 by 2.3% to $22.5bn in 1993,
and by a massive 36.9% to $30.Sbn in 1994. FSU imports from the EU also
increased over this period, from $16.9bn to $23.4bn, in other words by 38.9%.10
These increases compare veiy favourably to decreases in real GDP in 1991 of
11.6%, in 1992 of 18.2%," in 1993 of 12.0%, and estimated in 1994 at 15.0%.12
Not only does this growth in trade with the Twelve contrast sharply with the
because using an average exchange rate for a period which saw a 199% appreciation of the dollar (in
relation to the ruble) would only be a close approximation if the foreign trade was vely evenly spread
throughout the year, whilst in fact it appears that over 36% of exports were traded in the last quarter of
1993 (figures from the Market Research Centre under the Russian Government, in Segodnia, 13 April
1994, and from Ekonomicheskala gazeta, no. 16, April 1994). Finally, although Russian prices in 1993
were much closer to world prices than they had been for seventy years, there were still large variations;
in September, for example, the commodity exchange price of crude oil in Russia was 28% of 'world'
price, petrol 58%, aluminium 65% and wheat 540/e, although sugar was overvalued at 152% (from
Martin McCauley, 'The Russian Economy —Januaiy/September 1993', Russia and the Successor States
Briefing Service, vol. 2, no. 3, June 1994).
If the latter is taken to be Rb162,300bn, and is converted at the average exchange rate for 1993
of Rb941:$1. Export and import figures taken from 'Bankovskli biulleten", Ekonomicheskaia gazeta,
no. 16, April 1994; GDP figure from EIU, Country Report - Russia, 2nd quarter 1994, p. 4; average
exchange rate calculated by getting the average of two weeldy readings from the MICE for every week
of 1993. My estimate of the average exchange rate is slightly lower than that of the EITJ (Rb985:$1),
the latter probably being overestimated by having used every reading from the MICE, which would give
a disproportionate weighting to the higher dollar rate of the second half of the year, as MICE started
dealing daily from June 1993.
8 OECD, Short-Term Economic Indicators: Transition Economies, Paris, 1994, p. 25.
9 'Russia and European Union Reach Historic Agreement to Deepen Trade and Political Ties',
European Commission Document 1P1941565, 22 June 1994, p. 5; the figure for FSU exports to the EU in
1993 is 18.5bnECU, converted here at a mid-1994 rate; the same figure for Russia exclusively is
14.8bnECU.
10 Towards Greater Economic Integration - The European Union 's Financial Assistance and
Trade Policy for Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States, European Commission,
DG lÀ, Brussels, October 1995, p. 15 - here also, the same mid-1994 Ecu:Dollar rate is used as
above.
11 IMF, World Economic Outlook, Washington DC, May 1994; the figures are weighted averages
of the separate estimates for the various FSU states, mostly referring to net material product.
12 According to EIU figures in EIU, Country Report - Russia, 2nd quarter 1995, p.4.
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collapse in the ex-CMEA's proportion of Russia's foreign trade, from 50% in
1990 to 28.1% in 199l' and 20% in l992;' it also generally compares
favourably to the increase in total hard currency exports by 9.0% to $53.2bn in
1991, their decrease by 22.7% to $41. lbn in 1992,' falling behind the 11.3%
increase in these exports in 1993, to again outdo the 11.4% increase (to $51.6bn)
of 1994.16 The proportion of official hard currency exports which were destined
for the Community thus rose from 40.4% in 1990 (excluding the ex-GDR), 40.7%
in 1991 (including the ex-GDR), and of 53.4% in 1992. Of all Russia's trade
partners, the EU is undeniably the most important in volume.
At least as important as the monetary value of Russian foreign trade is its strategic
significance. It is arguable that, as the economy of the FSU is potentially one of
the world's most self-sufficient economies, there is no great need for the CIS to
prioritize large-scale foreign trade. This was seen as a main reason for the USSR
not joining the IMF and the IBRD at their inception, despite the Soviet delegation
attending the UN Monetary and Financial Conference in Bretton Woods in 1944,
and even signing the draft agreement to the setting-up of these institutions, but
later renouncing membership when their conditions were not met.
The dream of independence from capitalist imports was not to last very
long, however. By the 1970s, despite the small size of Soviet foreign trade, the
USSR was already very dependent upon imported capital. A large proportion of
the imported commodities were essential to alleviate bottlenecks in industiy,
which were particularly damaging in the highly interdependent Soviet economy.
The importance of Western equipment as a short-term solution to a bottleneck
rather than a well-planned strategy was suggested by the fact that so many pieces
of equipment were bought, rather than the licence to produce them, despite the
13 According to Goskomstat figures, converted into dollars, Russian Economic Trends, vol. 1,
1992 no. 1, pp. 48-49.
14 According to EIU figures in EIU, Country Report - Russia, 2nd quarter 1994, p. 4.
l5pj
16 According to EIU figures in EJU, Country Report - Russia, 2nd quarter 1995, p. 4.
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latter option being much cheaper and more sustainable in the long term.17
Whether as immediate solutions to shortcomings in production or long-term aims
of technology transfer, the share of foreign materials used in production kept
increasing, until in 1986 the food industry was importing 46.8% of its machinery,
and the chemical industry 49.9%, whilst Western equipment also accounted for
between 66% and 100% of Soviet polythene, 65% of all complex fertilizers and
40% of all nitrogenous fertilizers.' 8 By 1989, the proportion of equipment for the
chemical industry which was imported had risen to 61.4%.' Although foodstuffs
have also been a very important component of imports, still accounting in 1984
for a greater share of imported goods from non-socialist countries (29.7%,
according to Vneshtorg figures in rubles) than machinery and equipment
(22 . 4%20) , by 1993 machinery and equipment were the most important sector of
imports, accounting for 3 8.5% (in more reliable hard currency figures for the
period from January to September), compared to 28.5% for foodstuffs and
agricultural produce. 2' Thus despite its size and great natural wealth, by the mid-
1980s the USSR had a high level of dependence on imports from Western
countries, and this dependence has only increased since the demise of the Soviet
Union.
A new approach to foreign trade finally materialized under Gorbachev.
Although the oil price rises in the 1970s made it particularly easy for the Soviets
to count solely on their energy exports for their foreign currency, exports were
still considered to be a last resort, a necessary evil; Soviet products would be sold
abroad purely in order to pay for essential imports, not because exports were
desirable per Se. Despite earlier moves by Gorbachev to transform the Soviet
trade deficit into a surplus, with perestroika came a new positive attitude towards
foreign trade, not least because Gorbachev did not have the luxury of the 1970s
17 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., p. 60.
18 Leonard Geron, op. cit., p. 29.
19 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit, p. 63.
20 Ibid.,p.56.
21 Segodnia, 13 April 1994; it should be noted that the figure for foodstuffs may have been
disproportionately low due to the fact that food imports are often highest in the last quarter.
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oil price booms. Quite apart from the fall in oil prices, terms of trade during the
twelfth Five-Year Plan (1986-90) also worsened for the USSR because of the
weakening of the American dollar against European currencies. This was
detrimental because although the USSR sells its oil in dollar terms, most of its
equipment purchases are in European currencies (some 70% of Soviet convertible
currency purchases are made in currencies other than the dollar).22
Opening up foreign trade, eventually, to all enterprises was just one of
Gorbachev's moves to reform the Soviet economy, the expression of a movement
which had started in the early 1980s. 23 The problems to be tackled were
enormous. The Soviet Union's net debt24 was already $9.5bn in 1984, $26bn by
1987, and $84bn by the time the CIS was presented with the contentious task of
dividing it amongst the republics in late 1991.25 Although this was not a
disastrous figure in relation to the size of the CIS 's economy, and particularly not
for Russia, which, for example, had a $9. lbn trade surplus in 199 1,26 it was still a
bad footing from which to increase foreign trade. One policy deeply regretted in
Moscow has been the provision of credit to many Third World countries (mostly
to buy arms; the USSR accounted for around 39% of the Third World arms
market in 1989), which by 1982 had cost the USSR approximately $5Obn. 27 The
FSU's estimated $90.8bn external debt in 199328 was a major reason for the
reluctance of Western investors or exporters to risk capital in the CIS, second
only to political instability.
22 Leonard Geron, op. cit., p. 29.
23 Many experts see Tatiana Zaslavskaia's 'secret paper' as a milestone. It was delivered in April
1983 (shortly after Andropov replaced Brezhnev), and claimed that the central planning system could
no longer cope and that more autonomy should be given to enterprises.
24 Net debt = debts to BIS area banks + other hard currency debt (mainly to official creditors) -
bank deposits with BIS area banks. Figures from Michael Eliman, The USSR in the 1990's, EIU
Special Report no. 1152, London, 1989, P. 73.
25 The Guardian, 14 Januaiy 1992; this figure was used at a meeting in Germany, concerned with
the sharing of the CIS debt. Estimates of the debt in late 1991 and early 1992 fluctuate between $57bn
and $84bn (The Economist Intelligence Unit Country Report on the CIS, no. 1, 1992, p. 68).
26Thit,p67
27 Michael Ellman, 1989, op. cit., p. 72.
28 IMF estimate in IMF, op. cit., 1994, p. 163; the IMF's estimate for the USSR's external debt in
1991 was $67. lbn.
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Thus, although it is impossible to accurately calculate the proportion of
foreign trade in relation to Russian GDP, it is clear that importance of exports and
imports to Russia is greater than the monetaly value might suggest. Traditionally,
the goods bought with the foreign currency earned by Russia are in large
proportion strategic goods, in the sense that without them production would
significantly decrease (even further than may already be the case). This is
particularly the case with the restructuring of Russian industiy, as modem
technology is needed to reorientate production towards the more modem and
complex goods demanded by today's markets. The need for increasingly
advanced technology explains why trade with the EU continues to increase even
in its monetary importance, at a higher rate than overall foreign trade, and despite
the sharp decreases in production, both overall and more specifically in oil and
gas, still Russia's main export commodities. This dependence on Western
strategic goods is now complemented by a growing demand for foreign consumer
goods and foodstuffs, which is both cause and effect of a failure on the side of
private electronics producers and fanners to take over from large and often
obsolete Soviet factories and collective farms. Russia would be in a very severe
state of crisis if its imports were ever strongly curtailed.
3.3 Traditional Weaknesses of the Soviet Economy
Russia's inability to become a powerful and versatile participant in world trade is
inextricably linked to its domestic economic problems. The scope of these
problems is virtually unlimited and this thesis can only superficially deal with
them, although this type of summary is nonetheless helpful in understanding the
organizational and psychological bathers which new entrepreneurs must tackle in
order to succeed in foreign trade or in translating foreign investment into profit,
and in estimating the possible role of the EU.
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During his leadership, Gorbachev had only limited success in reforming a
centralized planning system which had in essence changed very little since Stalin
had ensured the Kremlin's firm control over every important aspect of the
economy. Tendencies to over-staff (in order to secure additional capacity, in the
event of a sudden increase in plan quota), to overstate needs (as one always
received less than one ordered) and to understate capacity (as whatever capacity
was declared would have to be increased the following year, according to the
'ratchet principle'), are amongst the most damaging habits acquired under Soviet
Communism. Wherever possible, the actual figures of output would also be
tampered with, if needed to fulfil the all-important plan. Thus the whole
economy was based on largely false data.
Regardless of the accuracy of the data, the task of using it to calculate the
supply and demand for every important commodity in the economy was
impossible. The central planning authorities used a system of material balances,
whereby each product's demand (as ordered by every enterprise) would be
matched to possible sources of supply. Until the late 1980s, Gosplan worked out
the material balances for 2,000 commodities, whilst Gossnab (the State Supply
Committee) handled approximately 20,000 commodity groups.29 This task in
itself was unmanageable enough, but then came the constant need to re-adjust the
figures, a task made particularly complex by the fact that many goods are
interdependent; for example, when changing the material balance for steel, the
balances for coal, iron ore, train carriages, and therefore for steel itself, would all
have to be re-adjusted. In fact and practice, however, because of the complexity
of performing multiple iterations of what is in fact a 20,000 x 20,000 matrix,
relationships of the second order, to say nothing of those of third or fourth order,
were only made when volumes involved were substantial. 3° A high degree of
inaccuracy, therefore, was inevitable.
29 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., p. 37.
30 David A. Dyker, Restructuring the Soviet Economy, London, 1992(1), p. 9.
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The main success indicator in Soviet induslry until Gorbachev's refonns
was still volume, despite attempts to change this in the mid-1960s. Other factors
had been measured, but there was little or no impact on bonuses for good results,
for example in being more cost-effective. It is therefore easy to understand the
shoddiness of many Soviet goods; the combination of fixed-time plan quotas and
virtually no quality control was especially disastrous, explaining practices such as
television manufacturers using hammers to drive in screws to fulfil the plan
before the month is out (Soviet consumers often tried to avoid buying goods
manufactured at the end of the month). This is one problem which perestroika
had started solving, as profit became vital for the survival of an increasing number
of enterprises, under the policy of khozraschet (self-accounting) and
samofinanirovanie (self-financing). Old habits die hard, however, and many
enterprises have been unable to become profitable. The fact that plant closures
and mass redundancies were not resorted to helped to protect old working
methods, as did the continued granting of credits.
Gorbachev's attempts at agricultural reform were yet less effective. State
farms and collective farms were allowed to continue operating, and although
private farmers were in theory able to rent and cultivate their own land, keeping
all profits, in practice little was done to prevent local collective farm managers
and party cadres from obstructing the arenda (land-renting) programme. Thus a
country with vast areas of rich soil had to go on spending an important share of its
foreign currency on importing wheat (in 1986, $l.6bn was spent on OECD wheat,
7.8% of all imports from OECD countries 31). The lack of livestock fodder was an
important contributing factor to the inability to meet the demand for meat, meat
production in 1982 having slumped to 6% below the 1975 level; this is yet
another example of centrally set prices not reflecting the true cost of production,
which in the case of meat should have been particularly prohibitive when the use
of large amounts of Soviet grain for fodder led to the necessity of turning to
imports. The inadequacies of the Soviet transport system were at their most
31 Michael Eliman, 1989, op. cit, p. 14.
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damaging in the failure to get a high percentage of agricultural goods to the
market-place before they rotted.
The Soviet economic system had traditionally been heavily biased against
innovation. As there had been no freedom to enter markets where a supernormal
profit could be made, there was no incentive to broaden the range of commodities
produced; even within existing production, any extra efficiency would cease to
generate supernormal profits from the following year, when the 'ratchet principle'
would simply add to the present year's output to determine the new quota. The
lack of competition, or of 'creative destruction', meant that there has been no
need to innovate to stay in business; on the contraly, by tiying new methods a
manager would simply risk losing his bonuses by failing to fulfil the plan. Even
enterprises whose function it is to do research and development have had their
success measured according to volume of output! Despite the gradual emergence
of profit as the main aim of production, Russian inventors and researchers have
much time to make up for.
These failings of the domestic economy are intrinsically linked with the
needs and problems of foreign trade. The low levels of output and of quality fail
to satisfy all the domestic needs, leaving few fields with exportable surpluses, and
creating a need to spend scarce hard currency on imports.
3.4 Gorbachev's Attempts to Liberalize Foreign Trade
As early as 1977 the Soviet government started making moves towards freer
foreign trade - in that year ministries and departments were granted the right to
exchange goods directly (or through Vneshpromtekhobmen) with parallel
institutions in CMEA countries. Then in May 1983, Andropov legalized the
establishment of joint ventures with CMEA countries (on USSR territory); in
practice the procedure was overly bureaucratic and rigid, however, and was not
implemented. Another measure which achieved limited success was taken in June
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1984, when Chernenko's leadership laid down procedures for direct production,
scientific and technological cooperation between ministries, departments and
associations in CMEA countries and Yugoslavia; industrial enterprises also
gained the right to set up their own funds for the development of international
Cooperation.
Gorbachev's own measures to liberalize trade first appeared in August
1986, when two important resolutions were passed; one 'On Measures to Improve
the Management of Foreign Economic Relations', and the other 'On Measures to
Improve the Management of Economic, Scientific and Technical Cooperation
with Socialist Countries'. The former resolution stated that ninety-seven
ministries, departments and enterprises would now be granted the right of direct
transaction with foreign enterprises, 32 whilst previously all foreign trade was
conducted by less than sixty state-controlled foreign trade organizations (FTOs).33
The second resolution concerned the setting-up of joint ventures (JVs) with
socialist countries, and ensured that Gosplan would no longer determine import
and export levels for individual associations, enterprises and organizations; these
bodies could also now use the foreign currency they earned (after high taxes) for
their own purposes.34
The next set of trade-freeing policies came in January 1987, with decrees
setting out legal regulations for joint ventures, both with CMEA countries and
with non-socialist countries. Joint ventures could develop and approve their
business operation programmes without interference from Gosplan or the central
authorities. Any equipment or other property imported to the USSR by the
Western side of the venture would not be charged import duties. A two year tax
exemption was also specified, and there were a multitude of positive general
statements about JVs. 35 A profit tax of 30% (basic rate) and a profit repatriation
tax of 20% (basic rate) were at first applicable to JVs. 36 As the months went by,
32 Leonard Geron, op. cit., p. 101.
Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., p. 42.
Leonard Geron, op. cii, p. 101.
Ibid., p. 24.
36 David A. Dyker, 1992(i), op. cit., p. 91.
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however, very little of the expected enthusiasm (and hard currency!) materialized,
hence the 'Decision on Improvements' which was issued in September; it
extended the two year tax exemption, now to be counted from the date of first
profits, and there was also a simplification of the procedures for setting up joint
ventures.37
A new level of trade opportunity for Westerners was achieved in
December 1988, with the decision 'On further Development of the Economic
Activity of the State, Cooperative and Other Public Enterprises, Associations and
Organizations', whereby a foreign partner could hold a majority share in a JV,
and there would no longer be any restriction on remuneration of employees. A
foreigner was now allowed to become chairman or managing director of a JV, and
foreign partners could now pay for the accommodation of foreign workers in
rubles. Another stimulus for foreign invesiment was a reduction of JV profit
taxes (from 30% to 10%), a longer tax holiday (from 2 to 3 years) in the Far East,
and repatriation taxation could be waived altogether for foreign partners. 38 More
and more milestones were reached in the autumn of 1990, when full foreign
ownership of JVs was allowed.
Cooperatives also received encouragement, when in April 1989 they were
granted the right to deal directly with foreign enterprises. They could keep a
'considerable proportion' of their currency income, and spend up to 10% of it on
consumer goods, medical goods, improving the workplace, and similar
expenditure. 39
 By April 1990, 2,500 cooperatives had been registered as
participants in foreign trade. 4° The April 1989 Decree not only permitted
cooperatives to deal in foreign trade, but granted this right to all associations and
enterprises, subject to the procurement of a licence from the Ministry of Foreign
Economic Relations (after the merger on 1 January 1988 of the Ministry of
Foreign Trade and the GKES).41
37 Leonard Geron, op. cit., p. 24.
38 Thid.; and Michael Ellinan, 1989, op. cit., p. 95.39 Abel Aganbegyan, Moving the Mountain, London, 1989, pp. 184-85.
40 Leonard Geron, op. cit., p. 26.
41 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., pp. 13 1-32.
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The joint venture legislation, especially the later measures to seduce
Western businessmen into investing in the Soviet Union, eventually had a positive
effect. 'There is a clear correlation between the loosening of legal restrictions
and the number of JVs registered', wrote Geron, pointing out that the number of
JVs increased from twenty-three in 1987 to 191 by the end of 1988, and to over
1,600 by June 1990.42
Despite the regressive steps taken in the previous year (described below),
March 1990 saw the passing of the 'Law on Property in the USSR' which
allowed foreign individuals, as well as foreign companies, to be participants in
JVs; it also catered for JVs to be set up as joint stock companies, partnerships
with or without limited liabilities. Foreign juridical bodies were permitted to own
industrial or other property, although excluding land, for the purpose of their
business. Then in June the law 'On Taxes on Enterprises, Corporations and
Organizations' (corporate tax law), was passed, which was to establish a unified
rate of tax of 45%, but with JVs to be taxed on a differentiated basis according to
the size of foreign share: JVs with less than 30% of foreign share were to pay full
Soviet tax, whilst JVs with more than 30% paid only 30% tax, 43 although this
could vaiy according to particular circumstances. There was now a clear
advantage, on the Western side of a venture, to become more deeply involved.
Although these efforts never achieved the high level of foreign investment
for which the Soviet authorities had hoped, it nonetheless steadily increased. The
spirit of these liberalizing measures greatly augmented Western businessmen's
interest and desire to deal with the USSR, and Russia in particular. The number
of JVs in Russia, by the end of 1991, exceeded 2,600 and involved over sixty
countries, employing some 130,000 people, with a yearly turnover of more than
Rbllbn, over 3.5 times that of l990fr'
42 Leonard Geron, op. cit, pp. 43-44.
Ibid., p. 102.
Radio Moscow World Service in English. 8 Februaiy 1992, from Summary of World Broadcasts
(SW8), Weekly Economic Report, Former Soviet Union, 14 Februaiy 1992.
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Another approach designed to lure foreign investment which attracted
much attention during this period was the establishment of Special Economic
Zones (SEZs) and Free Economic Zones (FEZs). 45 The first official statement by
Gorbachev announcing the intention to establish special zones for joint
entrepreneurship came in September 1988, and even these early measured moves
towards granting advantageous investment conditions for FEZs suggested much
potential for local authorities and enterprise managers to encourage autonomous
border trade, control regional foreign exchange reserves, and establish direct
transactions at grassroots level with foreign businesses. FEZs were also seen as a
way to entice JVs away from Moscow, which in early 1990 was home to 45% of
Soviet joint enterprises. The fact that FEZs could be used as a tool to gain
support from regional authorities in exchange for promises of increased self-
determination was not lost on the RSFSR authorities; between May 1990 and
June 1991, the Russian Supreme Soviet granted FEZ status to eleven territories.
The types of benefits which were offered by some of these FEZs included profit
tax rate as low as 10% (compared to 25-30% basic rate in 1991, and 32% in
1992), up to five years' tax holiday, restriction-free barter transactions in foreign
trade, and duty free and tax-free imports and exports.46
One of the greatest problems faced by anyone trying to do business outside
the official plan was always that of finding supplies, as a free wholesale-trade
market was nonexistent. In this field also, perestroika established the first
structures which would allow freedom of choice of supplier. In May 1990, a
commodity exchange was set up in Donetsk, and, at the beginning of June 1990,
another was set up in Moscow.47 By the autumn of 1991, there were commodity
exchanges, as well as stock exchanges, in most large cities of the USSR, dealing
' It is often difficult to distinguish between the two, but Geron's rule of thumb is that the 'FEZ is
seen to differ from SEZs in so far as it emphasises changes to the local economy as a whole, not just
means of encouraging foreign investment'; Leonard Geron, op. cit., p. 51.
46 Sergei Manezhev, 'Free Economic Zones in the Context of Economic Changes in Russia', in
Europe-Asia Studies, vol. 45, 1993, no. 4, pp. 610-13; these territories were: Vyborg, Prirnorskii k.rai
(including Nakhodka), St Petersburg, Kaliningrad oblastç Chita oblast', Altai krai, Kemerovo oblast',
Novgorod oblast', the Jewish autonomous oblast', Sakhalin oblast' and Zelenograd.
Leonard Geron, op. cit., p. 49, taken from ftvestia, 19 May 1990, and SWB, SU/0782i, 5 June
1990.
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in just about anything, from foodstuffs and building materials, to motorcars,
metals and oil.
Gorbachev had also taken the first steps along the road to convertibility,
starting with the devaluation of the ruble's tourist rate, first to Rb10:E1, and then
to almost Rb50:fl in April 1991. The move to total hard currency dealings in
CMEA trade was another clear sign that the USSR was determined to have an
ever more convertible currency. Currency auctions, starting in the autumn of
1989, slowly became more efficient, with a growing number of traders being
allowed, and small but increasing volumes of currency changing hands.
Gorbachev's privatization drive had also met with some success; by March
1991, Moscow City Council's Committee for Privatization bad identified 16,000
businesses which could be sold off; already, some thirty-two tailoring workshops
and fifteen hairdressing salons had been privatized, 'mainly by transfer of control
to employees'.48 One sector of privatization in which there was particular hope
was agriculture. Families or small groups have had the legal basis for using
patches of kolkhoz or sovkhoz land for fanning ever since the 1988 'Law on
Cooperatives', and although the uptake was veiy slow, the Russian Goskomstat
reported that by the middle of 1991, there were 20,000 individual farming units.49
Foreigners' involvement in privatization, however, was not at that stage possible.
Thus from the point of view of a potential West European exporter or
investor, Gorbachev's foreign trade reforms had achieved a great deal. Most
important of all was the fact that the state's monopoly on foreign trade had been
broken; although accreditation processes, obtaining licences and paying tariffs
were all significantly restrictive, there was nonetheless a real possibility to
establish partnerships with foreign businesses, and/or to earn foreign currency
from exports. The joint venture initiative was a hand outstretched to the
developed world for cooperation and development, and it generated much
enthusiastic, if not fearless, response. Yet although the ideas and the direction
48 Alex Brummer, 'Pulled From the Ruble', The Guardian, 22 March 1991.
49 TASS World Service in English, 24 Januaiy 1992, from SWB, Weekly Economic Report,
Former Soviet Union, 31 January 1992.
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were commendable, in practice Gorbachev's policies had many failings, as shown
by the disappointing output and trade figures. These are examined in the
following section.
3.5 Barriers to Reform Facing EI'tsin
Despite its positive approach and worldwide acclaim, perestroika, in the short
term, had been damaging to the Soviet economy. When El'tsin became the most
powerful man in Russia, following the failed August coup, he inherited an
economy which was in a state of accelerated decline. By the first quarter of
1991, Soviet output was 12% less than the year before, 5° and GDP was to be
down almost 13% by the end of that year.5'
Although a great deal of positive legislation had been passed by
Gorbachev, the degree of execution had been disappointing. The level of
involvement in joint ventures, for example, was still not veiy encouraging.
Although the number of discussed projects had been fairly respectable, only a
small percentage of these ventures were actually being set up, and the average
capital of those that did take off was relatively low (approximately Rb im).
Another factor discouraging Western involvement in JVs had been the confusion
which seems to prevail in the implementation of joint venture legislation. One
good example was the corporate tax rate for JVs, which according to the decree
of Januaiy 1987 should normally have been 30% on the net profit and another
20% on profits repatriated abroad (in other words a maximum tax rate of 44%, if
all the remaining 70% are repatriated), but which was negotiable in every case.52
This was a scenario, like so many others, which openly invited corruption. As
discussed below, however, the fiscal position of JVs has since altered again.
50 John Pinder, 1991, op. cit., p. 57, taken from The Financial Times, 11 March 1991 and 10 April
1991.
51 EIU, Country Report—Russia, 2nd quarter, 1995, p. 4.
52 Leonard Geron, op. cit., p. 45.
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El'tsm was left with a desperate need to clarify the jurisdiction of the
different levels of government, especially with respect to their taxing authority
and expenditure responsibility, if an effective and realistic fiscal policy was to be
devised. Under Gorbachev's 'guidelines', all that had been specified was that
both the Union and the republics could levy taxes, but federal tax rates and
liability to federal tax had to be approved by the republics. 53 This resulted not
only in confusion in tax collection, but also in the encouragement of tax evasion.
There had also been actively regressive legislative moves against freer
foreign trade in the last years of Gorbachev's leadership, such as the strict
decision passed in December 1989, greatly increasing the number of goods which
needed an export licence, to include most foodstuffs, vodka, most fibres and
clothes, electrical appliances, and many more. This same decree of the Council
of Ministers outlawed the export of foodstuffs, fossil fuels, construction materials
and others through barter operations. 54
 An additional problem was that most of
the licences were issued by the Ministry for Foreign Economic Relations, which
itself dealt on foreign markets, and was inevitably biased in its decision-making.55
Much hard currency revenue from exports was thus lost.
El'tsin took power at a time when lack of confidence in Russia's political
stability, and in the impartiality of the judiciary, was great. Even at the peak of
perestroika such apprehension was shown not to be unfounded; for example
when a diplomatic row erupted in mid-1989 over spying charges against Soviet
personnel in London, and the Soviet Union was only at the last moment
persuaded not to limit the numbers of foreign businessmen in Moscow as one of
their 'tit-for-tat' measures. Fear of a renewed Cold War, resulting in tighter trade
restrictions being reimposed, had never fully dissipated. As civil war erupted in
some areas of the former Soviet Union, and the political situation in Russia
remained unstable, worries about the security of potential investments became
greater than ever.
5 EEC report on the Soviet economy, p. 93.
Leonard Geron, op. cit., p. 105.
Ibid., p. 25.
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Western banks remained extremely reluctant to risk new funds in Russia,
unless they were fully collateralized. Although banks in the West are not averse
to occasional high-risk investments, the high level of uncertainty and poor quality
of financial information in Russia go beyond what most investors perceive as
viable nsk. 56 In contrast to the period up to 1990, when the USSR's
creditworthiness was impeccable, payments have since gone deeply into arrears.
Of the estimated $65. lbn (Vneshekonombank figure; see footnote 24 in section
[ii] of this chapter) owed by the former USSR, 57 around $2Obn was due in 1991,
most of which had to be deferred. In losing its high credit rating, El'tsin's Russia
had lost one of the few relative advantages it had over its neighbours in Eastern
Europe, from West European investors' point of view.
Another area in which the West had little confidence at the end of 1991
was that of convertibility of the ruble. Even the ruble's commodity convertibility,
that is the extent to which the ruble could be translated into desired goods or
services, was minimal by the time of the coup. Although Gorbachev had
devalued the ruble, and introduced the concept of hard currency auctions, these
auctions were irregularly held, had veiy restricted access, and had only a limited
amount of hard currency to offer, put forward by the RCB. The result was a veiy
biased exchange rate, only achieved for relatively small amounts of currency by
privileged enterprises and organizations. This situation could at best be defined
as extremely limited internal convertibility.
If there was to be any chance of a greater degree of convertibility being
achieved with any measure of stability, the Soviet approach to monetary control
had to change radically; yet despite expressing this aim, the pre-putsch leadership
failed to sufficiently tighten the money supply. Although Gorbachev's
government had managed to reduce the budget deficit to a 'mere' Rb58.lbn in
56 See Volker Burghagen (Head of the International Division of the Dresdner Bank), 'Soviet
Financial Policies Towards the West', The Soviet Economy under Gorbachev, NATO Colloquium, 20-
22 March 1991, Brussels, Brussels, 1991, pp. 183-87.
Vneshekonombank figure, given by TASS World Service in English, 19 Januaxy 1992, from
SWB, Weekly Economic Report, Former Soviet Union, 24 Januaiy 1992.
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1990, less than half of what it was in the previous year, 58 the slowing down of
reform momentum was accompanied by a renewed slackening of credit in 1991.
By the end of that year, the USSR's budgetary deficit was Rb205.Thn, of which
Rb108.4bn was Russia's (despite Russia's budgetary income having increased by
around 60% to Rb291.7bn,, according to Goskomstat). This brought total internal
debt to Rb99Obn for the USSR, and Rb572bn for Russia. 59 The increase in
money printing was not compensated for with inflation, therefore the monetary
overhang kept growing. In 1991, people's income exceeded expenditures by
Rb87.lbn, compared with Rb19.2bn in 1990; by the end of December 1991 the
population had Rb161.9bn in ready cash, according to TASS.6° This mass of
liquid assets inevitably created an inflationary pressure which made price
liberalization even more difficult.
It was on freeing prices that Gorbachev's 'Basic guidelines for the
stabilization of the national economy and the transition to a market economy', the
compromise synthesis of the 'Shatalin Plan' and the 'governmental' (mostly
Prime Minister Ryzhkov's) proposals, was at its least ambitious in relation to the
Shatalin plan (the '500 days' project). At producer and wholesale level,
distortions in relative prices were to have been administratively reduced, and
although 49% of producer prices were to be negotiable between enterprises, they
were still subject to the surveillance of the central authorities; in retail prices,
some 15% of prices (mainly for 'luxury goods') were to have been freed by the
end of 1990, and further price liberalization was to depend upon the extent of
macroeconomic stabilization being achieved. It was hoped by advocates of
greater decentralization of the economy that in 1991 responsibility for consumer
subsidies, and hence, eventually, for the prices, would go to republican
authorities.61 The Gorbachev 'solution' was not only much less ambitious than
Shatalin's, it was even more superficial than Ryzhkov's proposals; the still widely
The Guardian, 15 February 1991.
59 The Economist Intelligence Unit CountryReporton the CIS, no. 1, 1992, Op. cit., p. 53.
60 TASS World Seivice in Russian, 24 January 1992, from SWB, Weekly Economic Report, Part
1, Former Soviet Union, 31 January 1992.
61 Ibid., p. 12.
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centralized Soviet economy needed a much stronger and clearer blueprint of what
to do next. In fact, any optimism about freeing prices soon faded with the
measures taken by Valentin Pavlov (who had replaced Ryzbkov as Soviet Prime
Minister), which increased prices, but through central control, thus continuing to
hide the signals of supply and demand from producers, whilst nonetheless fuelling
popular anger at the resulting inflation.
In areas less directly related to foreign trade, the gap between theoretical
and practical reform had been even greater. With regard to the attempts to free
the supply side, despite the 'Law on State Enterprises', in 1988-89 most of the
industrial output still went through the system of state orders, and the role of
Gossnab as the organizor of suppliers and clients for large enterprises remained
basically unchanged. 62 With the collapse of the Soviet Union, as attempts were
made to gradually abolish the goszakaz (state order) system, a great many
enterprises became threatened with (theoretical) bankruptcy as they failed to fmd
suppliers or buyers; trade between the republics plummeted, as new customs had
to be faced, and confidence in the ruble collapsed, leaving only bartering as an
option. On the individual consumer's level, the long-existent need to obtain
coimnodities from friends and contacts became increasingly unavoidable. An
ever-greater proportion of Russian consumer goods production was
misappropriated before making it to the shelves of retail outlets, with corruption
and mafia involvement mushrooming as the general level of discipline and
authority declined. The result was that in 1991, there was a centrally imposed
return to traditional supply links, and continued extensive usage of state orders.
These measures failed to halt the fall in production and trade, but they did
succeed in reversing the positive momentum in the supply side reforms.
The much-lauded privatization process had achieved virtually no concrete
results by the end of 1991. Privatization's first result was to trigger stubborn
resistance amongst large enterprise and collective farm managers, who refused to
allow their power to be dissolved so easily. Even if the bureaucratic wrangles
62 IMF, 1994, op. cit., p. 4.
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could be solved, the original intention of absorbing a large proportion of the
inflationary overhang through the sales of shares was never likely to succeed.
The public was highly aware that a high percentage of the enterprises being sold
to the public were likely to go bankrupt once they became self-financing.63 For
privatization to be effective as a macroeconomic stabilizer, there was also a need
to increase public confidence in government schemes in general. The
improbability of this should have been learnt in 1990, when a governmental
scheme to finance part of the budget deficit through sales of 4% government
obligations was largely unsuccessful. 64 The government was never perceived as a
good investment in the Soviet Union.
By 1992 even pro-shock therapy economist Jeffrey Sachs had recognized
that privatization of large-scale enterprises could not be carried out quickly, and
that therefore other measures, such as macrostabilization and price liberalization
had to occur first, without being able to use mass privatization of large enterprises
as an effective tool to absorb the monetary overhang. 65 Nonetheless, privatization
had to remain a priority, starting with small and medium-size enterprises; this was
essential if the Russian economy was to be seen by the EU and other countries as
a viable target for investment. It was needed to increase business confidence in
Russia, but had another important function - Anders Aslund suggested that 'it
matters less who owns shares than that there is an active assessment of the values
of various forms of capital by many mutually independent traders'.66
Linked to the problem of privatization was the need for a fully functional
banking system, which would permit the use of interest rates as an effective
macroeconomic lever. The introduction of reserve requirements, refinancing
policies and the lifting up of real interest rates at least to a non-negative level
were still desperately missing. By December 1991, even the commercial banks
63 Edgar L. Feige, 'Perestroika and Socialist Privatization: What is to be done? And how?',
Comearative Economic Studies, vol. 13, no. 3, 1990, pp. 1-54.
O4 LMF 1994, op. cit.,p. 9.
65 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit, p. 196; although macrostabilization has not in fact been fully
achieved, whilst privatization is at an advanced stage, the point is that pnvatization could not be used to
cushion the hyperinflation resulting from price liberalization.
66 Anders Aslund, Gorbachev's Struggle for Economic Reform, London, 1989, p. 188.
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were lending money at an average of 20.4% p.a., 67 whilst the average annual rate
of Russian inflation for 1991 was 92.7%,68 and rising fast.
For trust in banks to increase, not only did the interest rates have to
become higher than inflation, but confidence in money itself had to be restored.
The extraordinaiy move of banning all 50 and 100 ruble notes from circulation in
the spring of 1991, although moderately helping to reduce the inflationaiy
overhang, showed a total disregard for the need to increase the respect for money
in the Soviet economy. Although citizens had a few days to exchange their 50
and 100 ruble notes, this move set a precedent which, it was feared, could be
repeated for some or all of the other notes in circulation. Thus the traditional
feeling that holding rubles did not necessarily mean the possibility of acquiring
goods, and the tendency to exchange rubles for commodities at the earliest
opportunity, were both reinforced by this measure.
The confidence in the government itself, which in the early days of
perestroika had risen considerably, had been severely undermined by the time of
the August coup. This was due in part to Gorbachev's lack of legitimacy, as he
had not been popularly elected. In contrast, El'tsin's electoral mandate gave him
a clear advantage. Gorbachev's unpopularity, however, ran much deeper.
Mikhail Sergeevich had brought the government down to pre-perestroika depths
in the eyes of the population; yet again, fantastic promises had been made, only to
be broken, then changed, and unfulfilled again. The names of the goals had
changed, but they remained utopian slogans nonetheless. Despite his success and
popularity abroad, Gorbachev became unpopular at home most of all because he
allowed prices to rise, whilst shops remained empty. Gorbachev's attempts to
make the Soviet economy more compatible with that of the EC had left many with
no cause to rejoice.
67 Russian Economic Trends, vol. 1, no. 1, 1992, p. 16.
68 IW, 1994, op. cit., p. 126.
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Much criticism followed from all sides, but most harshly from the neo-
Slavophiles. One of the vocal figures of this opposition was the author Mikhail
Antonov, who wrote that
people are already signing agreements on 'free economic zones'.
This insults me personally, as a Russian and as a Soviet citizen, it
affronts my patriotic feelings [...] We are not an underdeveloped
country, we are a great industrial power, and if we remove the
interfering administrative and economic cobwebs from the people
[...] then in a short time they will be able to flood the market with
food-products and to create any super-modem technology without
foreign mentors and culture-bearers.69
An article by Andrei Kuznetsov was not quite so extreme, although still very
much against FEZs, arguing that their benefits are not as great as many had
previously claimed, and that the organizers of many FEZs no longer see them as
positive, or controllable. He deplored the fact that the multinationals were very
much in control, and could make FEZs compete against each other until the
supposed benefits had been largely bargained away. 7° Although these two
examples were directed at Free Economic Zones particularly, they applied to any
measures which 'sold out' to the Western way of running the economy and the
country. The support for these right wing groupings was fuelled by the economic
hardships caused by the failures of Gorbachev's reforms. El'tsin, from the very
beginning of his leadership, had to deal with this important level of antagonism to
pro-Western economic policies.
Boris El'tsin came to be the most powerful man in the former Soviet Union
after being carried on a wave of popular support for his opposition to Gorbachev,
and his brave leadership of the anti-putsch forces. The euphoria very soon
dissolved, however, with El'tsin this time being in charge of government, and
therefore the new target for blame. The new President had the unenviable task of
69 Leonard Geron, op. cit., p. 18, from Mikhail Antonov, 'Idti svoim putem', Molodala gvardiia,
no. 1 1988.
/0 A. Kuznetsov, 'Svobodnye zony I natsional'naia ekonomIka', MEMO, no. 12, 1990, Pp. 24-35.
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trying to balance the need to preserve his popularity, against his stated aim of
enacting more thorough-going reforms, with their inevitably unpopular results.
3.6 El'tsin's Economic Successes and Failures up to 1995, with Regard to
Foreign Trade and Investment
It was made clear from the beginning of El'tsin's leadership that making a success
of the economic reforms was the first priority. There has certainly been no lack
of debate and initiatives. Between August 1991 and June 1992, the Russian
Parliament passed over five hundred new laws concerning economic reform.71
This tendency continued into 1994, as shown by the President's announcement in
May that one hundred decrees would be prepared, with thirty of them to be
passed in 1994.72
 Such prolific legislative activity is not without a negative
effect, however. There was great uncertainty at home as well as abroad over
which laws were stifi effective, and which ones were truly being enforced. Only
once laws stop being introduced, and start being effectively implemented, can
they have the desired effect on economic recovery. Nevertheless, despite the
unpredictability of the legal situation, there were enough positive measures taken
to ensure continued growth in the number of Western investment projects in
Russia, and conditions for trade which more closely resembled those in Europe,
although still presenting many unique challenges.
The remainder of this chapter seeks to determine what El'tsin has done to
attract EU and other Western investors or exporters/importers, and how he has
tried to assist Russian exporters. The material is separated into the three main
goals of his economic reforms: privatization, macrostabilization and price
liberalization, and convertibility. Finally this section covers the main changes in
71 According to Igor Ivanov, Russian People's Deputy and Chairman of the Sub-Committee on
Finance and Currency, from a talk given at the School of Slavomc and East European Studies,
University of London, 9 June 1992.
72	 CountryReport—Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1994, P. 21; andBEE, 20 June 1994, P. 7.
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foreign trade policy itself, together with other legal changes affecting investment
conditions.
Privatization
Privatization is widely considered the most important part of El'tsin's economic
reforms. It is also of great importance to European traders and investors in
Russia, for a number of reasons. The significance of being able to value
enterprises according to market forces has already been noted; the need for
managers of privatized enterprises to achieve profitability and to be answerable to
shareholders also make denationalized enterprises more comprehensible and
attractive to potential foreign partners. The political importance of the
privatization programme was great, making the shift away from a centralized
economy virtually irreversible; this in itself was priceless for Western business
circles. Finally, especially in the latest phase, privatization paves the way for
Western capital to directly help rebuild the Russian economy as equity partners,
many branches of which can expect fast growth, and corresponding profits.
Until 1993, the pace of the privatization process was slow. Attempts had
been made to speed up the process, for example in early February 1992, when the
maximum time allocated for an authority to refuse an application for privatization
was halved from a month to two weeks.73 One of the more positive signs to date
has also been the numerous and diversified regional privatization programmes. In
the Moscow oblast for example, there has been an accommodation privatization
drive at relatively moderate expense. By June 1992, however, less than 1% of the
flats had been privatized. The pauperization of the population, and the
73 RIA in English. 7 Febniaiy 1992, in SWB, Weekly Economic Report, Former Soviet Union, 14
Februaiy 1992.
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imperfection of the legislation have been blamed, 74 but the simple fact that rent
was still by far the cheaper option remained the main reason for the slow uptake.
At the end of 1991, El'tsin had declared many over-optiniistic goals for
Russian denationalization. By the end of 1992, according to his 29 December
decree, 5 0-70% of all enterprises would be privatized. His November decrees
required that all trade and services enterprises open their own bank accounts by 1
January 1993, in order to become legal entities. In practice, many failed to fulfil
this legal requirement in time. Even enterprises which were legal entities were
still run by joint accounting offices, which meant that they were not in fact
independent. 75 There had been virtually no successful instances of privatization
of medium or large enterprises by the summer of 1992.
The large proportion of enterprises which were neither state nor private
became increasingly problematic. Although the state still controlled 80% of
interests in non-governmental corporations, and 60% in non-governmental
partnerships, the managers were left mostly to their own devices. As they had no
interest in the firm itself, owning no part of it, there was a tendency to be more
interested in short term gain, and more open to corruption than ever. It also left
much time for the planning of nomenklatura takeovers of enterprises, or
'spontaneous privatization'.
The main spur to the privatization programme was the distribution of
vouchers to every member of the public, through 40,000 branches of savings
banks throughout the country, starting in October 1992. Medium and large
enterprises which had not yet been privatized were to be sold through voucher
privatization, unless otherwise decided by the State Committee for Property
(GKI). A minimum of 10% of shares in any 'mass' privatization had to be made
available for vouchers. 76 To facilitate mass privatization all enterprises (except
those deemed by the government to be unsuitable for privatization) had to re-
74 1TAR-TASS, 18 June 1992, in SWB, Weekly Economic Report, Former Soviet Union 26 June
1992.
Ibid.
76 The Financial Times, 2 October 1992; and 'Ostankino' television, 1 October 1992, What the
Papers Say, 2 October 1992.
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register as joint stock companies with a corporate charter and a board of directors,
even though 100% of equity was owned by the government. Following
corporatization, its managers and workers could choose one of three forms of
voucher privatization. 77 The first type of privatization offered free allocation of
25% of preferential (non-voting) shares to the collective of managers and
workers, a further 10% of shares (with voting rights) werç offered to workers at
0.7 times the nominal book value, with 5% of shares available to managers at the
nominal price. It is important to note that the nominal book value is that which
was estimated by auditors in 1992 (this is true for all three types of voucher
privatization), meaning that in real terms the cost is extremely low, due to the
effect of hyperinflation. Variant number one also granted 10% of any post-tax
profits to the employees' collective. Variant number two offered 51% of stock to
the employees at 1.7 times the nominal book value (in late 1993 this meant, in
real terms, about 2% of actual value), with the employees also able to participate
in the auctions selling off the remaining 49%; in this type of privatization,
outsiders had to buy shares through property funds, or employees. Variant
number three was intended for medium-size enterprises (200-1,000 employees).
It called for a group within the enterprise to be delegated by the employees to take
over the management for one year, being permitted to purchase 20% of stock at
nominal value at the end of the year. The remaining shares could be bought by
employees from the property fund, using the enterprise's profits. Although the
Minister responsible for privatization, Anatolii Chubais, recommended the first
variant of privatization, by late 1993 80% of privatized enterprises had used the
second type.78 These details are important for potential EU investors for two
reasons. Firstly, any investor, especially if investing through equity, needs to
know the composition of shareholders in their partner/investee company. The
predominance of variant number two meant on one hand that investors could
count on the extra motivation derived from a higher degree of shareholding
77 Maxim Boycko, Andrei Schleifer and Robert W. Vishny, 'The Progress of Russian
Pñvatization' in Economic Transformation in Russia, ed. Anders Aslund, London, 1994, p. 102.
78 Martin McCauley, op. cit., pp. 27-28.
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amongst the workforce, but on the negative side there resulted an increased
likelihood that granting important proportions of shares in a company to foreign
investors would be vetoed by shareholders. More generally, though, this
relatively high level of shareholding participation was likely to decrease the
likelihood of renationalization, thus veiy slightly decreasing political risk.
Although originally all vouchers were to have been used by the end of
1993, this was extended first to the end of June, and then the end of July 1994.
The Moscow City authorities ruled to extend voucher sales of shares in
companies based in the capital until 1 January l995. After having sunk in price
to just over Rb4,000 ($10) in November 1992, and to Rb5,000 ($5) in May
1993, 80
 heavy voucher trading and domestic confidence in the privatization
process pushed up the value of vouchers to over Rb3 1,000 ($26) in November
1993.81
Land privatization was in need of a similar boost. By summer 1992, a
mere 2% of Russian land had been privatized. 82
 This helps explain why, despite
earlier reticence, E1'tsin signed a decree in October 1992 which gave citizens the
right to use vouchers to buy land or homes. The rights of land owners have
progressively increased, up to the stage where, after another presidential decree
signed in November 1993, Russians were allowed to freely buy, sell, rent and
bequeath land, contrarily to the situation beforehand when land had to be owned
for ten years before it could be resold.83
By September 1993, 27% of Russian industry had been pnvatized, the
highest figure for any former Communist republic or state;M by April 1994, this
figure had more than doubled, as around 70% of large and medium-sized
enterprises had been formally transferred to private ownership. According to the
government-run Centre for Economic Analysis, by the end of the first quarter of
' BEE, 11 July 1994, p. 3.
80 Maxim Boycko et al, op. cit., p. 105.81 BEE, 22 November 1993, p. 3.82 Gngorii Iavlinskii's Centre for Economic and Political Research, 'Spring '92 Reforms in
Russia', Moscow News, no. 21, p. 6.83 BEE, 8 November 1993, p. 3.84 Martin McCauley, op. cit., p. 20.
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1994 41% of Russian industrial workers were employed in the private sector,
compared to 0.2% in January 1992; this does suggest, however, that it is the
largest enterprises which still remained to be privatized. 85 By the spring of 1995
there remained 7,186 of the large state enterprises to be privatized.86
Small scale privatization was at least as successful, following the decision
to leave local authorities in charge of the cash auctions for their transfer of
ownership, and in control of the proceeds. 87
 By the end of September 1993, 61%
of small enterprises had completed their privatization, although the rate was much
lower in rural areas and in Asian Russia. 88
 By April 1994, privatization of small
businesses was virtually complete, 89 although many still had a minority state
shareholding in 1995.
Post-voucher privatization consisted of straight auctions for cash of 25-
30% of shares in remaining companies, with corresponding voting rights.
Successful bidders were expected to invest the sum proposed over a period of
three years, with an initial tranche of at least 20% to be payable immediately after
the tender was accepted. Additional share offerings were expected to follow in
companies needing extra capital, if this was acceptable to existing shareholders.90
It was in these post-voucher sales of equity that the development of a respected
system of auditing and an efficient interaction with shareholders started to be of
tremendous importance. This is one of the areas where Western technical
assistance (see chapter 4) has been very helpful, both in auditing itself; and in
helping Russian auditors adopt international standards, thus gradually becoming
more trusted both by potential investors and existing shareholders. This newly
created possibility for Russian workers to reap the benefits of their labour through
dividends should not be ignored. Although in the majority of cases shareholders
are still obtaining little or no dividends on their shares, most of all because of the
85 EITJ, Country Report - Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1994, p. 23.
86 EIU, Country Report—Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1995, p. 16.
87 Maxim Boycko eta!, op. cit., p. 101.
88 Martin McCauley, op. cit., p. 29.
E, Country Report— Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1994, p. 23.
90Ibid.
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common practice to minimize official profits in order to minimize fiscal liability,
foreign investors who gain influence in a company and who ensure that profits are
declared in order to receive their yield through dividends will simultaneously be
stimulating the workforce who have kept their shares.
As regards the possibilities for West European involvement in Russian
privatization, the situation also improved considerably after early 1992. Although
the 'Basic Provisions of the Programme for the Privatization of State and
Municipal Enterprises in the Russian Federation for 1992' were very restrictive
with respect to foreign investment, these Provisions were repealed in June of that
year, and replaced by the full State Privatization Programme. In this Programme,
the following conditions to foreign involvement in privatization were stipulated: if
the foreign investor was the sole participant in the auction, competition or sale,
the transaction could proceed, but the price had to be determined pursuant to a
scheme determined by the GM; foreign investors could take part in the
privatization of trade, public dining and service enterprises or other small
enterprises of industiy, construction and automobile transport only by the
decision of the local authorities; allowing foreign investors to participate in the
privatization of fuel and energy complexes or specific mining enterprises required
a decision of the Government of the Russian Federation or constituent republic
when the principle of privatization was agreed. 9' With the acceptance of the
three above-mentioned modes of voucher privatization, however, access to shares
became largely dependent upon purchases from employees.
There also remain some companies which are in a grey area, neither state-
owned nor joint stock companies. Such companies can be majority-owned by its
workers, without this ownership having been formalized through the issue of
shares. Although the GM seeks to abolish this type of half-way house, directors
often tiy to retain the starus quo precisely because they fear that their employees
91 W. E. Butler and M. E. Gashi-Butler, Legal Aspects of Doing Business in Russia, London,
1993, pp. 28-3 1.
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could sell a controlling share to foreigners or to Russians who do not have the
company's future at heart.92
Many workers were likely to be reluctant to allow foreign investors to
aquire a majority share, however, in fear of job-threatening restructuring.
Another option deemed to be possible in 1993 was to approach a company before
it was included in the mass pnvatization programme, and strike a deal with GKJ.
The Western investor could opt for a majority share, or the cheaper option of
3 3.3% plus one share, to ensure that another Western competitor could not later
obtain greater control, short of buying it from the enterprise's workforce. There
naturally remained the choice of simply establishing a JV with a company once it
was privatized, which provided the significant advantage of having no
responsibility for bad debts or environmental damage. One potential stumbling
block is the requirement for 75% of the investors to approve such an asset transfer
at the target enterprise's shareholders' general meeting. 93 Nevertheless, JVs have
clearly continued to be the main vehicle through which Western companies have
sought to become involved in production or trade in Russia, short of opening
wholly-owned subsidiaries. With post-voucher privatization, however, the
opportunities for simple portfolio investment, without seeking controlling shares
or direct involvement in production or management, have been greatly facilitated.
The American bank Credit Suisse First Boston (CSFB), which was appointed in
1992 to coordinate the first stage of Russia's privatization, was granted a
securities licence in March 1994 which allowed it to trade and underwrite equity
(as well as debt). 94 In its first few months of trading (still during voucher
privatizations), CSFB was reported to have brokered $300m worth of Russian
equity.95 The new opportunities granted by the latest stage of privatization are
dampened, however, by the fact that brokerage fees are high, workforces may
block Western takeover bids, and legislation on share ownership is still
92 This was still the case in the spring of 1996; the author met with such Directors in the Urals.
BEE, 16 August 1993, p. 4.
94 BEE, 14 March 1994, p. 12.
95 EIU, CountryReport—Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1994, p. 28.
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ambiguous. A poll conducted by Russian Economic Trends classed legal
disincentives as the most wortying type of barner to investment, and within that
category, fears about shareholder rights ranked highest. Nevertheless, at least
S748m of portfolio investment flowed into Russia in 1994. 96 Figures given by
then Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii Chubais put the figure at well over $2bn,
peaking in June at $500m per month, down to $lOOm per month at the end of the
year;97 this is likely to be optimistic, however, as the RCB assessed the figure at
$602m, although Credit Suisse Frist Boston estimated over double this amount, at
$1,287m, from January to November. 98 Although the flow of portfolio
investment slowed down with events in Chechnia, and later with concern over
parliamentary and presidential elections, Western capital has nonetheless
continued to be invested through the Russian stock market, and new Securities
Funds have been set up in Moscow, gambling on an eventual boom.
The fact is that privatization has been the Russian government's greatest
success in terms of market reforms. No other former Communist country has
privatized so large a proportion of ex-state enterprises so quickly. Acquiring
equity, even a majority share, in Russian companies was now a possibility for EU
investors. Even at this early stage many EU investors took up this offer, despite
the many uncertainties and bureaucratic hurdles; once the risk has lessened and
the red tape reduced, EU equity investment can be expected to increase
dramatically.
Macrostabilization and Price Stabilization
The Russian authorities' ability to control domestic money supply is naturally of
great significance from the foreign investor's point of view. The levels of
96 Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends - 1995, vol. 4, no. 1, pp.
118-20; the $748m figure is based on official balance of payments figure - the actual figure is likely to
be higher.
97 Ibid., p. 118.
98 EIU, CountryReport—Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1995, p. 35.
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inflation that were reached after price liberalization, and the rate of exchange of
the ruble as it became increasingly convertible, depended largely upon El'tsin's
governmental policies on credit emission, interest rates, taxation, and budgetary
expenditure. From a potential West European investor's perspective, astronomic
domestic price rises are a strong disincentive for many reasons. One main
problem of hyperinflation is the inability to predict costs; contracts with suppliers
have proven to be no protection from this changeability, as in practice they have
tended to be either renegotiated or simpiy not fulfilled. From a supplier's
perspective, losses are inevitably made, even if longer-term contracts are avoided,
as payments in rubles will have depreciated between the time when the price of a
purchase was made, and the money actually transferred to the seller, who then has
to convert it into either goods, investment capital or hard currency. Last, but not
least, the political instability which is fuelled by hyperinflation is another potent
disincentive to investment in Russia. The effect of macrostabilization on
convertibility, and the use of hard currency as a tool against the repercussions of
hyperinflation, are discussed in the next section.
The Soviet authorities' catastrophic monetary policy record was on the
whole not improved upon by the Russian economic decision-makers in their first
year. On the 23 January 1992 the Chairman of the Central Bank of Russia
reported that the domestic debt of the FSU was Rb500bn, whilst Goskomstat had
given a figure which was twice that only five weeks previously. 99 It should be
stressed that contrarily to budget deficits in the West, which generally consist of
state bonds and obligations, the Russian budget deficit normally consists of extra
cash, adding directly to inflationary pressure.'00
The emission of cash itself proved to be fairly restricted, at least in the first
three months of 1992. Despite Georgii Matiukhin's claim in January that this
period alone would see more money printed than in the whole of 1991, in fact
99 Matiukhin's (then Chairman of the Russian Central Bank) figures taken from Russian TV on 23
January 1992 (see SWI3, Weekly Economic Report, 31 Januaiy 1992), whilst the Goskomstat figure was
issued by TASS World Service inRussian, 24 December 1991.
100 F"JcJyn D. Holtzman, op. cit, p. 18.
The Effect of Russian Economic Reforms on Forefrn Trade, and on Prospects of
Closer RUUIS-ELJ Economic ReIalIons
amounts of cash injected into the economy were lower than in the last part of the
previous year. The restriction of cash injections did not unfortunately mean a
curtailment in money supply; credits continued to be granted, but there was
simply not enough physical cash to spend them. The 'cash crisis' was at the
centre of media attention for much of the first half of 1992; the general
impression conveyed was that if only enough cash could be printed, the problem
would be solved. Gaidar seemed to have abandoned his monetarist policy when
he said in May 1992 that he hoped to reach Rbl42bn in cash emission in June,
approximately 2.5 times that of May, and that he also wanted to introduce
Rb5,000 notes from July, and to increase the level of cash printing to Rb270-8Obn
per month by August.'°' The fact that it took so long to take such simple
measures as printing higher denominations, however, suggests that in fact the
'cash crisis' was a primitive way to limit the money supply, made possible by the
fact that a very high proportion of personal consumption transactions in Russia
were still conducted in cash.'°2
Regardless of how much cash was being made available in early and mid-
1992, the growth in credit would sooner or later be translated into inflationaiy
pressure, short of all credit being indefinitely frozen and/or the existing ruble
being abandoned for a new currency. Despite that fact, strict monetary control
was given only lip-service. In theory, the Russian government's economic
programme, adopted on 27 February 1992, cleared the way for a tightening of the
money supply. Konstantin Kagalovskii, the plenipotentiary for relations with
international financial organizations, had then made it clear that he wanted to
bring monthly inflation down to 3% at most, by the last quarter of that year. 103
 In
fact, however, the amount of rubles being introduced into the economy continued
to augment exponentially. From a level of Rb325bn in February 1992, total RCB
credits increased to Rb485bn in March, Rb833bn in May, Rb2,009bn in July, and
101 Channel 1 TV, Moscow, 31 May 1992, in SWB, Weekly Economic Report, 5 June 1992.
102 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., p. 182.
103 ITAR-TASS World Service in Russian, 27 Februaiy 1992, from SWB, Former Soviet Union, 29
February 1992 (SU/1317 B12).
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Rb3,ll7bn in August. This is the period which saw the greatest proportional
increase in RCB credits, and in M2.'°4
One main reason for the pressure to allow credits to grow was the inter-
enterprise payment crisis. The practice of spending empty credit had become
increasingly common. This process habitually started with a commercial bank
granting credit which it did not have, with the recipient in turn spending this
credit, regardless of its baselessness. This scenario was then copied, creating a
long chain of enterprises counting on non-existent funds. Non-payments, both
between enterprises and banks, and purely between enterprises, amounted to
Rb764.3bn, in the first quarter of 1992, a twenty-three fold increase on the same
period of the previous year. In other words, 3 7.4% of industrial output was not
paid for. 105 The commercial banks which had brought themselves into debt in
this way were not dissolved, but instead tended to be accorded credits by the
Central Bank of Russia. This was done partly in the hope of avoiding panic in the
new banks which could have resulted from commercial bank closures, and not
least because of the pressure from the anti-market reform opposition not to do
anything which would lead to widespread bankruptcies of enterprises affected by
inter-enterprise debt. In this desire to protect enterprises caught in this
conundrum, the conservatives were not necessarily being unreasonable, as Alan
Smith notes;
perfectly viable enterprises have been caught up in debt chains and
it is exceedingly difficult to ascertain the long-term prospects for
an enterprise by looking at this short-run cash position. There is a
fear that a single enterprise bankruptcy could lead to a major chain
of bankruptcies [...].106
On 3 April 1992, the Central Bank obtained permission from the government to
take measures to allay the payments crisis, envisaging an increase in credits of
104 M2 is the aggregate of currency in circulation, demand deposits and time deposits; figures from
Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends - Monthly Update, 30 April 1994,
p. 11.
105 Gngorii Iavlinskii's Centre for Economic and Political Research, 'Spring '92 Reforms in
Russia', Moscow News, no. 22, p. 6.
106 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., p. 182.
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approximately Rb200bn. The following month, further increases in wages were
approved, as were rises in pensions from Rb342 to 800-900 per month. Such
freeing of budgetary control resulted in the massive amounts of credit listed
above. Thus despite earlier talk of aiming at very strict monetary policy, Russia
was, albeit by default, using a commonly prescribed method of reducing a
currency overhang, namely allowing monetary supply to increase, but making
sure that the increase in prices is proportionally greater. Thus the real average
wage of the Russian population was 46% of its 1990 level in the first quarter of
1992, 44% in the second, 59% in the third and 65% in the last.'°7 The problem is
that whilst such an approach may be beneficial with medium or even high levels
of inflation, the disadvantages of hyperinflation meant it was an inappropriate
approach for Russia in 1992.
The rate of credit emission and monetary growth was lower in 1993,
although still unacceptably high. Until September, only one month saw a rate of
increase of total RCB credits of less than 10% (May, with 6%); the average
monthly credit growth for those first three quarters was of 12.8%. The average
monthly growth of M2 for the same period was 15.7%, bringing the total figure
up to Rb28.7trn by the end of September.'°8 Another significant destination of
these credits was the former Soviet States; this capital was granted partly in order
to maintain political leverage, and partly to prevent strategic suppliers collapsing,
thus leaving their client Russian companies without essential inputs.
A clear sign that the government was still struggling to control inflation
was shown at the end of July, when the authorities announced that all banknotes
printed before 1993 would be withdrawn from circulation; enterprises were given
one day to swap notes, individuals two weeks (this was later extended to 31
August by El'tsin). What was meant as an anti-inflationaty measure seemed
simply to have the effect of reducing confidence in the ruble, just as it had started
to grow. It targeted both the shadow economy, and the former Soviet Republics,
107 Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends - Monthly Update, 30
April 1994, p. 13.
108 Thid., p. 11.
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but affected only some 12% of cash in circulation, whilst Pavlov's move had
affected some 45% of cash. The proof of the damage done to confidence in the
ruble came the next day, when the exchange rate had depreciated from
Rbl,000:$1 to Rbl,600:$1 in the kiosks.'°9
Despite counter-productive policies such as the currency reform described above,
however, from the second half of 1993 the government's control over the
macroeconomic situation seemed to increase significantly. In the last three
months of 1993, the nominal increase in total RCB credits never reached 10%,110
and credits from commercial banks also appeared to have been greatly reduced.
As a result, after having reached 18.8% of GDP in 1992, Russia's budget deficit
for 1993 was halved."
Viktor Chemomyrdin, then relatively new as Prime Minister, although
having maintained the impression that he was opposed to the monetarist approach
of Egor Gaidar and Boris Fedorov, nonetheless continued to curb inflationary
pressures in 1994. Almost certainly due to governmental pressure, in February
the Central Bank ordered that the minimum capital requirement for new banks be
increased from Rb lOOm to Rb2bn, effective from 1 March 1994; existing banks
had until 1 January 1995 to comply, even though in March 1994, only 7% of the
country's banks would have qualified." 2 This measure was aimed at curtailing
the empty credits which fuelled the inter-enterprise debt, as was another decree in
early 1994, which obliged enterprises to withdraw funds from their hard currency
accounts if they were unable to meet their obligations from their ruble accounts.
Nevertheless, the situation could only improve if at least some of the worst
offenders, or those least likely to become profitable enough to ever repay their
debts, were forced to dissolve. Rosgoskomstat had estimated that although some
8,000 firms had been officially recognized as insolvent, only eight enterprises had
109 BEE, 2 August 1993, p. 5.
110 Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends - Monthly Update, 30
April i99, p. 11.
111 IMF, 1994, op. cit., pp. 69-71.
112 BEE, 21 March 1994, p. 6, and 28 Februaiy 1994, p. 6.
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been declared bankrupt by the end of 1993. The Federal Bankruptcy Agency said
in mid-February 1994 that another fifty companies were being considered for
bankruptcy proceedings in arbiiration courts. 113 After years of vague threats
about bankruptcy which were virtually never acted upon, the Prime Minister
appeared to be pushing for a clearer and more forceful policy. Russian industrial
plants were to be divided into three categories: i) those that managed to adapt to
the new conditions, and whose output has started to grow; ii) those that had so far
failed to adapt, but had obvious potential to do so (this was by far the largest
group); iii) those which had no future and had to close down, a list of which was
being prepared."4
Chemomyrdin's greatest achievement in the first half of 1994 was to
succeed in passing his budget through the Duma in May; this budget provided for
a deficit of 9.6% (Rb7Otm) of GDP, not too far from the 6.5% requested by the
IMF. The Prime Minister also succeeded in getting enough support to defeat
proposals for a 67% increase in defence spending, which would have made
adherence to the budget inipossible.'15
The government's interest rate and taxation policies have both been of
relatively limited use, at least until late 1993, in the struggle to achieve
macrostabilization. From the beginning, in 1991, taxation's role in the attempts
to reduce the inflationary gap were bound to be limited for two main reasons.
Firstly, the significant falls in production meant a decrease in fiscal income from
corporate taxes. Secondly, as noted in the previous section, there was great
ambiguity in the levels of taxation which had to be forwarded from the regions to
Moscow, and a great reluctance on the part of autonomous republics and areas to
maintain their fiscal contributions to the federal centre. 116 These tendencies have
prevailed up to the time of writing. E1'tsin's Presidential decree of 22 December
1993 did, however, attempt to clarify the situation. The new maximum profit tax
113 BEE, 7 March 1994, p. 3.
114 EIU, Coun try Report - Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1994, pp. 16-17.
115 Ibid., pp. 8 and 21.
116 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., p. 119.
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rate, which was raised from 32% to 38% (43% for banks), was now clearly
divided: 13% went to the federal government, and up to 25% (30% for banks)
was to be kept by the regional authorities." 7 Despite this clarification of the legal
position, however, regions have continued to ignore the requirements set by
Moscow. For example, in April 1994 Irkutsk oblast' and Khabarovsk krai both
declined to pay their federal taxes; meanwhile, lakutia was pressing Moscow for
greater retention of profits, in return for less central subsidization." 8 The amount
of loopholes in existing fiscal legislation, and the corruption of many officials,
also shoulder part of the blame for the poor levels of taxation revenue. In the first
quarter of 1992, only Rb3Obn of the Rb228bn due in fiscal income from foreign
trade was received, the rest being written off as 'privileges' granted to certain
enterprises and local authorities; in total, an estimated Rb3O9bn was lost in this
fashion between November 1991 and March 1992." Other figures suggest that
the overall rate of tax collection is not so disastrous; one estimate of the level of
uncollected taxes for the first three quarters of 1993 was 17%.120
Interest rates, as a tool to discourage spending, have also been unavailable
for most of El'tsin's time in power. During times of hyperinflation, the
maintenance of a positive real interest rate is often impracticable; this was
particularly the case for a government and central bank unused to the workings of
a free market. In the first half of 1992, Georgii Matiukbin, then Chariman of the
Central Bank, increased annual interest rates from 20% to 50%, which was a
positive sign that played a part in strengthening the ruble vis a vis the dollar, as
did the further increase to 80%; 121 these could not compare, however, with the
average inflation rate for 1992 of 1,353%.
In 1993, however, interest rates started catching up with inflation rates that
were still consistently over 15% monthly (apart from December). The monthly
117 BEE, 7 March 1994, p. 8.
118 BEE, 7 March 1994, p. 3.
119 Grigorli Iavlinskii's Centre for Economic and Political Research, 'Spring '92 Reforms in
Russia' Moscow News, no. 21, p. 6.
12O Martin McCauley, op. cit., p. 21.
121 JTAR-TASS World Service in English, in SWB, Weekly Economic Report, 1 June 1992.
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interest rate in January was 9.9% ( -12.8% in real monthly terms), in July it was
14.5% (-6.1%), and 18.4% in October ( 2.1%). 122 By December, interest rates
became positive in real terms,' 23 but the RCB's base rate kept rising. Thus by
March the RCB's quarterly refinancing rate was 2 10%. Throughout spring and
summer the rate fell in relation to the decreasing rate of inflation, and by the
beginning of August the RCB three-month refinancing rate was down to 150%.124
As mentioned above, privalization could not be used to substantially alleviate the
inflationary pressure before prices were freed. Price liberalization was essential
to solve many of the problems that had precluded efficiency under the Soviet
system, as depicted in previous sections; the lack of reflection of supply and
demand, the irrationality of the choice of imports and exports, the development of
a black market and of corruption, the incessant need to queue, and many others.
The new aims of economic reform also required free prices; only free prices could
bring about the commodity convertibility which would make currency
convertibility a possibility, and only they could make possible accurate
estimations of the value of enterprises being privatized, or of those which need to
be liquidated.
In January 1992, the Russian government freed 90% of retail prices and
80% of wholesale prices; by March 1992, price controls remained for only twelve
basic foodstuffs, rents, public services and public transport. Predictably, the
highest inflation came in the first month of price liberalization, January 1992; the
month-to-month inflation rate was 245%, followed by 38% in February and 30%
in March. 125
The other main factor discouraging a stabilization of prices after
liberalization, apart from the high levels of credit being granted by the RCB and
the natural tendency to spend rather than hold rubles, has been monopolies.
122 Martin McCauley, op. cit., p. 23.
123 jMY, 1994, op. cit., p. 71.
124 The Guardian, 2 August 1994.
125 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., pp. 178-79.
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Monopolistic state enterprises have on the whole reacted to reduction in demand
not by cutting prices, but by cutting output. Thus despite the freeing of prices,
food output declined by 28% in the first quarter of 1992, footwear by 21%,
televisions by 28%. 126 This was made possible by the fact that whilst tight
monetaiy and fiscal policies squeezed the retail sector and exposed consumers to
tightening budget constraints, enterprises still enjoyed easy access to credit. This,
combined with the fact that so many large Russian enterprises were monopolies,
meant that managers could simply restrict output and increase prices.' 27
 Despite
the extremely high propensity to spend which is triggered by such hyperinflation,
especially considering the fears of the effects of the high levels of money supply,
it is interesting that in the first quarter of 1992 the increase in wholesale prices
was greater than that of retail prices, which suggests cost-push inflation. The
combination of free prices but still state-owned retailing outlets created a situation
where many shops left their food to rot rather than bring prices down, after they
had overestimated demand.
Strong and effective anti-monopoly regulations needed to be imposed not
only at large enterprise level, but with street trading as well. There have been
widespread reports of producers attempting to sell their products on street stalls or
markets, and being chased away by thugs protecting the interests of other traders.
For small shops and kiosks, there is a well-documented need to pay a significant
cut of profits to mafia-type protection rackets, and this discourages not only
traders from doing business, but potential producers from setting up workshops or
small enterprises. Such oligopolistic conditions allow prices to stay much higher
than necessaly. The Russian government has not been unaware of the problem.
El'tsin issued a Presidential decree on 3 February 1992, stating that all enterprises
were allowed to sell goods not specifically banned, that local governments should
encourage free enterprise, and ensure that there are suitable facilities for Street
126 Gngorii Iavlinskii's Centre for Economic and Political Research, 'Spring '92 Reforms in
Russia' Moscow News, no. 21, p. 6.
12' Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., p. 197.
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markets to be safe and attractive.' 28 There have been some examples of popular
markets, where access is clearly available to all, but these gigantic boot sales are
not sufficient; they are infrequent, and overcrowded, but most importantly they
are veiy small-scale. Any trader wanting to go a stage further and to open his
own outlet is still likely to be faced with protection rackets. By mid-1994, the
situation appeared to have begun to stabilize in Moscow, but only in as much as
the jurisdiction of particular 'mafia' groups had become clearer, as had the rates
which they demanded. In other cities, the fear and uncertainty remained at
previous levels, continuing to act as an extremely strong disincentive to new types
of production or services.
Yet whilst mafia-type oligopolies have increased in importance, the
monopoly of the state in the supply sector has virtually disappeared. This took
some time; in the spring of 1992 it was reported that despite Gaidar's pledge to
the IMF that by the end of 1991 state orders would be virtually abolished, they in
fact remained widely in operation, and the old distribution system was intact in
many regions of Russia. A new sort of state order had also appeared, as local
authorities often claimed 10-15% of the volume of their area's industrial output
for inter-regional barter trade. Wholesalers frequently faced republican
limitations to the prices they could charge, or even to which customers they could
sell; middlemen likewise faced restrictions.' 29 Despite these set-backs,
commodity exchanges have gradually taken over as the main way to acquire
supplies, together with direct contacts with suppliers. Newspapers such as
Kommersant" have been printing user-friendly charts of the rates for metals,
energy products, wood and other goods at commodity exchanges since 1991.
Television and phone exchanges of goods have also been popular, especially for
cars and apartments. The downwards pressure on prices created by the more
open competition permitted by the increasing number of exchanges was often
more than compensated for by the increased access to world markets. Thus
128 RIA, in English, 3 Februaiy 1992, in SWB, Weekly Economic Report, 14 Februaiy 1992.
129 Grigorii Iavlinskii's Centre for Economic and Political Research, 'Spring '92 Reforms in
Russia', Moscow News, no. 21, p. 6.
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between Januaiy and September 1993, most goods continued to approach 'world'
prices, the commodity exchange price of petrol going from 37% of world prices
to 58%, aluminium 41% to 65%, and wheat from 47% to 54%. 130
For all of the reasons elaborated upon above, prices on the whole
continued to rise long after liberalization, albeit at a much slower pace than in the
first month. Apart from the period between May and September 1992, and again
in April-May 1993, the monthly increase in the consumer price index remained
above 20% until November 1993. 131 Nonetheless, the overall rate of inflation
(still of consumer prices) was reduced in 1993, from the 1992 rate of 1,353%, to
896%. 132 Although there was some expectation in mid-1994 that a new loosening
of credit emission was likely to bring interest rates up slightly before the end of
the year, Russia managed to remain close to the IM1F's target monthly consumer
inflation growth rate of 7% by the end of the year, ensuring credits for 1995 (see
Chapter 4). This stabilization of the rate of inflation is clearly a precondition to
any great increase in EU and other investment in Russia. A study done by the
EBRD, compared the number of foreign investment projects per capita (in
millions) in 1994 to the logarithm of inflation in that country in 1993. The results
showed a very strong correlation between the two, with six out of nine countries
with an inflation logarithm of under two having over ten projects per million
inhabitants, whilst no country with an inflation logarithm of over 2.5 had more
than five FDI projects per million inhabitants.' 33 Thus the relative stabilization of
inflation in 1994, especially in the summer, will have been a significant
motivating factor for potential EU investors.
130 Martin McCauley, op. cit. p. 23; in the examples given in this source, there were two
exceptions: crude oil went from 29% to 28%, whilst sugar distanced itself in the other direction, going
from 129% of world prices to 152%.
131 Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends - Monthly Update, 30
April 1994, P. 10.
132 IMF, 1994, op. cit. p. 126.
133 EBRD, Transition Report, London, 1995, p. 85-86.
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Ruble Convertibility
The achievement of a veiy high level of internal convertibility in Russia has
probably been the most important reform measure in terms of opening up the
Russian economy to the world market. What Gorbachev's decrees did in theory
- allowing any enterprise to deal in foreign trade - convertibility achieved in
practice, although still limited to vaiying extents by tariffs, licences and quotas.
Convertibility also works in tandem with free prices to determine in which
commodities Russia has a comparative advantage, and which ones should be
imported. Convertibility not only increases the possibilities for Western
businessmen to operate in Russia, but it also increases demand from the
increasing number of Russian traders buying on international markets, reflecting a
level of demand for Western goods which is only now possible. Most
importantly for Western entrepreneurs, convertibilty makes viable the exchange
and repatriation of ruble earnings from products produced in, or exported to,
Russia. It reduces the need for barter trade, which was not only complicated, but
sometimes forbidden. The internal convertibility of the ruble in terms of hard
currency is complemented by the ruble's commodity convertibility (free
availability of merchandise for rubles), achieved due to price liberalization and
the decentralization of the supply side of the economy, and by a high level of
capital convertibility (rubles being acceptable for investment or other capital
transactions),' 34 although the latter has been affected by high rates of inflation.
Achieving this level of convertibility was not without its problems and
delays. From late 1991 until mid-1992, the situation was complicated by the
continued operation of a multiple exchange rate. There was one extremely high
rate for centralized imports (Rb5.4:$1); a special market rate, mostly used for the
replenishing of Russia's currency reserves (Rb55:$1); the 'market' rate,
established weekly by the Central Bank of Russia for transactions with authorized
134 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., p. 45.
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banks, also artificially high (RblOO:$1); 135 the free market rate, which can be
divided into the cash rate and the money market exchange (non-cash) rate; and
finally the black market rate. In another positive step towards nonnalization of
ruble convertibility, President El'tsin issued a decree stating that from 1 July
1992, only the free market exchange rate was to remain in operation, calculated
by the Central Bank on the basis of the rates achieved at auctions in the previous
week. The rate charged by commercial banks was obviously slightly higher,
providing a profit margin. Already before this measure, as more and more banks
and kiosks had been selling hard currency, including certain branches of the
central Sberkassy (savings banks), the black market rate had come down to a level
only slightly more generous (by about 25%, 136 in May 1992) than that of the
banks. This unification and liberalization of the exchange rate meant that the cost
of any investment or expenses in Russia became much easier to calculate for
foreigners, not only in terms of convertible currency, but also in terms of rarity
value of whatever is being purchased.
Another destabilizing factor was that the Russian Central Bank did not
always make its policy clear enough. On 16 January 1992, for example, the All-
Russian Exchange Bank suspended its hard currency auctions, as it expected new
hard currency legislation.' 37 The artificiality of the auction rate was reduced
when in May 1992 the Central Bank once again allowed other banks to deal in
non-cash hard currency trade. This both extended the number and type of entities
dealing at the auctions, and reduced the extent to which the Central Bank could
affect the rate through hard currency injections. Such interventions were the
norm, and in the second quarter of 1992 they could go up to $15m' 38 per auction,
although they were normally lower, for example $3 .5m on 12 May, or $7-8m on
135 These figures are given hi Gngorii Iavlrnskli's Centre for Economic and Political Research,
'Spring '92 Reforms in Russia', Moscow News, no. 21, 1992, P. 6.
136 Commersant, 19 May 1992.
l37postfactum in English, 25 January 1992, from SWB, Weekly Economic Report, Former Soviet
Union, 31 January 1992.
138 Kommersant", 23-30 March 1992, no. 13, p. 7.
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 It is important to realize that this stabilization was being achieved
without the G7 stabilization fund, which had not then been signed off.
By the spring of 1992, enough commercial banks had acquired the right
from the Russian Central Bank to buy and sell hard currency cash to create a
competitive downward pressure on the price of the dollar. Both foreign and
Russian individuals could now freely go to commercial banks or currency kiosks
to buy or sell cash currency. A more determining factor, which also strengthened
the non-cash market, was the tight control of cash rubles being issued, as
discussed above. In the early months of 1992 the rate of the dollar actually fell,
and remained vezy strong until the summer. A. Potemkin, head of the Russian
Central Bank's foreign currency administration, claimed that this fall in the ruble
rate from June was a deliberate move to start lowering the level of Central Bank
intervention;'40
 presumably, the RCB could not afford to keep the MICE rate at a
significantly higher level than the market cash rate for veiy long. Many
questioned whether spending hundreds of millions of badly needed dollars on
stabilizing the ruble so far had not been premature, but it must be remembered
that it was extremely important to show that the ruble could reach a high level of
domestic convertibility without crashing, increasing confidence both at home and
abroad in both the currency and the economy as a whole. If the levels of credit
from the RCB had stabilized in early 1992, the exchange rate could have
survived.
The massive levels of credit being issued, compounded by the huge
amounts of rubles flooding in from republics which were switching to their own
currencies, meant that even the massive stabilization fund discussed by the G7
could not have saved the exchange rate in 1992. Already by August, total RCB
credits had topped Rb3,000bn. 141 Taking a hypothetical and slightly devaluated
rate (compared to the MICE rate on 2 June of Rb112:$1) of Rb150:l, the whole
139 Commersant, 19 May 1992, p. 14.
140 Izvestia, 17 June 1992.
141 Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends - Monthly Update, 30
April i99 p. 11.
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of the potential $6bn stabilization fund (in other words worth Rb900 bn at this
rate) would disappear in less than a year if one third of these credits were directed
towards buying hard currency. Admittedly, the credits could not immediately be
translated into dollars, as cash emission was restricted, and as corporate credits
could only be exchanged by showing proof of a hard currency obligation;
nevertheless, it was only a question of time before these credits became cash,
which would in significant part be targetted at hard currency commodities. In
other words, with Russian credit policy so loose, not granting a ruble stabilization
fund is not something the EU or other multinational organizations should be
criticized for in 1992-1993.
As undesirable as it may be to allow the exchange rate to fall drastically, it
must be remembered that the real exchange rate (actual exchange rate in relation
to inflation) is the most important parameter, especially for foreign investors.
Figures for the whole of 1992 have no useful meaning, however, as they compare
centralized prices with free prices, and a very restricted convertibility regime to a
relatively open one by the end of the year; thus, no real conclusions can be drawn
from the fact that consumer prices rose ten times faster than the MICE exchange
rate in 1992. A much more accurate impression may be derived from the figures
from July, when the exchange rates were unified, and the MICE rate was a much
truer reflection of actual supply and demand, and because the shock of price
liberalization had been largely absorbed. For the period from July to December
1992, however, the exchange rate grew faster (15 8%) than the rate of inflation
(136%) meaning that the ruble was devalued by 16% in real terms for that
period. For 1993, however, the ruble appreciated by over 200% in real terms.142
In other words, Russia's GDP, in relation to that of all other countries dealing in
hard currency, would have doubled if it had remained the same in terms of 1992
rubles.
'42 MICE exchange rates and consumer price indices taken from Russian Economic Trends -
Monthly Update, 30 April 1994, PP. 10-12.
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The Moscow Inter-Bank Currency Exchange continued to be the Russian
government's main vehicle to gradually increase non-cash convertibility. By the
beginning of 1994, only five other regional exchanges were licensed by the RCB
to deal in hard currency. Trade was through actual auctions, lasting only an hour.
All bids had to be submitted in advance, with a broker moving the price to clear
the market.' 43 Thus although the average daily trading volume had reached
$SOm-lOOm by the second half of 1993, it was still impossible for a company to
put in a very large order without distorting the market. The annual turnover in
1992 was estimated at $2-4bn in 1992, whilst it rose to $l5bn in 1993, and was
expected to reach $25bn in 1994. One main reason for the increase in trade in the
second half of 1993 was the rule introduced requiring exporters to convert all of
the mandatory 50% of export income through exchanges, whilst previously 30%
went to the RCB. By 1 September 1993, Western organizations which were not
Russian legal entities (for example representative offices) could also buy or sell
foreign currency at the MICE, 144 albeit still through an intermediary broker bank.
By July 1993, out of a total of some 1,700 commercial banks in Russia, some
fifty-five to sixty had permission to engage in foreign exchange operations. There
has been a great improvement in the efficiency of the banks which participate in
the currency exchange. Whilst in 1992 there were reports of currency transfers
using these banks often exceeding one month, by late 1993 it was reported that
rubles deposited with such a broker bank could normally be transferred to a hard
currency account within twenty-four to thirty-six hours, thus minimizing
exchange rate exposure. On larger amounts, however, delays were likely unless
some warning was given.
By early 1994 there was general satisfaction amongst Western business
people in Russia with the level of convertibility, although the main complaint
remained that foreign firms still had to work through broker banks, where a
143 BEE, 12 July 1993, p. 7.
144 Martin McCauley, op. cit., p. 26.
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commission rate of 5% was the norm; at the time of writing, the Russian banks
still enjoyed a monopoly position.
Despite the undeniable success of the currency exchanges in achieving a
very high degree of convertibility, the fact remains that the restricted access to
money markets and a very poorly developed market in government obligations are
two factors which help keep the exchange rate below its long-term equilibrium
value. Until the ruble ceases to be undervalued, controls over foreign trade can be
justified.145
The banning of the use of hard currency cash in retail outlets was aimed at
achieving a higher equilibrium rate for the ruble. This controversial measure had
often been talked about in the previous two years, but it was finally enacted in
January 1994. Despite the newfound convertibility of the ruble, continuing
hyperinflation ensured that holding rubles was still not desirable, and thus led to a
further dollarization of the Russian economy. As an example, dollar deposits
held in Russian commercial banks were estimated at $804m in Januaiy, whilst by
July 1993 they had grown to $16,600m.' 46 One official estimate put the
proportion of savings of the Russian population which was kept in hard currency
at 61.8% for 1994.' These figures are certain to greatly underestimate dollar
holdings, as Russian banks continue to be widely mistrusted and underused, most
of all where hard currency is concerned. The use of dollars had become very
common, not only in Western shops, but for virtually any large transactions.
During the period when the hard currency cash ban was merely a rumour,
the general impression of Western businessmen was that it would be disastrous.
When it actually happened, however, most were very quick to adapt and to see
the benefits. The effect was less daunting than it would have been in 1991 or
1992 because of the increased efficiency and turnover of currency exchanges, and
also because non-cash hard currency transactions, both in retail outlets and
145 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., p. 187.
'46 Mrtin McCauley, op. cit., p. 22.
147 Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends - 1995, vol. 4, no. 1, p.
115.
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between banks, were still permitted. Retail prices could even still be quoted in
dollars. The ban has created an impetus for retailers to adopt credit card systems
(which can still use hard currency), including Russian ones, such as that run by
the Stolicbnyi Bank, which reportedly had 20,000 users by the beginning of 1994.
Some retailers, such as the Swiss-Russian JV Sadko, planned to develop their
own credit card system.'48
Most of the representatives of Western companies who were interviewed
by Business Eastern Europe believed that, despite the short-term problems
created, the compulsion to do business in rubles would bring Russia in line with
other developed single-currency economies. One of the main drawbacks has been
to hold large amounts of cash rubles, with the veiy likely result of losses as long
as inflation remained high. Another concern, expressed for example by Sadko,
was that the capacity to deal with the extra amount of rubles in the currency
exchanges, despite their progress by the end of 1993, would still be
insufficient.' 49 In fact, though, by mid-1994 it seemed that the currency
exchanges were coping veiy well.
Like a Western currency exchange, the Moscow rate has also become
sensitive to the international situation. In late 1991 and early 1992, for example,
whenever the '$24bn' G7 package seemed closer to being confirmed, there was a
tendency for dollar demand to fall, in expectation of its price falling with the
$6bn stabilization fund;' 5° conversely, unsatisfied noises from the West have
tended to decrease the ruble's value. As in any other developed country, as far as
the markets are concerned, the perceived economic and political situation is more
important than that which is real. This heightens the need for Western countries
and financial institutions to show confidence in the stability and the prospective
growth of the Russian economy.
The readiness of the market for the iMP stabilization fund was finally
achieved by the end of 1994. Despite the severe political turmoil in September
148 BEE, 10 Januaiy 1994, pp. 1-5.
149 Ibid., p. 5.
150 Kommersant", 6-13 April 1992, p. 8.
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and October 1993, RCB intervention meant that the ruble fell less than 20%, from
Rb992:$1 on 31 August to Rbl,181 on 1 November. In January 1994, the
resignation of Gaidar and Fedorov put more pressure on the ruble, and the RCB
reportedly spent $lbn to limit its fall to 24%, from Rbl,255:$1 to Rbl,560:$1,
whilst in March the Central Bank was buying dollars back.'5'
Despite the continued fall of the ruble in nominal terms in 1994, and the
fact that it had dropped to around Rb3,000:$1 by the end of the year, it had
appreciated in real terms in the first quarter, and continued to do so. For foreign
traders and investors, this meant yet more profitability being lost on exporting
goods to Russia, yet increased the appeal of investing in Russian production.
Although many Western businessmen were very slow to realize that they
could convert their ruble earnings for hard currency, which could then be
repatriated, it has now become the norm. As long as the Western partner owns
more than 30% of their concern, they may repatriate the currency profits without
incurring any additional taxes. The joint venture or Western subsidiary must be
fully registered with the Russian authorities to be able to repatriate such
converted profits; here again there has been potential for bureaucratic wrangles,
as well as bribery and corruption. Already by mid-1993, the trend was moving
away from simply maintaining a representative office in Russia and invoicing
sales in hard currency directly from abroad, and towards establishing local legal
entities which sell goods for rubles, use currency exchanges, repatriate profits,
and buy new merchandise to repeat the cycle.' 52 Still in March 1994 Business
Eastern Europe was commenting on the 'increasing liquidity of monetary
exchanges, which allows companies to repatriate profits relatively painlessly'.'53
Thus, the major obstacle of non-convertibility, despite the remaining
imperfections, had grosso modo been solved, greatly stimulating the involvement
of Westerners in Russian production and trade. Although very many EU
151 EIU, Country Report - Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1994, p. 25; exchange rate figures (of the
MICE) from Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., p. 12.
152 BEE, 12 July 1993, p. 7.
153 BEE, 28 March 1994, p. 1.
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investors remained unaware of the level of convertibility and opportunity to
repatriate profits, or feared the need to register and thus become a target for the
Russian tax inspectorate and other authorities, the fact nevertheless remains that
these most damaging obstacles to foreign trade and investment had practically
been resolved.
3.7 Foreign Trade Policy Reform, and New Conditions for Foreign
Investment
Having examined aspects of Russia's reforms which, despite affecting foreign
trade and investment, were aimed primarily at rejuvinating the domestic economy,
attention can now be turned to El'tsin's policies which were directly targetted at
foreign entrepreneurs. First the new regime affecting trade into and out of Russia
will be analysed, followed by an examination of the conditions for foreign
investment inside Russia.
The previous section noted the increase in categories of goods which required
export licences after December 1989. First the list of goods needing licences was
shortened in the first half of 1992, then more new regulations were introduced in
the second quarter of that year, intended to set up a uniform procedure for the
issuing of export licences. Export quotas were to be defined by the Russian
Ministry of Economy and Finance, and these quotas were to be confirmed by
certificates, the owners of which had the right to obtain export licences. Free sale
of certificates was allowed. Certificates could either be specific to the country of
the purchaser, or open; all certificates were valid for up to one month. Licences
were to be issued to the owners of certificates against presentation of agreements
for delivery of goods and signed export contracts.1M Although El'tsin's team had
t54 Postfactum in English, 8 Januaiy 1992, from SWB, Weekly Economic Report, Former Soviet
Union, 10 January 1992.
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pledged to abolish all non-tariff export restrictions in the summer of 1992, the
above system of quotas and licences has continued, for some goods, up to the end
of 1994.
Non-tariff restrictions were not the only hindrance to exporters, however.
On top of profit tax (see below), exporters also faced the mandatory exchange of
50% of their export revenue. This was especially damaging before the exchange
rates were unified in mid-1992, when exporters had to sell 40% of their hard
currency profits at the 'special' rate (Rb55:$1), and to sell a further 10% at the
full market rate. In certain sectors, such as that of precious metals, even larger
proportions of hard currency profits have to be sold to the state. After July 1992,
as explained above, 30% of profits went to the RCB at their market-based rate,
and 20% directly to an exchange, and by the autumn of 1993, the entire 50% went
directly to an exchange. The confusion and obstruction caused by the licence
system and the mandatory exchange, coupled with the overall decreases in
production, resulted in a 20% fall in Russian exports in the first quarter of 1992,
in relation to the previous year.'55
The political ambiguity of 1993 was reflected in foreign trade policy. On
the one hand, the number of organizations which were granted licences to export
goods considered to be 'strategic' was greatly reduced; by September, only four
organizations had licences to export oil, five for peiroleuin products, and five for
non-ferrous metals. Any P/s wanting to export such goods had to seek
exceptions to the regulation.' 56 On the other hand, the number of goods for
which export quotas and licences were needed was reduced, for example timber
products, coal, mineral fertilizers and some non-ferrous metals were all exempted
by December 1993. As far as imports were concerned, obstacles were still
minimal, as long as customers with hard currency could be found. Import tariff
rates were relatively low, over 10% only for chocolate (30%), cigarettes (15%),
155 Grigoril Iavlinskii's Centre for Economic and Political Research, 'Spring '92 Reforms in
Russia', Moscow News, no. 21, 1992, p. 6.
156 BEE, 6 September 1993, p. 3.
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ethylized spirits (150%), drinking spirits and wines (100%), clothes and footwear
(15-30%), consumer electronics (15-25%) and cars (25%).'57
This situation was not to last, however. Even while Gaidar was still
Deputy Prime Minister, his policy had shifted to one of 'sensible protectionism'.
Although cynics argued that this was merely a move to increase political support,
Gaidar argued that contrarily to the situation at the outset of Russia's economic
reforms, a level of internal competition had developed, which meant that imports
could be curtailed without pushing prices upwards. He believed that at that stage
of reforms many Russian industries needed protection, although he vowed to
resist pressure to protect industries where Russian producers have a monopoly.158
Such protectionism towards imports and encouragement of exports, at the
beginning of a country's economic rebirth, has a precedent in the case of Japan;
in the Japanese scenario, the emphasis was likewise on protecting only industries
which had effective internal competition.' 59
 Thus import duties were
significantly raised, with effect from July (after March had been abandoned as the
starting date) 1994. The tariff rates for all types of goods increased, apart from
leather goods, perfumes, video cassettes and knitwear. The only goods to have
rates of under 15% were grain (1%), yogurt (10%), sunflower oil (10%), tomatoes
and cucumbers (10%), and raw sugar (l%). 160
 The 50% surcharge on import
tariffs in the case of barter goods, introduced in January 1993, 161 remained
operative.
The equivalent measure for exports was to abolish export quotas and
licences. Such a move had been forecast in 1993, and was enacted in July 1994.
Even oil and petroleum products, as well as rare metals, no longer required export
licences. The Russian authorities admitted that, especially for oil, the system of
quotas had been a source of massive profits, through corruption and illegal
151 BEE, 28 March 1994, p. 1.
15$ The Financial Times, 24 November 1993.
159 Alan Smith, 1993, op. cit., pp. 224-25.
16OBEE,28March 1994, p.1.
161 BEE, 21 June 1993.
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exporting of oil bought at domestic prices.' 62
 Equally as important is the fact that
most export duties were lowered, although that for oil was still substantial at
ECU15 ($18.3) per tonne.' 63
 This helped not only oil companies, but
countertrade opportunities as well. Inevitably, the freedom to export still
remained restricted in other ways, as the domestic price was still well below the
average European level. In practice, the monopoly over the pipeline network was
again used to limit export levels, but nevertheless domestic prices were pushed up
to a level vely close to that in Europe (see Appendix Two).
The increased import tariffs, together with the ever-strengthening real rate
of the ruble and the gradual disappearance of import subsidies, have meant that
exporters considered more and more seriously the possibility of producing and
sourcing in Russia, the conditions for which are described below. For those
traders still exporting from the West, the above factors increased the need for
countertrade arrangements. One of the approaches on the increase was 'advance
purchase', where a Western exporter first bought goods from Russia in hard
currency, through the potential Russian client; the hard currency was usually kept
in an escrow account, to ensure that it was used for the intended Western exports,
whilst the Western exporter obtained his profits from selling the Russian goods.
One major problem with this solution, however, was that rigorous restrictions on
offshore accounts mean that escrow accounts needed special approval from the
RCB or other government officials, which was difficult and time-consuming to
obtain; many Western banks were also reluctant to open escrow accounts because
of potential sequestration claims on Russian assets. Another common approach
was pre-financing, needed especially in deals where the Russian producer may
have needed the Western equipment to produce the goods which will pay for the
foreign technology. In such cases, most often, the Russian importer eventually
sent goods to a Western buyer, which paid for the Russian goods in hard currency
to a Western bank (probably guaranting or fmancing the original export) which,
162 EI1J, Country Report— Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1994, p. 22.
163 BEE, 18 July 1994, p. 2.
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having received a payment instruction from the Russian producer, transferred the
payment to the original Western exporter, having retained a fee.'' Another
alternative to finding the financing for Western exports was to find a Russian
exporter with the necessaiy hard currency resources, and willing to pay for the
imports of another Russian enterprise, in exchange for a beneficial deal on the
products of this importer. This was done, for example, by the Norilsk Nickel
Plant, which financed the importing of brick-making equipment for a Siberian
plant, which in turn secured local grain products which were supplied to Norilsk
at favourable prices.'65
Helping both countertrade and simple export-for-money operations was the
increasing use of letters-of-credit (L/Cs). One practice on the increase has been
that of exporting to the Russian market via straight LIC business, with Russian
firms who have hard currency export proceeds in Western bank accounts; this
practice is illegal, but given the instability of the ruble, it has become common.
Using L/Cs based on Russian banks is the legal option, but Western banks'
confirmation of such letters-of-credit was expensive at 6-7% of the transaction.
Some banks were willing to use L/Cs without Western confirmation, but this
almost never happened on amounts over $100,000. 166
 This practice has been
increasingly used, however, as some Russian banks have emerged as particularly
trustworthy.' 67
 In these cases the L/Cs are payable in Russia, and an additional
five or six weeks are usually needed in order to transfer payments to a
correspondent Western bank. In virtually all cases, the Russian bank will require
100% coverage deposit in counterpart rubles from the Russian payer before
agreeing to the L/C. This variety of mechanisms enabling trade to occur, albeit at
a relatively high price, has been of crucial importance in allowing imports as well
as exports to keep increasing throughout 1994, the former increasing from
164 BEE, 17 Januaiy 1994, p. 1.
165 BEE, 16 August 1993, p. 2.
166 BEE, 27 September 1993, p. 4.
167 BEE, 3 Januaiy 1994, p. 2; the leaders in this field were Rosvneshtorgbank, International
MOSCOW Bank, Dialog Bank, Mosbusinessbanlç Credo-bank and Tokobank.
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$44.3bn to $4Sbn, and the latter from $33bn to S35.7bn. 168 Again, however,
trade would have been higher still had more EU and other Western importers and
exporters been aware of these tedious details.
Despite the incentive provided by the changing foreign trade regime to invest in
Russian production, the risks and disincentives of such a move remained veiy
high. As noted above, the greatest fear has usually been that of political
instability, of the possibility of the pro-market reforms being overturned.
Whether it be the immediate uncertainty after the August 1991 attempted coup,
the stalemate between Parliament and government in late 1992 and early 1993,
the 'events' of September and October 1993, or the December 1993 elections
where the extremist Vladimir Zhirinovskii collected an alarming proportion of the
vote, there has always been much to woriy about. Already by the end of 1994,
investors were looking with trepidation to the Parliamentary elections expected in
1995 and the Presidential elections to be held no later than in 1996.
It has already been pointed out that some surveys put worries about legal
disincentives first on the list of worries of Western investors. This is in part due
to the changeability of Russian legislation, as also alluded to above, and which
renders futile many long and expensive attempts to assess the risk involved in
given projects. Another concern is that Russian laws are often ambiguous,
perhaps on purpose, allowing significant freedom of interpretation; this,
combined with the lack of an experienced and objective law enforcement system,
often means that local officials can impose legal requirements on foreign
investors as and when they feel the desire to receive fines or bribes. There are
many concerns over weak contract law, as well as over shareholder rights. The
latter are not helped by the fact that there is no common practice of keeping the
share register of companies with an independent share registrar.' 69 The lack of
168 EIU, Country Report - Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1995, p. 23.
169 Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., p. 123.
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trust often shown by Russian business people themselves in their legal system
does not help the situation.
Of the more tangible concerns of Western investors, Russia's external
debt, both governmental and commercial, has also been on entrepreneurs' minds.
Although Russia has more or less followed repayment arrangements reached in
the last few years with the Paris and London Clubs of creditors, these have been
very lenient, as a result of poverty claims from the Russian side. In late 1991 and
early 1992, threats by Matiukhin to declare Vneshekonombank bankrupt, or the
statement by Egor Gaidar (then Finance Minister) that Vneshekonombank had
only $60m in credit remaining, did nothing for Russia's new credit standing.
There were plenty of reasons to keep Western financial organizations and credit
funds reluctant to support projects in Russia.
The chaos regarding the respective jurisdictions of the federal and regional
authorities brought yet more uncertainty into the equation of investment in
Russia. Whilst in some cases the greater willingness of the regional governments
to strike a deal has helped Western companies (see Appendix Two), at some stage
Moscow normally still had to be dealt with where exporting to Western Europe
was concerned, in which case regional agreements could not contravene federal
principles. One of the Western companies to have suffered from this problem is
Star Mining (of Australia), which pledged to pay $20m to the joint-stock gold
mining company Lena Gold, in which it holds one third of the shares. Star
Mining originally planned to pay this $20m in 1993, and invest another $105m in
1994, but in fact only in the spring of 1994 was the first $5m tranche disbursed.
The delays have been due to disagreements between Russia's central government
and the Jrkutsk regional government, over control of the project. Star Mining
planned to invest a total of $250m to raise production six-fold in six years, but in
mid-1994 the future of the project was uncertain.'70
Different obstacles also emerge from the need to deal with Russia's
regions. Due to the country's geographic immensity, and the underdeveloped
170 BEE, 16 May 1994, p. 9.
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infrastructure and transport organization, distribution is a major problem for
Western companies trying to establish a presence in Russia. The care-free
approach to service that was inherent with the supplier's sovereignty under the
Soviet system, means that finding a network of effective retailers and achieving
an adequate level of product and customer support has also been very time-
consuming, expensive, and only partially successful. Companies have found that,
unless they are simply aiming for an enclave presence, there is little point in
advertising before the above goals are reached.'7'
Another significant deterrent, although less so than for Russian traders and
producers, is that of the mafia-type organized criminals. Such was the level of
woriy amongst foreign businessmen, following a rise in the number of muggings
and death-threats to foreigners, that in early 1994 British businessmen held an
unprecedented meeting with Russian police chiefs to discuss the matter of
defending themselves; briefings on the same issue have also been offered by the
security officer at the British embassy. Such is the power of organized crime in
some areas that the line between the 'mafia' and the authorities becomes blurred.
An example is provided by the example of the Spanish wine firm Cordoniu,
which had 100 loriyloads of its produce stolen from a warehouse in St Petersburg.
When representatives of the firm went to see the head of the 'economic crimes'
branch of the Ministry of Security, they were given the phone number of a group
of people, who turned out to have 'control of the merchandise in question'.'72
By 1992 taxation was another factor which helped keep potential investors
away. The tax holidays offered under Gorbachev had disappeared, as had the
special tax rate for companies with more than 30% ownership. Furthermore,
from March 1992 foreign businessmen faced a maximum tax rate (of their
'worldwide' income) of 60%, on annual incomes of over £2,500; 173
 the impact
was lessened, however, by the fact that bills could be paid first at the official rate
(RbO.67:$l) and then at the commercial rate (Rb2:$1), until the rates were
171 BEE, 25 October 1993, p. 1.
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unified, whilst in fact rubles could be bought much more cheaply on the black
market.174
In the second half of 1992, though, the maximum income tax rate for
foreigners was reduced and by 1993, it was 30%. The corporate profit tax was
32% (in certain cases 45%), and the employer payroll/social security tax was 39%
of payroll. Also to be considered was the VAT (of 10% or 20%), an excise tax
on certain goods, varying from 10% to 80%, and a withholding tax of either 6%,
15% or 20%.' The Presidential decree of December not only divided profit tax
revenue more precisely between the centre and the regions; it also introduced a
3% 'special purposes tax', intended to support priority areas of the economy,
such as coal-mining and agriculture. Of most damage in this decree, however,
was the 23% tax imposed on non-banking foreign loans; intending to crack down
on companies seeking to disguise trade payments as loans (which were never
repaid). The problem is that this tax has also been applied to offshore financing
of Western companies, as a result of which the amount of capital being injected
into such ventures has been greatly reduced.' 76
 On the positive side, the
December decree reintroduced the concept of tax holidays for foreign JVs. The
applicability of tax holidays was defined more precisely in decree number 1004 in
May 1994: the holiday was to be of a duration of three years; it was to be
available only to ventures with an initial investment of at least $lOm; the
enterprise involved had to be registered after 1 January 1994, and had to be
involved in 'productive activities'; such ventures had to have a paid-in foreign
investment of at least 30%. ' Apart from the rather restricted benefits in terms of
tax holidays, decree 1004 also called for big changes in the taxation regime,
including a request for the Duma to reduce the number of taxes levied, and to
impose a 10-20% decrease in corporate income tax.178
174 Commercial Department, British Embassy, Moscow, Setting Up an Office in Moscow - A
Guide for Business Representatives, June 1992.
175 BEE, 8 November 1993, p. 7.
176 BEE, 6 June 1994, p. 2; and 18 July 1994, p. 2.
177Jbid,p. 1.
178 BEE, 20 June 1994, p. 7.
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Despite this intention to reduce the number of taxes, in practice the new
possibility for regions to impose their own taxes has meant an increase in the
number of levies. For example, Moscow city has imposed three new taxes on all
commercial enterprises, including joint ventures, as of 1 March 1994: i) a
residential and social infrastructure tax, of 1.5% of companies' pre-tax profit; ii)
an educational facilities' tax, of 1% of companies' payroll, and iii) a $1 per day
tourist tax, to be collected by hotels. The fact that the first of these taxes is on
turnover suggests that they are separate from the share of profit tax which regions
can also claim. In another example of how taxes appear to be worsening, the
maximum rate for property tax was raised from 1% to 2% in mid-1994. 179
 Many
Western companies have also had to pay excess wages tax levied on salaries over
six times the minimum wage (about $60/month), although this was supposedly
aimed at local wages. There has been confusion over the propriety of this
practice; the State Tax Inspectorate has said that foreign companies do not have to
pay the extra tax, whilst El'tsin has been quoted as saying that 'all' companies
must pay it.180 Thus the tax regime, although sometimes showing veiy promising
signs of becoming less prohibitive and more stable, has on the whole remained a
disincentive to invest, in part because of the high rate of taxation once the taxes
are amalgamated, and in part because of the continuing unpredictability of levies.
In short, still by the end of 1994, there were very many serious problems
which limited the number and size of investors ready to gamble on Russia, and a
long way to go before the business environment in Russia could be seen as
anything vaguely resembling that in the rest of Europe.
Other changes, however, have made the prospect of business involvement in
Russia more attractive, apart from the increased convertibility and access to
suppliers. One of these has been the increase in the number and size of funds
which guarantee investments in Russia. Most of these are funded by Western
179 BEE, 18 July 1994, p. 2, and 7 March 1994, p. 8.
180 BEE,6 June 1994, p.!.
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governments and can be considered as part of aid, and are therefore discussed in
the following chapter. There is also a growing number of private investment
funds involved in Russia. The Flemings Russia Investment Corporation Ltd
(FRIC - see Appendix One for their involvement in the aeronautics industry),
was the first such Western fund to be aimed purely at the USSR, established in
1991. This self-sponsored and self-managed fund, with $15m in capital, invested
mostly in new or privatized enterprises expected to earn hard currency, especially
in aeronautics, and forestry/furniture.' 8 ' We have already seen that the CSFB
have established a strong presence as the first Western bank to be dealing with
portfolio investments on the Russian market, and they were joined in 1994 by
Lehman Brothers (a $300m Fund), Paine Webber ($105m), and the Firebird Fund
($40m).' 82 The Russian government also established a fund to protect foreign
investors against political risk, called the State Investment Corporation (SIC),
created by Presidential decree in February 1993. In the autumn of 1993, the
Russian government deposited its first payment of S lOOm in the SIC (in an
unnamed West European bank), aiming ultimately to reach $lbn.183
Most of all, it is still the size of the Russian market, and its untapped
opportunities, which keep attracting new investors. Encouraged also by the
positive changes described above, entrepreneurs have established more and more
joint ventures and wholly-owned subsidiaries, despite the time and bureaucracy
involved. By July 1993, for example, there were 9,125 registered JVs with
foreign capital in Russia, mainly involving partners from the USA (1,433),
Germany (1,141), Britain (557), Italy (511) and Austria (475).
The level of foreign investment attracted into Russia up to 1995
undeniably leaves much to be desired when compared to most other former
Communist states in Eastern Europe, or to China. The figures themselves are not
very encouraging. Figures for FDI to Russia in 1994 vary, from Slbn estimated
181 Interview with Mark V. Jarvis, FRIC Fund Manager, 21 May 1996; BEE, 18 April 1994, P. 3.
182 EIIJ, Country Report—Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1995, p. 33.
183 BEE, 6 September 1993, P. 3.
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by the EBRD' to an EJU estimate of around $3.6bn. 185 If we use the figure
given by the Russian Ministiy of the Economy,' 86
 which is conveniently situated
between the two figures quoted above, we get $2bn in FDI to Russia in 1994.
Using EBRD figures for Ceniral and East European Countries, this Russian FDI
figure is much higher than that for any of Moscow's former allies in 1994, with
Hungary at $1. l5bn, the Czech Republic at $0.85bn, Poland at $0.54bn, Romania
at $0.43bn, and Slovakia at $0. l9bn (although in 1993 Russia's FDI was far
behind Hungary's, and if EBRD figures are taken, even behind Poland, the Czech
Republic and Kazakhstan).' 87 In per capita terms, of course, Russia does not
quite measure up to Central Europe. Whilst $2bn received by Russia amounts to
$7 per capita, in 1994 Hungary received $111 per capita, former Czechoslovakia
$69, and Poland $14 per person.' 88 If compared to China's FDI, foreign
injections of capital into Russia appear to be even more modest - according to
official figures produced in 1994, Russia was attracting only 4% of FDI directed
towards China. The case of China is exceptional, however. A poll by Ernst and
Young of companies which are internationally active showed that 58% of them
had invested, or were planning to invest, in China, whilst this figure was only 6%
for Russia, Poland and former Czechoslovakia (all other CEECs were lower
still).'89
Even in the comparison with China, however, there are some positive
aspects. Russia could simply not compete with some facotrs which have
supported the growth of foreign investment in China, including the impressive
interest rate of 30% of GDP between 1952 and 1975, whilst the ratio of foreign
indebtedness was only 4% of GDP in 1980. Most important of all, 60% of the
184 EBRD, Transition Report - 1995, London, p. 87; this figure was obtained before all the
relevant figures were available.
185 EIU, Country Report - Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1995, P. 33.
186 Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., p. 117.
187 EBRD, Transition Report - 1995, London, p. 87; EBRD figures for 1993 FDI: Russia -
$400m; Poland - $580m; Czech Republic - 517m; Kazakhstan - $473m. Of all these figures, only
Russia's and Czecbia's increased in 1994.
188 Population figures as in Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends, op.
cit
189 Government of the Russian Federation, Russian Economic Trends, op. cit., P. 117.
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inflow of FDI into China came from Hong Kong Chinese, an advantage for which
Russia cannot be seen at fault for not having. Martin Raiser believes that even in
the medium term, China's overwhelming advantage in attracting foreign
investment is likely to be greatly eroded. Central Europe, and to a large extent
Russia as well, will reap the benefits of having gone through vigorous structural
political as well as economic reforms, and of their highly educated labour forces.
Raiser writes that
..as their continuing effectiveness comes under suspicion, China's
policy makers may have to learn from their counterparts in EMEs
(European emerging market economies) that changes in the
behaviour of economic actors within the public sector may require
more than changes at the margin.'90
When comparing Russia to Central European countries, the differences
which have meant Russia receiving less FDI per capita are explained throughout
this chapter, but can be summarized as follows: insufficient use of the period of
'extraordinary politics', allowing a much greater proportion of the old elite to
remain in power; greater governmental incompetence and obstruction; much more
gradual approach of reforms; and lack of information on companies, and of
coordination between various bodies and levels of government.' 91 Russia's
relatively unattractive position is quickly changing, however. As well as its
privatization progress, which has always been exceptional, Russia's more recent
successes in macroeconomic stabilization, currency stability and gradually
increasing experience at dealing with foreign partners in an acceptable manner
have all meant that Russia's attractiveness is growing. This is magnified by the
fact that the lack of competition and the supernatural profits which existed in
Central Europe have dwindled away, whilst they are still largely present in
Russia. The EBRD confirms that foreign investment in the former CMEA is
190 Martin Raiser, 'Lessons for Whom, from Whom? The Transition from Socialism in China and
Central Eastern Europe Compared', Communist Economies and Economic Transformation, vol. 7, no.
2, 1995, pp. 138 and 150.
191 Anders Aslund, 'Has Poland Been Useful as a Model for Russia?' in Economic Transformation
in Russia, ed. Anders Aslund, London, 1994, pp. 157-73.
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spreading out geographically. The dominance of the top five countries has eroded
from 83% of total FDI in the region in 1992 to 68% in 1994. 192 Evidence points
to the conclusion that there is already a steady flow of foreign direct investment
into Russia - although still low compared to Central European per capita figures
- and this flow into Russia is likely to expand exponentially if the legal and
political climates can become more stable and predictable.
In trying to estimate the amount of investment coming from the West, it
must be remembered that figures for foreign direct investment usually reflect only
financial investments, excluding the provision of equipment (unless included as a
share capital contribution) and even of wages. There is a strong disincentive to
include equipment or other expenditure investment in the share capital of a JV, in
that buying equipment in exchange for production, rather than in exchange for
equity, can reduce declared profits. Therefore, whilst the EIU estimate of FDI to
Russia by the end of 1993 was of $2bn,' 93 already by April 1993 the level of
investment purely in JVs was evaluated at $7.6bn, representing 3.9% of total
investment in the couniry's economy. 194 The amount of foreign investment
overall is clearly considerably higher than the figure for FDI. According to the
consultancy firm Pete Marwick, there was approximately $6bn of Western
investment injected into Russia in 1993. 195 The table of some major investment
projects in Russia (Table 3.1), including only the projects with a total planned
investment of over $150m which had been made public by the autumn of 1994,
shows that the levels of commitment are high, even if immediate disbursing of
capital is still relatively limited. As noted in the section on privatization, Western
portfolio investment is also now expected to grow rapidly with post-voucher
privatization. According to the Head of the Russian Privatization Centre Maksim
192 EBRD, Transition Report - 1995, London, p. 86.
193 EJTJ, Count,yReport—Russia, London, 2nd quarter 1994, p. 23.
194 BEE, 4 October 1993, p. 3.
195 Richard Layard, 'Can Russia Make It?', lecture given at the London School of Economics and
Political Science, University of London, 8 February 1994.
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Boiko, from March to May 1994 $lbn of equity had flowed into Russia, as
against virtually none the year before.'96
Apart from the energy sector (see Appendix Two), the areas attracting the
most investment were telecommunications, automobile production, food and
drink production, cigarette production and forestry. A selection of some of the
projects involving European enterprises follows.
Despite the very large amounts of investment involved in
telecommunication projects, and the slow rate of return, this sector has been
second only to energy projects in the volume of investment commitments it has
attracted. This sector also reflects the benefits of the CoCom trade restrictions
having been lifted. The most important project is by a Deutsche Telekom-led
consortium, which has concluded a memorandum of understanding with the local
enterprise Intertelekom on a $lbn project to modernize the country's
telecommunication infrastructure. The plan is to build 50,000km of glass fibre
cables and install a digital network connecting some fifty Russian cities with
some fifty West European cities; the Western consortium's investment will be of
$600m. in a much smaller project, the British firm Cable & Wireless have
offered $40m worth of services to Petersburg Long Distance, involving a 25.1%
acquisition of this Russia-Kazakhstan JV.' 97 Without this input, Russia could not
be expected to participate in the international 'information superhighway', and
could not supply essential fax and electronic mail services to either foreign or
local potential investors. This is of particular importance for the development of
non-metropolitan Russia.
In automobile production the German company Mercedes-Benz,
encouraged by very high sales of its vehicles in Russia (over $250m in 1993),
signed a letter of intent with the local Ulianovsk Automobile Works (AvtoUAZ)
for the joint production of Land Rover-type vehicles, and has also agreed to
196 'Russian Privatisation - Briefing Held by Sir Leon Brittan and Maxim Boycko, Head of the
Russian Privatisation Centre', document issued by the European Commission's London Delegation, 5
June 1994, p. 2
197 BEE, 16 August 1993, p. 11, and 18 July 1994, p. 10.
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cooperate with Avtrokon, a Russian bus manufacturer, to assemble up to 2,500
buses p.a..' 98 Volvo Bussar (the bus division of Volvo) also plans to build buses
in Russia, starting in 1994, on the basis of chassis imported from Sweden.199
This type of investment is crucial, and needs to be increased substantially, if
Russia is to have a chance at avoiding its automobile industiy being entirely
destroyed by imports.
In the food industry, one of the larger projects is being carried out by
Master Foods of Austria, which has obtained permision from the Moscow
authorities to build a $ lOOm production facility for 'Uncle Ben's' sauces, ice-
cream, confectionaiy products and pet foods, with production expected to begin
in 1995.200
 The Russian penchant for ice-cream has already been exploited by
the British Allied Lyons group, who in 1992 started building a $45m ice-cream
plant through the Baskin-Robbins JV with the Russian Ministry of Trade's
Rosmiastoltorg.20 ' In the tobacco industry, two British enterprises are involved in
the largest investments, BAT industries developing a factory in Saratov needing
$40m in capital, whilst Rothmans International has committed itself to a cigarette-
producing factory involving an investment of $36m.202
These projects can be seen as merely the cutting edge, the toe of Western
capital testing the water, and if political, legislative and fiscal stability can be
used to achieve the right temperature, very many EU investors can be expected to
dive in, increasing the interdependence between Russian and the EU still further.
198 BEE, 22 November 1993, p. 9, and 20 September 1993, p. 9.
199 BEE, 15 November 1993, p. 9.
200 BEE, 4 April 1994, p. 10.
201 The Guardian, 16 April 1992.
202 BEE, 18 July 1994, p. 10.
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3.8 Conclusions
It is clear that, especially considering the terrible economic inheritance of the
Soviet Union, Russia has gone a long way indeed towards making itself attractive
to EU investors, and open to Western goods.
The progress towards the level of openness and compatibility achieved by
the end of 1994 was certainly not without its hold-ups and mistakes. Gorbachev
achieved a great deal, but still left El'tsin with a soft currency, a huge inflationary
overhang, a process of privatization which had barely begun, a shortage economy,
and very restrictive legislation with regard to Western investors. Russia's first
President largely solved these problems, but by 1995 had still to achieve much
before EU investors and even exporters and importers were ready to risk much
more in Russia. Perhaps the greatest disincentive, and probably the most difficult
to solve, was the political instability which resulted from the discontentment of
the dispossessed groups (pensioners, soldiers, Party cadres), and a lack of control
over, and coordination with, regional and city authorities. This is linked to the
other great factor alienating Western investment, namely the ambiguous,
changeable and badly enforced legislation. One particular ann of legislation,
relating to tax liability, is particularly to blame. The unpredictability and
prohibitiveness of the fiscal system has continued to prevent both foreigners and
potential Russian partners from either increasing their levels of production, or
from producing at all. Another significant bather to foreign economic
involvement in Russia which El'tsin still had to overcome was organized crime,
and its protection by politicians. It has become increasingly clear that the
authorities at every level are half-hearted at best in their attempts to combat
organized crime. The debt crisis, both that of the whole couniry vis-à-vis foreign
governmental and private creditors, and that between Russian enterprises
themselves, and the lack of cash created by this crisis, are also a considerable
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hinderance. Finally, the lack of infrastructure, in everything from telephone lines
which can support faxes and electronic mail to hotels without cockroaches and
which can be reserved from abroad, are alt contributing to keeping EU business
people away.
Nevertheless, despite such an overwhelming catalogue of disincentives,
EU and other investors and traders have kept dealing with Russia, for ever greater
amounts. Gorbachev began to pave the way for them by de-monopolizing foreign
trade, by making the use of hard currency in Russia legal, by allowing foreign
involvement in JVs, and starting the privatization process, on top of all the
politically attractive actions described in Chapter One. Gorbachev's task was all
the more impressive considering the lack of precedents for such actions under
Soviet rule; his contribution should be seen as the turning point, which made all
further progress in opening up the Russian economy to Western Europe possible.
The inefficiency and lack of innovation inherent in the command economy which
Gorbachev inherited made this opening up to the West particularly unavoidable,
as Soviet technology fell further and further behind that of the rest of the world.
El'tsin followed by pushing hard for a privatization process which was faster and
more extensive than in any other former CMEA countly, and by allowing
Westerners to invest in Russian shares, once voucher privatization was over.
Boris Nikolaevich achieved full internal convertibility, and by freeing prices
despite the political cost, he managed to achieve commodity convertibility as
well, whilst absorbing the inflationaiy overhang, despite the iiiflationaiy cost. Of
even more direct relevance to EU business people, full repatriation of profits was
legalized. The importance of these changes is tremendous.
The fact that the macroeconomic situation has stabilized sufficiently for
the IMF to continue supporting Russia - as shown again by the $6. 8bn
stabilization fund for Russia which was approved in early 1995 (see Chapter
Four) - has helped give confidence to potential Western investors. Although
having a certain dampening effect upon EU exporters, the increase of some
import taxes and the disappearance of import subsidies has been an extra
The Effect of Ruulan Economic Refornu on Foreign Trade, and on Froepecta of
Qoeer Ru,sta-EU Economic Relatloiu
motivating factor for EU companies considering production in Russia. Also
helpful is the constant improvement in banking relations between Russian and EU
banks, increasing dealing with everything from ATMs to large letters of credit,
this of course encouraging both investors and traders.
It is for all these reasons that the number of joint ventures has continued to
increase, not only in theory, but in the visibility of their products and of the effect
of their competition and work ethics. Foreign Direct Investment into Russia has
also continued to grow, to the point where it was bigger in size in 1994 than that
of any Central European state, and approaching the size of Central European FDI
per capita. This trend seems to be set now, as the attractiveness of Central
Europe fades just as its normality increases, and the wave of European FDI moves
eastwards and southwards.
Despite the lack of reliability of Soviet GDP and export/import figures, it
is still obvious that the USSR's trade with the rest of the world was relatively
small, but its importance disproportionately great, as the goods being imported
were of strategic importance, needed to solve bottle-necks or technological
inadequacy of Soviet equipment. Although overall (officially registered) trade
with the rest of the world decreased in the first three years of the 1990s, and only
picked up slightly in 1994, trade with the EU per se has increased overall by more
than 45% between 1989 and 1994.203 It should be stressed that in this 'shuttle'
trade is included. Despite the fact that a large part of this increase is from
consumer goods and food products, Russian industry is more dependent than ever
on Western technology, as investment in R&D in purely Russian projects is lower
than ever. Both in terms of equipment, and of capital - in fact also in know-how
- Russia can ill afford to become isolated from the EU and the rest of the
capitalist world, lest it fall much further behind in technological terms, whilst the
rest of the world develops ever faster.
203 Towards Greater Economic Integration - The European Union 's Financial Assistance and
Trade Policy for Central and Eastern Europe and the New Independent States, European Commission,
DG 1A, Brussels, October 1995, p. 15— here also, the same mid-1994 Ecu:Dollar rate is used.
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In a nutshell, at the end of 1994 the Russian market is much more open to
Western investors and traders than it ever has been, and the commercial
interdependence between Russia and the EU is also as high as ever. Having said
that, still much needs to be done to make this potential develop into the actual
boom which Russia needs to pull itself out of the economic rut it is in. For the
EU business community, most of all, there is a need to prove the longevity and
enforceability of the new economic laws, to make the taxation regime simpler and
less prohibitive, and to develop a more effective and user-friendly system of
government, at Federal, regional and local level. These are but some of the areas
in which assistance from the West could play an important role, helping to
increase the level of economic interaction between Russia and the European
Union.
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Chapter 4: Vestern Aid and Economic Assistance to Russia
4.1 Introduction
This chapter aims to uncover what the European Union can achieve through
assistance to Russia. In order to do this, we shall firstly explore the nature of
Western statecraft towards the USSR/Russia since the October Revolution, how it
has changed, and why a further increase in positive statecraft is being resisted.
The role of Western Europe, and the often contrasting appraoch of the USA, is
examined in order to show the relatively privileged position of the EC/EU as a
more open trading partner and more generous donor to Russia.
The enormous impact of Gorbachev's and El'tsin's reforms on Western
assistance to the USSR/Russia is noted, as are the various Western responses to
the new conditions. The various aid plans which were put forward are covered,
as are the reasons why they were mostly not carried out, or were much less
generous than claimed.
The EC/EU's own aid to the USSR/Russia is then explored in detail, to
determine which aspects of it can be expected to contribute effectively to the
success of reforms and/or the development of closer relations with the EU, and
which aspects can further fuel criticism of Western aid to Russia and its motives.
The EU's gradually increasing cooperation with other bodies, and in particular the
EBRD, is examined, as is the important potential for Brussels to improve the still
inadequate coordination of aid between the Union, the IFIs, and individual donor
countries.
Westirn Aid iind Economic Assistance to Russia	 250
4.2 The Changing Approaches of Western Economic Statecraft Towards
Russia
Definition of 'Statecraft', and the First Aid Programmes to Soviet Russia
Since the late I 980s, the granting of assistance to the Soviet Union. and later to its
successor states, has become a focal point of relations between the West and the
ex-USSR, and one in which the EC/EU has played a particularly important role.
Although the granting of aid to the USSR would have been considered a nonsense
between the end of the Second World War and perestroika. the question of how
the West should use its economic policies to encoura ge desired developments in
Russia is an old one indeed: such attempts to influence other countries' actions
are known as economic statecraft. To better understand what the EU can expect
to achieve from granting various types of aid to Russia, we can learn much from
looking at the theoretical debates over using aid to improve relations with the
USSRlRussia, and the successes and failures of past attempts at using statecraft
with Moscow.
Different writers use different meanings of the term 'economic statecraft',
so a precise defmition is essential. David Baldwin described statecraft as all of
the economic means by which foreign policy actors might try to influence the
political situation, either domestic or foreign, of other international actors', 1 and
this is the definition used in this thesis. It is often useful to contrast seperate
statecraft from 'pure aid', which is a much rarer occurrence. Aid in its 'purest'
form occurs when it is given exclusively to stop human suffering, in other words
where the donor country simply exercises benevolence, or appeases its guilt,
depending on the point of view. Such aid is not even an exercise attempting to
avoid a flow of refugees into the donor country, nor foreseeing the possibility of
1 Based on the definition used by David Baldwin in his 1985 book Economic Statecraft. cited
from Philip Hanson. op. cit... p.6.
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civil war in the recipient country
 spilling over and affecting the donor country. or
its sources of materials or profit. Any political change resulting from such 'pure
aid' 2 is incidental: the aim having been to 'do good'. Food aid to Third World
countries is the most common variant of 'pure aid', although it by no means
always qualifies, often entailing conditions or ulterior motives. Such 'pure aid'
has only very uncommonly been directed to Russia. This is not least because in
tenns of physical suffering and risk of fatal malnutrition or diseases, the needs of
many Third World countries are much greater. Such selfless aid did
spontaneously emerge, in particular in the autumn of 1990, when there were
widespread fears of starvation in the Soviet Union in the winter to come; many
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), especially in Germany, responded with
food donations and the required transport. All in all, however, the projects for aid
and assistance to the FSU tend to be offered with different expectations.
Even the first example of significant Western aid to Soviet Russia
(disregarding loans during the First World War), The American Famine Relief
Programmes of 192 1-23, had important elements of statecraft. The widespread
famine in Russia in 1921-22, following drought and economic chaos due to the
lack of any motivation for farmers to grow more than they needed for themselves,
had led to Maksim Gorkii's plea to the United States for help. Although the
United States had had no diplomatic relations with Russia3 since 1917, Secretary
of Commerce Herbert Hoover convinced the Harding administration to carry this
initiative through, under the auspices of the American Relief Administration
2 This is a much narrower definition than the one given by Baldwin (op. cit.. p. 294). in other
words where there is no payment. either in money or in support for the donors foreign policy: quoted
from Peter van Ham. 1992. op. cit.. p. 59.
It is pertinent also to note that one of the main issues preventing the US from re-establishing
relations with Russia was that of debt-claims, which the Americans estimated at $636m. for loans
extended during the First World War, and for property confiscated during the Bolshevik revolution.
Even when. in 1933. Roosevelt initiated meetings to re-establish diplomatic relations, the Comnüssar for
Foreign Relations Maxim Litvinov anticipated E1tsin (although Boris Nikolaevich did not car! out hIs
threat) by sixty years by claiming that most of the debts had been incurred by the previous (in other
words tsanst and provisional) governments, and would thus not be refunded. The Soviet Union was
finally recognized without the issue being resolved - see 1. G. Paterson: J. G. Clifford and K. J. }{agan,
1988. third edition. Lexington: pp. 303-05.
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(ARM of which he was head. 4 Hoovefs support for such aid was based on the
belief (later reversed) that -Russian relief would contribute to the downfall of the
Bolshevik regime': he had remarked to his Secretar y of State that the relief
measures will build a situation which, combined with other factors, will enable
the Americans to undertake the leadership in the reconstruction of Russia when
the proper moment arrives' . Partly because the Russian authorities were insulted
by the conditions which the Americans had asked for (including the release of
American prisoners in Russian prisons, a guarantee that aid workers would be
housed and not interfered with, and that Russia officially acknowledge that the
aid was wanted and needed), suspicions ran as high as ever. The aid nonetheless
fmally came through as the need became overwhelming, with some estimates of
as many as ten million Soviet citizens having been saved from starvation as a
result. Despite the official messages of gratefulness and of a new era of
cooperation, however, no concrete signs of this were to become apparent in
subsequent Soviet foreign policy.
Hoover's approach to statecraft had therefore been for the use of the carrot
rather than the stick, for aid rather than sanctions. In this case the aid was real,
but even talk about aid, a mere proposal for assistance, may constitute statecraft,
as the threat of reducing or abandoning the project can then be used as a lever.
In the study of different approaches to aid, Functionalism and Strategism
(Realism) can be used as two extremes of a scale. The true Strategists see the
(former) Soviet Union as a snake, likely to bite the hand that feeds it, whilst the
Functionalists see it as a wounded bear, which will become benign if cared for
and helped to heal. Whilst the typical Functionalist approach is constructed upon
the assumption that conflict is based on misunderstanding and fear that can be
ironed out, the Strategic approach is based on the premise that the world is
characterized by conflicts which can only be checked by force; in other words, it
is the the school of economic interdependence versus that of economic
John Lewis Gaddis. Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Jnterpretzi'e History.
Amen can Foreign Policy. A History - since 1900. New York. 1978. pp. 98-102.
Peter van Ham. 1992. op. cit.. p. 60.
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contamment. As explained previously, both positions are exnemes: few
individuals or governments will be all one or all the other, and any period of time
will see both schools in operation. though one of the two alternately tends to
predominate.
The only other important example of pre-perestroika Western aid to the
Soviets, the American 'lend-lease' programme during the Second World War,
provides an interesting example of interaction between the two approaches. The
granting of enormous amounts of civilian and military aid to assist the Soviet
Union in its struggle against the Nazis was not being strongly opposed by either
side in 1941, but the terms and conditions were contentious. The position
supported by Franklin D Roosevelt was that the aid could be given without any
conditions, as both sides were so dependent upon each other, and the Soviet
Union's mere presence in the war was all that really mattered. It is likely that at
the back of Roosevelt's mind was also the fear of a repetition of the First World
War agreement between Moscow and Berlin. Although the Soviet Union had
been despised in the West for its treaties with Nazi Germany as well as for
attacking Finland, once it entered the war pragmatism had to prevail. The
Democratic Representative Clifton Woodrum, during one of the debates on the
lend-lease issue, best expressed the situation by using the proverb 'it is permitted
to walk with the devil until the bridge is crossed'. 7 Roosevelt's ambitions went
further, however; he was counting on lend-lease to be of use after the war as well.
Roosevelt had said about Stalin 'I think if I give him everything I possibly can and
ask for nothing in return, noblesse oblige, he won't try to annex anything and will
work with me for a world order of democracy and peace'.8
Meanwhile, US General Standley was one of the leading proponents of a
more conditional approach. At the very least, he wanted to insist on the Soviet
government publicizing this aid and its origin to its population. Standley warned
Roosevelt that his plan was based on all the wrong assumptions about the Soviets;
6 Petervan Ham, 1993. op. cit.. pp. 6-8.
George C. Herring Junior. Aid to Russia - 194 1-46. New York. 1973. P
. 
22.
8 Peter van Ham. 1992. op. Cit.. p. 65.
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US Ambassador to Moscow Averell Harriman atifeed. and said that the US policy
would be construed as a sign of weakness. and acceptance of Soviet policy.9
Roosevelt's successor in the White House. Harr y Truman. brought with him a
very different approach to lend-lease. This has been judged to have been partly
owing to his natural Strategist tendency. but largely because by this time victory
against the Nazis was clearly nearing, and after lalta Stalin's determination to
control Eastern Europe had also become more obvious. Even before the war in
Europe was over, Truman sharply curtailed the lend-lease shipments to the Soviet
Union.'° Stalin was furious, stating to US delegate Hopkins that he considered
this course of action threatening and treacherous. Such was the acrimonious end
to any hopes that the lend-lease programme would bear post-war fruit.
Both the 1921-23 food aid and the Second World War lend-lease achieved
their main objectives: the ARA saving perhaps millions from starvation, whilst
lend-lease played a significant role in the defeat of Nazi Germany. In both cases,
however, the Functionalist hopes of coaxing the Russians to be more open and
cooperative failed. Some drew the conclusion that only forceful methods are
understood by the Russians, that they would only ever cooperate if compelled. It
would be fairer to the Functionalists, however, to stress that in the case of the
famine relief, the ideology of the revolution was still very fresh, as, more
importantly. was the memory of American intervention during the Civil War, with
American troops present in Siberia as late as April 1920. Although this did not
prevent Lenin from wanting to trade for American technology, even at the price of
leasing Kamchatka or Sakhalin if only the Americans would get the Japanese
out,' 1 it still meant that trust and good-will were to play no role. Concerning the
Ibid.. pp. 58-66.
Herring Junior. op. cit.. pp. 280-88.
First in October 1920. the Soviet government announced that it had granted exclusive rights on
coal, oil and fishing for sixty years on approximatel y one million square kilometres of northeastern
Siberia (including the whole of the Kamchatka peninsula) to an American s ndicate led by Washington
B. Vanderlip (who had been mistaken for the bi1lionair& Frank A. Vanderlip. and who in fact had no
close links to the White House). land which was then under Japanese control. Once this came to
nothing, oil magnate Harry F. Sinclair was granted a contract with the Far Eastern Republic (soon to be
absorbed into the RSFSR) for the exploitation of oil on the northern half of Sakhalin, also under Japanese
control. As even Sinclaifs genuine contacts within the Harding administration failed to get the US
We,teni Aid and Econonuc Assistance to Russia 	 255
lend-lease. Stalin's own narrow-mindedness and paranoia must override any
conclusions about general reactions of Russians to aid.
Nonetheless, as the same factors which minimized the long-term benefits
from assistance to Soviet Russia led to diplomatic confrontation in Europe and
alienation from the world economy. Strategists were to have a clear upper hand in
Western debates on statecraft towards the USSR in the ensuing Cold War. The
relevant question during the Cold War was not how much aid?', but how tight
an embargo?'.
From Cold War to Détente, or from Stick to Carrot
As relations between the Soviet Union and the West took a sharp turn for the
worse after 1946, the United States was particularly determined not to worsen the
now considerable militaiy threat from the USSR. A unilateral policy of export
control was not sufficient, especially as a great deal of sophisticated American
technology was being shipped to Western Europe through the European Recovery
Programme. Thus, in November 1949 the Coordinating Committee for
Multilateral Export Controls, or CoCom for short. was officially established.
This was the first time that North America and Western Europe had formed a
body specifically to prevent trade to a particular country and its allies, i.e. to
perform 'negative' statecraft. From the beginning, however, consensus was hard
to reach. The whole venture was clearly an American initiative, and the British
and French in particular resented being told how to go about their foreign trade by
the US. The so-called Battle Act of 1951, which legally linked American aid to
submission to CoCom export restrictions (including goods without possible
military application), did nothing to ameliorate diplomatic relations. CoCom
itself, however, remained a guideline organization. not legally binding. Although
involved against Japan. the concession was eventually given to the occupiers: from John Lewis Gaddis.
op. cit.. pp. 91-93.
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compromise was reached on a list of restricted exports. disagreements over the
definition of 'Strategic goods' which should be controlled by CoCom were to be
an issue of contention for a long time to come.
'Strategic goods' can mean anything. When sold to a potential enemy, any
commodity whatsoever can be either directly used by that country's military, or
indirectly help by freeing part of the civilian industr y to concentrate on military
production. Once the threat of war is minimized, at least in the short and middle
terms, the definition becomes narrower. Peter Wiles has discerned two main
types of strategic goods: bottleneck items, without which the whole supply chain
of the target nation is interrupted and the lack of which will be multiplied, to
mean a much greater reduction in output than the value of the reduction in input;
secondly. imported technology, even for civilian use, as its removal can increase
the time lag before the target economy can catch up with the sanctioning
country's technological level. 12 This defmition has a strong Strategist flavour,
though, and West Europeans have consistently argued for controls only over
goods which have more direct military applications; thus even during the Cold
War, Europeans had repeatedly put pressure for CoCom's industrial list ('List II',
or 'List IB' in the US) to be strongly curtailed, or abandoned altogether. The
discrepancy between the European and American approaches will be examined
later on.
Together with the general political détente of the late 1960s came a
revision of the approach to statecraft. The growth of a more Functionalist
approach during this period had two main causes; i) the effect of the technological
revolution, whereby communications transformed the Earth into a 'global village',
and nuclear weapons brought military power too dangerous to use, therefore other
factors had to prevail in international relations; cooperation was now vital for
survival; ii) both populations and governments had had enough of confrontation
12 Philip Hanson. op. cit.. p. 10.
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and of the tense international situation: the Cold War mentality had outlived its
natural life.'3
The change in approach to statecraft varied in speed on either side of the
Atlantic. however. Serious disagreements occurred in 1978 amongst Western
allies, when President Carter's sanctions (on human rights' grounds) on sales of
oil and gas drilling equipment were not backed by the major EC countries.
Following the establishment of martial law in Poland. a new round of US
sanctions was enacted, against both Poland and the USSR. US sanctions against
the USSR were to cover equipment, produced under US licence by West
European finns, for the compressor stations of the Urengoi/Western Europe gas
pipeline. This time Western Europe, and West Germany in particular, felt that
too much was at stake and refused to comply. The Americans finally agreed to
the compressor-equipment deals going ahead, and to Western Europe receiving
important amounts of Soviet gas (although this was to be limited to a maximum of
35% of total gas usage of any US ally).'4
The situation was thus not very different from the early days of CoCom,
when The Economist summed up Western Europe's attitude, and particularly that
of Britain and France, when it remarked that,
the Battle Bill implies either that America's allies are disloyal or
that they are incapable of deciding for themselves what is the
balance of gain and loss in their exchanges with the Communist
countries - in short, that they are either fools or rascals.'5
In the United States, however, veiy strong anti-trade statements continued to
come from the highest quarters. Secretary of Defence Caspar Weinberger. for
example, declared in 1982:
Without constant infusion of advanced technology from the West,
the Soviet industrial base would experience a cumulative
obsolescence, which would eventually constrain the military
industries - without access to advanced technology from the
13 Peter van Ham 1992. op.cit. pp. 26-27.
14 Philip Hanson. op. cit.. p. 46.
15 The Economist. 25 August 1951. pp. 43 1-33.
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West. the Soviet leadership would be forced to choose between its
military-industrial priorities and the preservation of a tightly-
controlled political system. By allowing access to a wide range of
advanced technologies, we enable the Soviet leadership to evade
that dilemma.16
Sovietologist and former member of the National Security Council Richard Pipes
put it in simpler terms: The Soviet Union is one great war machine [...] Thus.
Western energy assistance helps the USSR to build up its military [..,]'.17 This
was all part of the philosophy behind the USA's declared attempt to make the
USSR 'arm itself to death', It was for such reasons that in 1987, the USA was the
only OECD countly to deny the USSR MFN status.18
The above description of the American policy on statecraft to the USSR
(until the late 1980s) is provided as a contrast, to put the appraoch chosen by the
EC countries into perspective. There is no one simple reason why Western
Europe's approach has tended to differ. Some analysts have underestimated the
many implications of West European proximity to the Soviet superpower. The
short distances meant that trade was much more difficult to prevent between
Europes East and West. As mentioned previously, improvements in
communication, relative reductions in the costs of transport. and decreasing size
of many components of advanced technology all made trade restrictions more
difficult to enforce, and West Europeans were more realistic about the
impossibility of the total isolation of Eastern Europe. It is also true that a greater
proportion of West European jobs and profits were linked to trade with the
Eastern Bloc, making trade restriction a more politically difficult option for
Western Europe than for the USA. What trade the Americans did have with the
USSR was not in technology; in the early 1980s, 80% of American exports to the
Eastern Bloc consisted of grain. 19 and the American abandonment of the grain
16 The Economist. 22 May 1982. p. 67.
17 Cited from Philip Hanson, op. cit.. p. 54.
18 Ibid.. p. 57.19 The Economist, 22 May 1982. p. 63.
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embaruo was a decisive factor in strengthening the resolve of Europeans to defeat
the oil equipment embargo.
Whether because of these reasons, or due to a different intellectual
approach. or of 'instinctive' pan-European understanding, Western Europe's
perception of the factors which justified an embargo towards the USSR differed
greatly from that prevalent amongst the decision-makers of the United States. All
of the following premises were, on the whole, considered to be much less
important by West Europeans than by Americans: the scope of the Western
embargo; the probability of war; the level of Soviet aggressiveness; the level of
Soviet dependence upon East-West trade; the technology gap between East and
\Vest.2°
It must be remembered, however, that such generalizations concerning
American and European attitudes hide important differences that existed between
various sectors of the respective societies. For example, European NATO
defence ministers tended to have a similar viewpoint to that of the US Defence
Department, whilst on the other hand there were bitter debates between
departments of the US government which defended the interest of American
exporters, and the defence establishment.2'
Gorbachev and the Metamorphosis of Statecraft
All the above definitions and approaches were worked out in the pre-Gorbachev
era. The very foundations upon which the Functionalist and Strategist positions
had been formed were altered in the second half of the 1980s. First with
perestroika, then with the August 1991 popular counter-coup followed by
E1'tsin's attempts to implement democratic reforms, even the staunchest
Russophobes had to re-evaluate the probability of Russian aggression against the
20 Peter van Ham. 1992. op. cit.. p. 159.
21 Philip Hanson. 1988. op. cit.. p. 3.
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West. By the beginning of the I 990s. the most popular view on trade with the
Soviet Union was the opposite to that of the Cold War - not only was trade with
the East not seen as increasing the threat, but failure to increase it came to be
perceived as the greatest danger. This emergence of a more pro-trade attitude was
partly due to old arguments. Functionalists had always argued that even if the
West should want to control Russia's actions, 'negative' statecraft, that is
sanctions and embargoes, were by their vety nature decreasingly efficient, as they
forced the Soviets to find ways of becoming self-sufficient: on the other hand,
'positive' statecraft was intrinsically and increasingly effective, as with it
increased dependency, and therefore Western leverage on Russian policies. More
positively, pro-traders counted on a 'habit of cooperation' to form, which would
be diffused from the economic into the political sphere. contrarily to isolation
which led to ignorance and fear of the other side. As we have seen in chapter
two, the late 1980s also brought a realization of the need for pan-European
cooperation in the fields of ecology and nuclear power.
Most important of all has been the fear that the pro-market and democratic
reforms could fail if popular support is not encouraged through a tangible
improvement in Russia of the material standard of living. The possibility of the
unstable political situation reverting to large-scale civil war, and/or an
authoritarian/populist takeover, has been the main motivation for Western plans to
provide various types of aid and assistance.
After the previous decades of adversity and withdrawal, the new level of
enthusiasm for cooperation was startling. This mood even went as far as
proposals for a 'Marshall Plan' for Eastern Europe. forwarded as early as the
spring of 1988 by the Italian industrialist Carlo de Benedetti, and later endorsed
by former French President Giscard d'Estaing, as well as by an editorial in Le
Monde. The latter called for measures towards the USSR which would 'increase
the weight of Europe in the world, whilst also alleviating the fate of a whole
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sector of its population' . During the following years. such calls were repeated
from very varied sources, but although many of the more concrete proposals for
aid were very important in scale, none of the seriously
 considered projects have
come close to the levels of commitment and support of the European Recovery
Programme. According to one estimate, at today's prices the Marshall Plan was
worth $300bn a year. 23
 whilst between September 1990 and late May 1992 the
West had pledged a relatively tiny $7Obn to the FSU. 24
 Another difference is the
lag, both in volume and in timing, between the pledges and actual disbursements.
Only I3bnECU of the 62bnECU committed by January 1992 had been received
by the former USSR by the end of spring 1992. 25 By far the most obvious sign
that the level of aid in the 1990s is incomparably less than aid given after the war
is the fact that most of the Marshall Plan consisted of grants. whilst the vast
majority of present pledges are credits or loans.26
Nonetheless, there have been some momentous plans to rejuvenate and
rationalize the Soviet economy. The most popular of these during Gorbachev's
time in power was the so-called 'Grand Bargain' or 'Harvard Plan', devised
maiiily by Graham Allison and Grigorii Iavlinskii. They concentrated on adapting
the Soviet economy to the 'six recognised pillars of the world economy':
stabilization of the macroeconomy; liberation of prices; establishment of and
respect for private propertY, ownership and enforceable contracts; privatization of
enterprise; opening of the economy to normal international trade: and limiting
direct governmental intervention in the market.27 This was defmitely not a pure
gift of goodwill; there was a reforming price to pay for the assistance. Martin
Walker described the Grand Bargain as 'the plan to exchange financial aid in
return for Soviet structural and economic reform'. Neither was it ever meant to
22 Elargir le poids de l'Europe dans Ic monde. tout en allëgeant Ic sort de toute une partie de Ia
population'. in Neil MalcoInL 1989. op. cit.. p.5: from Le t londe . 29 March 1988.
23 Victor Keegan in The Guardian. 3 June 1991.
24 Perdita Fraser. The Post-Soviet States and the European Community. London. 1992. p. 42.25 Ibid.. p. 35.
26 Philip Hanson. Western Aid to the Soviet Union's Successor States. RFE'RL Research Report.
vol 1. no. 18. 1 May 1992.
27 Graham Allison and Grigony Yavlinskv. Window of Opportunity: Transforming the Soviet
Union into a Democracy with a Market Econom y. 19 June 1991. p. -4.
\Vestcrn Md and Economic Assistance to Russia
	 2
be easy : estimates of the unemplo yment that would be caused by the Harvard Plan
were of a minimum of 1 1 million people. possibly twice that The
reward to be received from the West was sizable, in the order of $25-3Obn per
year for three to five years.
Back in mid-1991, however, when the Grand Bargain was most fervently
being discussed, the industrialized nations were not willing to fund any grand
schemes. In comparing it to the post-war aid, many critics pointed out that
contrarily to Germany in the late 1940s, the Soviet Union at the end of the 1980s
was not starting from scratch; it was argued that any massive aid would simply be
grafted onto a rotten system. 29
 Another reason why assistance was considered not
to be as deserving as with the European Recovery Programme was that then the
aid was clearly helping to reduce the chance of Communism spreading to Western
Europe. whilst giving credits to the Soviet Union in 1991 might have simply
allowed the old Communist nomenklatura to survive. Furthermore, in exchange
for the Marshall Plan the US obtained concrete political leverage and
military/strategic advantages, none of which were part of the assistance deals to
the USSR. 3° Many also believed that the very concept of large-scale, official aid
could never help to abolish the socialist system, as it had many similarities; in the
opinion of Paul Craig, a former economic advisor to President Reagan, now with
the Centre for Strategic and International Studies. the Harvard scheme and
communism are similar in that they share the idea that society is a process that
can be designed at the centre, and led from the centre'. 31
 All of these arguments
entirely failed to suggest a positive approach to replace the 'Grand Bargain',
however - all they implied was that the West should continue granting nothing
more than the purely token amounts being offered so far, or alse offer nothing at
all.
28 The Guardian, 28 August 1991.
29 The Guardian. 8 June 1991.
30 Michael Hughes. Can the West Agree on Aid to Eastern Europe!'. RFE RL Research Report.
vol. 1.110. 11. 13 March 1992. P. 36.
The Guardian. 28 August 1992.
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These were just some of the reasons (others. which were still to be maor
restricting factors a year later, shall be examined below) why Mikhail Gorbachev
came away from the London G7 meeting with many enthusing messages of
support. but little more substantial than relatively small-scale bilateral technical
assistance. This was to be remembered with much criticism and guilt when the
conservative elements of the Soviet government attempted a puisch on 19 August
1991; British Prime Minister John Major. as the host of the previous G7 meeting,
subsequently attempted to reopen the debate on aid. The key period had been
wasted already, however. During the early period of perestroika, when the level
of support and motivation of reforms was at its highest. is when the positive effect
of aid which affected the person on the Street directly would have been at its
greatest. Those who had argued that the EC and its partners must not build up the
optimism of the Russian people over the benefits os a new period of cooperation
with the West, merely to let them down with a lack of concrete material aid to
support the verbal backing, had their worst fears realized. Already by the end of
1991, Western Assistance was fighting an uphill battle, because of the lack of
oportunism shown by the EC and the rest of the Western world.
New Country, Old Empty Promises
When Moscow asked for aid after the August coup, the new level of credibility
and Western concern for the survival of Gorbachev and El'tsin's pro-democratic
governments made it more difficult for the West to back down. In late summer
1991, the Soviet government requested nearly $1 5bn in Western assistance, for
food purchases (later modified to SlO.2bn); in October, the response of the G7
nations was to pledge a 6bnECU ($7.4bn) food and medicine credit facility,
2bnECU of which was to be provided by the EC, and the remainder being offered
by Canada, Japan and the US. In fact, however, not all of this credit was new
money; the EC's 2bnECU, for example. included the previously pledged
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25OmECU food aid grant. and 500mECU credit guarantee. The new element of
the EC aid was a 1 .25bnECU medium term loan to the FSU (see section 4.3).32
There were many more months of debate, compromise and lack of clear
leadership from any country or organization as to what further assistance should
be granted to the ex-USSR. President Bush fina11' announced in the spring of
1992 that a $24bn package' was to be offered. again by the G7 states, on
condition of Russia's economic reforms proving to be effective. Presenting
Western aid in such a packaged form was an attempt to give the impression that
this was comparable to the volumes of assistance considered in the 'Grand
Bargain', yet this was by no means the case. The now famous $24bn was only a
'package' in the loosest sense of the word; it was in fact an amalgamation of
many independent packages of bilateral aid, multilateral aid, and debt
rescheduling. Even more misleadingly. an important part of this 24bn again
consisted of already committed aid; according to Grigorii Iavlinskii, $1 lbn of the
package was already committed bilateral credit, tied to donor state exports.33
Although by the summer of 1992 $4-5bn of these bilateral credits had been used,
other parts of these credits had been blocked on account of the growing arrears on
existing debt. 34 An estimated $2.5bn of the package was in deferred debt or
interest repayment, and $6bn of it consisted of the hypothetical stabilization fund
which had still not been granted by the end of l994. Even the part of the $24bn
intended to be from multilateral organizations. that is $3bn from the IMF and
Sl.Sbn from the EBRD, had already been agreed in principle, though the IMF
funds were then dependent upon Russia fulfilling very strict conditions (see
section 4.4). 'The perception of a $24bn package is a combined result of a
political operation of the (Washington) White House, and of the ignorance of
32 Perdita Fraser. 1992. op. cit.. p. 34.
Grigoni Iavlinskiz's Centre for Economic and Political Research. Spring '92 Reforms in
Russia. .tloscow News. nos 21 and 22. 1992. p. 4.
3' Perdita Fraser. 1992. op. cit.. p. 35.
Grigorii Iavlinskii. op. cit.. p. 4.
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many journaiists. according to the then Head of the IMF representation in
Moscow. Jean Foglizzo.
Despite the fact that the $24bn was far more a public relations exercise
than an offer of significant new aid, the mere fact that Western governments
wanted to be seen to be giving large-scale help was important. Not only was the
G7 keen to have generous sums of assistance publicized, but even conditions tied
to the aid were in some cases slackened. This was true in particular of the first
$lbn tranche of IMF credit (described in more detail in section 4.3), granted
despite the minimal achievements of economic reform goals. This suggested a
change in policy, possibly a realization of the political pressure bearing down
upon Egor Gaidar and his policies. It also constituted a move away from the use
of the promise of aid as a lever for the execution of reforms and for the protection
of reformers, a view favoured then by Jeffrey Sachs. rather than actual disbursing
to try to appease the critics of refonns.37
This one example of increased leniency rather went against the grain of
1992 as a whole, a time when the momentum of readiness to commit many
resources and much effort to help the FSU decelerated notably, for numerous
reasons. The worsening of the situation in the Former Yugoslavia, and the famine
in Somalia and other parts of Africa were areas of greater need for humanitarian
aid. The lack of readiness to provide more large-scale restructuring capital was
closely linked with the continuing global economic recession. Two of the three
main economic powers, the USA and Germany, were dealing with huge budget
deficits. In the United States, for example, polls 'suggest that, despite genuine
sympathy for the Soviet Union, most Americans want to see their money spent at
home rather than on aid efforts abroad'. 38 Although the $250bn in five years
talked about in the Grand Bargain was no more than the Japanese surplus, most of
the latter was already committed (to say nothing of the political issues restricting
36 Author's interview 'sith Jean Foglizzo. Head of the IMFs representation in Moscow. 14
October 1992.
Philip Hanson. 1992. op. cit.. p. 5.
38 The Guardian. 28 October 1991.
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Japan's assistance to Russia). Neither was that amount more than West Germany
has ploughed into East Germany. yet the whole of Europe felt the cost of that
scale of capital inflow, as interest rates were forced up. resulting in a downward
pressure on spending and jobs. these problems being magnified greatly in
Germany itself. Consequently, Germany's role in talks on assistance to Russia
was reversed from that of pace-setter for generous packages to that of begrudging
member of the G7 on new development spending or debt rescheduling for the
FSU. With its balance-of-payments problems, German y is now obliged to remind
the other powers that it has given far more than its fair share of aid, and that on
the debt issue it has a great deal more to lose. All these factors meant that actual
levels of aid were a mere fraction of the amounts needed. A report financed by
the IBRD as part of its Technical Cooperation Programme was a full study of the
state of the Russian economy, released in September 1992. This study not only
confirmed the dire economic crisis, but it also highlighted the inadequacy of
Western assistance to date. The report suggested that a minimum of $2Obn p.a. of
foreign injections would be needed to truly increase the chances of the economic
reforms' success. 39 Even Michel Camdessus, Managing Director of the
monetarist-minded International Monetary Fund (IMF), said at the Lisbon
Conference (23-24 May 1992) that the international community would have to
find over $3Obn per year to save the refonns in the FSU.4°
In part because of the German-led European demands for the rest of the
developed world to play their part in supporting the Russian reforms, there has
been a distinct increase in the USA's readiness to help the FSU, bringing the
Americans closer to Europe's approach. This has occurred not only in recent
talks on the rescheduling of Soviet debts, where the cost to Washington reflects
the USA's relatively small outstanding loans. The United States position on
technology trade with Russia has also undergone massive change. This has been
apparent in the joint USA-Russia plans to develop joint space projects (where it
The Financial Ti,nes. 21 September 1992.
40 The Guardian. 25 May 1992.
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seems likely, nevertheless, that it will be more a case of the (IS buying technology
rather than sharing its own state-of-the-art discoveries). More importantly.
Washington finally agreed to dissolve CoCom. and to replace it with a new
organization which is to include Russia. 41 In practice however, it has become
apparent that the new organization will also restrict the export of sensitive
military and dual-use technology to certain countries, in some cases Russia and
China; again, the Americans are being blamed for this continued prejudice against
Russia, and the West Europeans are seen as the only hope for a more trusting
approach.42
This feeling of continued discrimination against Russia, of still being on an
'untrustworthy' list, adds to the general feeling of frustration and betrayal many
feel with regard to the West. This is not purely an ideological antagonism. as
described in chapter one. Many commentators who remain pro-marketeers are
nonetheless very disappointed with the West's performance in terms of assistance
to Russia. Aleksei Pushkov, editor of the Moscow News, wrote that
The main mistake was to oversell this assistance to the Russians.
[ ... J the Russian masses never felt any real increase in their living
standards as a result of this aid, for it was clearly insufficient.
Some Russians tended to believe that all the fuss about the foreign
economic aid was a huge hoax [...]43
Even when aid credit is actually granted, complains another commentator, the
problem is that it is often spent on consumer imports. thus allowing the industrial
base to disintegrate further, and with no hope of having increased production
enough to back these loans when they become due. Although it may well have
been advantageous from the Western side, for political reasons, to give an
enormous amount of media attention to aid, for man y Russians the result has been
a loss of faith in Western assistance. An important distinction should be made
41 The Financial Times. 17 November 1993.
42 MN Biznes. in Moskovskie novosli. no. 14. 3-10 April 1994. p. Bi.
Alexei Pushkov. Russia and the West: an Endangered Relationship?'. 'MTO Review. February
1994. p. 21.
Evgenii Gudkov. Pomoshch' zapada: na chto rasschitvvat ?'. Literaturnaia Gazeta. no. 2. 11
January 1991. p. 4.
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between pubIicizint actual aid, and advertising potential commitments. It is the
latter which has been very damaging, especially as E1'tsin's foreign policy was
based to a significant degree on Western assistance proving worthy of the
sacrifices being made in geopolitical tenns.
There has also been much criticism of EU aid in particular. One main
complaint has concerned the amount of aid spent on salaries literally hundreds of
times the size of Russian specialists' wages. Worst of all, according to the Vice-
Chairman of the Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development
(RAICD) Aleksandr Zhitnikov, 'half of what the Western consultants write is no
good'. 45
 Another criticism is that Western consultants are paid handsomely to
establish a presence in the developing Russian market, whilst often leaving little
in their wake, as the proportion of TACIS spending on equipment is small, never
exceeding 3O35%.46 Also a bone of contention is the amount of resources spent
on feasibility missions from the EU, when much of this work could be done more
cheaply by Russian and Western staff based in Russia, who normally have a
better understanding of local conditions. 47 This leads on to the general point of
the assistance specialists' attitude towards the beneficiaries. Not only is it
considered by Russians involved with TACIS that too little use is made of
Russian specialists, or at least Russia-based Western staff, there have also been
regular instances of aid consultants simply translating and presenting material
which is not applicable to Russian circumstances. Although these criticisms can
to a large degree be rightly rejected by the Commission, as shown in the next
section, the fact still remains that instead of encouraging a general feeling of
gratitude and friendliness towards Western Europe, even the EU's aid has
sometimes caused irritation. The author can vouch from his own work with the
Russian business community that the level of frustration with and cynicism
'	 TheEconomist. 10 April 1993. p.21.
46 Interview with Igor Markov. Director of the CU. 30 September 1992.
Interview with Viktor Viadimirovich Inozemtsev. Russian Coordination Unit, responsible for
Nuclear Projects. 25 September 1992; the fact that most feasibilit y missions are undertaken from
specialists based in Western Europe and with often limited knowledge of Russian conditions was
witnessed by the author during work on the structuring of TACIS projects.
\Vestern Aid and F.conomic Assitane to Russia 	 269
towards Western consultants is very hi gh, both because of the high salaries they
earn and the often low level of relevence of what the y right.
In the spring of 1993. it seemed as if Western leaders had finally realized.
particularly considering the degree of poverty and anger in Russia. that it was
time to grant more aid, with less conditions: in other words, it should have been
accepted that the level of influence of statecraft would have to be lowered, despite
volumes of aid increasing. The clearest sign of this was yet another impressive-
sounding 'package', announced at the Tokyo G7 Summit. supposedly offering
$43bn. Again, however, it contained a high proportion of 'recycled' aid, as well
as very hypothetical elements. Debt rescheduling accounted for $l5bn of the
package, of which $6.5bn was deferred from 1992. The most important part of
the package was a promise of $1 8bn of IMF and IBRD funds, but $6bn of that
was the same stabilization fund which had been promised in 1992. 48 In fact, only
approximately $2bn of the IMF and World Bank credits were disbursed in 1993
(see section 4.3).49 It was another case of large numbers at press conferences not
translating into much real assistance. President El'tsin joined in the strong
criticism of the slow implementation of Tokyo promises. 5° The amount of
disillusionment with promises of Western backing naturally kept growing, and is
likely to have been a factor in the strong Liberal-Democrat turnout in the
December 1993 elections to the State Duma.
Predictably, the new political clout gained by Vladimir Zhirinovskii
triggered off a new set of promises for greater aid and faster action. Finally, the
G7 office in Moscow which had been promised in April 1993 was opened; the
second $1.5bn tranche of IMF credit was approved in March 1994. In terms of
multilateral aid, however, there was nothing else of substance which had emerged
by mid-1994. The many comments by policy makers, following the Russian
election results, about the need to try to prevent a strong increase in the support
for nationalistlpopulist politicians by massively increasing aid to Russia.
48 The Guardian. 16 April 1993: and IMF. op. cit.. 1994. p. '8.
IMFop. cit.. 1994. p. 78.
50 The Guardian. 15 January 1994.
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disappeared with the headlines about Zhinnovskii. Assistance to Russia is clearly
going to continue at an increasing rate, but not at a level even approaching the
amounts saved by the (present) termination of the Cold War, nor even realizing
the promises given by the G7 'packages'. There is of course no guarantee that
granting more aid, and aiming more of it at Russian consumers rather then
Western consultants, would have greatly reduced the Slavophile backlash which
has occured in the last few years. but it could at least have made Western aid a
useful tool for pro-reform politicians, rather than the weapon of populists which it
has now become.
4.3 The European Union's Assistance to Russia
The Special Role of European Union Aid
The role of the European Union in Russia truly differs from that of other
institutions. The 'family relationship' talked about by the EU Ambassador
contrasts starkly with the 'doctor-patient' relationship of the IMF with Russia.
The fact that the EU is not a financial institution like the IMF or the World Bank
allows it not to insist upon the same harsh macroeconomic prerequisites for the
approval of large-scale aid programmes. The special case of the EU derives not
only from its proximity to Russia, but from its dual role as a representative of its
member states as well as of the supranational Commission of the EU per se. As
such, the EU accounts for the vast majority of aid to the FSU; of the pledges of
almost 7ObnECU (this may exclude sections of the S24bn 'package') committed
between September 1990 and mid-May 1992, approximately 74% originated from
the EC and its member states. 51 The proportion is similar for the period 1992-93,
Perdita Fraser. 1992. Op. cit.. p.35. This figure excludes debt rescheduling, as well as grants
from private sources: the figure was only slightly
 less in early 1994. in terms of aid actually delivered.
according to Martin Walker: of the $94.4bn (77.6bnECU) received from the West by the FSU. 64.1%
($6O.Sbn or 49.8bnECU) was from the EU - from Europe - .\Iagazine of the European Union.
(published in Washington) no. 333. Februar y 1994.
\% cstern Aid and Econonuc Assistance to Russia
when the EU Member States provided a total of $44.Sbn in export credits and
loan guarantees to Russia. representing 66% of the total for G7 countries. 52 The
aid of the Community itself, as an institution, is relatively modest: for the period
September 1990 to mid-May 1992, it represented only 5.8% (3,O13mECU) of the
EC's total aid to the FSU, 53 the remainder being bilateral aid. Although the
proportion of Commission aid may seem negligible, we shall see that the nature of
it makes it potentially very valuable.
One example of the Community's youthful and dynamic approach to
problem-solving is the creation of the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development, conceived by François Mitterrand during his presidency of the
European Council, and in which the EU has played an important part ever since
(see section 4.4). In the sphere of international coordination, the EC participated
closely in the January 1992 international conference on assistance to the FSU in
Washington and it prepared the Lisbon Conference in May of that year. The
Community has also encouraged the Russian government to establish a
coordination body, which has taken the form of the Russian Agency for
International Coordination and Development (the RAICD - elaborated upon in
section 4.4). There was a time when the possibility of the EC coordinating the
whole of Western assistance to the Soviet Union, just as it has been coordinating
all multilateral OECD assistance to Eastern Europe, was seriously discussed. At
the Rome Council of December 1990, however, it was decided that the USSR
would not be included in the P1-TARE programme of assistance to Eastern Europe,
but instead the Technical Assistance to the USSR programme was launched (later
becoming the Technical Assistance to the CIS programme, or TACIS). Although
the Baltic states were originally included in TACIS. they were subsequently
amalgamated with the PHARE programme. The very concept of TACIS has
52 Europe - .tIagazzne of the European Union. (published in Washington) no. 333. February
1994. P.8.
This includes the 1992 TACIS programme. but excludes technical assistance to the Baltic states.
Western Aid and Economic Assistance to Russia	 272
turned out to be very different from that of PHARE. largel y because of the CIS"
greater distance from Western Europe, and because of its immensity.54
Until relatively recently the EC had very limited influence as a participant
in economic statecraft with the USSR. This had been due to the fact that most
Soviet exports were not covered by the Conimunitv's commercial policy; oil, gas
and raw materials enter free of tariff or quota.. as the EC member states kept
control of their energy supplies. Also responsible was the fact that CoCom, as
well as most of the institutions which previously provided credit to the USSR
(mostly national governments granting bilateral deals). had all been outside the
EC's jurisdiction. 55 As EC member states still kept control over policy
instruments which were vital in relations with the USSR, namely energy imports
and granting credit, they had also kept control over the main levers of economic
statecraft. In the field of energy trade, the European Energy Charter may bnng
about a situation where energy trading conditions are controlled jointly by
Europeans from East and West, once agreement is finally reached (see Appendix
Two).
As concerns purely EC help, from its very beginning it had an important
statecraft element. The 25OmECU grant for food aid approved at the December
1990 Council meeting was suspended in early 1991 after the Red Army's
intervention in Lithuania (together with KGB and MVD forces), and then
resumed in May on condition that constructive dialogue continued to be held
between Moscow and the Baltic republics. The I .25bnECU in credits accorded at
the end of 1991 were also not free of conditions; they were granted on the basis of
commitment to market principles, and pluralist democracy, although in cases of
real hardship these were ignored. It had also been a condition that the
Memorandum of 28 October 1991, regarding the debt to foreign creditors of the
USSR and its successors, would be signed (this agreement is now obsolete, as
Author's interview with Mr. D. Ivarsson. responsible for procurement and contracting in
lAdS' Coordination Unit, 6 October 1992.
John Pinder. 'The EC and Eastern Europe Under Gorbachev: How Normal Could Relations
Become?', in The Economies of Eastern Europe Under Gorbachev 's Influence, V4 TO Colloquium,
March 1988. Brussels. 1988. p. 266.
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Russia and the republics eventuall y reached 'zero-option' agreements: see section
4.4). Significantly. they carried the traditional waiver of sovereign immunity.
which remained an obstacle to agreement for a long time. The l,86OmECU
committed in technical assistance to the CIS (including 4OmECU for the Baltic
states in 1991 and 1992. and an unspecified amount for Mongolia in 1994), on the
other hand, has been relatively free of conditions. Naturally, if the government of
any of the beneficiary states clearly ceased to carry out democratic and market-
oriented reforms, their share of TACIS would be reduced or dissolved, but there
are no clear parameters as to what would constitute a breach of the reform
process.
There now follows an examination in more detail of the three types of
assistance which the Community has so far granted to Russia - food aid, credit
guarantees and loans, and the most important part. technical assistance. The
section ends with an appraisal of how EU assistance to Russia might be expected
to change in the future. The detail provided in the following sections is included
to show where Russian (and Western) criticism of food aid and of TACIS
programmes can be justified, and on the contrary which aspects of EC/EU aid is
particularly well thought out.
Food Grants
The first type of aid to be offered by the European Community to the Soviet
Union was food aid. The role of food aid in EC cooperation was crucial, and the
reasoning behind it simple: 'there can be no political or economic reform on an
empty stomach'. 56 EC food aid consisted of non-repayable grants which could be
used to purchase foodstuffs, normally from EC states, though in some cases from
Eastern Europe. The first grant for food aid, as noted above, was for 25OrnECU
56 Food and Humanitarian Aid, documentation produced by the EC Conunission for the Lisbon
Conference. 23-24 May 1992.
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and was approved at the Rome Council in December 1990. The grant was used
mostly to purchase products from government surplus stocks, though others were
bought on the market by the Commission after offering tenders. Part of the aid
consisted of approximately 26.565 tonnes of foodstuffs being supplied directly to
the governments of the Central Asian Republics. The major part of the operation.
however, was in delivering 88.000 tonnes, mainly to Russia. Ukraine. Belarus.
Georgia and Armenia through non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The
whole process proved to be painstakingly slow; by April 1992, only around half
of the 88,000 tonnes pledged at the end of 1990 had reached their destination.
Some of these NGOs were themselves working with corresponding organizations
in the CIS.57
For a closer look at the mechanism of distribution for this food aid, the
work of Médecins Sans Frontières / Belgique (MSF) can be used as an example.
For the programme approved by the December 1990 Rome Memorandum. MSF
was involved in the distribution of baby food, milk and pasta. Before distribution
commenced, the distribution points were contacted, to determine how many
children, of the appropriate age, MSF would have to feed in the capital. The
distribution of ordinary milk and pasta was part of a second wave of dietary
assistance. The foodstuffs were separated into ten prefectures of Moscow: each
prefecture then providing a list of its neediest people: old age pensioners. large
families, invalids, and other needy groups. The prefectures then sent out notices
to these people inviting them to come and collect the donated food, which was
granted upon presentation of this notice, the recipient's old age/invalid/large
family card and his/her passport; after receiving their parcel. the beneficiaries
signed a receipt. 58 In this way, the first year's food aid programme, eventually,
reached the people it was destined for. Although the amounts distributed were
small, they appeared to be well targetted. This programme can be seen as having
been successful at both improving living standards of a small section of Russia's
Food and Humanitarian Aid. op. cit.
)8 Résumé des aclivités de Médecins Sans Frontiéres en CEI depuis 1988. par I'Equipe
MSFfBelgique a Moscou (as.036).
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needs', and increasing their good will towards the EC. On the other hand., as will
all food aid to Russia. it failed to address the problem or decreasing production
and reliance on imported goods. and was the target of Russia nationalist attacks
on the West's demeaning charity to a world superpower. needed only because of
the poverty inflicted on Russians due to Western policies.
The other purely food aid programme of the EC was announced one year
after the first one, at the Maastricht Council meeting in December 1991. The aid
from this operation was originally to be aimed only at Moscow and St Petersburg,
although this was later extended to include Saratov. Nizhnyi Novgorod and
Cheliabinsk. Apart from an initial 5mECU of food and medicines which was
allocated in the same way as in the original operation.. the distribution tactics for
this programme were more complicated than for the first year. In the first stages.
the aid was not to be distributed directly to recipients, but to shops. The
participating retail outlets in Moscow and St Petersburg were provided with bright
blue and gold European Community stickers; this time recognition was clearly
one of the objectives. The foodstuffs were sold at fixed prices, at levels aimed to
be high enough not to discourage local production, but low enough to have a
downward effect on the inflation which had accompanied the chaotic start to price
liberalization. The next stage of food aid was intended to simultaneously assist
the development of a new supply structure, using commodity exchanges. EC food
was auctioned off at commodity exchanges. to shop managers and distributors,
who were then allowed to add a mark-up of 20%. Buyers were to have their
identities verified, and their outlets randonily checked to ensure that the food was
neither overpriced, nor sold on the black market. 59 Where sold directly through
shops, or indirectly through auctions, the revenue from the sales of the food was
placed in a hardship fund, which was then used to top up social security payments
to similar categories to those which were targeted with food distribution, if
somewhat broader. In Moscow, for example, some two million people were to
Interview with Elena Prokhoreva. of the Moscow Delegation of the Commission of the European
Communities' Information Office. 2 November 1992: also The Times. 4 January 1992.
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have their pensions or social securit-v payments significantly increased, for a few
months, due to this fund. Some of the money was also used to pay for hot school
meals.6° The Commission employed a total of over 100 people, primarily soldiers,
but also other staff seconded by the Member States: use was also made of
consultancy firms to ensure both the sales in shops. arid later in public sales, as
well as to monitor that the counterpart funds were being used properly. 6 ' The
25OmECU aid package has been particularly praised as a model of efficiency, its
delivery time, at least for the first half of the operation, having been relatively
speedy, and the proportion of misappropnated food being very low, It was also
considered a success in helping to develop market mechanisms within the FSU.62
However, there was criticism about Russians having to pay for this 'aid', the
perception being that the EC making money from its food surpluses at the
expense of Russian consumers, as much of the population did not know or did not
believe that the proceeds were being re-directed towards the poorer citizens of
Moscow and St Petersburg.
Food aid may continue to be funded by the EU, this time using TACIS
funds. Starting from the 1993 TACIS budget, up to 10% of TACIS funds will be
available for humanitarian needs, if justified by circumstances. Such a system has
already been in use with the PHARE programme. 63
 Although this is more likely
to be needed in the states of Central Asia and the Caucasus. the theoretical
possibility is there also for Russia, although this seems very unlikely to happen.
The criticism of food aid described above have pushed the EU firmly into
financing technical support of Russian production or service sector enterprises,
aiming at the more long-term benefits of this type of aid.
60 Food and !fu,nan:tarian Aid. op. cit.
61 Food and Humanitarian Aid. op. cit.
62 Interview with Michael Emerson, op. cit.
63 74C1S - Annual Report from the Commission - 1991 and 1992. Conunission of the European
Communities document. COM(93)362 final. Brussels. 28 July 1993. p. 46.
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Credit Guarantees and Loans
The second part of the aid package agreed at the Rome Council at the end of 1990
was the 500mECU credit guarantee. This assistance was also tied to food, but
contrarily to the grants described above, it had to be repaid. This capital was to
be used against a loan which was originally to be granted to the
Vneshekonombank by a consortium of banks led by the Deutsche Bank.' The
loan was at first to be used purely for EC food products. but this was then
extended to East European products, which could account for up to 25% food
products purchased with these credits. The idea behind this scheme was not only
to help East European recovery at the same time as alleviating some of the
hardship in Russia, but also to reduce pressure from East European exporters on
the Western markets. Nonetheless, this aspect did provide more scope for choice
on the part of Russia than habitual bilateral credit arrangements.
The delays in reaching fmal agreement on the terms for this credit were
enormous, as finding a Soviet counterpart with the appropriate responsibility was
at first problematic, then simply impossible with the collapse of the Soviet Union.
It was only after the European Council agreed to transfer the responsibility for the
credit guarantee that the appropriate promises could be obtained and letters of
credit exchanged with Vneshekonombank. the latter being able to provide the
guarantee money to the consortium of Western banks. 65 This had occurred by the
end of May, although by this time, after interest had been taken away, only some
4O6mECU were left in credit.66
This problem of finding the right interlocutor to achieve one's goal in the
FSU, and determining which competence and spheres of influence a potential
partner or negotiator has in reality, is a major difficulty for every type of aid
programme, just as it is for business. The collapse of the Soviet Union, for all its
64 Perdita Fraser. 1992. op. cit.. p. 33.
65 lnrerJa.r in English. 21 February 1992.
66 Perdita Fraser. 1992. op. cit.. p. 34.
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beneficial results. has greatly worsened this particular drawback. Much time and
energy is wasted either through untenable promises. or through the need to make
parallel arrangements and agreements with local, regional and republican
authorities, to avoid one of these vital links refusing to cooperate.
The other pledge of EC credit that we have seen to date is the 1 .25bnECU
medium-term loan, approved at the December 1991 Council meeting, which made
up EC aid figures to the 2bnECU promised at that summer's G7 meeting. Each
republic's proportion of this loan, which is intended for agricultural, food or
medicinal products, was later balanced in accordance with Russia being the sole
benefactor from the 500mECU credit guarantee. Russia's share of this loan has
thus been set at 499mECU, all of it to be used on food (mostly wheat) and
medicines. Although the Commission had signed memoranda of understanding
on these loans with Belarus. Kyrgyzstan. Tajikistan and Turkmenistan by
December 1992, only in the spring of 1993 was such a memorandum signed with
Russia,67
 which had previously refused to agree to the waiver of sovereign
immunity, in the event of defaulting on repayments, leading to the necessity of
appropriating Russia's assets abroad. Thereafter this very important sum, the
largest single amount granted to Russia by the Community, could be translated
into badly needed medicines and cheaper food.
Afterhaving granted these loans, the EC concentrated on financing TACIS:
as explained below, the author believes that offering new credits to support
Russian reforms would be a wise investment of European tax payers money, if
this debt was exclusively tied to the development of projects which had been
identified and supported by TACIS consultancy projects.
67 The Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities: A Second Year in Moscow'.
press release by the Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities in Moscow. 25 March
1993.
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Non-TACIS Energy Programmes
Before moving on to TACIS. it is worth briefly mentioning an area in which
TACIS funds can be supplemented by other EU bodies. There are two such
programmes run by the Community which have been involved in energy projects
concerning Russia: Thermie and the International Energy Cooperation Programme
(IECP).
Thermie is the Community Programme for the promotion of energy
technologies, which since December 1991 has been empowered to undertake
activities in the FSU. By mid-1992 it had opened three energy centres in Russia:
Moscow. St-Petersburg and Tiumen'; the centres at Moscow and St Petersburg
were strengthened by TACIS (1991) funding amounting to 2.5mECU each. The
main objectives of the centres are: to promote the transfer and use of efficient
European energy technologies; to provide a permanent representation of European
energy technology experts; to facilitate the establishment of European equipment
manufacturers and suppliers, as well as defming opportunities for joint venture
actions. As an example of the benefits which have been achieved, the EU Energy
Centre in Moscow had already completed fourteen actions by mid-1993. It has
been estimated that these actions will produce energy savings of 2.5 GJ over the
next five years, for a cost of only 31 8,000ECU, which represents a pay-back
period of just over two months.68
The International Energy Cooperation Programme (JECP) is a body run by
DG XVII which covers energy assistance to the developing world and the former
Communist bloc. Funding amounts are modest, at around 3mECU for 1992 and
4mECU in 1993. An advantage of the IECP is that it covers all Eastern countries
and can therefore cut across boundaries, for example by jointing PHARE and
TACIS recipient countries; this is especially important considering the important
68 The Commission of the European Communities Directorate General for Energy (DG XVII),
Commumtv Assistance in the Energy Sector to the Countries of Central and Eastern Europe and the
FSU'. in Energy in Europe. Special Issue. August 1993. pp. 11-12.
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energy links remainini between these countries. Projects in the 1992 IECP
involving Russia included a seminar on demand-oriented energy policy;
workshops on energy legislation and regulation. with emphasis on the European
Energy Charter: study tours for energy policy-makers from the FSU to provide
direct experience of energy policy and the Charter principles in practice in EC
member states: and a workshop on social and economic reconversion of coal
fields. The Energy Cooperation Programme has also worked together with
Thermie and TACIS by assisting with the initiation and support for EC Energy
Centres. The IECP has furthermore provided fmanciai support for the
administrative costs of conducting European Energy Charter negotiations.69
Technical Assistance to the CIS
After two winters of massive food aid, from 1990 to 1992, by the time of the
Lisbon Conference the emphasis was much more on self-help, on 'helping the
new republics feeding themselves rather than us feeding them'. This is the whole
philosophy behind the Community's Technical Assistance, an ambitious project
of extensive transfer of know-how to the FSU. The concept of a technical
assistance programme to the Soviet Union was first officially approved by the
European Council in Rome in December 1990. On 15 July 1991, the Council
adopted a regulation on the implementation of the Technical Assistance
Programme for the Soviet Union which provided it with a budget of 400mECU.
Already this was far more than any other non-refundable know-how transfer
project from the West, even though the amount pledged in following years was to
be higher still. TACIS is by far the most visible aspect of EU assistance to
Russia. and therefore merits particular attention as a major source of publicity,
gratitude as well as frustration from the Russian recipients.
69 Ibid.. pp. 12-13.
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In its approach to helping liberal reforms, one of the objectives was to
encourage Soviet society to organize itself, without the need of directives.
A prerequisite to the successful evolution of a market economy is
the emergence of a democratic society. Therefore, the Technical
Assistance programme will encourage the establishment of those
formal and informal organizations that are vital for the
development of a pluralistic democratic civic society.7°
Assisting the pnvatization process has also been a general goal of this operation
Discovering precisely which were the most urgent tasks was a challenge in
itself. 'The inability of the Soviet authorities to translate an infinite number of
needs into a limited number of clearly formulated and concrete projects
enormously complicated the task of the Commission'. 71 Nevertheless, an
Indicative Programme proposal for 1991, signed jointly by EC Commission Vice-
President Andriessen and the USSR's Ambassador Voronin, was approved by the
Twelve on 22 July 1991. 72 The main objective of the Programme was to support
measures promoting the transition to a market economy in the USSR. Five
priority sectors were identified: training, energy (including nuclear safety),
financial services, transport, and food distribution; there was also a miscellaneous
section, which included, inter alia, telecommunications and the environment.
Assistance was to be provided in these areas mainly through policy-making
advice, the design of suitable legal and administrative frameworks, training, the
reorganization of existing institutions and the establishment of new ones. The
assistance was to be concentrated on sectors and geographical areas where it was
most likely to play a key role in the continuation of the reform process. 73 This
70 Russia - /992 Technical Assistance Indicative Programme. Programme agreed at a series of
meetings between Representatives of the Russian government and of the EC Commission. in February-
March 1992. EC Commission document. No date.
71 Background Brief TACIS - Technical Assistance to the Commonwealth of Independent States.
Implementation 1991 - Programming 1992. EC Commission document. No date.
72 Technical Assistance to Economic Reform and Recover y in the USSR. 1991 and 1992. An
Operational Guide. EC Commission Document. No date.
'	 Ibid.
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was considered to be an important mechanism with which to encourage those
regional leaders which proved themselves to be true reformists.74
Now that the priority areas of training, energy, fmancial services, transport
and food distribution had been established, the search for appropriate projects
could begin. Any proposal for Technical Assistance TA) funding must, at least
in theory, originate from the potential benefactor. and it should first of all be sent
to the recipient country's Coordination Unit (CU). The CU acts as the link
between the EC Commission or its Moscow Delegation. and targeted benefactors.
It consists mostly of Russian experts in the priority areas, and has been
complemented by Western experts, seconded at the cost of the Commission. The
USSR Coordination Unit had only just managed to start operating in the late
summer of 1991 when the coup greatly complicated its task. The first part of the
CU's responsibility within its own country is to inform all potential recipients
about the nature of EC technical cooperation and the terms of access to funding.
All project proposals put forward by Local bodies were to be sent to the CU for
evaluation, with satisfactory ones being sent through to Brussels as official
fmance requests; from 1992 these were to be signed by the National Coordinator.
To achieve this 'filtering' role, the CU attempts to retain only projects which are
compatible with goals set out in the Indicative Programme.
For many reasons, the preparations for the 1991 TA programme were not
so smooth in practice. The main delaying factor was the August coup, and the
resulting institutional chaos as Russian government bodies started to take over
from Soviet ones. Despite this mayhem, from August to December, 400mECU
worth of projects had to be found; any of the TA budget not pledged by the end of
the year was to be returned to Community coffers. Even without the political
uncertainty, this would have been impossible to do thoroughly and systematically,
especially as this was the Programme's first year, involving much trial and error.
The result was that neither the CU nor Brussels could afford to be too particular
about which proposals should be examined further in identification missions; a
tnterview with Michael Emerson Op. Cit.
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rule of acceptance became the nonn. according to the Head of one Western
consultants' firm which managed to secure contracts during this period. The
insufficient time available for the CU to make clear to all potential benefactors the
precise conditions of EC technical assistance also led to misunderstandings, and
often frustration. Sometimes, at this stage. the Western partner had to go to
Russia to placate the beneficiary, and persuade them to sign the Statement of
Endorsement for a project which is different from what they had expected. 'Once
we're on site, we find solutions.' was the approach of one consultant.75
One of the objectives of the 1991 TACIS programme was to privatize
enterprises, but when 1991 projects were being approved, virtually all companies
in the USSR were still state owned; this meant that the approach of management
became a vital determining factor, but knowledge of this was very limited,
especially amongst the Western specialists who chose projects during
identification missions. 76 From the point of view of the CU, its task of
disseminating knowledge of the TACIS programme was much easier to achieve
amongst large centralized structures, or their inheritors, due to the nature of their
approach; amongst independent enterprises, information was still badly lacking.77
Thus numerous projects were selected whilst only a minority of eligible
enterprises knew of the existence of this opportunity to obtain EC know-how.
The rushed procedure and the lack of information for 1991 projects also meant
that many Russian managers who had their project approved realized only
afterwards that it did not involve having the project's budget to spend at will, nor
even large scale acquisition of equipment. 78
 These two negative aspects of
TACIS' first year were the source of much Russian criticism, much of it justified.
After having been forwarded by the CU (although in practice, projects by
Western companies or consultants were sometimes presented directly to the
Meeting with a consultant working for BDPA Scetagri, France: 9 October 1992.
76 Background Brief TACIS - Technical Assistance to the Co,nmonwealth of hidependent States.
Implementation 1991 - Programming 1992. EC Commission document. No date.
Inteiview with Viktor Viadimirovich Inozemtsev. Russian Coordination Unit, responsible for
Nuclear Projects. 25 September 1992.
78 Interview with Igor Andre evich Markov. Director of the Russian Coordinating Unit. 30
September 1992.
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Commission). potential projects are studied by TACIS staff at the Commission, or
contractors working for them, and the most interesting ones selected for appraisal
by identification mission. 79 After these missions, projects (at least major ones)
which are still considered worthy are kept, to be presented to the Management
Committee for Technical Assistance to the CIS, and thus approved as part of
concrete Action Programmes. 8° The Management Committee is composed of
representatives from the Twelve Member States and is chaired by a representative
of the Commission. Their decisions are reached by a majority in weighted voting
(as when the Council must reach a decision on a proposal from the Commission),
in which the Chairman does not vote. 81 In the case of the 1991 Programme, the
respective sectoral programmes were to be presented to the Management
Committee in October (for energy) and November (for all other sectors). Any
projects above IOmECU had to be individually examined and approved by the
Management Committee.
By 12 December 1991, despite the teething problems, the putsch and the
shortage of time, the five sectoral financing memoranda were ready to be signed
by Vice-President Andriessen and the Chainnan of the Inter-State Economic
Committee of the USSR (later to become Ambassador to the EC), Ivan Silaev.
The Baltic republics were dealt with separately, with 15mECU of the FSU's
budget for their projects: there was also 7.3mECU set aside for the monitoring
and implementation of the 1991 TA to the USSR. The most important division of
the programme was that of energy, for which 1 15mECU was provided. Within
this sector, the largest component was in the field of nuclear energy, for which
53mECU was allocated, concentrating on closing or improving the safety of
existing reactors, and tightening nuclear safety regulation. 82
 The training
Interview with Mr. M. Korvvakov. Russian Coordination Unit, Responsible for Food
Distribution Projects. 9 October 1992.
° Technical Assistance to Economic Reform and Recoveni in the USSR.... op. cit.
81 Council Regulation (EEC. EURATOM) No. 2157/91 of 15 July 1991. concerning the provision
of technical assistance to economic reform and recovery in the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics:
Article 7.
82 Indicative List of Projects, TACIS 1991 - Energy Sector. EC Commission document (no date):
also TACIS— Operational Guide. (draft 6 August 1992). op. cit.. p. 10.
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subsection of the 1991 TA was next in volume of capital. with IO3mECU. of
which management training received just over half. 83 The third section in order
of spending was that of food distribution, accounting for 73mECU. the largest
share of which went to 'Soviet Union-level integrated measures'. 84 Transport
problems were not only addressed in the food distribution sector of TACIS, but
also had their own sector, with financing worth 45.8mECU. 85
 The fifth and final
sector of the 1991 TA programme was that providing for fmancial services, worth
37.5mECU. Commercial banks receive by far the most attention in this field,
with projects amounting to over 19.7mECU.86
Although these Action Programmes had a very definitive appearance, they
could by no means be taken as final; some of the above figures had in fact been
changed (by the spring of 1992) from the time when they were first approved in
the autunm of 1991, both in terms of amounts needed and projects targetted, as
originally planned projects in practice often had to be altered, replaced or aborted,
before some of the remaining bureaucratic stages had been crossed, even though
Action Programmes had already been agreed upon. The procedure at this stage
depends upon the amount involved in a particular project; if a project is worth less
than 300,000ECU, an EC/EU company (or one from the FSU, in theory) specified
for the task by the FSU recipient can be directly contracted, so long as the project
itself has been approved. If a project is valued at more than O.3mECU, however,
the Commission's tender offering procedure has to be used. Tenders for service
contracts are always restricted, which means applications are not encouraged
through mainline press or the EC's official journal. Instead, applicants from the
Commission's 'short-list' are invited to apply for these tenders; these are
consultant or fmancial organizations which have applied for recognition on the
Central Consultancy Register, and which have a 'proven' record in their field.87
74 CIS - Training Sector. Subsector t'fanagement Training; EC Commission document: also
TACIS - Operational Guide. (draft 6 August 1992), op. cit. p. 11.
Draft Commission Decision of 1991 - approving a sectoral support programme for food
distribution for the USSR; EC Commission, no date.
85 Sector Transport (1991); EC Commission Document, no date.
86 Sector Financial Services (1991); also Evropa, September-October 1992. pp. E15-16.
87 TACIS - Operational Guide. op. cit.; and conversation with the TACIS Info, office. Brussels.
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Equipment needed for the projects. if valued at over 50.000ECU. is put out
to open tender, for which any supplier from the Community or from the FSU can
apply. The equipment content of these projects is ahvays relatively small, as the
emphasis is on the transfer of knowledge rather than hardware: only the
equipment needed to facilitate this task is acceptable. Although there is no
official limit to the proportion of equipment expenditure a project may have, it
tends never to exceed 30%.88
Even after one of the applicants for the tender has won the contract, the
project is not settled; all that is offered to be signed at this stage is a draft
contract, which is then returned to the EU Commission, before a real contract can
be issued.89
Another stage then to overcome is achieving approval of the final Terms of
Reference (TOR), which are guidelines to the project which are drawn up by the
Commission in Brussels; such agreement is needed by the former Soviet recipient,
through the signature of a Statement of Endorsement. As noted above, this in
itself is often a major obstacle, especially with the 1991 projects, when the
Russian partner sometimes saw the truth of the project for the first time. It is
sometimes the case that the draft TOR, which were used to draw up the Action
Programme, have been substantially redefined by the Commission, compared to
what had been requested by the Russian beneficiar y, the Western consultant or
the Russian CU. This, again, has been the source of much disenchantment from
the Russian side, as well as from EC consultants. Once the Statement of
Endorsement is signed and the real contract offered by the Commission for all to
sign, the financing can finally be acquired; the Western company, though, still has
to adjust its workforce and prepare its staff (see table 4.1).
It normally takes at least 4-5 weeks for a contract to be applied, after it is
signed. For the 1991 programme, the first tenders were granted in January 1992.
In practice, the execution of the post-identification stages of the 1991 TA
88 Meeting with Georges Champseix. (Director) of BDPA Scetagri. France: 9 October 1992.
89 Interview with Mr. lvarsson. Russian CU. op. cit.
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programme also proved problematic. After the initial rush to obtain budget
approval, which must be finalized by 31 December of the year in question, there
was a marked deceleration in the amount of tender procedures being completed
and contracts being signed. which has prompted some expressions of frustration
from tender seekers. By as late as March 1993, only 268.3mECU of projects (233
projects) had been identified, and only I 70.OmECU worth of contracts had been
signed (176 contracts). 9° Funds from the 1991 TA budget which had not been
allocated by this time were not added on as extra funding for subsequent years,
but merely credited back to the EC's budget.
Admittedly, it is not only the EC's slow bureaucratic procedures which are
to blame for the long delays. Some of the approved 1991 projects could not be
carried out by 1992, because the All-Union structures that were designated
recipients no longer exist, nor did they have a Russian or CIS equivalent. This is
not the case for many projects, however. Other projects were particularly time-
consuming because of their extreme complexity; this was the case, for example,
for nuclear projects. Nevertheless, the low rate of contract fmalizations was
indeed worrying. The slowness of execution of TACIS progranimes due to the
mass of bureaucratic procedures described above is the most common target for
Russian criticism of the TACIS programme, together with the lack of funding
with which to implement the restructuring which is often suggested to Russian
entrepreneurs being consulted by TACIS projects.
This does not mean that nothing positive was happening. By the end of
1992, many projects were underway, and a few had even been completed.
Despite this fact, in early 1993 there was still no evidence of independent
consultants' (as opposed to those benefiting from the service contract) reports on
the success of projects either completed or in progress, whilst neither the
Commission nor its Moscow Delegation had the extra staff to work on
Programme Managing Units (PMUs). TACIS guidelines specify that final
° 'Technical Assistance Dossier of Selected Projects; List of Projects. 1991: All Sectors -
Russia. computer print-out obtained from the Moscow EC Coordination Unit. 9 March 1993.
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benefactors should be closely involved in the appraisal of a programme; for this
purpose, PMUs were to be set up, staffed both by EC consultants and officials at
Republican or inter-Republican level (originally). These theoretical guidelines
further state that as well as regular follow-up by the Commission's services and
regular reporting by the PMUs, the Commission will conclude contracts with
independent consultants to monitor the progress and the performance of projects
and their various components as well as to undertake a comprehensive ex-post
evaluation of whether the objectives of a project have been achieved.9'
On the CU side of things, any project implementation work in the first year
was limited to ad hoc trouble shooting. After the attempted coup, and the
eventual dissolution of the USSR, the demise of the USSR Coordination Unit also
became only a matter of time, a factor which could not have assisted the working
atmosphere. Indeed, on the 1 January 1992, fmancing to the USSR CU was
stopped, and new accommodation had to be found.92
It should be stressed, however, that under the circumstances, it is laudable
that any projects were running at all or had been identified for 1991, and running
by late 1992. It is significant that a fact-fmding mission representing the
budgetary control committee of the European Parliament, which itself had already
proved that it was not averse to strongly criticizing TACIS, came back from the
FSU with a report indicating that the 1991 TACIS programme had, on the whole
and all things considered, been well managed.93
Even as the first 1991 projects were being launched, the basis of the 1992
TACIS programme was being drawn up. By 19 March, the 1992 Indicative
Programme was signed by Alexander Shokhin and J. Ter Haar, Head of the
TACIS Unit. The total grant for the CIS was 425niECU, with an additional
25mECU for the Baltics (which was later transferred to the PI-IARE Programme).
Of the funds available to the CIS countries, 3OmECU was allocated to actions in
91 'Draft Financing Proposal. Sector Programme - FINANCIAL SERVICES', EC Commission
document, 12 November 1991.
92 Interview with Igor Andreyevich Markov, Director of the Russian Coordinating Unit, 30
September 1992.
European Parliamentary Brief, 2 November 1992.
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support of specialists in the nuclear sector, including 2OmECU towards the
establishment of what became known as the International Science and
Technology Centre. A 5mECU 'mini-budget' was also established, for small-
scale unexpected expenses; furthennore, funds of approximately I2mECU were
set aside for the setting-up of a coordination unit in each of the states, and a
budget of 5mECU was secured for the implementation of the 1991 projects, and
the programming and preparation for 1992 projects. 94 This time, the remaining
balance of the budget was more precisely separated amongst the newly
Independent States. The distribution of TACIS funds was done according to a
weighting system dependent on population (5 0%), share in the industrial
production of the FSU, and GNP per capita (20%); there was also significant
compensation for the relatively high share of aid received by Russia in 199
Russia's share was to be 11 1mECU;96 Russia could also benefit from programmes
in the 7OmECU regional programme. 97 Although these were the figures in the
Action Programme, they were to change slightly before projects were fmalized.
Having learnt some of the lessons from the identification and
implementation of 1991 projects, the authors of TACIS 1992 intended to
approach certain aspects differently. Part of the new emphasis was on having
fewer, larger projects, thus maximizing the effect whilst reducing the bureaucratic
effort involved. This was partly due to the fact that EC research had concluded
that assistance from the international community had been fragmented, and
should concentrate in the future on a limited number of areas. 98 Linked to this
policy was the orientation towards pilot projects, which was present in choosing
1991 proposals, but was stressed even more for 1992. The triggering of a chain
reaction was sought either in provoking subsequent financial operations from
'Financial Allocation for 1992 Technical Assistance Programmes to the Independent States of
the Former Soviet Union', European Commission document, 24 April 1992.
TACIS Operational Guide, (draft 6 August 1992), op. cit.
'The Delegation of the Commission of the European Communities: A Second Year in Moscow',
op. cit.
Evropa, September-October 1992, p. E14.
98 Bulletin of the European Community - Commission, ECSC-EEC-EAEC (Euratom), no. 1-2,
1992, p. 79.
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organizations in the EC. or rationalization in other enterprises in the CIS. The
reasoning for this was partly that the Russian economy is much too large for an
EC-fimded project to have a direct effect on the whole, therefore the value as an
example is of primary importance; also important is the fact that the command
system has resulted in virtually the same conditions existing in enterprises
throughout the country - the same problems, but also the same advantages; this
means, in theory, that if a solution is found for one enterprise, it may well be
effective all over the FSU, thus making pilot projects the ideal answer.99
The aims of the 1992 TA programme remained much the same as those of
199!, though they were to be defmed through priority focal sectors, of which
there were four main ones: food production and distribution; human resources and
development; networks (whether trade links, communication or energy flows
between regions or republics); and business support services. To further
concentrate the impact of TACIS, the Russian Indicative Programmes specified
that projects in that country were to be concentrated in three regions: Central
Russia, Western Siberia and the Volga region.
It was also intended that there should be much more emphasis on the
interaction between various sectors. For example, if a particular region already
had a project to retrain the staff of a commercial bank, and a new project was
proposed in that area for the assistance of a privatized firm in its new financial
self-management, the two projects would be actively encouraged to interact.
Already by 1992, the Community's technical assistance was concentrating on
reducing or compensating for any negative social consequences of the economic
reform process. More specifically, consultancy on the creation of a more efficient
social safety net was a stated aim. Also particularly emphasized in the
desirability of a project in 1992 were the extent of institution building, and the
downstream flow of investment)00
Interview with Wolfgang Kaiser. Russian CU. op. cit.
100 Interview with Mr. D. Ivarsson.. Russian CU. op. cit.
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Within the 7OmECU Regional Programme, energy again attracted most
resources, especially for its nuclear projects. In fact, as the process of project
identification developed, nuclear energy had its own section, using both funds
originally earmarked for Regional Programmes, and funds at first intended for
national programmes, amounting to 8OmECU.'°' Oil and gas were also being
assisted in the Regional Programme, although more from the side of infrastructure
and training; these complemented the oil and gas projects in national
Programmes, for example those in Tiumen'. Telecommunications became a
greater priority, and within the enterprise support services' bracket, pnvatization
was to be particularly assisted, as was conversion of the military-industrial sector.
The Regional Programme considered proposals which were made on the behalf of
three or more of the CIS states, and which emphasized inter-regional or inter-state
cooperation.'°2
 Government advice projects, including some in support of the
Russian government, were also included in the Regional Progranime.
Within Russia, three regions specified in the Indicative Programme were
narrowed down in the Action Programmes to four cities or regions: Moscow
(59mECU), St Petersburg (25mECU), Tiumen' (12.5mECU) and Samara
(9.5mECU). The remaining 5mECU were presumably kept aside for
implementation and/or contingency costs.
Identification missions for the 1992 projects started in July. By early
December 1992, all proposed projects, covering the full budget of TACIS 1992,
had been approved by the Management Committee, and only fmal approval from
the Commission was required for tendering and implementation to commence. 103
Unfortunately, this is where timing efficiency of the management of
TACIS 1992 appears to have ceased. As in 1991, the contracting procedure was
very slow after a project had been approved in theory. Even the 'minimum'
timeframe for a project cycle provided by the Commission shows that projects
101 Bulletin of the European Communities - Commission', ECSC-EEC-EAEC (Euratom), no.
12, 1992, p. 125.
102 Financial Allocation for 1992 Technical Assistance Programmes to the Independent States of
the Former Soviet Union; EC Commission document, 24 April 1992.
103 According to the TACIS infonnation bureau, Brussels. 4 December 1992.
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over 300,000ECU, as they virtually all were in the 1992 Programme, could expect
to take at least fifteen months before they became operative (see table 4.1). This
figure was likely to be an underestimation, not least because it did not include any
time for projects to be considered by the CU and forwarded to Brussels. The
European Parliament's Committee for External Economic Relations passed a
damning Motion for Resolution, in Februaiy 1993, which stressed the need to
improve TACIS, especially speeding up procedures and decentralizing the
identification and selection stages of projects; it considered that the Cooperation
Councils set up by the EC-USSR Trade and Cooperation Agreement should
address this problem as a ririty°4
 Individual parliamentarians also raised this
call to speed up the implementation of TACIS projects, as did the Scottish MEP
David Martin in March 1993.' Delays were not limited to the setting-up of
projects; there were also massive delays in the payment of EC experts. According
to The Economist, 'the Commission's payments typically arrive from three
months to a year after they are due. Consultants talk of taking it to court - but
never do, for fear of losing business') 06 Delays in payment are consistent with
the author's own experience of work financed by TACIS.
Accusations of incompetence or inevitability of bureaucratic hold-ups are
not entirely warranted, however. The major problem is that most of the
responsibility for the identification and implementation of TACIS projects
remains with the Commission, and that the Commission's TACIS section is
chronically understaffed. By the end of 1992, TACIS had 24 'A' staff (senior,
non-clerical) in Brussels; most of them on short-term contracts, rather than
functionaries; this defies comparison with the IBRD, which has 400 professionals
involved in projects on the CIS, whilst their projects, being less numerous and
less complicated to arrange, are not as staff-intensive.'07
104 EP Doc. A3-0073 93, 25 February 1993, p. 5.
105 European Parliamentary Brief 11 March 1993.
106 The Economist, 10 April 1993. pp. 2 1-22.
107 TA C/S - Annual Report from the Commission - 1991 and 1992, op. cit., p. 45.
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Thus the drive to accept only larger projects did not succeed in solving the
problem of administrative workload. What it did achieve, however, is the
alienation of many potential EC partners for projects. Western experts have
complained that projects they tried to support were rejected because of being too
small. Another problem with the large projects approved in 1992 is that they
were often over-ambitious; one example was the project (under the Regional
Projects' bracket) to establish business support centres, which aimed to set up
eighteen such centres, whilst a consultant involved in instituting one of these
centres believed that with the time and resources available, only three or four
could have been initiated without compromizing standards.'°8
The identification stage of TACIS 1992 was still affected by the rapid pace
of change affecting both the CUs (for the USSR and Russia), and the
Commission's Moscow Delegation. The fate of the USSR CU was decided at the
February 1992 conference in Moscow regrouping the eleven CIS states and
Georgia with the EC, which established a new structure for cooperation. It was
agreed, through the 'Protocole d'Accord', that each state should now have its own
CU, headed by a National Coordinator, who should be an official of senior status.
There was furthermore an attempt to establish an inter-republican coordinating
body, but this proved impossible as there was too much animosity between the
independent states. The EC at this stage also agreed to pay for the USSR CU for
six months, until 12 August, by which time all of the states should have formed
their own CUs; in the mean time, and in fact still at the end of 1993, the USSR
(and later the Russian) CU has had to work from hotel rooms - at TACIS'
expense.
In March a Russian CU was formed, but the USSR CU continued to exist,
and although most of the respective functions of the two CUs were clearly
defmed, the issues of finance, accommodation and staff were all problematic. To
some extent coherence was retained by Russia's National Coordinator for TACIS,
Deputy Prime Minister Alexander Shokhin. In July the USSR CU was dissolved,
108 Interview with Joe O'Neill. of the consultancv Trade Advisoiy Service. 7 Februazy 1994.
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and only one Russian CU remained, although in effect it was virtually a take-over
by the staff of the USSR CU; Igor Markov became the new Director of the
Russian CU. The rate of turn-over of staff was very high, and some of the
Western members of the CU complained that obtaining and retaining high-calibre
staff was a problem, as permission had not at that stage been granted to pay the
Russian members official hard currency salaries.' 09 The European Commission's
refusal to pay adequate salaries for top quality Russian staff (whilst paying often
generous fees for Western consultants) is an important problem not only within
the CU, but also in TACIS projects themselves. The author has often witnessed
Western consultancy companies finding it unprofitable to send their top Russian
specialists on TACIS-funded projects, as it is EC/EU policy to pay no more than
15OECU per day in fees for Russian nationals; in these cases more Western
consultants are used, often with less relevent experience, yet costing four to eight
times the Russian's rate, and therefore spending correspondingly less time
working on the project due to budget restrictions.
Although the CU could not fulfil functions such as implementation and
monitoring as efficiently as it should for the 1991 or 1992 programmes, the
evolution of a system, the gaining of experience and the addition of more Western
experts have meant that these roles could be better fulfilled for TACIS
programmes from 1993 onwards. Nevertheless, in the author's experience,
Western consultants and European Commission staff tend to view the CU a a
necessary evil to thin out the number of project proposals which must be
processed in Brussels, and to give the Russian government a voice in the
administration of the TACIS programme, but not an organization whose
objectivity or efficiency can be overly relied upon.
The EC's Moscow Delegation was also in a high state of flux. It
commenced operations in the spring of 1991, but only moved to a more
permanent emplacement in November of that year (the Delegation moved again in
late 1994, with the TACIS team then being located seperately). Until the end of
109 Interview with Mr. Ivarsson, Russian CU, op. cit.
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1992. TACIS had been only a small part of the Delegation's activities, with a
single member of staff devoted to it full time; the EC representation also had to
deal with political relations with the whole of the CIS (representations in the other
states were still in the process of being opened), with the implementation and
monitoring of food aid, negotiations for further aid, promotion of EC-Russia
trade, and dissemination of information about the EC. In 1991-92, contact
between the CU and the Delegation had been very limited," 0 the coordination
bureau's dealings with the Commission normally being sent directly to Brussels.
Despite the extraordinary changes being faced by both these Moscow
institutions, they both managed in this period to increase their input in the TACIS
process. In defining the priorities for the EC's second TA operation, and defining
the Indicative Programme, this time the CU had significant input. In choosing
which projects to recommend to Brussels, the CU had developed a clearer
approach, a better defmed structure, and a more precise idea of the Conunission's
expectations. The CU gained the power of veto over TACIS projects, although in
practice it would normally not be considered worthwhile to antagonize the
Commission by using it. In some sectors (that of energy in particular) the Terms
of Reference were already being drawn by the CU; in other cases, Brussels sent
the TOR to the CU to be approved. Yet the feeling within the CU is that this
process should continue, for example by having all Terms of References for small
projects being determined by the Moscow coordination bureau. The reason for
this was not only in order to shorten the delay; it was also to reduce the
frustration on the part of recipients when the Terms of Reference received were
significantly different from the original project suggested, as well as to reduce the
dependence on over-worked decision-makers in Brussels, who in any case rarely
had the same level of expertise as the experts in Moscow.
This tendency to augment the CU's competence was typified by the
request for an Emergency Fund. Igor Markov suggested such a fund as a special
measure to enable small but desperately needed projects to be implemented with a
110 Interview with Wolfgang Kaiser, Russian CU, op. cit.
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minimum of delay. Financing from this Fund, which was proposed at 10% of the
budget, could have been used in cases where both the CU and the Delegation
agreed that a project met the necessary conditions." Critics of such a measure
were not only Eurocrats worried about unjustified expenditure, but even members
of the Russian CU. One member of the coordinating bureau believed that the
existing delay was often needed, for a project to be investigated properly, and that
Brussels' role should be welcome, while the CU is still relatively inexperienced at
implementing assistance programmes. The most important objection was that if
the CU became directly responsible for the granting of large hard-currency
funding, the already significant pressure from Russian Ministries to have their
projects approved and to share in the decision-making would become
overwhelming, and the CU's independence would most likely become restricted.
In the end the proposal for the Emergency Fund was rejected by the Commission.
This episode demonstrates that there is no easy to the conflicting interests of the
Russian side which seeks more influence over assistance aimed its way, and the
ECIEU's determination to avoid losing control over their tax-payers' money.
Partly due to the CU's suggestion, however, a new type of funding became
available. Although it had not been included in the Action Programmes, by the
beginning of 1993 the Commission's Delegation could approve small projects of
up to 50,000ECU. The Commission did have to be informed, but only had two
weeks to raise any objections. This was still not satisfactory in the eyes of the
CU. The exclusion of the CU in this decision-making process contributed to the
coordination bureau's criticisms, even though such small project proposals were
actively encouraged from the CU by the Delegation. The size of maximum
budget for such projects was the main objection expressed, as it was sufficient for
little else other than conferences. It meant that business projects still had little
chance of being realized before they were outdated. Nonetheless, it was a start in
empowering the Moscow bodies, and lessening the burden of the Brussels TACIS
team, and it was to be built upon in the following year.
Interview with Igor Markov, op. cit.
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Meanwhile, the Delegation's own capabilities to speed up the procedures
for the evaluation, definition and approval of projects was increased. In early
1993, at least six new staff members were to join the TACIS section at the
Delegation; by September 1994, the TACIS section had nine administrators, and
six secretaries. 112
 Although decentralization of decision-making power within
TACIS is a main aim of the new policy, the new Head of TACIS at the Delegation
warned that this should not be done too precipitately. Again, this is because such
is the level of fear amongst some Eurocrats of accusations of public European
money being misspent that this prophesy becomes self-fulfilled, due to the
resulting bureaucratic hurdles to efficient distribution of project financing.
From 1993, TACIS took on a distinctly different slant, with a clear attempt
at minimizing bureaucratic delays. The greatest change was in the fact that the
national indicative programmes were for a three year period, valid until 31
December 1995. This meant that until 1996, the time and resources spent on
indicative programmes could be used to speed up the identification and
implementation stages. For regional (inter-state) programmes, the indicative
programme was dispensed with altogether." 3
 It was expected that this decrease
in administrative work would enable a decrease in the average time time needed
to implement projects. Perhaps because they were for such a protracted period,
however, the indicative programmes were a long time in the making; they were
completed only in June.
The possibility of direct project agreement, initiated with the 1992 funding,
was developed further. Under the name of the Bistro facility (from the Russian
bystro, meaning quickly), which was accorded 3niECU, projects of a value of up
to lOO,000ECU could be approved by the Delegation, with the Commission only
having a week to veto any Moscow initiative." 4 There were other differences in
112 Interview with Fiona McLean. of the Moscow Delegations TACIS Office. 16 September
1994.
113 1993 Technical Assistance Programme - Programme - Regional (Inter-State) Actions,
European Conunission document, no date. p. 1.
114 TACIS 1993 - Action Programme - Russian Federation. European Commission document,
nodate.p. 61.
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the approach to project identification which were aimed at quickening the pace,
such as contracting out the evaluation of projects and choice of experts to outside
organizations, in the case of specific sectors. This affected projects under the
new democracy programme, for example, which was adopted after a Resolution
by the European Parliament called on TACIS to copy PHARE in establishing
separate fund for projects 'consolidating democracy and the rule of 1I5
Democracy Fund projects were limited to 150,000ECU, and the TACIS
contribution was not to exceed 70%. 116 Project proposals under this programme,
although ultimately chosen by the Commission, were to be evaluated by the
European Human Rights Foundation (E1{RF), who would also monitor the
progress of the chosen projects.' 17 The Regional (inter-state) Programme also
introduced an identical Democracy Programme on a CIS-wide basis, worth
4mECU, and it will also contract out its management. A similar arrangement was
secured for projects in the European Expertise Service (EES), the major TACIS
component in 1993 for delivering policy advice to the Russian government.118
The Commission has hired Coopers & Lybrand to handle requests for advice from
the Russian government up to a limit of 300,000ECU, and to pick the consultants
to manage the approved projects. Such an approach is likely to result in more
consistency than with the previous situation, when various consultants were used
to evaluate TOR or project proposals. In areas not covered by special agreements
such as those with the EHRF of Coopers & Lybrand, the Commission's TACIS
section has made particular efforts to become increasingly self-reliant. 119
 The
1993 TACIS introduced another new element of project implementation by
making project contracts open not only to EC and CIS firms, but now also those
of PHARE countries, and in some cases non-EC Mediterranean countries, when
115 EP DocumentA3-0201/93, p. 8.
116 1993 Technical Assistance Programme - Programme 	 Regional (Inter-State) Actions,
European Commission document, no date, Annex VIII, p. 2.
117 Conversations with David Geer, Manager of the EHRF's TAC1S operations, Februaiy 1994.
118 Wh at is TACIS?, Document of the European Commission's TACIS Infonnation Office, May
1994, p. 12.
119 Interview with Professor Helen Wallace. 19 January 1994.
Weateni Aid and Economic AsSIstance to Russia 	 299
they could offer specific and relevant expertise, especially if they have experience
to offer in transition to a market economy or in close links with the beneficiaries.
Also a novelty in 1993 was the inclusion of the TEMPUS Programme in
TACIS, aiming to support the restructuring of educational establishments in the
CIS, increasing their cooperation and links with EU academic institutions, and
support the changes encouraged by other TACIS programmes. For 1993-94, the
only TACIS countries to be involved were Belarus, Ukraine and Russia; in that
first year, the budget was minimal, as this first phase was intended principally for
the establishment of initial contacts.120
The TACIS 1993 Programme, which for the first time included Mongolia,
had an increased budget of 5 1OmECU. As in 1992, there was a separate Regional
Programme, which was granted 69mECU, and a separate and important inter-state
Nuclear Programme. Regional programmes within states were treated to their
own Action Programmes for the first time; there were two such programmes in
Russia, for Western Siberia (27.55mECU) and the Urals (30.O5mECU). Russia's
federal Action Programme was catered for with a grant of 89.4mECU, bringing
the total of 1993 projects for Russia (excluding inter-state projects and nuclear
projects) to 147mECU.
The 1993 Regional (inter-state) Programme, as in other years, was to deal
either with projects which tackle a trans-boundary problem, or joint projects
consisting of similar activities being implemented in a coordinated manner in
more than one state, often by the same operator. Projects of the latter type would
seek to minimize costs, and ensure that projects in various states are
complementary. Of the Regional Programme's eleven subsections, the largest
was Transport and Telecommunications. Some of the more innovative projects
included assistance with the establishment of the CIS Inter-State Bank and
support for a central banking advisory service; support for twinning arrangements
for know-how transfer between EU and CIS banks; and the Partnership in
120 'Guide special du candidat - Phase préparatoire du programme, année académique 1993/94
- Tempus (TACIS)', European Commission document, Task Force Human Resources, no date.
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Enterprise section which expanded on the work of 1992. through the EES, and the
MERCURE programme of exchange between CIS and EU Chambers of
Commerce. The Regional Programme in 1993 granted greater priority to the
environment than had been seen previously. The many calls for more ecological
measures from the European Parliament are likely to have played a role in this
development.' 2 ' The most noticeable emphasis in 1993 was on twinning. As
well as the project described above on bank twinning, the Regional Programme
included a section on Town Twinning, to co-finance twinnings with EU towns
which can share know-how in social and educational services, taxation or
environmental management.'22
The Russian Federation's own Action Programme concerned itself mainly
with projects of Federation-wide interest, with a few actions aimed at one of the
four areas targeted in 1992, or ones which may be targeted in future. Following
the Indicative Programme, its two main priorities were Enterprise Restructuring
and Development, and Human Resource Development. Also of particular
importance were Food Production, Processing and Distribution, Energy (see
Appendix Two), and Networks.
As suggested above, the Russian Indicative Programme for 1993-95
provided for actions at two levels; at the federal level, and at the 'level of selected
geographical concentration areas'. For 1993, this second level was provided for
with Action Programmes for the Urals and Western Siberia. These Programmes,
whilst maintaining the Indicative Programme's main priorities of enterprise
restructuring and new social protection systems, also concentrate on solutions
especially suited to their particular region.
121 See for example the Motion for Resolution passed by the Conunittee for External Economic
Relations on 24 February 1993, which considers that greater emphasis should be put on projects dealing
with environmental protection and nuclear improvements. EP Doc. A3-0073/93; similar calls were
echoed by the French MEP Henry Chabert in May 1993 (European Parliam entary Briefing, 26 May
1993), and by the Portuguese MEP Carlos Pimenta in September of that year (European Parliament
Briefln, 22 September 1993).
12z 1993 Technical Assistance Programme - Programme - Regional (Inter-State) Actions.
European Commission document, no date.
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Despite the many improvements since the early days of TACIS, there were
still many imperfections to iron out in 1993. As far as the Coordination Unit was
concerned, although the division between the USSR CU and Russia had been
resolved, another uncertainty had appeared. In 1993, the CU became part of the
Russian Agency for International Cooperation and Development (RAICD -
elaborated upon in section 4.4). Many in the CU had expressed concern about
being dependent upon the RAJCD for accommodation and salaries, putting them
at the mercy of the strongest influences in the Russian government. The potential
political role of the Agency was shown by the wranglings between the Ministries
of Foreign Affairs, of Foreign Economic Relations, of Culture and of Education,
which all had different objectives, and had prevented a quick defining of the
RAICD's precise jurisdiction and structure. Although the EC had played a
significant role in the creation of the Agency, and was hoping for positive results
from its coordination role, the possibility remained that the extra degree of
subordination to the Russian ministries meant the CU was even less likely to
acquire any real decision-making powers.
There was a feeling in Brussels in 1993 that the CU had complained
unjustifiably at the exclusion of projects suggested by it, even though the
proposals had been poor in the eyes of the Commission. The impression of some
consultants was that the CU was furthering projects of parties it already had links
with, rather than seeking the best proposals. Although it is certain that a non-EC
body such as the CU could never have the right to approve projects funded by EC
taxpayers' money, the question remains open as to how much of the management
of project preparation should be entrusted to this mainly Russian body. It is
important to note that the harshest criticism of the CU comes from consultants
whose opinions sometimes clash with those of the coordination bureau; it should
also be remembered that the EU specialists in the CU could be counted upon to
advise the Commission of any chronic preferential treatment which occurred in
the CU. One study on external assistance reached the conclusion that 'an explicit
objective of each project should be to determine how the support being provided
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can be replicated on a wider scale at lower cost. In this regard, it will be vital to
increase the use of local expertise'. 123
 As explained below, by 1994 the
Commission had shown that it accepted the desirability of a greater role for the
CU.
As has already been mentioned, the issue of high fees being granted to
those who have secured TACIS contracts is a sore point to many in Russia. Top
experts managing projects can be paid up to l,200ECU ($1,385) per day, and very
few Western consultants are paid under 45OECU per day, and this is exclusive of
the re-embursable cost of flights and per diems (of 225ECU per day in Moscow
and I6OECU in the regions). The Commission itself admits that 'it cannot be
denied that technical assistance in some fields (privatization, banking, financial
services, policy advice and so forth) commands very high prices'; it attempts to
justify the costs by claiming high costs are the result of enduring assistance of
high quality, and also points out that the limited number of specialists, and the
great demand created by similar projects being undertaken throughout Eastern
Europe, have inflated prices. 'The price of technical assistance is determined in
the market place. The Commission, through tendering, ensures that the price is a
significant determinant in the selection of any technical assistance'.124
Although the services offered by top specialists in TACIS projects may not
be overpriced, a more pertinent question might be the extent to which such 'top'
experts are essential to the success of TACIS projects, particularly as the fields in
which this 'top' expertise was proven will often not be directly applicable to
Russian circumstances. Sometimes, clearly, it will be, for example when
consultants involved have detailed knowledge of the fast-changing legislative and
especially fiscal regulations operating in Russia, and are also able to foresee the
implications for projects involving the EU. In very many cases, however, a
greater role for the CU and for the European Communities' Moscow Delegation
123 IBRD and RAICD, Structural Reform in the Russian Federation: Progress, Prospects, and
Priorities for External Support, 20 April 1993.
124 TACIS - Annual Report from the Commission - 1991 and 1992, Commission of the
European Communities Document, COM(93)362 final. Brussels, 28 July 1993, p. 14.
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(the staff of which, although having become top specialists in technical assistance,
are paid very much less than the visiting experts) in determining when this is the
case could greatly reduce the unit costs of projects, and increase the number of
possible projects every year, despite requiring an increased management budget to
increase the capacity of these two bodies. The budget for outside consultants
should be lowered for all but the most demanding positions in the more complex
projects (demanding in terms of high level of pertinent knowledge, and low
number of available specialists with that expertise). A further increase in the size
of the TACIS management team is required in order to give more attention to the
quality of consultants and the lowest acceptable fee in any given case, without
delaying the project unduly (as is often now the case). So far these savings are
not being made because it is easier to use TACIS 'investment' money and pay
outside consultants for such tasks which could be carried out by internal TACIS
staff, rather than increase the amount labelled as 'TACIS administration' and risk
facing ironic but politically damaging accusations of wasting funds instead of
investing them. This paradox should be adressed, not only to leave more money
for more or longer projects, but also to reduce potential Russian criticism of what
is often seen as the TACIS 'gravy train'.
Another factor which has contributed to keeping project prices at a
needlessly high level is the selection procedure for EC partners in projects. A
first barrier to competition is the daunting registration form to join the
Commission's register of consultants and experts, the only organizations to be
invited to tender on large TACIS projects; it strongly favours those who have
dealt with international organizations before, and who know the 'consultancy
game'. More restrictive still is the commonly accepted practice of having to
lobby the appropriate TACIS staff in Brussels to support particular projects; this
is a practice which small organizations, or those which are less developed in
public relations, can ill afford. In April 1994, the Parliament was still unsatisfied
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with the Commission's management of TACIS, and requested that proposals be
submitted for further suitable alterations to the Programme.'25
The TACIS programme for 1994 saw many improvements, even though the
same priorities are retained, as the same Indicative Programmes remain in force.
Two new geographical areas were introduced as priorities in 1994: South West
Russia (Rostov, Krasnodar and Stavropol) and Kaliningrad, the EU particularly
supporting Russian plans to make this area a free economic zone. There was to
be no increase in the overall budget, the allocation still being of 5 IOmECU.126
The share going purely to Russia was of 15OmECU, whilst the amount set aside
for multi-country programmes was 166.2mECU. This brought the total TACIS
investment for the period from 1991 to 1994 to 1,756.8mECU, with 630.9niECU
having been committed to Russia individually, and Russia also receiving the
lion's share of 591 .2niECU committed to multi-country TACIS programmes.
These area impressive figures, especially when considering that these are all non-
refundable grants.
One of the major changes to have appeared is the Partnership and
Coordination programme (PCP). Under PCP, projects will be fmanced, on a
50/50 basis by TACIS and by public and/or private sector funds from the Member
States of the European Union, in partnership with an appropriate institution in the
beneficiary state which must fully endorse all aspects of the project. Only
projects in sectors identified in the TACIS Indicative Programmes for 1993-95
will be eligible, and all project elements to be supported by TACIS funding
should be primarily concerned with the provision of technical assistance. 127
 The
amount of funding to be granted through PCP was initially 5mECU. This was
just one of many developments which were to help TACIS delegate some of the
administration of its funds (although maintaining a controlling say in the final
decision-making). As well as a continuation of the Bistro (3niECU budget for
125 Bulletin of the European Union, European Commission., no. 4, 1994, p. 62.126 EU-CIS - Relations with the Countries of the Commonwealth of Independent States (ex-
USSR), by the European Commission's DG X, June 1994. p. 6.
127 From the CD-ROM network NISSWAJS - GenNetlnfo: NISS BB Section: T2G91: accessed.
5 September 1994.
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1994), TEMPUS. EES, MECURE and Democracy Fund programmes which all
increased de-centralization of TACIS decision-making, TACIS also incresed its
level of cooperation with the Business Communication Centres established in
many cities in the CIS to support SMEs, as well as with the ACE (Action for
Cooperation in Economics) Programme, to promote academic research and policy
analysis in this field. Also jointly with PHARE, TACIS will fund the LIEN
Programme (4mECU in 1994), which offers co-financing with NGOs working to
supprto particularly deprived comniunitites. The European Communities'
Delegation in Moscow was given additional responsibilities in 1994, including the
preparation of terms of references for a number of projects in each sector, and the
management of consultants responsible for the implementation of programmes in
the regions. The EU also had plans to open technical offices (sometimes called
information offices) to support the preparation and implementation of TACIS
projects, which would work jointly with the CUs but would report directly to
Brussels. These centres can haip the EU achieve another new goal - to administer
some programmes directly through regions and municipalities, 'thus establishing a
channel to strengthen reform and sustainable development at local or regional
level'. 128 At the request of the European Parliament, the EU has revised tender
documents for TACIS projects to underline that preferential treatment will be
given to proposals which foresee sub-contracting to local companies. Another
aspect of TACIS which gives more influence to Russians is the increased
influence granted to local counterparts in the tendering procedures to select the
experts which will operate given projects. All these modifications should
improve the speed with which TACIS projects are realized, and reduce the
amount of work which has to be contracted out at costs far higher than that of the
staff managing the above programmes, and thus reducing the potential for this
issue to keep darkeing Russians' views on the desirability of EU assistance.
128 European Commission. TA C/S Annual Report 1994, Brussels, 18/07/95, COM(95) 349 final,
pp. 8-13, 30-34, 45-47.
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Arguably the most hopeful development of 1994 was the introduction by
TACIS of a joint venture programme for the Russian Federation, foliwoing the
success of the JOPP (Joint Venture Opportunities Phare Programme) run by
PHARE. Unfortunately, contrarily to JOPP, the TACIS initiative will not offer
equity funding, although it states that if the technical assistance aspect of this
programme is sufficiently successful, it could expand to offer capital. This type
of funding for those TACIS projects which truly would benefit from capital
injections is exaclty what the EU must secure, in order to make much better use of
the veiy large amounts being used already on consultancy. It is very encouraging
that such fmancing may soon be available.
There has even been some improvement to what is perhaps TACIS worst
fault, and its least forgivable one - the failure to facilitate access to the results of
completed projects. The progress and final reports of all TACIS projects should
be made as widely available as possible if the effect of TACIS projects is to be
maximized. These reports could not only help Russians who have not had the
chance to participatein TACIS projects, but could also make future TACIS
projects in similar fields avoid the many pitfalls that earlier projects fell into. In
1994, TACIS was apparently to start giving copies of these reports to the Russian
counterpart, but apparently had no intention of making them available to the
general public of either Russia or the EU. At the moment, to obtain such reports,
special permission from the Commission and from the consultancy company
involved is normally needed. This seems to be another case of putting the
interests of EU consultants before those of Russian reforms. There is also no
mechanism to encourage consultants about to embark on a project to become
familiar with the reports of previous projects with similar aspects. Solving this
problem could be relatively cheap, and bring enormous returns not only in terms
of raising the efficiency of TACIS projects, but also of increasing the number of
Russian intrepreneurs and policy-makers who are aware of the EU's work and
benefitting from it. It is to be hoped that the distribution of these reports to the
Russian counterpart is the first step in the more widespread dissemination of this
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information, and that the TACIS technical centres now being planned will be used
to achieve this goal.
The direction that TACIS will take in the future is beginning to be outlined. The
efforts to reduce the bureaucratic work and delays in the Commission are likely to
continue, both by contracting out the management of certain sectors, so that more
and smaller projects can be handled, and by reducing the resources and time spent
on Indicative Programmes. The degree to which the Coordination Unit and the
Delegation in Moscow will be used to further simplify and speed up the
management of TACIS may fmally also be increasing. The likelihood of EU
projects having much greater funding, and even being able to supply large scale
equipment or finance, continues to be slight. There have been calls by the
Parliament, for example in November 1992, to greatly increase the funding for
TACIS, and even to consider an 'aid in place of arms' programme, replacing
redundant arms orders in the West with commissions to produce equipment to
hasten and facilitate conversion in the FSU. 129 Following an assessment of
Western aid to the CIS, a similar Parliamentary Resolution was passed in April
1994, coming to the conclusion that the level of Western aid overall was
insufficient. 130
 There have also been repeated calls by the Parliament and its
Committee for External Relations with the CIS to have access to European
Investment Bank (EIB) credits, which could be used to provide capital for
projects supporting TACIS aims. It seems that access to EIB funds by the CIS
was supported by the Commission, but opposed by the Council, and by France
and the Mediterranean states in particular.' 31 There is no reason to believe that
the governments of the Member States are becoming any more willing to vastly
increase the EU's aid budget for the FSU, nor grant a credit facility. On the other
hand, as elucidated in the following section, there is a growing tendency to
129 'Resolution EP B3-1261/92, on relations with the CIS', The Official Journal of the European
Communities, no. C 284, 2 November 1992.
130 Bulletin of the European Union, European Conunission, no. 4, 1994, p. 62.
131 For example, EP Doc. A3-0073/93, Motion for a Resolution, passed by the Conunittee for
External Economic Relations, 24 Februaiy 1993, PP. 6-11.
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initiate joint projects with those organizations which can supply capital, whilst the
EU finances the know-how to optimize its use. This is a very positive
development which is also likely to continue. The need for more resources to be
spent on maximizing the effect of TACIS funding also seems to have been
accepted, as indicated by the 1OmECU segment of the TACIS' 1994
Multidisciplinary Programme, dedicated to fact-fmding missions, feasibility
studies, implementation, as well as monitoring and evaluation.'32
The European Community's Technical Assistance programmes have been
covered in so much detail because they are the most complex, and a unique part
of the EC's assistance. TACIS has changed for the better in many ways, yet still
deserves much of the criticism targetted at it for being slow, wasteful and its
results badly disseminated. There have also been too few resources available to
ensure optimal use of available funds. Nevertheless, TACIS remains by far the
largest source of grant aid to the CIS. A vast number of projects have already
been implemented, at little cost to the Russian side, and with benefits which are in
many cases indisputable. It is natural that those projects which have not run
smoothly have attracted most attention. The EU has learnt much from its
mistakes. One of the most positive changes has been to sub-contract the
management of smaller projects, thus allowing smaller organizations to benefit
from EU aid, and permitting these projects to be realized sooner. Reducing the
amount of administrative work involved by using multi-year programmes has also
been vveiy effective. It should also be remembered that by its very nature,
technical assistance aims at changes in the very long term, with few tangible
results at first. Yet although Michael Emerson refers to the TACIS experts as 'an
army spreading its way across Russia', 133
 the amounts being invested so far still
make the EU's technical assistance more comparable to pockets of resistance,
often well-trained, but deprived of adequate weaponry to win a clear victory over
economic and political decay.
132 Bulletin of the European Union, European Commission.. no. 3. 1994, p. 71.
133 Interview with Michael Emerson, op. cit.
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4.4 Assistance from Other Multilateral Organizations in Relation to that of
the EU
The Coordination of Western Assistance
The enormity of the problems to be solved through assistance precludes the
possibility of any one organization successfully attempting to act by itself. In
theory, at least since 1992, international and inter-institutional coordination of
assistance has been a priority. The EC played an important role in the first
international conference of assistance donors to the FSU in Washington in
January 1992, and it sponsored the follow-up conference in Lisbon in May of that
year; it was also a leading figure in the next conference of that series in Tokyo,
October 1992. At the Tokyo meeting, it was announced that the IBRD would
convene, with the participation of major donors, a consultative group on technical
assistance and other matters in support of structural reform, and that Russia was
ready to provide secretariat services for this group through the RAICD. The
European Commission announced that it intended to work closely with the IBRD
on the preparation of Countiy Consultative Group (CCG) meetings, and to ensure
that full use was made of EC experience and expertise. 134 Several more informal
meetings between the EC and IFIs have been held, some hosted by the
Commission in Brussels, and some taking place amongst Moscow
representatives.' 35
 Links have also been established between the EC and the
OECD to establish a joint database.
Although bilateral aid corresponds to the greatest share of credits being
offered to Russia and the other republics, coordination even among the EU
134 TA CIS Annual Report from the Co,nmission - 1991 and 1992. Commission of the
European Conununities Document. COM (93)362 final. Brussels. 28 July 1993. p. 38.
135 Ibid.. and TACIS 1993 - Action Programme - Russian Federation. op. cit.. p. 2.
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Member States has been minimal. Even with the Twelves bilateral technical
assistance projects. the Commission has in general experienced some difficulty'
in obtaining information on actions carried out to date with the CIS, although this
information should be supplied according to Council Regulation 2157/91. 136
 As
far as communication between the EC/EU and the IFIs is concerned, although it
has clearly imporved between decision-makers, little coordinated information has
been filtering through to potential consultants or business partners. The Moscow
CU's manager of information technology complained that the OECD's database
in Paris was very incomplete, and although the CU's database was apparently the
most comprehensive in Moscow in early 1993, the poor information-sharing with
bilateral aid programmes has already been noted.
The Russian government's solution to the aid collaboration problem was to
establish the Russian Agency for International Coordination and Development, by
Presidential decree in August 1992. The RAICD was to take over from the
Ministry of Finance's Committee on Foreign Investment, the Commission on
Technical Cooperation with the World Bank, and the Russian Government's
Commission on International Humanitarian and Technical Assistance, as well as
the more recent Russian Association of International Cooperation. The
previously existing organizations had never had a significant impact. None of the
documentation of Western assistance donors, nor any conversations with their
representatives, have revealed any sign of these bodies having proved helpful.
The EC provided advisors to assist the Russian government in establishing
this body, as it coincided with the strong desire to improve coordination which
both the Commission and the Parliament had expressed regularly in 1992. The
EC, the IMF, the IBRD, the British Know-How Fund and others have their own
representatives at the RAICD.' 3 Another important role which could be played
by the RAJCD, apart from assistance coordination, is to show the Russian public
that Russia has some influence over the aid-granting organizations. Support was
136 TACIS - Annual Report from the Commission - 1991 and 1992. op. cit.. p. 39.
137 Interview with Michael Emerson. op. cit.
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also shown by the IBRD. for example through the joint publication quoted in this
chapter. arid through discussions in 1993 of the possibility of World Bank
financial support for the Agency.'38
Nevertheless, some of the representatives of multilateral agencies had
dismissed the RAICD as nothing more than a bureaucratic organ, like its
predecessors. A significant factor which could hinder the activity of the Agency
is the continuing disorder between the various seats of Russian power and
management, and the vested interests involved. The RAICD admitted itself that it
remained unclear whether it would 'be able to overcome the historical tendency
for ministries to communicate only vertically', or manage to 'coordinate priorities
among sectoral ministries that have a long-standing tradition of operating as self-
contained entities'. 139
 Another worry was that the Agency's mandate was too
wide for it to concentrate adequately on any one aspect.' 4° The CU reported in
early 1993 that the RAICD did not have a computerized data system yet, 141
 and
the Agency itself reported that its capacity, 'particularly in information
management, remains rudimentary'.' 42 By the end of 1994 it seemed that all
these concerns had been justified. The RAICD has shown no ability to effectively
coordinate Western aid, or even to concentrate on any one area and provide
detailed or useful guidance. At best it can be seen as a watch-dog, through which
Russian criticism of certain aspects of Western assistance is channelled. This
failure of the RAICD to coordinate Western assistance donors reinforces the
importance of the EU's role in this very important and as yet undervalued field of
activity.
138 IBRD and RAICD. Structural Reform in the Russian Federation. Progress, Prospects, and
Priorities for External Support. 20 April 1993. p. 76.
139 IBRD and RAICD. op. cit.. p. 77.
140 Interview with Kovriakov, op. cit.
141 Interview with L. Cianforlini, responsible for inforinanon management at the CU. 26 March
1993.
142 IBRD and RAICD. op. cit.. p. 77.
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The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World
Bank
The closest relationship the EU has with an 1Ff is with the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD). The EBRD is closely linked to the
European Community. in origin as well as in public perception. as its concept was
mooted by François Mitterrand in October 1989, during his presidency of the EC.
Its realisation occurred with extraordinary speed for an 1Ff, as already in May
1990 an agreement to form the Bank was signed by its members, and by April
1991 the EBRD was launched in London. It was the first 1Ff to deal specifically
with Central and Eastern Europe, as well as creating a precedent in according fill
membership to the Soviet Union. Another particularity of the EBRD is that the
Bank's mandate specifies the promotion of democratic institutions and human
rights in the countries of operation as criteria for lending, as well as stating that
the Bank shall be committed to promoting environmentally sound and sustainable
development 43 All project proposals include a section on the environmental
implications of the project, and the terms of lending include ecological controls
where appropriate. The Americans hold the largest single stake in the bank, their
holding by June 1992 amounting to 10%, but the EC member states, together
with the EC's own contribution of 3% and the Effi's share of the same size,
jointly hold a controlling share of 56% of the EBRD's capital.' 44
 Thus the
ECTEU and its member states have the largest share of responsibility in making
this organization work efficiently to support reforms in Russia and the rest of the
former Eastern Bloc.
The Bank has clear principles guiding it in its choice of projects;
development of the private sector; encouraging foreign investment; strengthening
financial institutions; creating a modern infrastructure; improving the
143 Organisation, European Bank of Reconstruction and Development. London. March 1992. p.
2.
144 Karolv Okolicsanvi. 'The EBRD's First Year'. RFE'RL Research Report, vol. 1, no. 23. 5
June 1992. p. 41.
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environment, and promoting small and medium-size industry. At the EBRD's
first annual meeting in April 1992, Attali proposed a restructuring facility
containing a combination of soft loans (at a minimal or zero interest rate) and
high-risk equity, to support desperately-needed restructuring of the Russian
nuclear power industry and the conversion of its military-industrial sector. The
USA, Germany, Japan and the UK all strongly opposed the soft-loan proposal,
however, and it was therefore not implemented.' 45
 Yet again, a set-back for those
hoping to support TACIS projects with real money to put their new knowledge
into profitable practice.
Cardinal changes took place in the EBRD in 1993 following a public
uproar over the large amounts spent by Attali on the new London headquarters of
the Bank and on private jet travel. Another strong point of criticism was the fact
that the EBRD's rate of project implementation made the EC look efficient in
comparison; the Bank had only disbursed 200mECU in the whole of Eastern
Europe and the FSU by March 1993, less than it had spent on setting itself up.'46
As a result, Attali was forced to resign, and he was eventually replaced by the
former head of the French Central Bank, Jacques de Larosière.
The new President's major alteration was to abandon the division between
merchant and development banking, recognizing that the separation between
private and public sectors in the countries concerned was to a large extent
artificial. Overall management of individual countries was to be in the hands of
one person, unlike before when there was often confusion on the part of
beneficiaries as to who should be addressed. 147
 The Bank nevertheless intended
to retain certain cross-border industrial teams covering sectors such as energy and
telecommunications. Jacques de Larosière also appeared determined to cut
operating costs, for example with the dissolution of the political department and
145 i(arolv Okolicsanvi. op. cit.. p. 45. and Perdita Fraser. 1992. op. cit.. p. 37.
146 The Guardian. 14 April 1993.
147 Europe —The Magazine of the European Union. (published in Washington). no. 334. March
1994. p. 16.
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of the President's cabinet.' 4 In other words. the EBRD was going through very
similar restructuring as TACIS, after similar criticisms.
Like TACIS, the EBRD has progressively included more projects which
were designed to manage sub-projects of much smaller scale: this was particularly
needed in the case of the European Bank, as its mimmuin level of funding for a
project is 5mECU. The first such project was for the RPFB, which also involved
TACIS, as discussed below. Another project of this type was a $7.5m
(6.2mECU) co-fmancing line to the International Moscow Bank (60% owned by
Westerners) to provide currency to enterprises in Russia. A more recent action is
the 'Russian Enterprise Support Project', which is also affirmation of the high
level of cooperation with the World Bank. This project offers $300m
(246.8mECU - two thirds from the IBRD, one third from the EBRD) to the
Russian Ministty of Finance, which will in turn lend the capital to the twenty to
thirty participating commercial banks. The project aims to acclimatize banks to
offering term fmancing for capital investments and permanent working capital; it
was to be supervised with technical assistance from the IBRD's Financial
Institutions Development Project.'49
The EBRD's closest partner, not surprisingly considering the strong
historical link and the direct shareholding involvement, is the EU. Cooperation
between these two institutions was evident already in 1992, when the EBRD's
determination to co-finance projects became apparent. The Bank worked together
with the EC on projects to establish a wholesale food market in Moscow, as well
as in the establishment of International Schools for Business in St Petersburg and
50 Other such know-how projects have been assisting Moscow with its
privatization programme, conducting a survey on pricing policy and food
distribution, and a study of agricultural policy reform needs (also involving the
IBRD, the IMF and the OECD), which was completed in March 1992. The
148 The Guardian. 9 November 1993.
149 .5aff Appraisal Report. Russian Federation Enterprise Support Project'. IBRD. report no.
12953. 1 June 1994.
150 Evropa. July/August 1992. and Sector Financial Services (1991). Sub-programme:
Commercial Banks, European Commission document, no date.
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EBRD also financed a technical assistance programme in aid of privatization with
the IBRD, providing 35.4mECU and 72.SmECU respectively, for advisory
support and training for the administrators of the denationalization programme.'51
European Community technical assistance and EBRD equity financing
were first combined for the establishment of the Russian Project Finance Bank.
The EC's contribution was to be 6.7mECU, whilst that of the EBRD 2.2mECU.
Whilst TACIS provided interim managers, management training, and equipment,
the EBR1) put forward equity, amounting to 35% of the RPFB's shares, to
provide extra stability. This institution was designed at first to identify projects
which should be financed by multilateral agencies and banks (as well as domestic
capital), and gradually acquire the capital to take part in the financing itself. By
May 1993, the RPFB was functioning, and had forty projects under
examination.'52
Joint projects similar to the RPFB were also being set up on a regional
basis - the Regional Venture Funds. The first such Regional Venture Fund (RVF)
to be operational was the pilot Fund in Smolensk, with $ 12m (9.9mECU) of
EBRD venture capital and $Sm (6.6mECIJ) provided by TACIS for the
management of the Fund, as well as for pre-investment and post-investment
consultancy.' 53
 The first of the full-scale RVFs to be approved was for the Urals
(URVF). The LTRVF was to be the basis for the nine remaining RVFs, with an
initial 26mECU ($30m) in venture capital, and a TACIS contribution over the ten
years of the project of I7mECU ($20m). The RVFs target medium size
companies (with no more than 5,000 employees), on projects of between
260,000ECU and 2.6mECU.' 54 Inmost of the RVFs. the EBRD has insisted on a
10% extra contribution of investment capital from the sub-contractors managing
151 'Russian Federation. Pnvatisation Loan'. EBRD project proposal. 1992
152 'Russian Federation. Russian Project Finance Bank'. EBRD project proposal. 1992: Evropa.
September/October. 1992: Europe, 24 May 1993.
153 BEE, 18 July 1994. p. 12: a much larger EBRD investment fund was being negotiated in
1994, worth 272mECU. to provide funding for the restructuring of newly privatized small and medium
enteiprises. according to the World Aid Section database. and 'Banking in Russia'. a lecture given by
Martin McCauley at the School of Slavonic and East European Studies. 1 Mareh 1994.
154 
'Russian Federation. Urals Regional Venture Fund', EBRD project proposal. 1994.
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the Fund. e.g. Flemin gs has added $3m to the (JRVF. bringing the total capital to
be invested by this Fund up to $3 3m. Not all of the RVFs' management costs are
covered by TACIS; the majority of the RVFs will be run at the expense of
bilateral funding, for example the Far East RVF being managed on Japanese
money. These Funds work closely with the Business Support Centres which have
been established by lAdS, as well as in support with the EU-backed Russian
Privatization Centre. The establishment and running of the Regional Venture
Funds shows that TACIS' experience can sometimes be used to good effect. Like
TACIS learced to do, the EBRD used the RVFs to concentrate their efforts on
certain regions, and helped reduce the bureaucratic back-log by leaving most of
the project analysis to their sub-contractors, as well as to independent consultants.
As with TACIS, there is much room for improvement here as well, as in practice
projects have been delayed by the need for approval from the EBRD's
overworked legal department, and by the lengthy approval procedure involving
both the EBRD and the European Commission for the obligatory due diligences
carried out by Western consultancy companies. Despite these problems, the
RVFs are a good example of how the EU and the EBRD can improve each other's
effectiveness by working together, and of a partial solution to the problem of
TACIS know-how remaining unused due to the lack of capital.
Joint action between the World Bank and the EU, in terms of projects. has so far
been very limited. TACIS 1991 included one project to establish accounting
standards through the Central Bank of Russia (236,000ECU) which was co-
financed by the IBRD. Admittedly, both sides had agreed on a general
framework for collaboration by early 1993, and had identified specific areas for
closer cooperation.' 55
 The joint efforts were to be on overal strategy, exchange of
project information and draft terms of reference, joint participation in information
missions and use of TACIS funds to support the IBRD's loan preparation
155 IBRD and RAICD. op. cit.. p. 79.
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 The largest EU contribution to a joint project so far was the
5.5mECU share towards the Financial Institutions Development Project. the
capital for which was being put forward by the [BRD and the EBRD (total
investment of $300m).
It has become clear, however, that the approach of the World Bank is often
very different from that of the EU, even when trying to resolve the same problem.
The most acute discord is probably in the sphere of social protection. The World
Bank's perspective on the issue is naturally a reflection of the IMF's monetarist
slant. An IBRD report on social protection stresses that:
the system of social protection must operate within the fiscal
constraints imposed by the collapse of economic activity and the
need to reduce the budget deficit. [...] Furthermore, social
protection policies must support the development of an efficient
labour market in Russia.'57
The World Bank emphasized that under the existing system, many poor received
no benefits, and that aid programmes differed greatly from enterprise to enterprise
and oblast to oblast. It believed that a mechanism would be needed to obtain
funding from elsewhere for those mono-enterprise towns which will become
bankrupt. The report argued that increases in unemployment need not be
considered disastrous. Taking a social security rate 'just above minimum
subsistence', it estimated that every additional one percent of unemployment
would increase expenditure on unemployment benefits by less than 0.2% of GDP.
What should aimed for, it suggested, was an enforceable 'austere but realistic
poverty line'.'58
In the 1993 Action Programme for Russia, the slant was very different.
Not that the EU opposes change; the Programme acknowledges that 'new
structures, with accompanying managerial and financial systems, are required to
take the place of the former social protection systems based on guaranteed
156 European Commission, TA C'ISAnnual Report 1994, op. Cit.. p. 13.
157 'Russia. Social Protection During Transition and Beyond'. IBRD report no. 11748-RU. 2
February
 994 p. i.
Ibid., pp. vii-xvii.
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employment and the provision of extensive services by state enterprises', and
further that •there is a need for a radically revised well-functioning, Federal
social protection system directed towards providing a safety net for the most
vulnerable in society'; the EC also committed itself to 'a major project to assist
the main ministries responsible for social protection in the defming of a new
overall system of social	 ti159
Nevertheless, the emphasis of the TACIS actions were to be 'on the
optimal use of existing sources of livelihood and on existing community,
enterprise and social structures'. The programme expressed the need to explore
possible alternatives of maintaining the existing enterprise sector or voluntary
management, this being particularly acute in respect of housing and kindergartens,
which involve major assets and recurrent expenditures. hidden to a large extent by
subsidies and accounting systems based on them being considered as enterprise
production costs.'6°
In many ways, this approach appears to reflect a greater realism about the
existing situation. Although the maintenance of at least a basic level of social
protection by the federal authorities is probably desirable, the fact is that by 1993
the Government had in large measure devolved responsibility for the
administration of health, educational and social services and institutions to oblast'
or even district level authorities. Although avoidance of unemployment is also a
goal of the World Bank, the TACIS perspective shows a greater concern for the
fact that the very large number of threatened mono-enterprise towns, in
conjunction with the very poorly developed and expensive housing market in
Russia, mean that much of the unemployment created by reforms will be very
difficult to reabsorb into the workforce. 16' With social security needs increasing
whilst fiscal revenue decreases, and with much of state property (such as housing)
in very poor conditions, the municipalities are often reluctant to accept
159 TACIS 1993 - Action Programme - Russian Federation. op. cit.. pp. 6 and 41.
160 Ibid.. p. 39.
161 AlanSmith.1993.op.cit..p.221.
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responsibility, not least because of a lack of finance, structures, or trained staff to
manage these resources.
On the other hand, state enterprises, having lraditionally been in control of
many aspects of social security, labour market management, vocational training,
housing, as well as child and health care, are not always willing to abandon this
interaction with workers. The enterprises continue to play a vital role in social
protection not simply because the status quo has not had a chance to be altered,
but also because enterprises have been offered tax benefits in exchange for
continued responsibility over social security, for a transitional period of three
years. Thus 'the ownership and control of social resources and community
facilities [...] is a matter of choice, and one which appears likely to be determined
by the availability of the fmancial means to continue their operation under
arrangements for tax exemptions in lieu of transfer'. The EC paper also notes that
particularly in single industry towns, links between enterprise management and
municipal authorities are very close; this offers further potential for joint
management of social protection. According to the EC mission which visited
Moscow, the Urals and Western Siberia in 1993, 'it seems clear that substantial
investment is being made by viable industries for a local and enterprise based
system of social resource management, including measures to counter the threat
of unemployment'.'62
Although social protection is an extreme example of policy divergence
between the EU and the IBRD, it nonetheless reflects the very different priorities
of both sides. Despite these different approaches, the EU nonetheless intended to
study the problem of social security together with the World Bank, without
committing itself to the same conclusions.
162 Draft TACIS human resources policy programme. August 1993. P. 21.
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4.5 Conc!usions
The West European approach to assistance to Russia has undeniably seen a
complete turn around since the Cold War. From a position where trade with the
Soviet Bloc was kept to a minimum and threats of embargo ever-present,
gradually support for closer economic interaction became the norm. With the
revolutionary reforms enacted by Gorbachev, in total contrast to the prevailing
previous attitude, low levels of trade or Western investment came to be seen as a
threat to Western interests. It was increasingly realized that the success of pro-
democracy and free market reforms might depend on Western aid in restructuring
the Russian economy, and attracting foreign partners. From the negative
statecraft of trade restrictions used before perestroika. the EC and its allies shifted
to preferential trade treatment, grants, credits and technical assistance. The
abandonment of large scale trade sanctions and restrictions has been of obvious
benefit to the improvement in relations and the increase in interdependence
between the EU and Russia, as also explained in the last chapter.
This increased willingness to risk commercial interdependence with
Moscow was much greater, on the whole, in Western Europe than the United
States during the Cold War. This situation has continued to be the case, with
assistance from the EC/EU being granted in larger quantities and with less
conditions than that of the USA, and this has not gone unnoticed in Russia.
Nevertheless, old habits die hard, and EC/EU assistance has also remained
overly self-helping and conditional. Any large assistance project must, naturally,
be expected to be in the donor's interest. By having a short-term view of aid
benefits, however, and tying grants to highly paid Western consultants or credits
to often inappropriate Western commodities, the effect may in fact be to the
donor's detriment. With the amounts of aid as small as they are, in comparison to
the problems they face, everything should be done to ensure their effect is
optimal; this means having less selfish and short-sighted guidelines on how the
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funding may be spent. It should also be remembered that Russias transition
problems are unique, and that there are no proven solutions to her particular
circumstances; the condescension of decision-makers in aid granting bodies has
no justification. Even an IMF report on the Soviet economy concluded that;
Ideally, a path of restoration of graduated reform could be laid out
which would minimise economic disturbance and lead to an early
harvesting of the fruits of increased economic efficiency. But we
know of no such path, the more particularly given the difficult
starting conditions.'63
This does not mean, however, that assistance should be handed to Russia with no
strings attached at all; Western supervision and auditing will in any case remain a
necessity. What is needed is an approach to assistance which shares experience,
responsibility and fees paid between Western and Russian specialists. with more
equality and more frequency than has been occuring so far. Such an approach
would help reduce some of the antagonism generated by the enormous difference
between the salaries of EU-paid consultants, and of those they are tiying to help.
It would also help reduce the degree of cynicism towards Western consultants
which has developed, and therefore reduce further the impact of some TACIS
projects.
Although it is clear that conditions are very different from what they were
when the Marshall Plan was carried out, and that such levels of help in todays
prices are simply not realistic, it is nevertheless clear that the overall amounts of
aid being offered to Russia should increase, and that the EU needs to play a
leading role if this to occur. There must be a continuation in the trend started in
1993-94, slowly appreciating that aid must be granted in order to enable market
reforms to fully take place, and not as an eventual reward. This realization should
be translated into much more significant amounts of aid. Amounts approaching
$20-3Obn p.a., considered in the Grand Bargain, or by IMF and IBRD studies,
should be the ultimate aim. Most importantly, false generosity in the form of
163 IMF report. op. cit.. p. 2.
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recycled aid 'packages'. such as the $24bn in 1992 or the $43bn in 1993. should
be avoided at all costs, lest the feeling of frustration and betrayal in Russia grow
yet further, becoming a significant barrier in itself to the success of reforms.
There a strong need for more action and less talk and study.
The EC's first direct assistance to the USSR. through food aid donations
and credits for the purchase of foods and medicines was fairly well targetted, but
attracted much criticism from Russians who found such aid demeaning or short-
sighted. It was right that a shift occured thereafter in the EC's aid policy, aiming
instead to facilitate self-help though advice and teaching. It is unfortunate,
however, that ECIEU credits did not continue to be available, to further enable
those projects which needed more than a different attitude and management
approach to implement the recommendations made by TACIS consultants.
TACIS is by far the ECIEU's greatest assistance coniribution to Russia,
and the largest know-how transfer programme offered to Russia. In the areas
which it has concentrated on, TACIS is well known, and has offered the
possibility to many influential people both to learn more efficient management or
production methods, but also to see for themselves how their counterparts work in
Western Europe. Of course, whilst earning the praise of many, TACIS has also
been the target of complaints from many sources. TACIS' main weaknesses, as
described in the first draft of this thesis, were largely confirmed by monitoring
and evaluation missions carried out in 1994, which singled out the following
changes as being necessary: decentralization; a regional approach; the
introduction of new techniques; improved coordination with other donors;
familiarizing experts with the new environment within which they are going to
work; closer coordination with the CIS at an early stage. It also foresaw most of
the recommendations made by a 1994 report prepared by the European Parliament
assessing western aid to the CIS, in which the following aspects of TACIS were
criticized: "the reliance on short-term experts, lack of transparency, heavy
procedures, concern for specific issues including democracy, women,
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environment, nuclear safety and establishing partnerships with organizations in
the EU."
Nevertheless, the size of TACIS commitments to Russia speaks for itself as
an indicator of success. TACIS has also shown a healthy ability to learn,
eventually, from many of its worst mistakes. Already in 1993, the bureaucratic
workload was reduced by developing three-year programmes. and the effect of
EU assistance was concentrated into a few geographical areas. The positive
effect of geographical concentration can be confirmed by the author's work in the
Urals, where most managers of large enterprises have been contacted by the
TACIS Enterprise Support Centre, leaving a generally favourable impression. In
1994, TACIS improved the preparation of the experts it sends out into the field, in
strengthened the CU and its relations with it, it gave Russian counterparts a
greater say in the choice of experts chosen to carry out projects, and increased the
likelihood of Russian companies being sub-contracted to TACIS projects. Very
importantly, the EU declared that the reliance on short-term experts would be
reduce, and that approval procedures would be streamlined. A further
decentralization occured in decision-making from the Commission to the
Delegation in Moscow, as well as through channelling funds through the
Democracy Fund, Tempus, LIEN, ACE, EES, MERCURE, and support for
investment by the EBRD, the IBRD, and member states' bilateral aid
programmes. The joint investment with IFIs and member states' programmes
such as the British Know-How Fund is wise not only because if the increased
likelihood of finding investment for TACIS projects which need the capital, but
also to increase the coordinating role of the EU over assistance to Russia from
arond the world, a task which no other organization is carrying out satisfactorily.
Although these improvements or new goals do not solve the important
problems of difficulty of access to the information obtained from TACIS projects,
and of the lack of capital available to allow enterprises advised by TACIS to
grow, they nevertheless make it more likely that TACIS will earn the EU much
164 European Commission. TACJSAnnuaI Report 1994, op. cit.. pp. 9 & 13.
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more praise. and much less criticism, than has been the case so far. The
information and the contacts made through the TACIS programme. and the
coordinating role which the EU is increasingly inheriting, make it possible for
Brussels, if it can finally fmd the political will to do so, to lead a still badly
needed international increase in the amounts of aid offered to Russia, now that the
help granted so far has increased Russia's capability to efficiently absorb and put
to good use larger amounts of capital. This in itself is a great achievement.
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Table 4.1
TACIS Minimum Project Cycle Timeframe
1. Preparation for programming missions
2. Programming, including submissions to Member States
3. Sector/Countiy programme identification
4. Preparation of Financing Proposals
5. Translation of Financing Proposals
6. Submission to Member States; evaluation
7. Approval by Member States, then by Commisssion
8. Signing of Financing Memorandum
9. Preparation of tender documents (including TOR)
10. Approval of TOR by recipient
11. Processing and dispatch of tender documents
12. Tendering period
13. Tender evaluation
14. Contract negotiations, award, signing
15. Mobilization of experts
Total, for projects requiring tenders:
6 weeks
8 weeks
6 weeks
6 weeks
3 weeks
3 weeks
3 weeks
2 weeks
4 weeks
6 weeks
2 weeks
6 weeks
3 weeks
2 weeks
6 weeks
66 weeks
Total, for projects not requiring tenders: 49 weeks
[bold = stages not needed for projects under 300,000ECU]
Based on table in TACIS - Annual Report from the Commission - 1991 and
1992, Commission of the European Communities Document, COM(93)362 final,
Brussels, 28 July 1993, p. 15.
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Conclusions
The change in the nature of relations between Russia and the European Union in
the last decade can be described without any exaggeration as both monumental
and fundamental. Although the recent debate on Russia's role in Europe may be
seen as a continuation of the 'Great Debate' between Westernizers and
Slavophiles, both the issues being addressed and the very approach to the debate
have shown unprecedented similarity with the West.
The shift back towards closer relations with Western Europe in the last
quarter of this century is all the more remarkable when compared to previously
high levels of animosity and mistrust not only towards the main EC member
states, but also considering the fears concerning the perceived role of the USA in
Western Europe. Nonetheless, the late 1980s saw closer liaison with Brussels
becoming one of Moscow's main priorities. Greater political interaction began to
be sought, both to enable greater economic integration with the West, and to gain
support from a visionary 'return' to Europe. In a very short time, all the previous
deadlocks to agreement with the EC from the Soviet side were abandoned. Such
was the pro-European slant of Gorbachev's government that it was willing to
largely accept Brussels' ternis.
This desire to be more closely integrated with Western Europe was by no
means simply a temporary pipe dream of peace and cooperation throughout the
European continent; it was a pragmatic attempt to use demilitarization and closer
commercial interaction with the West to save the USSR's withering economy.
This is a factor which no wave of populist nationalism will be able to ignore. The
loss of the East European buffer zone; the established precedents of freedom of
expression and of embryonic democracy; the increasing presence of modern
communications equipment linking Russia to the rest of the world; the inevitable
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interdependence of modern economies - all these factors and more mean that
Russia can no longer realistically be isolated from Europe.
The fact that Russia no longer wants to be isolated in security terms either
is also of potential importance to relations with the EU. The definition of
'security' has broadened, to include risks such as mass migration and
environmental disasters; for both of these security challenges, Russia has been
receiving EU assistance through TACIS. Russia is likely to look to the EU for
support in establishing a new European security structure, whether based on the
OSCE or a new organization, as an antidote to a NATO-based structure.
Admittedly, a very great resentment and frustration towards the West has
also emerged, and disillusionment with Europe in particular is strongly felt. The
so-called 'Zhirinovskii factor' represents a pendulum movement, swinging back
towards a tendency for increasingly pro-Slavophile policies. This discontent is
most extreme in the nationalist press, but it has come to be reflected, more
moderately, in government policy also. Frustration has been expressed not only
about the failure to fully open up Western markets to Russian exports, but also
about the lack of progress in establishing a European security structure acceptable
to all. Linked to this bone of contention is the feeling that Russia is being
humiliated and exploited by the international community, rather than effectively
helped yet respected as an equal.
Whilst the complaining and resentment continues, however, in the pages of
populist news-sheets, in the statements of army representatives and born-again
Communists, the Russian government has not abolished the laws which allow EU
and other Western business people to trade with Russia and to invest in its future.
Those who wield economic power, and therefore usually political influence also,
are not overly vociferous in Russia, as too much attention can be unhealthy.
However, if they were to feel that their prosperity was being put at risk, they will
fmd ways to 'convince' authorities at almost any level to allow business to
proceed as usual. Even for the average person on the street, there is much to lose:
the Russian retail sector is now full of EU commodities, the Russian media are
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inundated with Western material, and travel abroad has never been so easy.
Freedom of choice, movement and of speech are not going to be given up easily
by the Russian public. The popularity of Liberal Democrats and Communists will
only continue to be significant as long as they do not seriously threaten the above
achievements of the Westernizers. In the same way, it is unlikely that the
improved political and commercial relations with the EU would be allowed to be
entirely squandered, regardless of any election results. Because of the need to
modernize its industrial base, to allow its entrepreneurs to travel and trade freely,
to satisfy the now Westernized tastes of its population, or to avoid being isolated
from the political and security developments in Europe as a whole, Russia can
simply not afford to cut itself off from the EU anymore.
After the protracted and fruitless attempts of the EC to establish relations with the
individual CMEA countries, the reversal of Soviet policy towards one of
cooperation was a great victory for Brussels' position of strength. In retrospect, it
could be argued that it was detrimental for the Community to become
acclimatized to winning its own way, with few sacrifices. Nevertheless, it
became clear that Moscow was being forced for economic reasons to compromise
with Brussels, and that the EC's upper hand was being recognized.
The first Agreement of Trade and Cooperation between the EC and the
USSR was achieved remarkably quickly, due to the political priority it received
from both sides at that time. Again, after the precedent of the original Helsinki
Conference, Brussels had been able to use relations with Russia as an instrument
to build its political prestige and diplomatic role. Yet the beginning of
negotiations for the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, just over two years
after the Trade Agreement, showed that there was much still to be achieved. The
main complaints were in the economic sphere, directed especially towards the fact
that anti-dumping measures remained particularly easy to introduce against former
Communist countries. Again, the Twelve's advantage was clear, and again, the
author would argue that it was to some extent abused.
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The signing of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement, for all the
shortcomings of this accord, is nonetheless a momentous step forward in the
pursuit of united and peaceful Europe. It is important that Russia became
classified as an 'economy in transition' in the Partnership Agreement, although it
is also telling that Russia was not granted assurances for its exports of non-ferrous
metals, nuclear fuels, textiles or satellite services. On the political front, the
biannual summit meetings which have been institutionalized are a historic step
forwards, but the most consequential part of the new Agreement could prove to be
the explicit aim of establishing a free trade area joining Russia and the EU.
However, if this free trade area becomes reality at all, it now seems likely that it
would still limit the benefits to those areas of trade where EU producers have
nothing to lose, Russia thus not having much to gain by this grand-sounding
scheme. It could very possibly become another opportunity wasted by the EU for
increased economic interdependence with Russia, unless Russia is sufficiently
encouraged through trade concessions to emulate many of the processes of
economic integration which have been achieved through the establishment of the
European Economic Area between the EU and EFTA.
The 1993-94 period brought a fall in the level of Russian cooperation with
the EU, as shown by tougher negotiations over the Partnership Agreement.
Despite this, Brussels has remained very positive and amiable towards Moscow,
even after such undemocratic events as the shelling of the White House. Events
such as these showed clearly that the Twelve are ready to forgive a great deal
before they initiate any move which would put the rapprochement with Russia at
risk.
The EU's role in promoting a European security structure which would be
agreeable to Russia is not limited to the reduction of threats to security from the
dangers of environmental degradation and economic migration. In terms of the
military aspects of European security, although the WEU will not be an
appropriate body for Russia, the EU may be able to push for other solutions.
Although NATO is the only organization which has shown the solidity to try to
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link up Eastern Europe and the FSU into one security body, and despite Russia's
acceptance of the Partnership for Peace, NATO's history and American
domination make it a very improbable vehicle for any truly active participation on
Russia's part, as it could not be treated as an equal. A more all-embracing
security structure would be more likely to be possible if based on the OSCE. The
OSCE, whilst being a well-established international organization, and already
having the right to call for the mobilization of the WEU and NATO forces, does
not have the Atlanticist domination which NATO commands. It could also easily
incorporate environmental policing, as well as continuing its human rights
monitoring. The EU could play a central role in encouraging, and then enacting,
such a restructuring of the OSCE, if only Russia itself could set a better example
by translating its theoretical support for a greater role for the OSCE into practical
support for missions in the FSU.
All in all, the ECIEU has moved quickly to offer support to the
USSR/Russia in its period of transformation, and the Partnership Agreement is a
very important achievement. The EU has shown great restraint in the face of
occasional slights from Moscow, and it is clear that maintaining friendly terms
with Russia is a very high priority. Although the possibility of building a new
security structure which included Russia receded as the Chechen crisis started,
and the protectionist forces (which affect Russia) within the EU were not
weakening, the fact remains that the EU is determined to make the political
aspects of the Partnership Agreement work, and to keep increasing trade and
investment with Russia, if not necessarily through a free trade area before the year
2000.
The further development and deepening of relations between the EU and Russia
will depend, to a large degree, on the levels of trade and investment flowing
between both sides, and the lobbying pressures thus generated. In particular, it
will also depend on what Russia has to lose by not maintaining good commercial
relations with Western Europe. It is clear that imports from the EC have
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traditionally been of particular significance to the Soviet economy, and that this
importance has grown still further in the first half of the 1990s, with the
importance of exports to Western Europe being equally essential in order to fund
the inflow of technology and consumer goods. Such was the legacy of the Soviet
command economy. The price for the lack of access to Western technology and
information, for the isolation from worldwide supply and demand, is still being
paid.
Many of the factors which prevented Soviet production from being
competitive, or which made Western involvement virtually impossible, were
successfully tackled since 1985. As a result of perestroika, EC entrepreneurs
could invest in JVs, set up wholly owned subsidiaries, and sell their goods for
hard currency, whilst traders could deal with individual companies rather than
state bodies. El'tsin pushed the reforms further, to the point where Russia could
at least begin to compete with other countries to attract investment or increase its
market share. The privatization process became accessible to EU investors, and
helped eveiyone to comprehend better the value and management of Russian
companies. The ruble could now be freely converted within Russia, meaing that
there was no longer any need to look only to export from Russia in order to obtain
worthwhile profits. Just as important is the fact that those profits, once
exchanged for hard currency, could now be repatriated, as long as this was done
by registered foreign investors. Prices had fmally started reflecting real supply
and demand, so that in a surprisingly short time the Russian workforce no longer
had to extend its lunch-breaks or shorten its working days in order to get a place
in the queue; by 1994, even inflation had become more or less manageable. This
does not mean that all the problems have been solved, and that it is now only a
matter of time before large-scale investment from the EU starts flooding into
Russia. The telecommunications, transport and tourist infrastructure are all
hindering greater trade and investment with the West, although not nearly as
much as the legal and especially fiscal chaos, both in terms of regulations and
implementation; nor are these factors as damaging as the political conflicts
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between pro- and anti-refonners, and between the centre, regions and
municipalities.
Still trade continues with the EU - in fact it keeps growing, just as
investment does. In terms of trade, already the rules of the game are becoming
more predictable, and the assistance of banks can be counted upon increasingly.
Already there is a shift of investment from Central and Eastern Europe to Russia,
and this flow of investment will increase vastly if the political and legislative
instability and unpredictability can be reduced. The relative stability of late 1993
and early 1994, for example, together with the conciliatory abilities of Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin, was all it took to obtain a considerable increase in
foreign investment in the summer of 1994. There is a large number of very
expensive projects which are just waiting for the level of political risk to settle.
Whenever this boom in investment does take place, the Russian government will
have all the more reason to avoid antagonizing the EU.
Although, in terms of influence on Russian governmental policies, Western aid
has been far from an unmitigated success, it nonetheless remains a crucial part of
relations between the EU and Russia. Although the EC has traditionally had little
statecraft influence on Russia, this situation is being reversed, partly due to
TACIS, partly because of the increasing importance of non-oil and gas exports
from Russia, and partly because of the inf'uence of the EU in bodies such as the
G7, IMF, IBRD, and GATT. The EC's technical assistance has been the largest
example of non-refundable aid, and of know-how transfer to Russia. TACIS has
provided many good examples of how to encourage long-term self-dependence
and avoid corruption, although there do remain many aspects of the EU's aid
which need to be improved. There needs to be a greater number of well-trained
EU staff to identify, manage and monitor projects, in order to limit the contracting
of prohibitively priced consultants in project management; communications and
relations should also be improved between the staff in the Moscow Coordination
Unit, the Moscow Delegation TACIS section, and the TACIS section of the
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Commission. The ability to put TACIS' know-how into practice should also be a
greater priority, both by increasing the proportion of projects' budgets which can
be used for equipment, and ultimately by providing credits as well as expertise,
possibly through the European Investment Bank. Perhaps most importantly, the
massive amount of useful information which TACIS programmes have created
should be made much more readily available, rather than allowing consultants to
repeat the same costly studies. All in all, however, despite the fact that a certain
amount of resentment has grown towards consultants who have come on TACIS
projects with much advice but no hard financial investment, and despite the other
failings mentioned above, TACIS programmes have provided good information
and good examples to a veiy large number of greatly influential people, and the
impact of these projects will continue to grow as this knowledge is passed on.
There were particularly encouraging changes recently in relations with the
Russian Coordination Unit; increased usage of TACIS' own staff and less use of
short-term consultants; better preparation of consultants before they start work on
a project; making tendering and contracting procedures easier to use; finally
operating independent monitoring and evaluation visits; and increasing
decentralization of decision-making from Brussels to Moscow. This left only two
major deficiencies to be rectified: the lack of easy accessibility to the reports
resulting from TACIS projects; and the lack of funding available to follow up on
TACIS restructuring recommendations. All in all, it appears that this relatively
successful aid programme will continue to improve, as will its effeect on the
Russian's goodwill towards the EU.
A growing number of projects now combine TACIS know-how and EBRD
or IBRD credits, which is to be welcomed. These joint projects show that there
have been improvements in the coordination of Western assistance, although the
sharing of information and experience remains inadequate, especially with regard
to companies and consultants seeking the optimal approach to new projects. Most
importantly, it is to be hoped that this cooperation between TACIS and IFIs will
allow a more large-scale financing of projects which would allow Russian
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entrepreneurs to maximize the benefits of new approaches and technologies
brought to their attention by EU-funded consultants.
Aid levels have not only been too low to have a sufficiently tangible
impact, they have also been insufficiently focused. Further investment should be
project-related, as the EBRD and IBRD have been offering, but on a much larger
scale. Some of the areas on which TACIS has been working need to be high
priority areas for overall Western aid, especially nuclear safety, which is already
being tackled in earnest, SME development funds and a programme of social
security development and support. The regional concentration achieved
successfully by TACIS should be emulated by other donor agencies.
The predicted backlash, in the case of insufficient support to prevent a
harsh fall in living standards, has now arrived. Yet the shift away from
unambiguously pro-Western policies and the disillusionment with Western
assistance does not mean that these elements no longer have a role. Many of the
reforms are likely to be irreversible, as long as total civil breakdown can be
avoided. In fact, it was always known that the seeds of individual
entrepreneurship sown by economic reforms would take a long time to truly
flourish and make a difference. Western assistance still has a vital role to play in
encouraging a continuation of the move towards a free economy and society, even
if at a pace slower than was originally hoped. It is just as well that Michael
Emerson believes the EU's contributions must be cooperative and patient, and
that 'the European Union sees itself as a steady, long-term partner of Russia, not
one quickly inclined to blow hot or cold'. 1 Although the TACIS component of
EU assistance per se cannot be expected to represent significant leverage over
Russian policy for Brussels, when taken together with the EU states' contribution
to the credits made available through the EBRD, the IMF and the IBRD, the
overall aid to Russia clearly has significant statecraft value, and will have even
more as the amount of aid increases.
Ibid., p. 14.
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Aid, of course, can only be a short-term solution. Russia needs to be allowed to
trade freely with the EU, at first perhaps even at a relative advantage, for
economic development to best ensure its progress towards democracy. The need
to integrate Russia with the rest of Europe, both economically and in terms of a
security structure, is not simply one of material and strategic interest to Western
Europe - it is a case of historical perspective and mission, something of which
the governments of present-day Europe are proving themselves in short supply.
The 1990s have provided a truly historic opportunity for the EU to lead the way
in re-unifying Europe, and recover from the ravages of the Cold War and Soviet
iniperialism. 2
 The need to build a New Europe is far too important for the EU
simply to protect those who are already a part of it. 3
 Although there is no
question of offering full EU membership to Russia, the European Union
nonetheless has the possibility, even the responsibility, to draw Russia into
mutually benefical and therefore long-lasting economic and political structures
which could help ensure a peaceful future for the New Europe.
Despite the fact that the pace of change could have been faster, or the
amount of aid and the openness of the EU market made greater, the successes of
the EU's relations with Russia outweigh the failures. The closer political
dialogue between Brussels and Moscow; the much freer travel between Russia
and EU states, especially for Russians; the possibility to avoid being locked out of
a 'Fortress Europe'; the need for EU goods, technology and investment; the
support of EU states in other multinational organizations; the aid through know-
how and credits being offered by the EU and other organizations uniting EU
member states; the freedom of expression, choice and lifestyle acquired under the
reformers - all of these factors, and many more minor ones enumerated in this
thesis, outweigh the factors which have pushed the Slavophile influence to
prominence again in the last few years. As Heinrich Vogel writes:
2 J. M. C. Rollo and Helen Wallace, 'New Patterns of Partnership',in The Community and the
Emerging European Democracies, a Joint Policy Report of six national EC foreign policy research
institutes, June 1991, P. 55.
Michaiski and Wallace, op. cit., p. 3.
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The limits to the re-embracement of the foreign policy perceptions
of the Soviet era will probably be reached when these clash with
the irreversibly commuted basics of a Russian society that is more
open in terms of its economic and information expectations, i.e.
when they come up against the interests of the new economic
elites and of society as a whole.4
The undisputable hardship brought to many under the economic reforms, the
frustration of the army and former Communists who have no lucrative
management post in a pnvatized company, the anger at the loss of pride since the
collapse of the USSR - all these issues are potent, and will always allow those
opposed to reforms to have a strong voice, but not to turn back the clock to pre-
perestroika days. The many advantages which have emerged from the sblizhenie
with the EU, and the many benefits to be obtained by Russia from a still closer
relationship, will ensure that the two sides of Europe do not become isolated from
each other again, at least for the foreseeable future.
Heinnch Vogel, 'Russland als Penner den europaischen Politik', Berichte des Bundesinstituts
für ostwissenschaftliche und internationale Studien, no. 8, 1996, p. 55.
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Postscri ptum
A great deal has happened between the end of 1994 and the second submission of
this thesis in June 1996 to significantly affect relations between Russia and the
European Union. The most well-publicized and influential event has undeniably
been the continuation of the war in Chechnia. The fact that armed intervention of
this scale occurred at all is a clear indication of the reduction in respect for West
European standards of conduct in general, and of the expectations of the EU in
particular, which had been occurring since 1992. The EU reacted relatively
harshly at first, more so than the USA, by postponing the signature of the Interim
Trade Agreement (which was to enact the commercial aspects of the Partnership
and Trade Agreement, pending the ratification of this Agreement by national
parliaments of all countries involved) until the situation improved; France also
threatened economic sanctions. At around the same time, the Council of Europe
put Russia's application on ice.
These were the only significant West European actions taken against
Russia over the intervention in Chechnia, despite much public criticism of the
maimer in which this crisis was handled by Moscow. The EU member states and
their allies were happy to hide behind the pretext of Chechnia being an 'internal
matter', in order to avoid a showdown which would have destroyed most if not all
of the positive effects of the political agreements, trade advantages and assistance
prograrmnes carried out in the last decade. In other words, despite the bloody
conflict in the Caucasus, the EU and its member states continued the 'support at
virtually any cost' policy which they had already demonstrated earlier, and which
was depicted in Chapter Two.
This determination to remain on as positive terms with Russia as possible
was shown even more clearly by the decision at the Cannes European Council
Summit in June 1995 to go ahead and sign the Interim Agreement with Russia,
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thus enacting the commercial aspects of the Partnership and Trade Agreement, as
mentioned above. This turn-around occurred, despite a continuation in hostilities,
because Russia had agreed to start negotiations with the Chechen pro-
independence forces, and because Moscow had agreed to permit an OSCE
delegation to visit Chechnia, and eventually to open a representative office to
monitor the conflict (despite many restrictions and interferences being imposed
upon this delegation, including virtual house arrest at one point). In the words of
the then British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, speaking as a member of the
European Council: 'We have for the first time made a link between the OSCE
mission and future relations with Russia'.' This development was of enormous
importance not merely as an indicator of a greater willingness within the EU to
grant a serious role to the OSCE, but most importantly Moscow's acceptance of
this condition showed that, despite pressure from anti-Western forces both in
opposition and among his own supporters, El'tsin was still ready to react to EU
pressure.
The signing of the Interim Agreement was not the only positive
development in Russia-West European relations during this period. As noted in
Chapter Two, Russia also fmally consented to sign two agreements which enacted
the most important aspects of the PEP agreement with NATO. Although this
move did not mean a greater acceptance in Moscow of the possibility of NATO
expansion into Central Europe, it was an important step towards Russia frying to
resolve objections it has to the policies of the rest of Europe and its allies from
within Western structures, rather than from without. Another historic
development over the last eighteen months, and also despite the on-going
bloodshed in Chechnia, was that the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of
Europe finally approved Russian membership of the Council of Europe, albeit for
an initial probationary period, despite the fact that Russian legislation in many
areas remained incompatible with Council o f Europe membership - notably in
the continued usage of the death penalty. Yet again, West Europeans showed that
The Guardian, 24 January 1995.
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they were more concerned about not worsening the cooling but still workable
relationship with El'tsin than about European standards being followed faultlessly
by Moscow. Although turning a blind eye to violations of mutually-agreed
standards in this way is likely to cause some confusion and over-estimation of
acceptable practices by Russian decision-makers, 2 it does show Russia that
Western Europe is also willing to compromise in order to bring Russia closer to
the rest of the continent, and that its presence is important.
Western support has also extended to the fmancial sphere (although we
have seen that this cannot be separated from the political situation). Despite
many ups and downs of the Russian economy over this period, all in all it
demonstrated at last a capability to stabilize the macroeconomic situation, and
thus also to maintain the ruble pegged within certain boundaries. Even whilst
these successes were only plans, the IMF approved in April 1995 what was then
its second largest stand-by loan worth $6.8bn. hi February of the following year,
despite on-going concerns about Russia's ability to stay within the strict budget
deficit boundaries specified by the IMF, the Fund announced a $1O.2bn three-
year loan to Russia. This measure was a clear message of support for EVtsin, as
well as a very tangible carrot which would be taken away if Boris Nikolaevich or
his successor after the June 1996 elections stray away from the policies of
pnvatization, macrostabilization and free market relations which have been
achieved so far. It is also significant that the EBRD's capital was agreed to be
doubled to 2ObnECU at the AGM in Sofia in April 1996, with a greater
proportion of this capital going to Russia and the rest of the CIS, as the economies
of Central Europe strengthen their post-Communist recoveries. Most directly
relevant to the EU, TACIS also decided in 1996 that its programmes would
continue into 1997 and beyond.
All the above developments do not hide the fact that there is a risk of
Russia falling back into isolation and a confrontational relationship with Western
Europe. Apart from Chechnia, Russia's refusal to ratify START II without
2 Heinnch Vogel, op. cit., p. 57.
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significant alterations, and its increasingly independent and often uncooperative
stance in international diplomacy also give cause for worry. The very strong
electoral results of the Communists and of the Liberal Democrats in the
December 1995 Federal Duma elections, and the majority predicted for Gennadii
Ziuganov in the presidential elections up to one month before them - until
E1'tsin's huge and monopolistic electoral campaign fatly got under way - all
justify fears that there could be mass support for policies which alienated the EU
from Russia. One possible scenario could be for Ziuganov to win the presidential
elections, for increased payments to pensioners, the army and the state sector to
cause hyperiuflation again, followed by a re-centralization of price controls over
at least essential foodstuffs, fuels and essential industrial raw materials. This
could be accompanied by a partial re-nationalization, and new restrictions over
foreign ownership and management of enterprises, especially in energy and other
raw materials. These measures would result in the exodus of the vast majority of
Western investors, as well as all assistance projects and credit offers. Trade
restrictions on Russian goods would again be increased due to the artificiality of
prices (and, most likely, to higher import restrictions being brought in by the
Communist Party), and not only would any hopes of a free trade area with the EU
would be lost, but many of the trade aspects of the Partnership Agreement would
have to be reversed. The antagonism caused by these trade conflicts would very
possibly lead to an even more bullish Russian foreign policy, which would renew
the mutual distrust and usual confrontations at international diplomatic meetings
which characterized relations between the USSR and the EC before Gorbachev.
Most of the progress of the last decade would have been lost.
The above scenario is possible, but it is extremely unlikely. This is not
only because it now appears that the huge lobbying power behind El'tsin, and his
control of the main television channels, will secure another presidential term for
him. Even with a Communist victory at the presidential elections, the shift of
power which has occurred in Russian society towards those with control over
large enterprises and over exports and imports would most likely mean a period of
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severe instability whilst alliances were re-aligned, following which the lobbying
power of the richest Russians, most of them from the previous Conununist
nomenklatura in any case, would ensure that the new President's policies would
not do too much damage to their business interests. Although a higher level of
inflation and devaluation of the ruble would almost certainly occur, the RCB
would be persuaded to minimize damages, and the success of economic reforms
would be slowed down rather than dissolved. Even in the unlikely case of the
large industrialists and exporters allowing the economic situation to deteriorate to
the point where relatively open trading with Europe is threatened, this position
would be only temporary. As explained in Chapter One, the freedom of choice
and of expression which has been tasted by the Russian population in the last
decade, and especially enjoyed and adopted by the young people, will not be
abandoned. Any denial of the freedom of choice, of enterprise and of trade, will
sooner rather than later collapse in the face of the inevitable attempts throughout
Russia to find a way around new rules, and to use the increased global
communications to return to the open society which Gorbachev and El'tsin
allowed them to enjoy.
It is difficult to say when the point of no return was reached; it could have
been when the masses changed the destiny of their country (or at least thought
they did, which is what matters) in August 1991, or it may have been the gradual
affect of being able to buy without queuing, to speak without fearing, and to
travel without dreaming. In any case, it is the author's firm belief that close
relations between Russia and the European Union., although not necessarily
without periods of struggle or restricted trade and contacts, will on the whole and
in the medium-term at the latest continue to strengthen, and allow Russians to be
ever more justified when they think of themselves as Europeans.
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Appendix 1: Aeronautics as an Example of the Potential for
Increased Commercial Interaction with Western Europe
A1.1 Importance of Sector
Aeronautics, together with the oil and gas industry, has been targeted in this study
as it is generally considered to be one of the more promising areas in which
Russia can exploit a relative advantage in the world market. A closer look at the
industry is intended to enable the reader to form a clearer understanding of how
the theoretical opportunities, risks and uncertainties of dealing commercially with
Russia covered in chapter three are being tackled in practice. The picture is
inevitably incomplete and to some degree inaccurate. This is in part because
many new projects and deals will have been concluded since the time of writing,
and in part because the specialist journals are certain to have missed many
projects, not least because many companies want to keep their formulae for
business success in Russia secret. This very reluctance to disclose the tentative
solutions being tried by Western importers and investors reflects the value of this
information, however: as suggested earlier, precedents are still more important
than legislation in Russian business today.
In aeronautics, Russian enterprises' attempts at breaking into the
international market must be put into the context of a global slump in aircraft
sales. Due both to the overall recession, and in particular to the global tendency
to reduce military budgets, most of the major Western aeronautics enterprises
have been reporting decreased orders, leading to large-scale lay-offs. For
example, the best-selling aircraft producer in the world, Boeing, intended to
decrease its output from forty aircraft a month in 1992 to twenty-five per month
in 1994. 1
 Within Russia as well, the freeing of prices and removal of subsidies
1 Presentation Lw Borge Boerskov. Vice-President of European Sales for Boeing. at the
Development of a Modern Air Transport Industry in the CIS' Conference. 13 May 1993.
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have led to a fall in demand for air transport. In the first quarter of 1993. Russian
domestic air travel fell by over 40%. with only 7.1 million passengers flying
compared to 12.1 million over the same period in 1992. as prices increased by up
to eight times after the liberalization of airline ticket prices on 1 January 1993.2
This clearly dampens the prospects for domestic sales of new aircraft until the
economic situation improves, despite the immense potential offered by the sheer
vastness of Russia, the size of its population, and the established precedent of
large-scale use of air transport.
Another potential disadvantage of having aeronautics as a priority growth
sector is its military slant, particularly in Russia. Apart from the diplomatic
problems involved in relying on exports of military hardware, encouraging the
military-industrial complex to continue producing military aircraft, even possibly
increasing its power through massive hard currency earnings, could well prove to
have an unhealthy effect on economic refonns overall. An increase in financial
clout of the military industrial complex could weaken the position of
internationally-minded reformers.
On the other hand, a well-supported commercialization programme for the
aircraft industries is likely to be the quickest and most efficient method of
converting them to civilian production, especially if opportunities to sell military
aircraft prove to be limited in practice as well as in theory. The capital available
in conversion funds, and more importantly the political priority that conversion
has been holding with E1'tsin's government, could also be factors attractive to
potential foreign investors in civilian aeronautics. There are furthermore signs
that despite the aviation industry's present slump, the longer term perspectives
may be more promising. According to the Chairman of the Aerostar Aviation
Complex, a 60% increase in air passenger traffic is expected by the year 2,000,
most of all in the Asia/Pacific region, creating the perfect opportunity for a boom
in the CIS aerospace sector, because of its geographical proximity, established
trade relations in aircraft with many Asian countries, and a specialization in
2 Moscow Times. 20 April 1993
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slightly more down-market planes. 3
 Also encouraging is the fact that despite the
decrease in the volume of air transport in Russia in early 1993, for the first time
the airline industry came close to breaking even, with Russian domestic and
international airlines having a total income of Rb! 7Thn, for outgoings of
Rbl8Obn.4
For the Western aeronautics industry, however, the mere fact of being able
to closely inspect most aspects of former Soviet aeronautics is attractive. The
overall Russian movement towards greater integration into the world economy (as
described in chapter one) has naturally included aeronoautics, meaning that a very
high standard of technology, which has been for so long shrouded in mystery, has
suddenly become largely open to scrutiny, and sometimes cooperation. As a
result, every major Western aeronautics manufacturer has been sending
representatives to Russia, to investigate the possibility of sales, and even joint
production. The appearance of a large number of Russian aircraft at the Le
Bourget and Farnborough Airshows, starting in 199 1-92, including many planes
which had never been seen in the West before, attracted an enormous amount of
attention. Perhaps the clearest confirmation of the opening of the former Soviet
aeronautics industry came in August 1992, with the MosAeroshow, displaying to
guests from around the world 114 types of aircraft, many previously unseen, as
well as previously undisclosed radar and missile technology. In the words of one
French military attaché 'five minutes at this show teaches us more than twenty-
five years of espionage'. 5 Those few companies who had already prepared or
even signed deals with Soviet aircraft producing enterprises before the USSR's
collapse have been fmdmg the rest of the aeronautics world right behind them,
hunting for the best way to translate Russian technology into profits.
The many aspects of Russian aeronautical involvement with foreign
countries worth investigating have here been divided into the following
Presentation by Vladimir Mikhailov. Chairman and Executive Director of the Aerostar Aviation
Complex. at the 'Development of a Modem Air Transport Industi in the CIS' Conference. 14 May
1993.
' Moscow Ti,nes. 20 April 1993.
Air & Cosmos / Aviation Magazine. no. 1389. 31 August-6 September 1992.
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categories: i) purely Russian military aeronautics export potential: ii) conversion
and restructuring of Russian aeronautics enterprises: iii) purely Russian civil
aviation export and leasing projects: iv) partnerships with Western enterprises,
amalgamating Russian and Western hardware: v) joint production partnerships
with Western enterprises, and the most marketable areas of Russian expertise: vi)
the purchasing and leasing of Western aircraft in Russia. This appendix starts
with military export potential because this is still the most lucrative earner in the
short-term, the models being tried and tested, and well-established relations with
many purchasers having been secured. Nonetheless, the future of the aeronautics
industry lies in the civilian sector, as does that of the Russian economy as a
whole, and hence the importance of the conversion of many of the military
aircraft producing enterprises. The process of pnvatization is also particularly
vital in the sector as a whole (not merely for enterprises turning away from
military production), both for the competitiveness of Russian aeronautics
enterprises on the global market, and to facilitate involvement with Western
partners. On the civilian side, firstly those export and leasing projects which do
not involve an important contribution from Western partners are examined, as
they are either concluded, or at least nearer to fruition than most joint ventures
with Western partners. The following section covers the most common type of
cooperation between Russia and the West in this industry so far, namely the
coupling of equipment from both sides to make an attractive package, both for
export and for domestic demand. This is followed by information on projects of
joint research or production of aircraft components, which are less numerous and
well-developed, but are incessantly increasing. Here the reader will also fmd
areas of specific Russian expertise where cooperation with Western firms has not
yet been secured, but may well be soon. Finally the other side of the free-trade
coin is studied, that is the new competition with Western aircraft producers in the
Russian market, in other words the standard which the Russian aeronautics
industry must reach if it is to survive.
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Cases used will include not only those involving West European
enterprises. in order to obtain as wide and accurate as possible a view on the
potential for greater involvement of Russian aeronautics enterprises in the world
market. A precedent set by a North American investor is likely to be as useful to
an EU aircraft manufacturer as one established by a European competitor.
A1.2 Military Aviation Export Potential
Exporting planes is by no means a new phenomenon for Russia; for decades
before perestroika, Moscow had sold aircraft to its socialist allies and to Third
World countries where it wanted influence.6 The potential for military aviation
exports is included here for the following reasons: a) EU member states have
considered purchasing Russian military aircraft; b) the worldwide revenue
received from selling military aircraft may fmd its way into supporting Russian
civilian aeronautics projects which could attract EU investments and find an
export market; c) the technological advantages of Russian military aircraft are
often found also in the civilian craft, although their disadvantages also tend to be
shared.
The new readiness to use military exports which has reflected the 1992-93
wave of Eurasianism (see Chapter One), although having had no great effect in
terms of volumes of military exports by mid-1994, still has the potential to
trigger international antagonism. Rotislav Beliakov, for instance, Mikoian's
Design Bureau Chief, complained bitterly about the USA's attempts to curtail
'legitimate' export proposals, such as his enterprise's MiG-29 (Fulcrum, as
designated by NATO); his argument was that the revenue was essential for Russia
to maintain 'sufficient defence efficiency'. 7 This readiness to reinvest military
6 Aviation International News - Farnborough '92. 7 September 1992. and Aviaexport
Information Release. Farnborough, September 1992.
' Flight International. 19-25 August 1992. p. 5.
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export earnings into military production also belies President El'tsins declared
aim to use such revenues to support market-oriented reforms.
The Mikoian design bureau is probably the most famous of Russia's
military aircraft producers, its two most advanced warplanes now being produced
being the MiG-29/33 (Fulcrum) family, and the MiG-3 I (Foxhound). Despite
now being rather agecL having first flown in the late 1 970s, the MiG-29 is still a
first-class aircraft, able to compete with its top Western opponents, the US F-15,
F-16 and F/A-18, albeit at a disadvantage. The traditional MiG-29A's marn
drawbacks include the Achilles heel of most Soviet-designed aircraft - a
relatively low life expectancy of the airframe and engine, and even lower 'on-
wing' life, that is the length of time between major overhauls of the engine.
Other disadvantages of the Fulcrum in particular are its short range, due to low
fuel capacity, and the inability of its computer/radar system to engage multiple
targets, thus greatly reducing its destructive capability. 8 To what extent the MiG-
29's faults have been resolved can only be guessed, yet it seems likely that the
MiG-33 was grosso modo the plane offered to Germany, 9 to complement the
twenty-four MiG-29's which it had inherited from East Germany and which
officially came into Luftwaffe service on 1 June 1993, 10 but which were rejected
for active service. Although the basic price of the MiG-29/33 is less, for
example. than an F-IS (about $30m compared to $65m' 1
 ), other factors reduced
its value for money. The estimated running costs, in a year with 150 flying hours,
were about $lm, 20% more than the F-4; worst of all was the fleet effectiveness
which was about five times worse than the F-15, in other words it was estimated
that, largely because of the lower stan&ird of computer coordination, it would
take five times more Fulcrums to achieve a particular mission.' 2 The provision of
spares and maintenance work was the fmal reason why Germany decided against
building on its fleet of Fulcrums, not wanting to be dependent upon Russia's
8 For further specifications see Military Technology. May 1992.
Flight International. 19-25 August 1992.
10 Moscow Times, 2 June 1993.
11 The Independent on Sunday. 12 July 1992: and The Guardian. 30 July 1994.
12 !tlilitarv Technology, May 1992.
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unstable economic and political situation for the functioning of its air force.
Germany's refusal to acquire more Fulcrums, however, has not prevented other
countries from wanting to join the nine non-CIS countries which already operate
them. In June 1994, the Malaysian government finalized a deal with Mikoian,
through the newly created state arms exporter Rosvooruzheme, to buy eighteen
MiG-29Ms for $450m plus S150m worth of palm oil.' 3 The Chilean Air Force is
also reported to be very keen on acquiring Fulcrums to replace its fighter fleet)4
The Fulcrum was also used in a debt-for-planes swap deal with Hungary,
whereby $800m of Russia's outstanding $l.7bn trade debt to Budapest was
cancelled in exchange for 28 advanced MiG-29s;' 5 a similar deal has been struck
with Slovakia.'6
An important unknown is to what extent Western avionics may become
available to complement the Fulcrum's tremendous structural and aerodynamic
strengths; poorer countries such as Malaysia and Chile may not be in the market
for such priced-up aircraft, but others such as India, China and Iran may well be.
With state-of-the-art avionics Mikoian and Sukhoi fighters would be a force to
contend with.' 7 Paradoxically, the fact that this would increase the need for the
controversial European Fighter Aircraft and the US F-22 could create strong
pressure in many quarters for facilitating the passage of modern avionics
eastwards.
The MiG-3 1, although also a product of l970s technology, has become a
more electronically advanced and specialized fighter. China has already ordered
twenty-four Foxhounds, and negotiations are supposedly in progress with other
countries, including Iran.'8
Mikoian is also the creator of the MiG-2 1 (Fishbed), the world's most
mass-produced jet fighter, with over 4,450 aircraft serving over thirty-five air
13 The Guardian. 8 June [994.
14 Flight International. 19-25 February 1992.
15 Business Eastern Europe. 12 July 1993. p. 11.
16 The Guardian. 30 July 1994.
17 Flight Daily News. 8 September 1992.
18 Flight International. 29 July-4 August 1992.
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forces. apart from the 3.000+ Fishbeds in the CIS. India's Hindustan
Aeronautics manufactured the MiG-2 I under licence until 1988 (and is still
manufacturing the MiG-27 (Flogger)). Although exporting of new MiG-2 Is is
Out of the question. parts and servicing may still be lucrative for some time,
especially as Israel Aircraft Industries (IA!) has already started negotiations with
many countries wanting to update the Fishbed's avionics and/or airframe.
ameliorated weapons. navigation and radar systems enhancing both air-to-air and
air-to-ground attack capabilities. In some cases the updates can be to achieve
interoperability with NATO systems; this may be particularly attractive to East
European countries, which may potentially have great difficulty distinguishing
friend from foe, and which want to quickly progress within Partnership for Peace,
which has a stated aim of achieving compatability between NATO and the East
European applicants for NATO membership. UK's GEC avionics have also had
talks with Mikoian about upgrading the MiG-2 1 's weapons and cockpit
systems; 19 GEC have already worked on Chinese Fishbeds. Although not every
possible combination will be mentioned, the option of adding Western electronics
to Russian military aircraft is now a theoretical possibility for every model
considered for export.
Moving now onto the Sukhoi design bureau, the aircraft commanding most
interest is the Su-27 (Flanker). Few experts rate the Su-27 lower in one-on-one
combat capacity than the most effective Western opponents, the F-15 and the
French Rafale. 2° Especially with the updated electronic optic systems and radar
equipment exposed at the MosAeroshow,2 ' the Flanker is the standard which
other fighters have to beat. Despite the high sensitivity of such top level
technology, China has signed a deal for seventy-two Su-27s, the first of which
should have arrived in late 1992.22
19 Flight International. 19-25 August 1992.
20 The Independent on Sunday, 12 July 1992.
21 Air & Cosmos, Aviation Magazine. no. 130. 7-13 September 1992.
22 Flight International. 29 Julv-4 August 1992.
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Of the Tupolev design bureau's military aircraft of the last few decades.
only the Tu-95/142 (Bear) long-range bomber has been sold abroad, with eight
units going to India. Its more feared models are the Tu-22M (Backfire) and Tu-
160 (Blackjack) Mach 2+ long-range bombers, which have not been the subject of
any proposed export or joint development deal rumours.
The Kamov bureau, on the other hand, has attracted a great deal of interest
from the Eu and other Western countries with its Ka-50 (Hokum) attack
helicopter. Despite its NATO-designated name, this is a very serious fighter
aircraft, and the threat to which the projected American RAH-66 Comanche
helicopter was aimed to contend with. The offering of the Ka-50 for closer
Western investigation has provoked two paradoxical reactions. Some experts
have been aghast at the low level of electronics aboard the Hokum (at least the
versions shown at the MosAeroshow and Farnborough); expectations had been
much higher, and some sources in Washington now expect the case for funding of
the Comanche to be severely damaged. 23 On the other hand, Kamov's total open-
mindedness to combining the Hokum with Western avionics and even weapon
systems makes it an awe-inspiring competitor in the market. 24 Together with the
fact that Kamov have declared that the Hokum will be equipped with a more
powerful arsenal than any comparable helicopter, all that is missing for a truly
top-class attack helicopter is the avionics to allow effective running even with a
single pilot.
Such is the optimism about the Hokuin in the West that several British
aerospace contractors have approached Kamov in order to jointly submit
proposals to fulfil the British Army's long-standing attack helicopter requirement.
Although, at $19m the price is similar to the US Army's AH-64A Apache, this
would include the cost of a UK partnership to adapt the Ka-50 for the installation
of British engines, equipment and weaponry. 25 No conclusive results of this
23 Rotor & Wing international Daily. 7 September 1992.
24 For technological specifications. see Aviation Week & Space Technology. 24 August 1992. and
Aviation international News. 7 September 1992.
25 Show News. Farnborough, 9 September 1992.
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tender proposal have emer ged. althout!h rumours have circulated to the effect that
the Kamov offer's chances of success were practically nil. Other customers are
now actively being sought, however, by Kamov's new American partner -
Group Vector.26 One main advantage is that the Ka-50 has received export
clearance from the Russian government, and should be offered to foreign
customers from 1993.27
The other important Russian military aircraft producer of the last years.
Iakovlev, has concentrated on V/STOL (vertical / short take off and landing)
aircraft in the military field, first the lak-38 (Forger), and then the Iak-141
(Freestyle). The Forger was never exported, and its attrition rate was relatively
high, with at least thirty-six aircraft being lost (according to lakovlev). Although
sharing some similarities, the Forger's successor, the Freestyle, is very different,28
and has undeniably broken barriers in VTOL technology. 29 Despite its potential,
government funding for the project dried up in 1991, and Iakovlev have tried to
offer other countries (including China and India) a share in it, but so far to no
avail. 30 As explained below, however, the privatization of the Iakovlev complex
is likely to mean the end of the Freestyle. It also seems that the Iak-UTK
advanced jet trainer, which was rumoured to have won contracts from the Russian
Air Force and Navy, has been abandoned. This project was already at an
advanced stage, and foreign cooperation was at a more elaborated stage than most
military projects. Rockwell-Collins were to supply the cockpit avionics. The St
Petersburg Klimov bureau had formed a new company, MTA (Motor Turbine
Aggregate) with the French aero-engine company Snecma, to develop the jet
trainer engine, using the existing Larzac West European core, and a Klimov-
designed fan. 31 The fruits of this cooperation are now almost certain to be used
on the MiG-AT (Advanced Trainer).
26 For details, see Flight International. 29 July-4 August 1992.
27 Show News. Farnborough, 9 September 1992.
28 See Flight Daily News, 8 September 1992.
29 Show News, Famborough, 9 September 1992.
30 Jane 's Defence Week/v. 5 September 1992.
31 Interav:a Aerospace Review. July 1992.
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Much could also be written on missile and radar technology, and their
export potential. but that is more closely related to armaments, and is beyond the
scope of this section.
A1.3 Conversion and Restructuring of Russian Aeronautics Enterprises
The conversion of the military-industrial sector has attracted much attention: it is
often assumed that considering Russia's tremendous military might, the transfer
of this productive capability to consumer commodity production would solve the
worst economic problems, not least by interesting Western customers. In reality,
there are no simple solutions. The intention has been to halve defence spending
in the FSIJ, from an estimated minimum of 20% of GNP to below 10%. If we
compare this to the situation in the USA, where the attempts to bring this figure
down from 5.3% in 1990 to 3.9% in 199632 have been causing significant profit
losses and unemployment, it becomes clear that the scale of the problem in Russia
is overwhelming, especially considering that few non-military industries are in a
state to offer large-scale alternative employment.
Many specialists now doubt that the military sector was more efficient than
the civilian sector, rather than simply more effective, believing that the defence
industiy's successes were attributable merely to the fact that it could work with a
'success at all costs' approach, having priority access to resources (including
imports), and few limits to production costs. Russia has the additional
disadvantage that many of the most advanced spheres of the Soviet defence
industry were based in other republics, notably in electronics, whilst ground
equipment and conventional armaments were based around specific central areas,
for example in the Urals, or shipyards in Leningrad. 33 S. Elekoev of IMEMO
argued that even if military technology was very efficient, there is no reason to
32 l'hierrv Malleret. Conversion of the Defense Industr y in the Former Soviet Union. New York.
1992.p. 9.
Thieny Malleret. op. cit.. p. 51.
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believe that the civilian economy would do a better iob at incorporating it than
with imported Western equipment which has been poorly used, for example at the
VAZ and KamAZ plants.34
Although conversion is aimed to be a budget-saving operation. its own
costs are enonnous. and the massive capital needed for successful conversion is
lacking. As the pressure to reduce the budget deficit increases, chances of
increasing assistance to conversion are reduced. In the 1990 draft state
programme for conversion, the military industry committee of the Council of
Ministers of the USSR, and associated ministries, allocated Rb6Obn to conversion
- clearly too little, and too late, as many enterprises had already ceased
production due to lack of funds.35
As far as the aeronautics industry is concerned, conversion could be relatively
successful as much of it may use 'conversion by speciality'. Although this has
sometimes meant simply using revenue from selling military goods to support
reforms in the economy, the term normally refers to adapting existing military
production so that it can be used for civilian uses. Not that the aviation industiy
has escaped central orders to increase low technology civilian production - the
Aviastar complex was told to produce refrigerators. 36 whilst Sukhoi was pushed
into starting to manufacture salt and tea packaging machines. 37 Producing
consumer goods was not new to the aeronautics industry, however, as it had long
produced agricultural equipment, industrial equipment, electronic and
communications equipment. Yet this was to increase further with conversion.
The plan was for the enterprises under Minaviaprom (the Ministry of Aviation
Industries) to increase their production of food processing equipment first to 43%
of the Soviet total, and eventually to 65%.38 Although in some cases this
production has created essential revenue at a time when aircraft orders were low,
few manufacturers were pleased with this forced diversion of resources and
Thierrv Malleret. op. cit.. p. 24.
5 Moscow News, no. 39. 1990.
36 Flight International. 29 July-4 August 1992.
Moscow News, no. 39. 1990.
38 l'hierry Malleret, op. cit.. pp. 63-71.
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wastage of expertise. Nonetheless, switchin g to civilian aircraft was still the
declared priority of conversion in the aeronautics sphere. although one important
restriction is that by no means all of the military production capacity can be used
on civilian output. It has been estimated, for example. that due to the high level
of specialization in Soviet military work, around 90% of the research realized in
the aeronautics field cannot be adapted to civilian production.39
The 1991-92 period saw the beginning of the decline of conversion as a
priority, whilst privatization became the figurehead of economic reforms. Staying
in the military sector was simply not an option for most enterprises, for reasons
made clear in the following table:4°
UNITS PRODUCED
Weapon category	1990 (USSR)	 1991 (USSR)	 1992 (Rus.)
Bombers	 35	 30	 20
Fighters/Fighter Bombers 	 575	 350	 150
Attack Helicopters	 70	 15	 5
Figures for export earnings of anns tell a similar story; earnings from the FSU fell
from $6bn in 1991 to $2.5bn in 1992, Russia's share accounting for 90%.' It
became increasingly clear that the Russian government could be of only very
limited help in the shift away from military production. The total budget for
conversion projects in 1993 was Rb5Obn, or around 1% of GDP at mid-1993
prices, but even that frugal allowance was reported to be suffering from a 60%
shortfall in distribution, particularly damaging to the converting enterprises due to
the virtual hyperinflation. Keith Bush wrote that
After years of little evident progress in the conversion!
diversification of the Russian defence industry, a turning point was
reached in 1993. [...] the political leadership, and most defence
industry executives, realized that the funding for conversion would
have to be generated by the enterprises themselves after
39 N. Nikitin.. 'Polozheme obiazyvaet'. Krasnaia Zvezda, 13 April 1990.
40 Aviation Week & Space Technology. 28 June 1993.
41 Ibid.
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privatization. and not from central budgetar y sources in the shape
of outright grants or soft credits. [...] a decision appears to have
been made at cabinet level in mid-1993 to expedite the
privatization of the defense industry and to expand the categories
of enterprises that could be sold off.42
This meant that many aeronautics companies started leaving the state sector, and
therefore the obligation to follow state conversion plan objectives. With costs
growing exponentially, and both orders and state fmancial support dwindling,
becoming independent, both for the capital from shares and from potential new
partners, was often the only alternative. Such examples of 'entrepreneurial
conversion' as lakovlev, Sukhoi, Tupolev and Aerostar are all covered below.
Every military aircraft producer, in sharp contrast with the guaranteed state
orders of the Soviet days, is now striving to fmd a product with which to
successfully break into the world market. Trying to succeed with an amphibious
aircraft is the BETA IR joint enterprise, comprised of the Beriev Research and
Development Complex, the Taganrog Aviation Production Association, the
Irkutsk Aviation Production Association (which also manufactures Su-27s), and
the Swiss investment firm ILTA Trade Finance S.A.. This project should result in
the production of the 64-passenger Be-200, an amphibious plane adaptable to
cargo, fire-fighting or naval surveillance roles. There is supposedly much interest
in the West in the Be-200, and Beriev estimate a demand for 500 such planes
abroad, and 350 in Russia.43
 This is a rare example of a part-foreign joint
enterprise obtaining money from the government's conversion fund; it had
already committed Rbl5Om (before the autumn of 1992), and has declared its
intention of contributing a total (but how will it be indexed?) of Rb2bn by the
year l996."
42 'Aspects of Military Conversion in Russia. RFE'RL Research Report. vol. 3. no. 14, 8 April
1994.pp. 3 1-33.
'- Commersant. 15 September 1992.
Commersant. 15 September 1992.
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The Mikoian company has been working on commercial projects since
1989, and has attracted particular attention for a project for the joint development
of airframe components for commercial aircraft with the French firm Dussault.45
The Sukhoi complex broke away from its top-secret production tradition in
1990, with its readiness to export the Su-26 acrobatic plane. The Su-26 was,
according to Sukhoi, the result of an intensive study of Western markets, and an
opening in the market was judged to exist in the market for high-performance
light aircraft, as these were overly engineering-intensive to be profitably produced
in the West. Sukhoi went on to produce the Su-29. which has been chosen as
the first aircraft to be examined under the US/Russian bilateral aviation agreement
for joint certification, which if passed would make CAA (Civil Aviation
Authority) certification to fly in Britain 'for hire or reward' very likely. 47 The
market for such planes in Russia at the moment is virtually non-existent, as
individuals do not yet have the right to own aircraft.
The end of state control over most of the aeronautics industry was assured by its
inclusion in the privatization process. As in most other industries, however,
aircraft producers had to reform more than the ownership structure to become
viable entities in a competitive world. Whilst previously different roles in the
aviation industry had been clearly delineated, it now became essential for
enterprises in the various fields of aeronautics production to join forces.48
Without the safety of state orders, every enterprise had good reason to seek
partnerships which could ensure preferential and reliable supplies or orders.
The oft-mentioned Ulianovsk Aviastar Complex is a good example of
privatization with which to start. Claimed to be the largest aviation enterprise in
the world, its future hung in the balance in late 1991, military orders having fallen
to negligible levels, and government funding for the completion of an engine plant
' Aviaexport Newsletter, Farnborough. September 1992.
Moscow News, no. 39. 1990.
47 Farnborough 92 International. magazine of the Society of British Aerospace Companies.
September 1992.
48 Kommersant',	 11. 15-21 March 1993.
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having then apparently run out. Rather than let the complex shut down.
Executive Director Vladimir Mikhailov prepared to make this $8bn enterprise
(Aviastar's own estimate) independent. Almost overnight, tJlianovsk went from
being entirely financed by the state to becoming totally self-financing. Ulianovsk
brought together a multinational management team including experts from
Avtovazbank, Price Waterhouse and Morgan Grenfell. The Aviastar group
clearly had much to offer; it was producing two of the Russian aircraft with the
greatest export potential, the An-l24 and the Tu-204: it also had a head start in a
process which many other aeronautics corporations were going to have to begin
from scratch, namely the bringing together of all levels of aircraft production,
from design to interior finishing. Not only did this mean that subsidiaries like
avionics developers or design bureaux finally benefited directly from their
production. but it also avoided the duplication of machine-tools in both design
sections and mass production factories.49
Western support was going to be useful in areas other than pure financing.
Volga-Dnepr Airlines was partnered with British firm Heavy-Lift thus helping to
find hard-currency custom. Airliner interiors are one of the most constantly
criticized aspects of Russian aircraft, and yet the cheapest way to make them
user-friendly. Finally aware of this problem, Aviastar established a joint venture
with Hunting Aircraft and Aviation Ventures (both from Britain) to form
AVINTCO, which would manufacture world-class aircraft interiors at Aviastar.5°
Another criticism with which Western partners could help is one not directed at
airliners themselves, but at the industry - the inability to reproduce the highest
technology in sufficiently large quantities, in other words to move from quasi-
cottage industry production of high technolgy, to mass production. 51 It has been
suggested that much of the enthusiasm about exporting Russian planes may be
overly optimistic, when there are not enough new planes being produced for the
domestic market, for example, Iliushin has been very late in its delivery of Il-96s
Flight International. 29 July-4 August 1992.
50 BEE. 14 June 1993. p. 9.
51 Thierrv Malleret. op. cit.. p.12.
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to Aeroflot. 52
 In Ulianovsk's case, although Western experts have reportedly
estimated that such an installation could produce 250 aircraft annually, in 1992
Aviastar was only assembling four An-i 24s, and around 11 Tu-204s. 53
 Although
Aviastar registered as a holding company in l993, a high level of
interdependence with the government remains. Thus in July 1993, the Russian
government declared that it will offer preferential treatment to Aviastar, in order
to retain some control over the plant.55
During the same period the Iakovlev aviation corporation was also about to
register as a joint stock enterprise. In a similar situation to Aviastar, in 1992
Iakovlev's military orders were down to nothing, its funding from the government
was a ridiculous Rb34m, and if it was not for an order to produce the 170-
passenger lak-46, it would have been bankrupt at one point; privatization was its
only chance. Iakovlev's plan to become an open joint stock company was
approved by the Russian government in December 1992, and supported by the
Moscow Committee for the Management of Property.56
For privatization to be approved, Iakovlev had to satisfy the Russian
Committee on Defense Industries (Roskomoboronprom) that it would totally stop
work on fighters and strategic bombers; as mentioned in the section on
conversion, this leaves unclear the position of its UTK fighter trainer aircraft.
Iakovlev's restructuring also had a merging dimension, with the amalgamation of
its Skorost' experimentation and construction plant with two serial production
plants. Iakovlev's Director Oleg Demchenko does not intend, however, to fuse an
engine-producing plant to their complex; he aims to have a Western approach,
whereby lakovlev can offer their clients a choice of engine. In this he differs
52 The Financial Times. 2 September 1992.
Flight International. 29 July-4 August 1992.
Presentation by Vladimir Mikhailov. Chairman and Executive Director of the Aviastar Aviation
Complex. at the Deve1opment of a Modem Air Transport Industry in the CIS' Conference, 14 May
1993.
55 For details, see Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 July 1993.
56 Kommersani'. no. 11. 15-21 March 1993
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from Tupoiev's General Director Valentin Klimov. who believes every single
stage of production should be united.57
The Kamov bureau went through the pnvatization process in the first half
of 1993. the firm itself initiating the move, and eventually obtaining Ministry of
Defence approval. 58
 The Sukhoi Construction Bureau, although having kept 95%
of its production in the military sector, also had its pnzaiization approved. 59 Like
Tupolev and Antonov, the Sukhoi complex is uniting its design bureaux with its
production plants, and like Tupolev, precise privatization proposal details were
undisclosed.60
A1.4 Purely Russian Civil Aviation Export and Leasing Projects
With state orders for aircraft at a fraction of what they used to be, and as the
internal commercial aircraft market remains weak, the pressure is great on
aeronautics enterprises to find customers abroad. The procedures needed to sell
or lease commercial aircraft are much more complicated than the situation with
military aircraft, where governments played a much greater role in funding,
insuring and permitting flights.
Before a potential client can be interested in acquiring an aircraft, he/she
must know that that aircraft will receive the right to fly and land in all necessary
countries. If an aircraft is only to be used as an exception, in a one-off leasing
arrangement, special permission can usually be arranged, after some time and
expense. For an aircraft to be a viable purchase, however, it needs to be fully
certified by the purchaser's national aviation authority. In the case of leasing,
military and commercial aircraft are treated differently; for example, at
Farnborough 1992 a military An-124 had to be used rather than the planned
Kornmersant'. no. 11. 15-21 March 1993.
58 Rabochaia Tribuna. 28 May 1993.
BEE. 22 February 1993. p. 11.
60 Kommersanr. no. 11. 15-21 March 1993.
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civilian one, as permission could be granted usin g its well-known military
certification, but not the unrecognized Russian civil certification. 61 Reaching
certification which is internationally recognized and respected is becoming easier
than the previously bilateral-based system through the Joint Aviation
Requirements (JARs) being increasingly used in Western Europe. At present the
JARs are voluntarily adhered to, but they should gradually have become
compulsory by 1996. Russia has not yet joined the Joint Aviation Authority, but
membership is being discussed; a more Western approach to certification could
solve many problems. Factories designing new aviation parts in the West, for
example, tend to have their own in-house aviation authority representative,
helping, advising and verifying throughout the design and production processes,
thereby minimizing the time required to achieve certification. A senior JAR
representative suggested that sending such representatives to Russian firms might
be subsidised. 62 Tupolev and Rolls-Royce probably wished they had done the
same at an earlier stage, as the international version of the Tu-204 was
experiencing certification delays in mid-1993.63
Lack of information, which has already been marked as a deterrent to
efficient production, is also hindering certification and affordable insurance, and
therefore sales. Russia could probably prove the high worth of many of its
aircraft, but international values and evaluators must be used. Comprehensive
data for every aircraft type is needed so that Western insurance brokers can
minimize perceived probability of error, and therefore offer less expensive
policies. Until there is sufficient capital in the newborn Russian insurance sector,
there will be a continued need for Western brokers on important covers.64
Gradually, nonetheless, some Russian insurance companies are gaining trust, by
honouring claims, and by correctly estimating risks; so far, however, access to the
61 Aviation International News. Farnborough '92. 7 September 1992.
62 Interview with Captain T. H. Sindall. Principal Inspector for the Civil Aviation Authority's
Safety
 Regulation Group, 13 May 1993
63 Interview with Richard D. Ciochetti, Rolls-Royce's Chief Representative in Moscow. 1 June
1993.
64 Interview with John Howard. Director of the Aviation Division. Gibbs Hartle y
 Cooper Ltd.. 13
May 1993.
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necessary Russian data to do this has been restricted, again necessitating
privileged links to be effective. 65 Not only freely available information is needed.
but a new approach to enforcing standards; there is much talk now about making
accident data available, but establishing normalized and well-followed
operational guidelines is also essential, in areas such as improved fuel needs
calculation, as well as packaging and marking of dangerous goods. 66
 These
measures would mean not only lower insurance rates, but also greater customer
assurance, and therefore more demand for the aircraft.
All the same factors which apply favourably to insurance clearly also assist
in the organization of fmancial arrangements for the purchase or lease of Russian
aircraft. Especially with the need to compensate for political risk, as well as
unpredictability and poor enforcement of propert y
 and commercial law,
information gathering and dissemination in order to facilitate risk assessment
must become a priority.
Although the vast majority of promising aircraft being offered for export include
some Western equipment, there are some notable exceptions. The giant An-124
is not only being offered on lease, as examined later, but should also soon be
available for export. Although Russian customers are lining up for it, Volga-
Dnepr has priority as it is part of the Aviastar Complex producing them (although
they are also being produced in Ukraine, at the Antonov plant in Zaporozhe), and
Volga-Dnepr intends to be involved not only with leasing, but also with sales of
the Ruslan. Lufthansa has already expressed great interest.67
Other examples of non-Western equipped aircraft being exported include
the old lak-18; 68
 Tupolev's Tu-204s with Solovev PS-90A engines from
65 Interview with Nikolai P. Ustimenko. Director General of the AVWOS' aviation insurance
joint-stock company. 13 May 1993.
Interview with Captain T. H. Sindall. Principal Inspector for the Civil Aviation Authoritvs
Safety Regulation Group, 13 May 1993.
67 Flight International. 29 Julv4 August 1992.
68 Kommersanr'. 23 March 1993.
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Kirgizstans national airline: Kamov's popular Ka-32 helicopters: 70
 and, finally
cleared for certification, the Iliushin 11-1
All-in-all, though, existing Russian planes in the present world market
seem now to be more appropriate for the lower end of the wet-leasing market than
for sales. Offering extrememly competitive rates, Russia is in fact a major player
in the international leasing market. 72 The star of the Russian leasing fleet is the
An-124 'Ruslan', the largest non-prototype plane in the world, flown by, inter
a/ia, Volga-Dnepr Airlines. Volga-Dnepris now expanding its fleet of Ruslans;
the next one is going to be leased to them, and is to be paid for by loans from the
Stolichnyi Bank. 73 As has tended to be the case for most successful CIS airlines,
help from the authorities has been a necessary key to Volga-Dnepr's success.74
As mentioned earlier, the government also offered a long-term loan to Volga-
Dnepr Cargo Airlines, to enable it to buy its six Ruslans. 75 One of Volga-Dnepr's
business deals is an agreement with Airbus Industrie, to fly sections of Airbuses
between the plants in Manchester, Bremen and Toulouse, once appropriate
certification has been received.76
 Other Ruslans are hired by petroleum
companies, such as Canadian Fracmaster, to transport their equipment to Siberia.
Aeroflot itself has resorted to leasing to increase its revenue, mainly Tu-
154s and Il-76s going to lesser developed countries. The possibility of leasing out
aircraft together with Russian crew is also being discussed, particularly with Iran
and Nepal. 77 Aeroflot has much competition from other Russian enterprises,
however.
One such new airline is the Polar Air Company, which emerged from the
old state-owned Polar Air, and is now keen on using Western marketing
69 See Air & CosmosiAviation Magazine. no. 1393. 28 September-4 October 1992.
70 Rabochaia Tribuna. 28May 1993.
71 See Aviaexport Newsletter. Farnborough '92 special edition. September 1992. and Aviation
Week & Space Technology, 12 July 1993.
72 Interview with Paul Hayes, Director of Product Development, Airclaims Ltd.. 11 May 1993.
Presentation by Alexander Bashkov, Financial Director of Volga-Dnepr Airline. at the
'Development of a Modem Air Transport Industry in the CIS' Conference, 12 May 1993.
For details. see Stolitsa, no. 5, 1992, p. 12.
Aviation Week & Space Technology, 12 July 1993.
76 Flight International. 29 Julv-4 August 1992.
77 .4viation Week & Space Technology, 21 September 1992.
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techniques. and a new office on Londons Regent Street. to obtain foreign
contracts. The company plans to start with the acquisition of three 11-76 TD jet
freighters, available for any kind of lease, or for sale. 78 Many air leasing
specialists are optimistic about the role of the 11-76, although one great
disadvantage is particularly high fuel consumption.79
Another new airline intending to acquire an 11-76 is the Aviaross Aviation
Company. Aviaross has been looking for a partner to supply the capital to buy an
11-76, hoping to use a lower purchase price as motivation, or a joint leasing deal
using Aviaross' experience and contacts. As it is. Aviaross have two An-32
turboprop cargo planes, and deals clinched so far with these have included
charters for Sub-Saharan governments. Aviaross also point out that starting off
was difficult, and that contacts were invaluable; the President of the company
previously held a senior post in the Ministry of Transport. Aviaross also has both
IATA and ICAO recognition; IATA certification was, unusually, aquired through
Aeroflot. Credit to buy the An-32s was not the least of the problems; it could
only be obtained for three-month periods, at 100% interest for that period.
Nonetheless, Aviaross managed to repay its debts within a year.8°
Russian helicopters are also in great demand on the leasing market, and
Eveready PANH Aviation Services, a section of Krasnodar's NPO PANH GA
(Scientific-Production Complex of Civil Aviation Usage in the National
Economy), is one of the recently formed private companies to provide such a
service. PANH Aviation is a member of the Helicopter Association International,
and the American Helicopter Society, and it claims that its prices are higher than
many other Russian firms because of their higher degree of professionalism and
reliability of their insurance. Nonetheless, a problem common to most such
companies was immediately apparent from the very poor quality of graphics and
English language on the publicity leaflet, and by the fact that the prices were only
78 Show News, Farnborough, 8 September 1992.
' Interview with Craig Mariacci. Sales Manager. Skvplan Services International (Calgaiy), 11
May 1993.
80 Interview with Sergei Leomdovich Vekhov. Manager of Aviaross Aviation Company. 13 May
1993.
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very approximat&. Obtaining necessary authorizations to fly abroad is said not
to have been particularly problematic; even in the case of flying the uncertified
Ka-32 to Ireland. it merely took a few weeks to obtain the necessary special
permission. In such cases, however, small companies are at the mercy of the
efficiency, or otherwise, of the commercial section of the relevant Russian
embassy, if unable to pay for private assistance. Helicopters have an advantage in
that they are not required to obtain landing rights. The main problem, it was
stated, was finding enough foreign customers. As with other small leasing
companies, such as Aviaross, PANH aviation do not normally bother flying
within Russia, unless being paid handsomely in hard currency; unreliability of
fuel source, of catering, and bribes having to be paid. all made domestic leasing
more trouble than its worth, at the time of the interview.8'
These examples of new airlines are but a small sample; there are now over
a hundred new airlines in the CIS. That does not mean that the above enterprises
are typical; they are part of a minority who have broken out into the international
market. They have all been helped either by having been important state
organizations before privatization, and/or by having managerial cadres who have
highly-placed contacts in the air transport authorities. Nonetheless, they are the
important precedents, showing that it is possible for entrepreneurs to make a
profit by selling the use of Russian aeronautics technology abroad.
The problems involved with international flight permission, flight plans,
landing permissions and other organizational support for Russian aircraft is an
area where many Western enterprises are achieving business; 82 marketing is
becoming another important role, as many new airlines complain that to get
contracts, for example with the UN, contacts are essential. Calgary's Skyplan has
been playing this role, for example with the An-l24s and I1-76s, Rostov
helicopter enterprises have employed British Carroll Aircraft Corporation to
1 Interview with Sergei Alekseevich Korobko. representative of EVEREADY PANH AVIATION
SERVICES (Krasnodar). 12 May 1993.
82 Interview with Craig Mariacci. Sales Manager, Skvplan Services International (Calgaly). 11
May 1993.
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certify and to market the Mu Mi-26 helicopter, and Iliushin have UK-based Euro
Iliushin Aircraft Sales. Yet confusion still appears prevalent amongst Russian
aviation companies, especially small leasing companies. as how to best break into
the international market, suggesting that such Western support organizations can
be faulted on not publicising their services widely enough.83
It is essential that Russian export and leasing projects do break into this
market in the near future, as the opening up of the FSU has created vast
opportunities for the likes of Boeing and Airbus, whose aircraft Russia will not
only have to match in performance and/or prices, but beat in order to compensate
for the difference in experience and reputation. This is made even more difficult
with the cost of leasing Western aeroplanes, particularl y the older models, now at
enticingly low levels.
Despite initial registration and insurance problems, 84 Aeroflot has already
purchased five Airbus A3 lO-308s85 and signed a letter of intent for the leasing of
four Boeing 767s. 86 The first new passenger airline to offer scheduled flights,
Transaero, is also the first airline to fly Western planes on domestic routes,
having aquired two B-73 7s, as well as placing an order mt he spring of 1994 for
two B-757s. 87 Western business jet operators are fmding a growing leasing
market in former Eastern Bloc countries. 88 Even Volga-Dnepr airlines, although
having achieved profitability with the use of Russian aircraft, announced in June
1994 that it would also start leasing Western cargo planes. Both Boeing and
Airbus have expressed interest. 89
A1.5 Partnerships Amalgamating Russian and Western Hardware
83 Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 September 1992.
84 Presentation by Dominique Menu. Manager of the Banque Nationale de Paris in Moscow. at the
Development of a Modern Air Transport Industry in the CIS' Conference. 14 May 1993: and interview
with M. Kramer. Airbus senior executive. 5 August 1992.
85 The Financial Ti,nes. 12 June 1992.
86 BEE. 31 January 1994. P. 8.
87 BEE. 18 April 1994, p. 8.
88 Aerospace World. September 1992.
89 BEE. 6 June 1994. P. 12.
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Most of the other aircraft packages being offered on foreign markets at present
have an element of international partnership to them. One of the main reasons for
opening up the industry to foreign companies. a process initiated by the USSR
Ministiy for the Aviation lndustiy in 1990, was the fear that in the near future
existing Aeroflot planes would no longer be allowed in Western airports, due to
their levels of noise and air pollution. 90 Increasingly, however, it is not only
Western customers who will demand Western components; as prices of Russian
aircraft are driven ever closer to Western levels, even traditionally less demanding
customers will now require the same benefits as offered by Western aircraft, and
Western partners are consulted mostly in regard to avionics, cockpits, and
engines. The main advantages are fuel efficiency, maintenance cost savings,
pilot/ATC91 friendliness, and customer trust and recognition. For all these
reasons, there has been an unprecedented movement towards establishing
partnerships or finding foreign contractors to assist export sales, and gradually
domestic sales also.
This tendency is not without its problems or its opponents. Mark
Vineberg, General Director of the Mil Design Bureau, expressed caution at the
prospect of being too dependent upon Western partners, and supported Rutskoi's
(then Vice-President) suggestion of a return to a greater degree of Governmental
support, even though his own enterprise has not been without success at fmding
foreign collaborators. 92 Tupolev's General Director also expressed a desire to see
a limit on foreigners' involvement in the industry, hoping the domestic market
would remain Russian; 93 his reluctance to see Tupolev's 60% of that market
being challenged is hardly surprising, however. Yet this concern is by no means
purely an issue of self-interest; it is very clear that partnerships with foreign
enterprises will almost exclusively deal with the few aircraft which are
Kommersant', 14 June 1993.
91 ATC = Air Traffic Control
92 Moscow Tribune. 26 May 1993.
tB Kommersant. no. 11, 15-21 March 1993.
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internationally competitive. If no supplementary support is offered by the
Russian government or IFIs, all other types of aircraft will instead gradually be
replaced by foreign models. Although this is often an inevitable process as all
economies become more internationalized, in this case it can be argued to be
particularly regrettable, as much of the existing expertise and infrastructure of the
aeronautics industry in Russia may be lost without having been given a
reasonable adaptation period to carve out a place in both the domestic and
international markets. In some cases it may already be too late; whilst the trend
now is to obtain Western avionics, there are claims that in some aspects the
Russian systems were superior, but priorities of compatibility and reputation have
prevailed. There is regret that joint development of systems did not start early
enough. 94
From the point of view of Western enterprises investing in the Russian
aeronautics industry, the situation is also very difficult. Worst of all are the
political, legal and monetary instabilities mentioned in chapter three. The
different approach to work, to respecting schedules and customer expectations all
regularly emerge as grievances, as well as the huge cost of introducing Western
levels of quality control. Added to this, in the aeronautics industry, are the
certification, finance and insurance problems. Another restrictive factor is the
lack of funds behind local demand; domestic sales cannot be counted on for a
very long time as a source of profit, as higher prices cause a decrease in Russian
air travel.
Despite all the problems and worries, important partnerships are being
struck. Not least because of Russia's large, well-disciplined and aviation-oriented
workforce, and the presence of enormous production facilities, the degree of
interest and support from Western partners has been extremely high. First we
will examine the two most important projects to join Western technology to
Russian airframes thus far, involving the Tupolev 204 and the Iliushin 96.
Interview with Tupolev engineers. 7 September 1992.
..ppendix t: .%eronautica as an Ezample of the Potential for
Increased Commercial Interaction ith Western Europe
The task of fitting the Tu-204 with Rolls-Royce engines is one which both
companies started working on in early 1990. One of the highlights of this project
is the company which was formed to run it - BRA VIA (standing for the British
Russian Aviation Company), is a Russian Joint Stock Company which was
formed in April 1992, its shareholders being London-based Flemings Merchant
Bank (or more precisely their Flemings Russia Investment Corporation venture
capital fund; they control 50% of BRA VIA's shares), the Tupolev Design Bureau,
and the Ulianovsk Aviastar Complex. Such a sizable project involves many risks,
and so Anatolii Bratukhin, head of the Russian Aviation Industry Department,
was found in order to provide high-level governmental support. 95
 Rolls-Royce
could not be a shareholder, because of conflicts of interest with their involvement
with the B-75 7,96 but it does have a member on BRAVIA's Council. For the
Rolls-Royce powered version of the Tu-204, BRAVIA is responsible for the
engines, the avionics, interior, certification, sales and customer support. It has
exclusive sales rights. 97 The Russian partners are to cover the costs of technical
work on airframe modification and of certification programmes (a similar
arrangement exists with the Iliushin-96 project). 98 Regardless of the widespread
claims of differences in approaches and of infighting, the BRAVIA team have
managed to get the first major re-engined Russian aircraft airborne almost on
schedule. It must also be stressed at this stage that despite the attention this
project has received, Western investment has not been massive; the fact that the
engines remain the property of the Western partner means that only the relatively
low costs of staff; travel and Russian offices have to be disbursed.
Such re-engming is not possible with any combination of plane and engine,
even if the thrust level would appear to fit. A tremendous amount of adjusting
has to be done and great attention must be focused on not compromising the
BRA VIA Farnborough '92 Briefing, September 1992. and Inreravia Air Letter. 13 April 1992.
96 Interview with N. P. Whittaker. RR Sales Financing Manager. 12 July 1992.
9 Presentation by George Horton. Head of BRAVIA and of the Flentings Russian Investment
Corporation (FRIC). at the Deve1opment of a Modern Air Transport Industry
 in the CIS' Conference.
13 May 1993.
Interavia Aerospace Review, July 1992.
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design and safety criteria of the airframe. Although the RB-2 I l/Tu-204
combination was possible, it involved a great deal of re-adaptation work. The
reasoning behind re-engining must be very good to justify the RB-2 li's cost of
$6.5-8m, when compared with the PS-90A's price of around $320,000.
According to BRAVIA's Mike Blore, the main advantage of the Western engine
will be in reliability and operational costs. 99 Furthermore, the RB-21 1 is a
definite winner with noise levels; it passes European and American Stage
3/Chapter 3 criteria, which is essential if the aircraft is ever to break into Western
markets in the longer-tenn.'°°
The international version of the Tu-204 does not only have Rolls-Royce as
a Western supplier. Hunting Aviation will supply the interiors, whilst a cargo
system package will be provided by the Pemco Aircraft Cargo Systems Division,
of California. 101
 Collins are responsible for the avionics.
There were delays holding up Russian certification of the RB-2 11 powered
Tu-204, although it was expected that full JAR flight certification would be
achieved in the first quarter of 1994, and full JAA certification in 1995-96. With
the aircraft having reached marketing stage, BRA VIA have set up a leasing group,
as outright buying has now become a rarity. The targeted market consists of
Russian airlines, especially for their international routes; other CIS airlines, and
CIS routes; and airlines from developing countries.' 02
 Although conflicting
evidence has emerged about the cost, it is usually estimated at $35-40m. To
hedge their investment, BRAVIA have diversified, starting with a series of wood-
processing ventures, already established in Ulianovsk. Izhevsk and Krasnodar.'°3
Now that this particular project is past its worst problems, it is possible
that other variants, and in particular a Pratt & Whitney powered version of the
Tu-204, to be called the Il-96M, could become a reality. This project has been
Flight International. 12-18 August 1992.
100 
.4viation International News. 7 September 1992.
101 Aviation Week & Space Technology. 12 July
 1993: and presentation by George Horton. Head
of BRAVIA and of the Flemings Russian Investment Corporation (FRIC). at the 'Development of a
Modern Air Transport Industxy in the CIS' Conference. 13 May 1993.
102 Ibid
103 Kommersant' 14 June 1993.
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talked about for almost as long as the Rolls-Royce partnership, but the level of
commitment needed to make the first project succeed has so far kept Pratt &
Whitney by the wayside; exactly the same reasons are blamed for Rolls-Royce
not yet having a firm foothold in the 11-96 re-engining programme.
The Iliushin-Pratt & Whitney venture is not a partnership in the same sense
as BRAVIA is; Pratt & Whitney remains a contractor of Iliushin, and the other
seventeen Western suppliers are also contracted by Iliushin, thus absolving P&W
of unnecessary financial responsibility. Yet even in this case, a memorandum of
understanding was signed by Iliushin, P&W and the Russian government's
Anatolii Bratukhin.'°4
 In this project also, the engines on the prototypes remain
the property of the Western manufacturer, and major capital investment from the
Western side is avoided; estimates of P&W's investment are approximately $60-
$ lOOm. Financing from the Russian side is said to have been a problem, and
barter possibilities are still being looked at as a way to allow further
investments.105
The reasons for choosing the PW-2337 instead of the PS-9OAs are the
same as in the Tu-204 project. The adaptation work required, however, is
substantially different for both Russian and Western partners.'°6
Of the other Western components provided for this project, the cockpit and
avionics are being supplied by Rockwell-Collins, who have subcontracted Smiths
Industries for the flight management system, and Litton for the inertial reference
system.'°7
There is even more optimism about the il-96M than there is about the Tu-
204, some experts expecting it to take away much of the A-340's custom: 108 the
June 1993 Paris Airshow saw an order by the Dutch company Partnair for five Ii-
104 !nterw:a Air Lelter. 13 April 1992.
105 Interview with George Dieck Project Engineer. PW 2000 Russian Program. 19 March 1993.
106 See Interavia Aerospace Review. July 1992. and Aviation International News, 7 September
1992.
107 Ibid.
108 Interview with Craig Mariacci. Sales Manager, Skyplan Services International (Calgar y). 11
May l993•
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96Ms. and five 11-96Ts.'° 9
 The latter is the cargo version. also powered by
PW2337s. and viewed as the ideal vehicle to break into the Western market,
avoiding the effect of any possible passenger prejudice against Russian planes."°
It is apparently this hard currency order which secured intervention by Prime
Minister Chernomyrdin. granting major tax and tariff concessions to P&W-
powered Iliushins." 1 Production deliveries are expected to begin in 1995, 112
 and
the conglomerate is hoping to produce around 300 of these aircraft over the next
ten to fifteen years.
Iliushin are also involved in a much smaller project, to re-engine the II-
103. UK-based Euro Iliushin Aircraft Sales is initially importing twenty of these
four to five seater airframes, most likely to be coupled with Continental engines
of about 200 horse power. The company expects to provide $3.5m to assist the
manufacturing process in Russia." 3
 The 11-114, described in the previous
section, is also being marketed with Western engines. The American company
Allison, although it had not signed a fonnal Memorandum of Understanding with
fliuslun, jointly presented a brochure at the June 1993 Paris Airshow for a GMA
2 100-powered 11-114, which could be ready for revenue service in 1996."
Iakovlev produces Russia's most serious contender to enter the
business/shuttle jet market - the Iak-40. Three of these regional liners are now
going to be combined with Textron Lycoming LF-507 engines, as the first step in
the partnership between the two firms. There is an estimated Russian market for
as many as one thousand such aircraft," 5 although there have been signs of the
Iak-40, admittedly powered with Russian engines, not attracting the businessjet
clientele (see next section). Future projects of this partnership could include re-
109 Moscow News, no. 7, 18-24 February 1994.
110 Flight International, 16-22 September 1992.
111 Aerospace Propulsion. 9 June 1994.
112 Flight International. 19-25 August 1992.
113 Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 September 1992.
114 Commuter RegionalAirline News. 14 June 1993.
115 .4ir & Cosmos/Aviation Magazine. no. 1393. 28 September-4 October 1992.
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equipping the lak-48 wide-body aircraft with LF-507 engines and Western
avionics to make it a competitive regional jet airliner.' 16
Amphibious aircraft technology is an area in which Russia is particularly
respected, and can hope to turn into profit. The T- 101 remake of the An-2 has
airady been commented upon, but an even more ambitious project, with a strong
element of conversion, is Miacheslav's T- 102 (lamal). 117 The larnal is being built
by the Aviaspetstrans consortium, including Miacheslav.. several research
institutes, the Moscow regional Commercial Bank. and several government
bodies. The project is expected to cost $1 lOm. Canadair have been approached
for cooperation on the lamal, as have Pratt & Whitney of Canada, the latter
offering four free PT6 engines to test the prototypes. 118 There are apparently
already twenty orders for the T- 102. 119
 Miacheslav has also approached Canadair
on the possibility of serial production of their CL-4 15 twin-turboprop amphibian
in Russia.
Moving now to joint projects in helicopter production, Kamov's scheme
with Allison to power the Ka-226 with Allison 250-C2OB turbines' 20 appears to
be the most concrete, the Western powered helicopter having flown in 1992. The
Ka-226, aimed at both the domestic and foreign markets, will be marketed by the
recently created Russian Helicopter Company Ltd.'21
One venture which appeared for some time to be definite between Kamov.
Rolls-Royce and Turbomeca had by mid-1993 to all intents and purposes been
abandoned. The RR-Turbomeca RTM-322 powered Ka-62 medium-sized
helicopter was supposed to have been certified in 1994, 122 but this programme
was halted, according to rumours reported by Rolls-Royce sources, because
Turbomeca was forced out in order to protect the French helicopter market. If
116 Aviation Week & Space Technology, 21 September 1992.
117 For technicaJ details. see Air & Cosmos / Aviation Iagazine. no. 1389. 3 lAugust-6
September 1992.
118 Flight International. 19-25 August 1992.
119 Presentation by Mrs. Baranova. Deputy General Director of the Aviaspetstrans consortium.
during e 'Development of a Modern Air Transpon Industry in the CIS' Conference, 13 May 1993.
120 Aviation International News, 7 September 1992.
121 Business & CommercialAviation, April 1992.
122 Aviation International News, 7 September 1992.
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these rumours are true, this would be the first obvious case of covert
protectionism against Russian commercial aircraft. yet a scenario which could
easily become a common and serious threat to the rebirth of the Russian
aeronautics industry.
Yet French involvement does not seem to have prevented Eurocopter, the
joint venture where France's Aerospatiale has a majority holding and is coupled
with Deutsche Aerospace's MBB helicopter division. 123
 from reaching
arrangements with Russian helicopter producers. The most developed project is
with Kamov, with Turbomeca again appearing as one of the likely suppliers of
engines (TP-319s) for the EC-150, competing with Allison 250s and P&WC
205s. Eurocopter were hoping for a 50% participation by Kamov and the Russian
government, including half of the estimated $1 65m research and development
costs. If the expected demand for 3,000 such helicopters materializes, the
resulting income to the Russian half would be over $Sbn. Eurocopter is also
envisaging development of a helicopter project with the Mil Bureau and the
Kazan works,' 24
 but by early 1994 progress on this project had been very slow,
as all sides were finding it difficult to attract the necessary funding.'25
Other projects of this nature include Tupolev's plans to equip their Tu-330
with BMW/RR BR-715 turbofan engines;' 26
 and Aviastar Complex and
Antonov's three-deck An-225 prototype.'27
123 Eurocopter - The Group, marketing leaflet EI-002. June 1992.
124 Interview with Christina Gotzhein. Manager of Public Relations. Eurocopter International. 8
september 1992.
125 Moscow News, no. 7, 18-24 Februaiy 1994.
126 Flight International. 19-25 August 1992.
127 Flight International. 29 July-4 August 1992.
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A1.6 Joint Production Partnerships with Vestern Enterprises, and the Most
Marketable Areas of Russian Expertise
To provide pre-fabricated Western equipment to add onto Russian airframes is
one thing; to invest in long-term joint production is quite another. Admittedly,
there are many grey areas, most of all where there is a need for some degree of
joint production to enable the coupling of Western and Russian technology to
work. The importance of joint production or research is that, through technology
transfer, or sometimes simply by creating an awareness of expected standards, it
paves the way for Russian enterprises to be able to compete effectively in the
international market.
The progress in joint production or research projects has been tremendous
in the 1992-94 period. In 1992, any joint production projects were still at the
hypothetical stage, and only a few tentative joint research programmes had been
initiated. By the time of writing, however, and contrarily to expectations in 1992,
there are many Western aeronautics companies who have braved the political risk
and economic uncertainty, and committed themselves to long-term work with
Russian counterparts.
The main sphere of joint production, so far, is in aero-engine development
and manufacturing. For the same reasons that Western engines were chosen for
export models of Russian planes, there have been two main approaches to joint
projects: either producing a Western engine in Russia, or components thereof; or
working jointly to improve Russian engine designs; in many cases, there are plans
to do both. Apart from the obvious advantage of cost, another potential benefit
of Russian-produced engines is that CIS airlines, if being supported by either
governmental or IMFIIBRD fmancing, may well be put under some pressure to
choose Russian/CIS engines.'28
The Russian company which has attracted the most attention for this type
of project is the Perm'/Aviadvigatel' complex. Perm"s PS-90 turbofan is
128 Interavia Aerospace Review, July 1992.
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comparable in size and thrust to the P\V2000 and RB-211, and it powers the Tu-
204s and Il-96s which are not equipped with Western turbines. In negotiating a
deal with Western partners, Penn appears to have played Western competitors
very effectively against each other. The first joint enterprise involving Penn'
which was discussed was one with the GE-Snecma joint venture CFM, in which
CFM was to control 20% of shares.' 29 By mid-1993, however, despite a statement
in September by GE stating that it was still in the running,' 3° Pratt & Whitney
appeared to have secured the 'strategic joint venture' with Penn/Aviadvigatel'.
Pratt & Whitney acquisition of Penn' Aeroengine Corporation stock is likely to
have played a part in this, although to what extent is unclear.' 31 By the spring of
1994, P&W had stated that they would invest $120-150m in a redesign of the PS-
90 (the PS-90P) with some of the work being carried out by P&W's German
partner, Motor und Turbinen Union (MTU). Pratt & Whitney are hoping for
certification of the jointly produced PS-90 in late 1996. The joint venture is
already evaluating projects to jointly develop next generation engines, possibly
even to replace the PW2000. 132
 The clearest sign that this partnership is serious
caine in June 1994, when the Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC, of
the USA) granted P&W and MTU $200m in political risk insurance.133
Pratt & Whitney's sister company, Pratt & Whitney of Canada (P&WC),
has been another leader in achieving joint production agreements. In August
1993, P&WC and the Klimov engine-building complex established a joint
enterprise - P&WfKlimov Ltd.; this joint venture was registered by the Russian
government in November. P&WC will hold 51% of the joint venture, the
remainder being held by the Kliniov Corporation.' 34 P&W/Klimov will at first
assemble and test PW200s and PT-6s, and although the volume of investment has
not been specified, P&W/Klimov already have orders for Russian-produced PT6s
129 Air & Cosmos/Aviation Magazine. no. 1385. 29 June-S July 1992.
130 Aviation Week & Space Technology, 13 September 1993.
131 Moscow Tribune, 26 May 1993.
132 Flight International, 18-24 May 1994.
133 BEE, 4 July 1994. p. 9.
134 Aviation Week & Space Technology, 20 September 1993.
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from the joint venture between the Miasishchev Design Bureau and the Tec-Avia
Management Group (Germany), for their twenty-four-seater MM-i.
Development finance of $1 OOm has already been secured for the MM- 1.13 5
 The
PW300 has also been chosen by the joint project between Israel Aircraft
Industries and Iakovlev, for their 'Galaxy' aircraft.136
The development and marketing of engines is also the aim of a joint
project between Textron Lycoming and the Soiuz Aero Engine Technical
Complex (AESTC). In the short-term, the joint programme will concentrate on
the production, certification and marketing of the Lycoming LF507, which is
being offered for various projects to Tupolev, Sukhoi and Iliushin, and has
already been chosen for the re-engining of the Iak-40 and Iak-48. Other projects
being envisaged are on the Soiuz R126 regional turbofan, as well as the LF512
turbofan and LP5 12 turboprop. Soiuz, which produced the engines for the MiG-
21 and MiG-27, should be a contender for US government conversion funds.'37
The other main Russian producer of powerplants for military jets, the
Saturn Design Bureau, has also concluded a joint enterpiise. The venture will be
80% owned by ABB (Sweden/Switzerland), and is to be called ABB Uniturbo.
The joint venture aimed to manufacture components for power plants, to work
jointly on engineering, as well as research and development.'38
Airbus Industrie, very possibly putting some of its Russian research work
on light metals into practice already, has contracted Tupolev to provide titanium
wing pylons for Airbuses. It is also evaluating the Tu-334 as a possible vehicle
for a joint project with Tupolev, Alema (Italy) and DASA (Germany),' 39
 and has
even had talks with Aviastar about possible assembly work on future Airbus
programmes, including the 600 and 800-seater concepts under study.'4°
135 Commuter Regional Airline News, 13 September 1993.
136 Air & Cosmos/Aviation International. 9-15 May 1994.
137 Flight International, 18-24 May 1994.
138 BEE, 4 October 1993, p. 10.
139 Air & Cosmos / Aviation International, 6-12 September 1993.
140 Flight International, 29 July-4 August 1992.
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Out of the Tupolev 204 re-engimng programme led by BRAVIA, already a
few genuine joint production ventures have been established. We have already
seen that Hunting Aircraft will soon be producing aircraft interiors in Russia
through the AVINTCO joint venture. More impressive is the fact that BRAVIA
may not incorporate Rockwell-Collins' avionics in their production aircraft, as by
then the Russian-American joint venture 'ARIA' (not to be confused with
Aeroflot Russian International Airlines) may have sufficiently developed the
BRED-IKBO ARIA-200 integrated system for it to run the RR-powered Tu-
204.141
By the end of 1993, the EU had also become involved in aeronautics
through TACIS. The 1992 Programme included two aerospace-related actions,
both concentrated in the Moscow region. Mikoian was to receive consultancy
and training worth 0.98mECU to assist in defining how, and to what extent, it
should adapt its production and testing to enter the Western European and other
international civil aviation markets. The second project from the 1992 budget,
valued at 1. 15mECU, was also aimed at a study of the non-militaiy production
capabilities of former defence manufacturer, the Lukhovitskii Machine Building
Plant. The study was to identify products to be developed, and offer
recommendations regarding adaptation of the corporate structure.142
Of the three actions catered for in the 1993 TACIS Programmes, that
supporting the 'Soiuz' Scientific and Production Association is very similar to
those of 1992, providing 1mECU in assistance in drawing up a feasibility study of
which branches of civilian technology this former specialist in rocket propulsion
should focus on. The two other actions focus much more on one of the main
problems pin-pointed in this appendix - the lack of compatible testing and
certification standards. The federal Russian Action Programme, which includes
the Soiuz project, also fmances a 2.5mECU action to assist the Mi! and Kamov
helicopter producing bureaux in assimilating Western certification standards.
141 Moscow News, no. 7, 18-24 Februaiy 1994.
142 'lAdS 1992 - Action Programme - Moscow', European Comniission document, Brussels,
14 September 1992, pp. 9 and 37.
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This project will concentrate in particular on reviewing the differences between
Russian and JAR (West European Joint Airworthiness Requirements) technical
and regulatory requirements, as well as recommending improved certification
procedures. 143
 The other 1993 project supporting aeronautics is to be found in
the Western Siberia Action Programme. This 1 .2mECU action is designed to
assist the Novosibirsk Aircraft Industrial Association (NAPO - another former
military aircraft producer) not only in the production and marketing of a light
aircraft, but also in making its certification procedures compatible with those of
the West. Some of the areas requiring reworking include test process
qualification, certification of materials, sub-contracters, and suppliers.'44
This is a very impressive list of projects to have been accumulated in two years.
Although the volumes of investment are relatively modest for the industry, most
of these projects require investment upwards of $1 OOm - a good start by any
measure. One fascinating aspect of these joint projects is that, despite the novelty
and uncertainty of the situation in Russia, the aims are very ambitious. Whilst
experts were predicting in 1992 that the first joint production projects were likely
to be in the production of simple parts, such as casings and blades (China and
Poland have been supplying similar parts to Western companies for over a
decade), in fact Western companies have sought to tap Russian expertise to a
greater degree, despite the complications involved.
Difficulties are bound to arise, quite apart from the common problems
inherent to partnerships in Russia. The question of technology sharing is never an
easy one; the same problems could be encountered which destroyed a much
earlier joint programme between RR and GE, after RR refused to reveal an aspect
of its technology which gave it a competitive edge.' 45 Nevertheless, the pressure
143 'TACIS 1993 - Action Programme - Russian Federation', European Commission
document, no date, pp. 23-24.
144 'TACIS 1993 - Action Programme - Western Siberia'. European Commission document,
no date, p. 18.
145 Interview with Richard D. Ciocheui. Rolls-Royce's Chief Representative in Moscow; 1 June
1993.
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of competitors also seeking deals to exploit Russian aeronautics potential has
proven to be very strong, pushing executives to take a chance with Russian
partners.
From the Russian perspective, it may be worrying that the first priority of
these projects is to either supply parts for Western engines or aircraft, or produce
Western engines in Russia; the execution of Russian ideas will come second, if at
all. 146
 This reflects a problem in the different approach of Russian and Western
aeronautics specialists. The Russian aeronautics industry has been used to a very
sectorized and theoretical approach, with little concern for the costs. Once the
cost of materials gets closer to world prices, however, interesting ideas such as
silicon-based blades or carbon-based turbine compressors (as have been
developed in Russia)' 47 are most likely to become more expensive than they are
worth, especially considering the present depressed state of the aircraft market.'48
Nonetheless, the very high level of Russian scientific research has
persuaded many Western aircraft producers to invest in R&D in Russia. With the
standard of wages still a small fraction of those in the West, the opportunities are
enormous. Boeing has been a pioneer in conducting such work in Russia, and has
gone on to open their own research centre in Moscow, to employ only a few
Boeing engineers and up to thirty Russians.'49
The TsAGI has also found many other foreign partners. Snecma has
signed fourteen contracts for R&D in Russia, not only with TsAGI, but also
withTsIAM (Central Institute for Aviation Metals) and MA!. Snecma is also
planning a very large joint project on titanium. Hiring out facilities to
Lockheed/General Dynamics and to Rockwell International is being negotiated;
TsAGI still need more contracts to cover their cost, now that government funding
covers less than half.'5°
146 See. for example, the problems of the Kuznetsov Bureau in Air International, July 1992.
147 Aviation Week & Space Technology, 30 March 1992.
148 Interview with Richard D. Ciochetti, Rolls-Royce's Chief Representative in Moscow; 1 June
1993.
149 Flight International, 19-25 August 1992. and Interavia Air Letler, 17 August 1992.
150 Moscow Tribune, 26 May 1993.
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Airbus Industrie, as hinted above, is another Western company which has
been conducting research projects in Russia. Discussions have been held with the
All-Russian Institute of Aviation Materials (VrAM) to test light-weight lithium-
bearing aluminium alloys, which could eventually be used on the new A3301340
family.' 51
 Another area in which Airbus has done research with Russian
specialists is cryogenic fuels.'52
Looking at know-how which will be needed in the longer term,
Aerospatiale, the French component of Airbus, has also signed contracts for R&D
with TsIAM and MAI research institutes for the French 'Prepha' hypersonic
programme. The work they will be concerned with relates to 'superstato', an
indispensible technology for hypersonic flight.' 53 Research into hypersonic flight
is being done on an important scale in Russia. Tupolev have begun bench-testing
several structures for a new single-stage-to-orbit hypersonic aircraft, capable of
speeds up to Mach 20-25. It is proving very difficult to fmd investors, however;
France and Japan have been approached in particular, but these countries are
already involved in their own hypersonic aircraft programme. Going beyond the
role of contractor, as is being done by IsLAM and MAT, may prove to be very
difficult in projects involving such state-of-the art technology. That having been
said, joint space technology programmes between Russia and Europe, and Russia
and the USA, show that sharing even the most sensitive technologies need not be
impossible.
Other areas of aeronautics technolgy in which Russia's experience may
prove marketable include the development of blimp-type aircraft. In a programme
started in the mid-1980s, the ALA-40 'Thermoplane' is an ecologically clean
vessel which should be able to carry five-six tonnes, and is only a prototype for
the giant ALA-500, intended for 500-600 t cargoes. Suggested uses of this
aircraft are as a fire fighting vehicle, as an emergency evacuation craft, or as a
mobile hospital; in every case helped by the fact that it needs virtually no ground
151 The Financial Times, 12 June 1992.
152 For details of a joint Airbus and Tupolev study. see Aviation Daily, 9 June 1994.
153 Air & Cosmos/Aviation International. 6-12 September 1993.
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support. Western interest has been great. but no concrete cooperation projects
have emerged.
The amphibious aircraft industry also has ambitious plans for the future,
hoping to build on the experience of the Soviet military's 'ekranoplan'
programmes, or wing-in-ground-effect (WIGE) cargo planes. A Virginia-based
company is being funded by the US Defence Advanced Research Department to
explore the possibilities of such aircraft, and has signed cooperation protocols
with the Panchenkov and Alekseyev institutes.'54
Clearly, the potential for future cooperation is great. As costs and risks rise in
aviation projects generally, and increasingly complex tasks require ever-higher
levels of research, Western manufacturers are likely to seek many more such
partnerships. It would certainly be a tremendous waste to have affordable yet
top-class aeronautics researchers and facilities standing idle, whilst the
aeronautical challenges of tomorrow beckon.
A1.7 Conclusions
Thus the competition is on between Russian and Western aircraft manufacturers,
as it should be in an open market. Despite the various successes of Western
companies in selling or leasing wholly Western-produced planes in the CIS, the
best sign for the future of the aeronautics industry in Russia is that the same
companies are investing in Russia, not merely in the production of components of
Western aircraft, but more importantly in the production of aircraft which truly
combine the abilities of Russia and the West.
It should be clear that the potential for Russia's aeronautics industry to
increase its share of the global market is there. The projects described here have
mostly been limited to those which are either confirmed, or have come close to it;
154 For details, see Flight International, 11-17 March 1992.
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there are many more again which are at a more informal stage, just waiting for the
right conditions. With so many projects confirmed despite the uncertainties of
investing in Russia, exponential growth of such cooperation can be expected
when the political and economic situation stabilizes. As in other areas, this sector
could also greatly benefit from a clear and enforceable legislative framework for
investment and foreign trade, so that special concessions such as those granted to
Pratt & Whimey in the Penn joint venture are not needed. Finally, there is a need
for investment guarantees (such as that granted by the OPIC to P&W) to be much
more forthcoming, a truer reflection of the confidence the Western aeronautics
executives themselves have in the future of their Russian counterparts.
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Appendix 2: Oil and Gas as an Example of the Potential for
Increased Russian Commercial Interaction with Western
Europe
A2.1 Importance of Sector
The oil and gas sector is not only of fundamental importance to the Russian
economy's ability to play a significant role in the global economy as a whole, it
will also become an ever more weight-bearing pillar commercial interdependence
with the EU states.
The disadvantage of this is the vulnerability that comes with dependency
on one particular market for exports, in this case oil and gas, which was
demonstrated during the 1986 drop in oil prices. The overall value of Soviet
exports to the industrialized West dropped 29.3% from the previous year to
Rb 13. lbn in 1986, thus burdening Moscow with a Rb2.Thn (hard currency) trade
deficit with the industrialized West. In terms of hard currency exports to the
industrialized West, crude oil and oil products decreased by S4.8bn (or 37.9%) to
$7.9bn in 1986, whilst gas export earnings from the OECD market decreased
slightly ($3.SObn from $3.4Obn) despite a 26.7% increase (to 38 bcm) in the
volume exported.' As a proportion of total hard currency export earnings (that is,
not only from the OECD), despite energy export revenue having recovered at over
$ l3bn, they still represented only 51.5% of hard currency export revenue,
compared to 66.6% in 1984. By 1989, Smith estimates that, at $12.Thn, fuels
represented 43.1% of hard currency exports. 2 The proportion of exports to the
EC which consist of hydrocarbons is considerably higher. In 1990, the $12.3bn in
I	 Alan Smith, Russia and the World Economy - Problems of Integration, London, 1993, p. 80;
based on a combination of OECD and Vneshtorg figures.
2 Alan Smith, 1993, Op. cit., p. 143: these figures are only approximations, however, to give one
example, figures for energy exports to OECD countries only have in some years been higher than the
total for hard currency gas and oil export earnings, for example in 1989, when they were calculated at
$ 14,053m and $13,268 respectively. The same trends are nonetheless reflected in both tables.
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fuel exports to the Twelve (or $15.3bn if the former GDR is included) represented
62.2% of total exports to the Community (or 60.3% if the ex-GDR is added); in
1991, $12.Thn or 58.6% (including the Eastern Lander); and in 1992, $12.Thn or
577%•3
In terms of hard currency earnings, according to Russia's Minister for Fuel
and Energy Iurii Shaftanil, Russia's dependence on the energy complex had
increased by 25% in the first quarter of 1993 alone. 4
 Crude oil exports (excluding
oil products) from Russia to outside the FSU in 1992 managed to climb to over 66
mt, a 17% increase on the 56 mt dispatched in the previous year, 5 and in 1993 this
increase continued, with a 62% increase in crude exports (reaching 11.8 mt) in
January and February compared to the same period in 1992. Natural gas exports
for the same period increased even more, by 24% to 15.5 bcm. 6 This has been
possible, despite falling volumes of production of both oil and gas, most of all
because of Russia's new-found freedom in choosing whether to keep its oil in the
FSU or to export it further afield. Exports from Russia proper are much higher
than the figures for the FSU; for example, in 1988 oil and petroleum products
leaving Russia amounted to 295 mt (as opposed to 183 mt for the USSR), and 193
mt in 1991 (97 mt for the USSR);7
 these figures show that Russia has not avoided
a decline in oil sold outside its borders, but can merely disguise it by using figures
which conceal the reduction in exports to former Soviet republics.
In the near future Russia has little choice but to exploit her undeniable
comparative advantage in energy production. The size of Russian energy reserves
is truly impressive. Despite the fluctuations in production, Russia has remained
the world's largest extractor of oil. From an output of 491 mt in 1975, Soviet oil
International Trade 1993 Statistics, GATF, Geneva, 1993, p. 25; these statistics have the
advantage of being based on Western figures, and not comparing energy products with other goods priced
in soft currency, or which may have been bartered.
Moscow News, no. 24, 11 June 1993.
5	 My, no. 11, June 1993; and Oil and Gas, no.3,1993.
6 Kommersant', 23 march 1993.
P. Godec, La situation petroliêre dans l'ex-URSS: l'évolution rdcente, les perspectives',
Februaiy 1993; copy given by author.
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production increased every year until it reached 616 mt in 1983.8 After dropping
to 595 mt in 1985, production again increased to an all-time high of 624 mt in
1988 following large-scale investment and unfortunately for long-term
production, short-sighted approaches to immediate extraction which reduced the
potential total capacity of many reservoirs. Yet even these measures could not
prevent another decline in production to 607 mt as early as 1989, plummeting
further to 570 mt in 1990. Although the above figures refer to production in the
USSR as a whole, Russian output accounts for the vast majority of this; for 1993,
Russia's oil output was expected to be 86.7% of FSU production (357.5 mt out of
412.5 mt'°). In fact, however, production in 1993 was yet another
disappointment; after having fallen to 384 mt in 1992, Russian production shrunk
further to 333 mt in 1993. 11 Explored reserves, upon which to base expectations
of future production, have not been a basis for hopes of a return to the levels of
production of the mid-1980s. British Petroleum has estimated the R/P rate
(explored reserves ratio to that of production) at 13, whilst Petroconsultants have
estimated it at 10 in 1985.12 Although these rates are similar to those of the USA,
in relation to the reserve levels of the 1970s they are discouraging, especially
when considering that the different classification system in calculating reserves in
the FSU probably overstates these figures, in relation to Western ones. Yet many
experts believe that such low reserve estimations are misleading. Exploration has
been a low priority in the Soviet oil industry in the late 1980s, representing only
18-19% of total drilling efforts, and it tends to be of poor quality; seismic surveys
in the USSR were supposedly only 20% as efficient as those of the USA.' 3 An
Jonathan P. Stern, Soviet Oil and Gas Exports to the West, Aldershot, 1987, p. 83, and Marshall
I. Goldman, The Enigma of Soviet Petroleum - Half-empty or Half-full?, London, 1980, p. 64.
Arild Moe, 'The Soviet Oil Industry: Where Do We Go From Here?, in The Soviet Economy
Under Gorbachev, NATO Colloquium 1991, Brussels, 1991, p. 82.
10 Moscow News, no. 24, 11 June 1993, based on information from the School of International
Business of the Moscow State Institute of International Relations.
11 OECDstats,1994,p.8O
12 Arild Moe, op. cit., p. 87; taken from, respectively, the BP Statistical Review of World Energy,
July 1989, and Soviet Geography, November 1987, p. 630.
13 Arild Moe, op. cit., p. 87, from Stroitel'stvo Truboprovodov. no. 12, 1988, p. 1.
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increase in the amount and quality of exploratory work could well restore a very
enviable R/P ratio to the Russian oil industry.
Even despite the inadequacies of its exploration data, Russia can clearly
claim to have the world's largest natural gas reserves, already accounting for
approximately 40% of global proven reserves. Seven of the world's ten largest
gas fields are to be found in Western Siberia. By the end of the centuiy, the CIS
gas industry (of which over 80% is expected to originate from Russian territory'4
) could well be producing 1,000 billion cubic metres (bcm) per year.' 5 Already
by 1990 the USSR was producing 850 bcm, almost double the 435 bcm figure for
1980. By 1992, however, gas production for the FSU had decreased to 788.1
bcm. Although the rate of increase in gas production has levelled off from around
10% p.a. in the early 1980s to a slight decrease in 1991_92,16 the reason lies in
lack of investment capital, not in the lack of accessible gas. A report by the
Cambridge Energy Research Associates notes that the sheer size of resources is
not the only reason for the gas industry escaping the depressed state of the oil
industry; the fact that there was less need for sophisticated technology, the smaller
scale of the needed workforce, and the creation of an independent yet still
monopolist ruling body in Gazprom are all factors which have enabled gas
production to remain high.'7 The importance of gas in relation to oil had also
been on the increase; by 1990 gas output in the CIS had overtaken oil production,
in terms of standard fuel equivalent. Russia's own gas production was of 254
bcm in 1980, 589.8 bcm in 1988, and 640.6 bcm in 1992; 18 the slow-down in
production has thus been less in Russia, for example, production being up 8.6%
between 1988 and 1992, compared to 2.4% for the FSU as a whole.
Of equal importance to the supply of oil and gas, in determining how much
energy Russia has at its disposal for export, is domestic demand. Only if Russian
4 According to tables provided by the Russian Ministry of Energy and Fuels, April 1992.
15 Jonathan P. Stern, 1987, op. cit., pp. 8-9.16 Oil and Gas Russia, no. 1, 1992, P. 97; Ekonomika i zhizn', no. 5, 1991, gave a lower gas
production figure for 1990, however, at 815 bcm.
Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1992.
18 New Markets Monthly, October 1993, p. 5.
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demand for gas and especially for oil can avoid growth, and energy wastage be
reduced, can Russian oil and gas exports play the role they should. An
underestimation of the importance of local consumption, and of its elasticity, has
been a main cause of the inaccuracy of many forecasts of Russian energy exports.
The most famous case is the prediction by the CIA in 1977 that by the mid-1980's
the USSR would have to import oil to satisf' CMEA needs. This estimation
turned out to be remarkably far from the truth, the USSR actually managing to
export 81 mt of crude oil to OECD countries in 1984, and 67 mt in 1985. The
CIA's estimation was spectacularly wide of the mark partly because it
underestimated Soviet oil production by 100-200 mt, but mostly because it
assumed that the Soviet economy would continue growing, and wasting energy, at
a fast pace, resulting in a growth in energy consumption of 2-3% p.a.. In fact
Russia managed to cut the growth rate of energy consumption during this period,
and increase the proportion of oil exports going to OECD countries (from 36.7%
of total exports in 1975 to 45.5% in 1984). 19 This tendency has become even
stronger, as domestic energy prices became ever closer to world prices in the first
six years of the 1990s.
The internal demand for oil is a very important issue, as the export market
conditions are much more favourable to oil than to gas, although this could
change towards the end of the century. In order to free oil for export, Russians
have long tried to substitute it with other fuels. 2° Most common has been the oil-
to-gas switch, which has proved to be the most logical solution as gas output has
boomed; many coal-burning power plants were also converted to gas in the 1980s.
Soviet gas consumption nearly doubled in the period from 1980 to 1990; in the
last six years of this period, electricity generating accounted for 60% of the new
gas. Yet despite a lack of lighter oil products, oil-to-gas substitution will not be
able to continue increasing much until the end of the decade, due to a lack of
capital for the re-equipment needed for this conversion, unless foreign investment
19 Jonathan P. Stern, 1987, op. cit., pp. 92-96, and Marshall I. Goldman. op. cit., p. 113.
20 Jonathan P. Stem, 1987, op. cit., p.10.
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is found.2 ' Although in both power stations and industrial boilers substitution of
gas for oil is not technically difficult, it involves infrastructure problems, and in
particular new pipeline connections to a large number of separate units.
Germany's Ruhrgas became involved in one such project in early 1993, providing
DM1 Om worth of financing for its first phase, the delivery of natural gas
processing and distribution systems to five Russian cities, through
Rosstroigazifikatsiia. 22
 Yet in some cases even the success of substitution is
problematic; the Soviet refming capabilities cannot cope with all the freed fuel oil
(mazut), which needs to be converted to lighter and more valuable hydrocarbons;
it has been argued that the 1982-84 surge of Soviet mazut exports to OECD
countries was due at least in part to the freeing of fuel oil from power stations.23
It is barely within Russia's means even to minimize the the decline of its
oil industry, let alone to hope for increases in production; of the 45 mt which had
been offered for export, the revenues from 25 mt were needed for essential oil
equipment, according to Mintopenergo figures. 24 Luckily for Russia, the gas
industry may be able to take over as the golden egg-laying goose. Already in
1991, gas exports from Russia had almost reached that of oil and oil products,
reaching 1.7 mt of oil equivalent. 25 This extremely young industry (in 1974 the
USSR was still a net importer of natural gas) may well be producing as much as
the gas output of the rest of the world put together by the end of the century.
Assuming that the necessary capital can be found for extraction, the main
question is whether demand can be found abroad for this gas; if so, the 70:30
balance of oil exports to gas exports which applied in the mid-1980s should have
been reversed by the year 2000.26
The remainder of this appendix will explore in greater detail, focusing on
the period between 1991 and 1993, the factors which will determine the future
21 Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1992.
22 BEE, 8 Februaty 1993, p. 12.
23 jonathan P. Stern, 1987, op. cit., p. 12.24 Kommersant", 23 March 1993.
25 Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1992.26 Jonathan P. Stern, 1987. op. cit., p. 70.
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level of energy trade between Russia and Western: the restrictions which have
traditionally limited exports to, and investment from the West; the spheres in
which Russia has the greatest need of European assistance; the aspects of the
Russian energy market which make it a tempting prospect for Western investors;
the main barriers yet to be broken in order to allow truly significant levels of
investment and know-how to flow in from the West; and fmally the main hopes
for the future.
A2.2 Previous Restrictions on Foreign Involvement in Oil and Gas, and New
Conditions Allowing Western Cooperation
The pre-perestroika possibilities for Western companies to open subsidiaries and
operate for profits or royalties were simply nonexistent. By the end of the Second
World War, the last of the few Western firms which had been allowed to operate
since NEP had been forced to leave.27
 This does not mean that Western
companies were to remain totally excluded; many of the problems of extraction
and transportation of fuels, for which Western partners are now being sought,
were already being tackled with the help of Western technology in the 1960s and
1970s. There were of course the gas pipes being offered by West European
countries, at first in the early 1960s for the 'Druzhba' pipeline, and those supplied
in the early l980s for the 'Progress' pipeline. 28
 Other examples of early
acquisition of EC oil and gas technology included a contract with a French firm to
install a gas lift system (explained below), one with Italy's Pressindustria to build
27 Marshall I. Goidnian, op. cit., p. 128.
28 Jonathan P. Stern, 1987, op. cit., p. 27.
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a plant to produce non-ionic surfactants to enhance recovery in water-logged
reservoirs, and an arrangement with West Germany's Borsig to provide two
carbon-dioxide liquefaction plants, used like gas to increase pressure in
reservoirs. 29 Although many of these projects were enormous and surely very
lucrative, the European partner was nonetheless restricted to the role of
contractor.
In pre-Gorbachev days, it was not only Moscow that put up barriers to
Soviet-EC trade in energy. In the mid- to late 1950s, despite a rapid increase in
oil production, the Soviets did not manage to increase exports, due mainly to the
fact that all the major oil companies were boycotting Soviet crude oil. The
breakthrough came when the Italian state oil company EN!, which was
challenging the established major oil companies, imported nearly 5 mt of Soviet
oil in 1960, and soon afterwards a barter deal with India helped to accelerate the
demise of the boycott on USSR petroleum.3°
A much more direct intervention against the Soviet energy sector came in
1962, when Western companies were to assist in the completion of the 'Druzhba'
pipeline to Eastern Europe, but were severely restricted by CoCom regulations of
the same year which forbade the export of the largest diameter pipes to the USSR.
It is worth noting in this context that, although there was an undoubtedly strategic
element to this decision, it was also clear that American oil companies had much
to gain from this stranglehold on the development of Soviet energy exports.3'
Despite the restrictions, pipeline equipment firms from Belgium. Britain,
France, Holland, Italy, the Netherlands and West Germany (to name but the EC
partners) became involved in business with the USSR, creating serious
disagreements in 1978 amongst Western allies, when President Carter imposed
yet stricter sanctions (on human rights' grounds) on sales of oil and gas drilling
equipment. Tensions were raised further when President Reagan increased
American pressure and sanctions were enacted, first following the invasion of
29 Marshall I. Goldman, op. cit., pp. 12 1-24.30 Jonathan P. Stern, 1987, op. cit., pp.26-28.31	 Ibid.,p.27.
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Afghanistan, and then the imposition of martial law in Poland, just as Western
companies had mostly finalized their contracts to supply the Urengoi-Westem
Europe gas pipeline. American sanctions against the USSR were to cover
equipment produced under US licence by West European firms for the
compressor stations of this East-West gas pipeline. This time West European
countries refused to comply. The French government went as far as to order
Dresser-France, an affiliate of Dresser-USA, to respect its contracts to the USSR,
supported in this by a statement of the EC Commission considering that this
extra-territorial application of American law was not binding. 32 The Americans
finally agreed to the compressor-equipment deals going ahead, and to Western
Europe receiving important amounts of Soviet gas (although this was to be limited
to a maximum of 30-35% of total gas usage of any US ally). 33 There were to be
no more energy equipment crises in the 1980s, but the petroleum and chemical
equipment section of CoCom's Industrial List remained in place, playing its role
in limiting the development of Soviet oil and gas production.
Nonetheless, as Soviet energy exports to the EC increased in the early
1980s whilst consumption decreased, thus increasing EC dependence on Soviet
oil and gas, no counter-measures were taken. Not only contractual agreements
increased, but Soviet supplies to the growing spot market (one-off sales of fuel,
not part of long-term contracts) in Europe were also increasing. As Gorbachev's
reforms had calmed tensions between East and West, EC companies found no
obstruction from their own countries when attempting to take advantage of the
new trade conditions.
As with the rest of the Soviet economy, the Soviet energy sector was to
become more open to foreign participation through perestroika. The movement
towards 'joint ventures' was to include the oil and gas industries as well, with
Phibro of Switzerland and Canadian Fracmaster amongst the first Western energy
companies to form JVs. The next step, as explained in chapter three, was the
32 Mane Lavigne, Economie internationale des pays socialistes. Paris, 1985, p. 168.
Peter Hanson, 1988, op. cit., p. 46.
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possibility to open wholly owned subsidiaries. In the oil and gas sector, however,
exceptions to the rules applying to the rest of the economy were imposed, leaving
Western oil and gas investors even more confused than those in other sectors. To
attempt to clarify the situation, the Russian government passed the Law on the
Subsurface in February 1992, stressing the distinctiveness of the oil and gas
sector. This law did give the subsurface user the right to 'use the products of his
activity', in other words fuels were out of the state's control once extracted;
however, the law avoided the issue of actual ownership, specific rights of foreign
investors, or rights of export. 34 At the time of writing, the passing of a Law on
Oil and Gas, to complement the Law on the Subsurface, was eagerly awaited, but
already expectations of this new law's impact on foreign investors' confidence
has been lowered.
Yet the number of projects involving Western oil companies slowly rises,
partly due to the currently preferred method of tendering out the right of access to
particular fields, usually for a substantial price; 35
 as we shall see later, this
process has attracted criticism, but it does at least show that there is still a desire
among the Russian authorities to attract foreign energy enterprises. Another
gesture towards encouraging new energy investment has been to draw up a list of
120 fields with tax benefits, enabling the producer to export 60% of extracted oil,
without paying export tax. Although this is basically aimed at Russian producers,
it is thought that when fields on this list are offered Out to tender, for example the
Poluniakh and Tailakov fields on offer in the Khanty Mansiisk tender, the
Western producer may well have the same benefits.36
in effect, the current situation is one where theoretical opportunities for
successful investment in Russian energy are many, yet the actual feasibility is far
from clear. It is a game of trial and error, until firmer legislation is in place; only
by achieving precedents are the limits of true possibility unveiled. Oil and gas
companies are so far investing relatively small amounts of capital, ready at this
Law of the Russian Federation on the Subsurface, in Oil and Gas Russia vol. 1. no. 1, 1992.
Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1992, and The Financial Time; 29 September 1992.
36 Petroleum Economist. April 1993.
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stage to be paying for the lessons rather than for fuel; the multi-billion dollar
projects which are discussed refer to long-term investment which will only be
fully spent once profitability has been proved. One of the main success stories of
this period from an EC firm is the deal reached by France's Elf Acquitaine for the
right of exploration and exploitation of an area in the pre-Caspian basin, between
Volgograd and Saratov. In mid-1989, during Gorbachev's visit to France, Elf was
offered a ready-to-sign agreement for a 50-50 joint venture, but the French
company refused, not wanting to share the responsibility for exploration.
Nonetheless, they immediately pursued new negotiations. In May 1990, Elf
managed to reach General Agreements with the USSR Ministries of Petroleum
and of Geology, allowing access, on a joint production basis, to these two areas,37
which led the way to the signing of an exploration and exploitation contract in
February 1992, supported by a presidential decree. 38 Due to the uncertainty of
regulation and the political instability, Elf insisted on having the contract ratified
by the Supreme Soviet as well, as it contained clauses, particularly in relation to
fiscal arrangements, which went against legislation being prepared by the Russian
government. Elf's contract explicitly avoids separate export or other taxes, Elf's
contribution being a predetermined proportion of revenues: first a royalty of 12.5
% is deducted before sharing the oil; 45% of what remains goes to Elf, as 'cost
oil', until investment outgoings are recovered; a further 10% will be put aside in
case a new pipeline must be built; of the remaining oil, in other words the 'profit
oil', Elf has 40% of production on up to 100,000 barrels per day (b/day), then a
sliding scale down to 15% on 400,000 or more b/day. 39 Elf's Russian subsidiary,
Elf Neftegaz, decided early on to create a joint stock company specially for the
Volga-Saratov project in order to untie certain bureaucratic knots, especially with
the export of oil.'°
P. Godec, op. cit.38 According to ITAR-TASS World Service in English - from SWB, Weekly Economic Rep°fl,
14 February 1992.
Petroleum Economist, April 1993.
40 Interview with P. Godec, General Director of Elf Neftegaz, on 18 March 1993.
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Thus success can be achieved, and Elf is by no means the only company to
have managed an agreement; Phibro, Canadian Fracmaster, Occidental and others
are at an even further stage, having already achieved production. Conoco and
Gulf Canada are two of the companies who have managed to secure deals which
similarly exclude obligation to pay export duties, and France's Total managed to
copy Elf's sliding scale of the proportion of produced oil to be kept. 4 ' What this
example also shows, however, is that there is no clear-cut or sure way of
successfully reaching an agreement. The section on pitfalls comes later, and
unfortunately there is much more to be said there.
A2.3 Most Promising Sectors of Cooperation
The fact that there are so many obstacles left in the way of potential West
European investors is certainly not caused by a lack of necessity for cooperation.
The deficiencies in the Russian energy sector are overwhelming, and the
following areas are merely the most pressing where EC and other developed
countries' assistance is required.
The most basic insufficiency is capital; the vast amounts needed for the
exploitation of large oil or gas fields are simply not available now that prices for
oil and gas machinery is approaching world levels much faster than Russian
energy prices. Russian state investment has plummeted; government capital has
almost disappeared, and enterprises' own investments have been restricted by low
gas wholesale prices, high taxes, and a very low percentage of hard currency
earnings being retained. 42 In early 1993, the Minister of Fuel and Energy
estimated that $4-5bn was needed in that year simply to stop production falling
below 340 mt.43
 Elf's General Director believed that it would take investments of
$l2bn p.a. for ten years to bring production back to 450 mt in 2003-04, after a
Arguments and Facts International, August-September 1992.
42 Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1992.
Petroleum Economist, April 1993.
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low of 250 mt in 1995-96. If a return to the levels of 1988-89 was to be aimed at,
Godec foresaw that an impossible $2Obn p.a. for ten years would be needed,
taking only Russia into consideration. Even with the best conditions and
intentions, such amounts would not be forthcoming, and the present uncertainty is
likely to keep the inflow of capital at a tiny fraction of what is needed. This is
deplorable, when over 15-20,000 wells stand idle, with no equipment or capital to
repair them, and the number of such wells increases by around 10% p.a.,
representing a loss of 30-50 mt p.a. . Another reason for the great shortage of
money in the energy sector is that it has suffered particularly badly in the debt
crisis; in mid-1992, the complex was owed Rb525bn, whilst it owed others
Rb386bn.45
Although the conditions are far from ideal, and foreign capital could
increase exponentially if confidence in the Russian investment climate was to
grow, there are fmally signs that some sizable sums are being committed.
Looking merely at some of the most important involvements of EC firms, there is
of course the Elf project described above, which has a stated minimum investment
of $500m over at least nine years; some estimates of the likely total investment
(the concession is for a maximum period of twenty years) are as high as $4bn.46
Another French oil company, Total, is likely to invest $lbn in the technical
refurbishment and development of Khariaginskoe field in northern Russia. In an
earlier deal British Gas, together with Gulf Canada, became involved in a project
in the Komi area which may well call for $875m of investment. 47 Of the capital
injections from multilateral agencies, the most recent and substantial is a $610m
loan granted by the World Bank, targeted at the restoration of 1,300 wells and the
replacement of over 1,000 km of pipeline in Siberia. 48 The EBRD also has
substantial involvement in the sector, acting successfully as a catalyst for further
capital flow. The first such project is for enhanced recovery in existing oil wells
P. Godec, op. cit.
The Financial Times, 23 September 1992.
Eastern Bloc Energy, April 1993.
47 Central European, September 1991, p.20.48 The Financial Times, 14 August 1993.
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in Western Siberia, involving Canadian Fracmaster and Samotlorneft; the EBRD
loan is $9.8m, which should have led to over $20m in subordinated loans.49
Second is a $30m EBRD loan, with an option to extend by a further $lOm,
offered to the Chemogorskoe joint stock company (consisting of Chernogorneft
A. 0. and Anderson/Smith Overseas Inc. [U.S.A.]); this loan, also to develop the
Samotlor area, was accompanied by $44m credit from Morgan Grenfell,
guaranteed by the US Eximbank. 50 The EBRD also agreed to finance part of
Conoco's Polar Lights project in the Arkhangelsk province, the Bank's $90m loan
triggering off a further $50m from the Overseas Private Investment Corporation,5'
and another $60m from the International Finance Corporation (IFC - affiliated
with the World Bank). 52 These commitments are definitely a move in the right
direction, but bearing in mind that the amounts quoted are for the total duration of
usually very long projects, and comparing the figures with the estimated needs of
the industry, it is clear that there is much hard selling yet to be done by the
Russian government. The most important selling point which the Russian
government must be ready to offer ECIEU investors if they are to be attracted to
the oil and gas sector, it must again be stressed, is a predictable and affordable tax
policy.
The lack of capital described above translates into a lack of equipment. It
is true that the recent shortage of expenditure on the energy sector is not the single
reason for insufficiency of technology; for three decades now experts have been
criticizing the Soviet authorities for putting too little emphasis on producing more
and better tools of extraction. Even in 1979, E. Khalimov, then Deputy Minister
of the Petroleum Industry, claimed that only 2% of the necessary equipment was
being produced in the USSR. 53 This lack of sufficiently advanced home-grown
technology is hurting the Russian economy ever harder, as new conditions require
'Russia Federation. Samotlor Pan-Canadian Fracmaster Services Joint Enterprises', EBRD
document no. BDS92-121, 30 October 1992.50 
'Morgan Grenfell Banking News Update no. 17', 18 June 1993.
51 Eastern Bloc Energy, April 1993.
52 The Moscow Tribune, 3 July 1993.
Marshall I. Goldman, op. cit., p. 124.
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increasingly complex instruments. The situation is made worse still by the fact
that with decentralization many oil and gas equipment producing enterprises have
switched to the production of more profitable consumer production, and/or have
massively raised prices of their equipment, to levels often both unaffordable and
uncompetitive in relation to their Western competitors.54
An example of lost opportunity is in the gas lift process, in which the
Soviets did much of the pioneering work, but never developed the capacity to
produce the required equipment in sufficient quantity. Since the 1970s, when the
Soviets began to buy Western gas lift systems, the need for these systems has
rocketed, as the newly prioritized fields in Western Siberia responded very poorly
to water injection which had worked adequately in the Volga-Urals region.
Drilling in the 1 990s is increasingly complicated, as most of the new layers of gas
and oil to be aimed at are much deeper, in reservoirs of much higher pressure, and
where the gas is often liquid, thus also requiring Western equipment for the re-
injection of gas.55
Exploration is another area in need of Western involvement. As mentioned
earlier, explored reserves of oil in Russia have come down to levels which are
unnecessarily low, in part due to the fact that Soviet seismic studies are judged to
be only 20% as efficient as Western studies. 56 Again, a lack of foresight is also to
blame. The central planning system coped poorly with the need for extensive
exploration, as there were few incentives to locate new oil reserves; the number of
exploratory wells drilled actually declined from 5,802,000 in 1967 to 5,418,000
by 1975. In geographical areas offered to Western companies, exploration
occurs de facto; the habitual form of the tenders now being offered on certain
fields is of a licence to prospect for and survey oil and gas fields, and only
subsequently can joint production be agreed upon. 58
 In these cases the standard
of exploratory data is often much higher than what the Russians require, the
Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1992.
Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1992.56 AIM Moe, NATO Colloquium, op. cit., p. 87.
Marshall I. Goldman, op. cit., p. 122.
58 Arguments and Facts International, August-September 1992.
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minimum being dictated by a project's financing institutions. 59 It would be wise,
however, to aim for a much broader involvement of Western enterprises in large-
scale exploration, not merely in the minority of fields with foreign involvement.
An increased R/P ratio would increase the magnetism of the Russian energy
sector to EU and other investors.
The requirements for gas pipelines, which caused the political turmoil
described in the first paragraphs of this section, are continuing. By having to use
an inadequately small number of Russian or Czech 25Mw compressors (as not
enough were available), or simpiy using less powerful ones, 6° large pipelines have
run into problems that now require major expenditure on Western equipment; for
example, Britain's Rolls Royce, a regular purveyor of gas equipment to Russia,
only recently secured another order, worth $21 Om, for thirty gas turbines for a
section of pipeline in Western Siberia. 61 Western gas equipment suppliers are
likely soon to have orders of much greater magnitude, as a new pipeline to
Western Europe is planned. Justified by the expected increase in European
demand for gas, and by the problems with transmission through Ukrainian
territory, at least one pipeline of 56 inches in diameter is to be built from central
Russia, through Belarus' and Poland to Germany. 62 According to Fuel and
Energy Deputy Minister Anatolii Shatalov, Poland and Belarus' are supportive of
the 'Iamal-Evropa' project, and have each agreed to purchase 5 bcm of gas from it
yearly.63 Although there are projects to improve Russian production of pipelines
and compressors, if the pipeline is to be built soon it is likely that the vast
majority of these parts, and the machinery to install them,64 will be purchased
from the EU and the USA.
Interview with David Denton, Manager of Marathon Oil Co.'s Russia Representation, 1 June
1993.
60 Jonathan P. Stern, 1987, op. cit., p. 8.
61 The Petersburg Press, no. 8, 29 June-5 July 1993.
62 Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1992.
63 Moskovskie novosti, 27 June 1993.
In this context, the US Eximbank has provided $14.5m in credit to Gazprom for the purchase of
American 'Caterpillar' pipeline installers, a company traditionally preferred by Russia. This credit, and
an accompanying $72m loan for other Caterpillar purchases, has been criticized for its effect on the
Russian 'Cheboksarets' company, also producing pipeline installers and bulldozers, at around one tenth
of the price; see Moskovskie Novosti, 27 June 1993, and Marie Lavigne, op. cit., p. 167.
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A2.4 Main Barriers to Cooperation Yet To Be Lifted
The number of factors discouraging potential Western partners is evidently still
far too large. A clear sign of this is that in 1992 only 4.5 mt of oil, or 1.1% of
Russia's total output, came from joint enterprises with foreign participation, and
in 1993 it was expected to be 7.5 mt, that is approximately 2%.65
We have already noted that the Law on the Subsurface was of veiy limited
effect, and that the complementing Law on Oil and Gas was still being awaited at
the time of writing. The delays and shifts in position over this draft law are
indicative of the ambiguous attitude of the Russian authorities towards Western
involvement in their oil and gas industries. Despite very many Western experts
being brought in to help draw up these drafts, often at very great expense by IFIs,
very few of the recommendations have been kept in later versions of the draft;.66
Many believe that the problem is not only with the conservative majority of the
Russian parliamentary assemblies, but also that even within El'tsin's government
there are many elements who wish to keep the stress on protectionist measures;
Prime Minister Chernomyrdin is said to have held that opinion, as is Aleksandr
Perchik, head of the working group on the draft law.67
One of the main aspects of the confusion for foreign investors, and an
important part of the problems delaying the ratification of the Law on Oil and
Gas, is the conflict between Russian federal authorities and regional bodies. The
problem of not knowing with whom to reach a valid contract still exists, the
jurisdictions still not being clear. Interviews with representatives of companies
successful in completing the first stages of projects suggest that the key is to agree
on a project proposal with regional authorities first, and then the regional branch
of the relevant federal body, before approaching the Moscow bureaucrats; there
65 Petroleum Economist, April 1993.
66 Petroleum Economist, February 1993.
67 Kommersant", 1 June 1993.
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will often be a willingness to comply with a project upon which regional cadres
have already set their hearts. This view is supported by Gaidar in his speech to
the Heritage Foundation in Washington: 'You should go to the factory, you
should go to the regional state committee, you should probably go to the regional
government, but not to Moscow'. 68 Nonetheless, the extent of powers granted to
local and regional authorities, which will have to be extensive to be accepted by
them, needs to be clarified and legislated in order to allow a business-like
approach to Western energy investment.
A similar situation has arisen with the production associations (PAs),
which are an essential part of energy projects as they have to be involved in the
exporting of oil (gas is discussed below). In energy projects, the EBRD has been
lending to PAs rather than fragile political institutions. 69 The PAs, however, have
not been in a position to ensure foreign partners' ability to export oil; they are
themselves restricted by federal government quotas.
The issue of export rights has been a major problem in the last few years,
as the amount of oil being produced by Western-related joint enterprises has
gradually increased. One of the factors which has led to the present difficulties is
corruption, resorted to by Western oil firms, often as the only way to export all
the oil to which they should have been entitled. It has been reported that
corruption was so rife in the winter of 1991-92 that civil servants issued export
licences for double the country's annual oil output. The capital flight through this
dealing outside official channels is estimated at more than $2bn p.a.. Another
accusation levelled at many part-foreign JVs is that they abuse their export rights
by also exporting other producers' oil, for a fee or percentage. 7° It is no accident
that one of the government's first steps, in the winter of 199 1-92, was to re-
register all the export licences; many of the JVs set up under Gorbachev have
been investigated, and have lost their right to export directly, now having to
68 Ibid
69 Petroleum Economist, February 1993, and Russian Petroleum Investor April 1992.
70 Kommersant", no. 23, 14 June 1993.
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export through a state-owned intermediary. 71 In June of 1993, two thirds of oil
producing joint enterprises which are more than 30% foreign-owned had their
right to export their oil cancelled, whilst their activities were being examined.72
Yet the reason behind the need for much of the malpractice and bribery is
the lack of legislative clarity and control, and the complicated export mechanism.
One disorientating factor in the exportability question was the applicability of the
Russian Federation 'Law on Foreign Investment in the RSFSR', which specifies
that any joint enterprise with more than 30% foreign-owned capital can export all
of its production, with no written exemption for the oil and gas industry. In
practice, however, this right was not guaranteed. Although the export quota of
such JVs is their full production, export licences also had to be obtained (until the
spring of 1994), for any volume up to that of the quota.73 Licences were
obtained monthly, varying arbitrarily from month to month, companies regularly
obtaining no permission at all. In the case of Occidental Petroleum, on average
less than half their export quota (which was less than full production, under the
terms of their agreement) received licence for export in late 1992 and early
l993. At the same time, as noted above, licences were being obtained by bodies
not legally allowed to export oil.
As serious a deterrent to energy investment is the justifiable fear of not
even reaching the production stage, despite exploratory work and the expenses it
involves. As already noted, the right to prospect for and survey oil and gas is all
that is normally granted to foreign oil companies in tenders for work on a field,
production being the subject of subsequent agreement; this remained the case
under the Law on the Subsurface.
The list of powerful disincentives unfortunately continues with the
disastrous fiscal climate for energy investors who have not managed exemptions.
71 The Financial Times, 23 September 1992.72 Kommersant", no. 23, 14 June 1993.
Postfactum in English, 8 January 1992, from SWB, Weekly Economic Report, Former Soviet
Union, 10 January 1992, and interview with Boris S. Teremenko, Chairman of Quinta joint stock
comyany, 1 June 1993.
" Interview with Robert Tomstrom, Head of Occidental Petroleum in Moscow, 18 March 1993.
Appendix 2: Oil and Gax ax an Example of the Potential for Increased
Russian Commercial Interaction 1th Western Europe
The list of tax outgoings in the spring of 1993 was prohibitive: export tax of $5
per barrel, subsurface resources royalty of 12%, subsurface resource replacement
tax of 10%, an excise fee on domestic controlled price of 680 per barrel, as well
as the corporate tax of 32%; this is on top of operating, transportation, original
investment and reinvestment costs. 75
 According to the highly-respected
Petroleum Advisory Forum, using average investment and reinvestment costs,
Western oil companies make a loss of $2.67 per barrel at the then current price of
$16 per barrel; even at $20 per barrel, there would be a loss of 130 per barrel
under the present fiscal regime. One of the main criticisms is that all of these
taxes apart from the corporate tax are on gross revenue, not on profit. Even the
corporate tax is calculated on a profit figure which does not take into account the
original investment nor a realistic deduction for reinvestment. One of the effects
of this situation, as pointed out by Quest Energy, is that reinvestment is kept at
unacceptably low levels. 76 According to Petroconsultants, even at a price of $20
per barrel, production would have had to be of 100 m barrels to become
profitable; for most producers, the price would have to reach an unrealistic $30
per barrel for production to be profitable, unless taxes are lowered 77 There was a
positive sign in March 1993, when it was announced that all part-foreign joint
enterprises could apply for exemption from the $5/barrel export tax (previously it
had been only JVs registered before 1 January 1992). 78 This by no means solves
the problem, however, as even if the application for a waiver is approved, it has
been reported that obtaining the necessary exemption papers at customs is
impossible, and that even if everything is in order, reimbursement is so late and
unsure that companies still have to count the money as lost. Clearly, the Russian
government had a great deal to change if it was to create conditions favourable for
EU oil and gas companies' large-scale investment.
75 
'Russian Crude Oil Exports: Tax Analysis', Petroleum Advisory Forum document, Februaiy
1993.
76 Petroleum Economist, March 1993.
77 Moskovskie novosti, no.24, 13 June 1993.
78 Petroleum Economist, April 1993.
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Turning to concerns particular to the gas industry, Gazprom's continued
monopoly has remained a great disincentive for foreign investors. Despite the
developments in the oil industry, and pressure from potential foreign investors,
leaders of the Russian gas industry have strongly supported a continued
monopoly. At the International Seminar on Oil and Gas Legislation in October
1992, under the auspices of the EC, Vitalii Cherniak presented a draft law on gas
which supported the existing strong central control, in order to avoid the chaos
which had enveloped the oil industiy. 79 From the Western point of view,
however, the prospect of investing what often needs to be billion-dollar sums in
an industry where only Gazprom controls exports is far from inviting, and many
Russian PAs also resent Gazprom supremacy. 8° When the political situation is so
uncertain, a state-controlled organ such as Gazprom is bound to be mistrusted;
from the Western investor's perspective, an oil-type scenario for joint production
and ownership, for all its failings, is still preferable to a Gazprom monopoly.
A2.5 Specific EU Involvement in the Sector
Despite the enormous difficulties involved in working in the Russian energy
sector, West Europeans' interest in participation and potential profits remains
extremely high. The sheer volume of the resources described in section (A2. 1) is
clearly the main reason, coupled with the vast demand for Western technology
and capital, as described in section (A2.3).
Another aspect of the attractiveness of Russian oil and gas production is to
ensure not so much that present contracts can be fulfilled, but to ensure that future
demand can be satisfied at the lowest possible price. According to Jonathan
Stern, demand for gas in Europe is expected to increase from its level of 370 bcm
Kommersant", 7 October 1992.
80 Presentation by Jonathan Stern, at the 'Opening Up of the Post-Soviet Gas Industzy', 15 April
1992.
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in 1989 to 650 bcm in 2009.81 Without Russia, meeting such demand will be
extremely difficult; Russian gas may well account for over a third of European
consumption by then, given the right investment, and no EU gas company wants
to be left out.
The prospect of so much of Europe's gas being provided by Russia will
awaken in many the old fear of dependence. Ever since the 1920s, there have
been fears of the Soviets using cheap oil to make foreign countries rely upon their
energy, and then exploiting this as political leverage. Reliance did grow, with the
decrease in world energy demand and increases in Soviet oil and gas exports in
the early 1980s, when the EC's share of crude oil originating from the CMEA
climbed to 8.5%. But Stern suggests that political use of energy supplies is not a
realistic option for Russia vis-à-vis Western countries. Although the USSR has
not been averse to using fuel power politics within the Eastern Bloc, and Russia
has shown the same tendencies recently towards Estonia, Moscow has virtually
never cut energy to Western or non-aligned countries. The reason is, as proved
when supplies to Israel or Ghana were curtailed, that alternative sources are easily
available. Oil supplies are intrinsically very mobile, and the gas transmission
system ill continental Europe is now so complex that talking of degrees of
dependence of one particular importer is meaningless. Stern's study suggests that
if anything, in the 1980s the USSR was more reliable in its oil and gas deliveries
to non-CMEA and non-Third World countries than many of their competitors.82
The situation would of course be different if the rest of the world did not have
enough energy to be an alternative supplier, but this situation is still very remote.
Paradoxically, one of the reasons now given to support greater energy trade
between Western Europe and Russia is to provide an alternative to dependency
upon another area - the Middle East. The European Parliament's Committee on
Energy, Research and Technology reported their belief that 'given the looming
81 The Financial Times, 24 October 1990.82	 p stern, 1987, op. cit., pp. xi-!, 29-53.
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concentration of oil supply in the Middle East, it is in the West's interest to
prevent Soviet oil exports from declining'.83
There is also an element of racing against time for EC energy
entrepreneurs, in terms of beating other Western competitors to the best deals,
both in extraction and in marketing of the product. The scenario is an ever-
changing one. In Germany, for example, strains have appeared in the relationship
between Gazprom and Ruhrgas, as Gazprom has been trying to sell directly to
Ruhrgas' clients through its new German-based marketing agent, Wintershall.
This is despite the fact that in the past Ruhrgas has traditionally shielded Russian
exporters from financial risk and looked after sales, which have amounted to over
$2Obn. Gazprom has been concentrating in the Eastern Lander, investing capital
in the 'Verbundetz Gas AG', even considering an alternative gas transportation
network. Yet new Russian gas, competing with other Russian gas owned by
Ruhrgas, could become problematic and could destabilize the whole price
structure of European gas.M
To solve questions of access to markets and competitiveness in a new
Europe, as well as very many other problems, the European Energy Charter was
signed in December 1991 by all the countries of Europe, including the European
Community, and nine of the twelve CIS states (the other three signed later, as did
the Baltic states), as well as Australia, Canada, the USA and Japan. The problem
of ensuring adequate supplies for future European energy needs was also part of
the reasoning behind the Charter, as was the desire to secure alternatives to
Persian Gulf oil. Other paths towards greater cooperation within an integrated
European energy market proposed by the Charter include regulations ensuring an
open market in fuels as well as in supportive capital and technology; promotion
and protection of investment; coordination of energy policies and safety
standards; improvement of energy efficiency and environment protection, and
training programmes to achieve all these goals. In parallel to the Energy Charter,
83 European Parliament Session Documents, 11 November 1991.84 Russian Petroleum Investor, April 1992.
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a series of protocols is also being prepared, on nuclear energy, oil and gas, energy
efficiency, clean coal, electricity, and new and renewable energy resources. One
obvious problem, however, is the present discrepancy in regulations and standards
of cleanliness and safety, to name but two; the delay in standardization will
inevitably be very long. 85 The Charter is only a political commitment, and not
legally binding; for this we must wait for the European Energy Charter Basic
Agreement, which will only be signed after many fears of inability to compete or
loss of sovereignty have been appeased. Many managers of the energy sector are
suggesting that a crucial role for the Charter would be to run an investment
protection fund for the sector.86
With every wave of effort from Western governments to stabilize the
situation in Russia, the pressure to ratify the Energy Charter Treaty, and make it
work, has increased. In negotiations in October 1993, the Community was
pursuing the following objectives: to set the highest possible levels of protection
for investors; to maximize access to investments; to lay down strict provisions
governing the freedom of transit; and to open up access to trade in energy
materials and products. Russia's position at the October negotiations was that
whilst it reaffirmed its attachment to the principle of national treatment for
investments, it requested a three-year period of adjustment after the signature of
the Basic Agreement in order to frame the legislation needed for the orderly
implementation of the market economy system and, where necessary, to prepare a
list of exceptions to that principle.
The Community's proposed solution to this request was to adopt a two-
stage approach to the Basic Agreement. In the first stage of the Agreement, final
agreement would be reached on all issues, except for the detailed procedures for
implementing national treatment during the pre-investment stage. On this
particular issue the MFN principle would apply for a period not exceeding three
years. The second stage of of the Agreement, to be completed within that three
85 Perdita Fraser, 1992, op. cit., pp. 39-41.86 Petroleum Economist, Februaiy 1993.
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year period, would aim at full implementation of national treatment to the pre-
investment stage. The Russian delegation welcomed this idea, although an
official opinion was to follow closer study. Other general problems yet to be
satisfactorily solved were whether equipment and services should be included in
the Basic Agreement, the applicability of the rules of transit to the continental
shelf, and temporary suspension of access to convertible currencies. Another
major hurdle, this one not involving Russia, is that the USA and Japan were
resolutely opposed to the Regional Economic Integration (REIO) clause; this
clause proposes to protect the acquis communautaire and any developments
thereof from being considered as national treatment enforceable by the Basic
Agreement. Such an extension of the Community's rules would be
unprecedented, with the exception of the EEA Treaty and the Europe Agreements.
The REIO clause would cover the preferential agreements concluded in the EEA
and Europe Agreements, and may be of interest to the CIS or other free trade
areas yet to be established. 87 Whether because of American and Japanese
objections to the REIO clause, or problems associated with granting a three-year
'transition' stage to Russia, at the time of writing the Basic Agreement was yet to
be signed.
The largest credit-granting deals from the IBRD, the IFC and the EBRD
have already been enumerated. Another possible boost to the energy sector from
the Washington agencies could soon come in the form of credit for other CIS
states to be able to buy Russian hydrocarbons at world prices, and this could also
be a less controversial way of allocating some of the promised credits without the
desired economic conditions having been achieved; at the IMF's Council of
Directors' meeting in April 1993, however, this was still merely a suggestion.88
EC assistance, though on a more modest financial scale, has also singled
out energy as a priority. In both 1991 and 1992 TACIS programmes energy
87 Communication from the Commission The European Energy Charter: Fresh Impetus from the
European Community, Commission of the European Communities document, Brussels, 4 November
1993, pp. 2-5.88 Eastern Bloc EnergyApril 1993.
Appendh2: flandGsaan ExampleofthePo#eN*iaI(orincrealed 	 1 1Rua1 CommerciJ Interaction with Western Europe
accounted for more spending than any other area. In the 1991 programme,
I I5mECU were set aside for energy, with about half of it going to nuclear safety.
The non-nuclear energy projects in TACIS 1991 were extremely varied,
including, for example, ventures in reorganization and refurbishment of power
plants and of power distribution, management training, pipeline design and
installation, creating a vade mecum for foreign investors, consulting on tariff
policy, as well as organizing well-attended conferences on energy legislation
options. Direct production of oil and gas represented only a small fraction of the
resources of know-how being directed at the sector as a whole; there was one
project on gas injection engineering, one on horizontal well training, one on well
drilling and oil production, and one on gas control and production; in total these
four projects cost a relatively insignificant l.8mECU. The reason is partly
because the EC's expressed policy is to encourage maximal use of existing
production rather than concentrating on increased extraction, and partly because
the necessary capital for important production projects is far outside lAdS'
means.89
 Desperately needed energy saving and efficiency had the most projects
in this first year, Russia having at least 11 projects directly aimed at this
weakness, the most important of which were two energy centres in Moscow and
Saint Petersburg which accounted for over 5mECU. Showing that oil and gas
would remain a priority in EC/EU assistance for some years to come, a part of the
1991 TACIS energy budget went to establishing a long-term Task Force in
Tiumen'.9°
This created a solid base for TACIS 1992, which concentrated on four
geographical areas, one of which was Tiumen'. Of the 12.5mECU allocated to
Tiumen' (again in 1992 the lion's share of energy spending went on nuclear
safety), about half is aimed at the oil and gas enterprises themselves, and the rest
at sustaining balanced development in the area, in accordance with a Presidential
decree to that effect. On the oil and gas side, the aim is to consult with productive
89 Interview with Wolfgang Kaiser, Russian CU, op. cit.
Evropa March-April 1993, and 'Indicative List of Project. TACIS 1991 - Energy Sector', EC
document, late 1991.
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enterprises on desirable forms of organization and association, as well as to tram
management in business skills, fuel loss reduction, upgrading their technological
basis, and in optimum methods of converting from state to private enterprise. To
support the oil and gas industries in the area, the programme also includes
ventures to assist agriculture, food distribution, fmancial organization and
forestry.9'
TACIS 1993, as well as continuing to fund the establishment of energy
centres to encourage greater fuel-efficiency, included four main programmes
concerning oil and gas. One of these is in the Urals regional Action Programme;
it provides 2.8mECU to help with the conversion of a defence manufacturer in
Ekaterinburg, facilitating the establishment of an oil equipment certification
centre. 92
 The three projects under the federal Russian Action Programme amount
to 8.4mECU. The largest of these aims to provide support for the Ministry of
Fuel and Energy Mintopenergo) in the formulation of policies more conducive to
foreign investment in the industry, as well as with the restructuring of local oil
companies. Mintopenergo is also the beneficiary for the next action, providing
assistance with the logging and analysis of geophysical data, the development of
new production technologies, and environmental protectino systems. Finally, the
'Astrofizika' plants receive 2mECU to use their expertise in laser equipment to
develop a capacity to produce equipment for the detection of pipeline leakage.93
It would appear that the targetting of programmes, especially in 1993, has
followed careful study of the main problems of the industry. Two of the main
failings described in this appendix are addressed: low quality or lack of domestic
equipment, and prohibitive and unpredictable legislation. The amounts being
spent, if compared to the scale of the problem, are as minuscule as ever, yet if
91 
'TACIS 1992 - Action Programme - Tiumen", European Commission document, October
1992.
92	
'TACIS 1993 - Action Programme - Umis', European Commission document, no date. p.
20.
'TACIS 1993 - Action Programme - Russian Federation'. European Commission
document, no date, pp. 75-77.
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these projects are successful and become widely emulated, their effect could be
very significant.
Although the EU is the most important provider of know-how programmes,
other organizations are also playing their part. The UN, for example, has set up a
scheme called Energy Efficiency 2000 to encourage the availability of Western
energy-efficient technology in the FSU and Eastern Europe. 94 For its part the
NYMEX commodity exchange is carrying out a $800,000 project, co-fmanced by
USAid, to translate materials about the energy futures market, to send professors
to give courses in Russia, and to give practical experience to the best pupils in
New York, all in the hope of developing a more up-to-date and efficient energy
market in Russia.95
These are all steps in the right direction, but the effect of technical
assistance is never immediate, and not enough; all the know-how in the world
cannot do much without the money and equipment to use the new knowledge
profitably.
A2.6 Conclusions
It is clear that the scale of oil and gas resources in Russia, and the potential for
EU involvement in its extraction, transportation and marketing, is enormous. It
should not be forgotten by the Russians, however, that Russia is far from being
the only new area in which energy enterprises might invest. There is stiff
competition from the sixty other countries where oil is already being extracted,
and even the forty-two where exploration is taking place; particularly interesting
opportunities are arising in China, South Africa, India and Argentina. There are
many more opportunities for investment going at the moment than there is free
capital available.
Perdita Fraser, op. cit., p. 39.
Moskovskie novosti 1 no. 24, 13 June 1993.
Moskovskie novosti1 no. 24, 13 June 1993.
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Nevertheless, despite the many factors making investment in Russia
extremely high-risk, the amount of capital being committed by foreign energy
enterprises in Russia has grown steadily. Even though in vezy many cases the
taxation levels have meant that production could not possibly be profitable,
Western companies have remained involved, partly to learn how to deal with the
Russian oil or gas industiy, and partly to be in the best possible position when
profitability does become possible. The levels of investment still need to grow
exponentially, however, if Russia's oil export volume is not to shrink further, and
in order for gas production and delivery to grow with European demand. The
degree to which this is allowed to happen, avoiding a delay of decades, is mostly
up to the Russian leadership. Only very clear signs that Western investment is
cherished, and will be helped and protected, can open the way for the needed
level of capital inflow.
The Western side must also show its desire to assist, and an understanding
of the inevitability of a degree of confusion in this period of transition. An
increase in the flow of technical assistance is desirable, but most of all there is a
need for many more large credit guarantee schemes, such as the $2bn one recently
offered by the USA's OPIC. Such examples of support and confidence in the
Russian oil and gas industry should be emulated by other governments and
multinational institutions. In this the EU, very possibly through the European
Energy Charter, could usefully take the initiative, not least because of the likely
European need for Russian gas in the next century.
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